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PREFACE
More than eighty years ago Maj. Gen. Philip H.
Sheridan, a veteran commander of troops in the transMississippi West, candidly predicted,

.there is no

subject connected with the history of the country ^which/
will be more interesting to the future student than the
fate of the red man...."^

While the comparative popularity

of historical topics may be mooted, it is certain that
scholars, as well as casual observers, have shown extra
ordinary interest in Indian affairs, particularly in the
post-Civil War era.

Anthropologists, ethnologists,

sociologists and western, cultural, military, social and
administrative historians have done extensive research in
this field.

Numerous works have been published on the

last Indian wars, tribal and regional Indian history, the
cultural clash between the red ana white races, the experi
ments of humanitarians and reformers, the dispossession of
tfEfe^ribes and the development of the government's Indian
policy.^

^Kaj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan to Lt. Gan. William T.
Sherman, April
, 1878 , ^Philip H. Sheridan Letter Book,
General Correspondence, Sheridan Papers, Manuscript division,
Library of Congress.

2

See the bibliography and comments in: Thomas Torrans,
"General Works on the American Indian," Arizona and the
West, II (Spring, I960), 79-103J William 1. Hagan, American
Indians (Chicago, 1961). 175-183 and Frederick J. Dockstadter,
The American Indian in Graduate Studies (New York, 1957)*

ii
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Still our knowledge of the Indian and the history
of Indian-white relations is far from complete.

Until

recently, for example, little work had been done to
synthesize and interpret the role of the red man within
the purview of western or national development.

3

Pleas

have been made for a more balanced approach to various
aspects of Indian affairs.

Many standard works are one

sided* because they present a more or less pro-Indian
or anti-Indian point of view or concentrate upon EuropeanAmerican expansion, treating the Indian as an impersonal,
environmental factor.^- Opportunities exist, too, for
example, for a comprehensive examination of the impact
of political, social and economic trends upon Indian po3 5cy.
The present study focuses upon another significant,
but neglected, aspect of Indian history —

the inter-relation

betv>:>,:',.a the War and Interior departments and Indian policy#
Seme •v.alysts have briefly mentioned the difficulty entailed
in not having a clear understanding of which branch of

^Hagan, 0 £. cIt., provides a provokative overview of
the impact of tEe Indians upon American history but does
not exhaust the subject.
^■Jack D. Forbes, "The Indian in the West:
A Challenge
for Historians,"'Arizona and the West, I (Autumn, 1959),
206-215# Forbes contends ’that the works of Frederic L.
Paxson, Robert E. Riegel, Bay Billington, LeRoy R. Hafen,
Carl C. Rister and others — all leading western historians —
fail to consider the Indian as a "positive factor in the
expansion of Anglo-American culture." He recommends an
integration of historical and anthropological studies and
a re-assessment of common generalizations about the red man.

ill
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government should act upon the tribes.

“A cardinal error

of the government," one prominent historian observes,
"lay in tolerating ’a vague division of authority over
the Indians between the war and interior department."^
Those primarily concerned with the Army's campaigns
against hostile tribes have also mentioned the inter
departmental problem.

"The Indian Eureau," one author

states with obvious bias, "...hamstrung the Army right
and left when it had the c h a n c e . O t h e r s more interested
in the Indians' side of the story have cited the same
difficulty, arraigning the Army for vindictiveness and

7

interference.'

Still others, with greater objectivity,

have summarized the contest between the departments over
Q

control of the Indian Bureau.

By examining the question

of Indian management daring the generation after the
Civil War in some detail, the author has endeavored to
demonstrate the nature and significance of this dual
system and its implications for the nation and its wards.

^Allen Nevins, The Emergence of Modern America (New
York, 1927), lOij..
^Fairfax Downey, Indian Fighting Army (New York,

1957), ia .
f9

fPerhaps the best example of this viewpoint is found
in George W. Manypenny, Our Indian Wards (Cincinnati, l880)»
O
Loring B. Priest, Uncle Sam»s Stepchildren (New
Brunswick, 19q2), Chapter ‘fwo; Donald J. D'Elia, ^The Argu
ment Over Civilian or Military Indian Control, 1865-1880,"
The Historian, XXIV (February, 19.62), 207-225.

iv
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The period which has been chosen for analysis, 1865
to 1 887 , was decisive in the history of Indian-white
relations, for it was in these years that westward expansion
rapidly closed the frontier and increased inter-racial
contacts.

Prom the point of view of the red man, it was

an ora of social and cultural crisis and the last stage
of white exploitation.

For the government, it was a time

of decision, because it was no longer possible to temporize
with the Indian question.

The passage of the Dawes Severalty

Act of 1887 , which established a general system of private
land-ownership and citizenship for most Indians and which
has been taken as the concluding point for this investi
gation, has commonly been interpreted as a turning point
in Indian history.
The writer is indebted to those who have aided in
this study.

He is grateful, first of all, to Dr. James

C. Olson, Professor of American History at the University
of Nebraska for his encouragement and assistance in the
preparation of this manuscript.

Professor Olson*s patient

reading of original drafts and suggestions, based upon
extensive familiarity with Indian affairs, have been of
special benefit.

Secondly, for financial assistance, he

is obliged to the Addison E. Sheldon Foundation and
Board of College Education of the American Lutheran Church.
Fellowships from these sources enabled him to spend several

v
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weeks in Washington D.C. and elsewhere doing research.
Thirdly, a word of appreciation is due to those who
facilitated his search for printed and unprinted materials
at the National Archives, Library of Congress, Hayes
Memorial Library, Oberlin College Library, Nebraska State
Historical Society and other depositories.

Finally, the

author owes sincere thanks to his wife, Mary Louise
Waltmann, who patiently assisted in preliminary research
and the final checking of this dissertation.

vi
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CHAPTER ONE

1865:

AN AUSPICIOUS AND PITTING TIME

The question Is now squarely before U3.
Either the extermination of the Indian tribes
or a humane policy which shall save them from
so cruel a fate and at the same time secure
from danger white emigrants* The present system
of Indian policy has only to be pursued a few
years longer and.*,it is certain that no Indians
will be left to treat with,
(Maj. Gen, John Pope, May 23, 1865)

The historic ceremony at Appomattox on April 9, 1865,
helped set the stage for a renewed assault upon the seemingly
irrepressible Indian Question,

Both Lt, Gen, Grant, who

accepted L e e ’s surrender, and Brig, Gen, Ely S, Parker, author
of the surrender document,

were destined to play leading roles

In federal relations with the red men inhabiting vast untamed
regions of the West,

Similarly, Maj, Gen. William T. Sherman,

who presently received the sword of Confederate General Joseph E.
Johnston, was to spend many years commanding troops in Indian
country.
North —

Many officers and men -- not only from the triumphant
were to fight, defend or supervise the nation’s ”wards”

while the country labored to "bind up its wounds,”

Dumas Malone and Allen Johnson, Dictionary of American
Biography (New York, 191+3), 219, Hereafter this source is
cited Diet, A m . Blog. Army officers will be identified by
brevet rank.
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Reconstruction was barely begun when President Andrew
Johnson told Secretary of the Interior James Harlan that he
was anxious to solve the Indian problem.

Vletory over the

rebellious states, he contended, was proof to the tribes that
the government was determined to maintain its honor and pv’.fer.
On June 22, Harlan relayed this message to Commissioner of
Indian Affairs William P. Dole, explaining,
... the President deems the present an auspicious
and fitting time for the renewal of efforts to impress
upon the Indians in the more distant territories, the
rapidly increasing and pressing necessity for the aban
donment of their wild and rcving habits, and the adoption,
in their stead, of^the more peaceful and industrial arts
of civilized life.
The task thus described devolved upon two departments:
the Interior Department, In charge of the Indian Bureau and
its network of superintendencies and agencies, and War Depart
ment, central authority for the military departments and
scattered outposts on the frontier.

In theory, most tribes,

through treaties, were under the management of the civil branch.
In practice, the military branch, which had been nominally in
control of Indian affairs from 1789 to I 8 I4.9 , had jurisdiction
over hostile Indians.

Hostility, however, was not easily de

fined and neither department’s interpretation was supreme.

The

result was confused and divided control, accompanied by constant

2
Secretary of the Interior James Harlan to Commissioner
of Indian Affairs William P. Dole, June 22, 1865, Miscellaneous
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, National Ar
chives, Record Group 75* Hereafter these records are cited
I.O.L.R., Misc., followed by the symbols KA, RG for National
Archives, Record Group, then the record group number.
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bickering over whether civil or military jurisdiction was most
conducive to permanent- solution of the Indian problem.-^
Urgency attended these inter-departmental differences,
for the "march of empire," partially abated by the Civil War,
was beginning to gain tempo.

Each year millions of acres were

being claimed by settlers under the Homestead Act and other
liberal land laws.

Railroad crews were busy laying track for

the first transcontinental and shorter roads along the fringe
of settlement.

Numerous freight trains were creaking over

land to frontier colonies.

Daily more Emigrants were setting

out for mountain valleys where they hoped to discover mineral
wealth.

Prom the south bawling herds of longhorns were being

driven toward shipping points in Missouri and Kansas.
Many contemporaries, particularly in the East, lamented
the effects of such intrusions upon the Indian country.

Others,

most vocal in the West, defended these developments as "mani
fest destiny."^

Early in 1865 Minnesota’s eloquent congress

man, Ignatius Donnelly, declared, "It is the destiny of the
white man to overrun the world; but it is as plainly his des
tiny to carry in his train the great forces which constitute
his superiority —

civilization and Christianity."

Precursing

^Priest, op. cit. I5ff»; D ’Elia, "The Argument Over
Indian. Control, 2 0 7 } Marvin H. Garfield, "The Indian Question
In Congress and in Kansas," Kansas Historical Quarterly, II
(Pebruary, 1933)# 29.
k
Priest, 0£. clt., 86-92; Garfield, "The Indian Question,"
l+0-l|J+; Robert G, Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman and the
Settlement of the West (N o r m a n ), llj..
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aooial Darwinist arguments, Donnelly continued, "We...are a
superior race sharing its noblest privileges with the humblest
of mankind and lifting up to the condition of freedom and
happiness those who from the dawn of time have been either
barbarians or slaves,**-*
Subjugation of the Indian for his own good was an old
and controversial argument, enlivened by post-bellum expansion.
Before considering government relations with the tribes in the
latter part of 1865, the writer will comment on the nature of
the Indians, pre-Civll War Indian policy, Indian affairs during
the war, and circumstances affecting the Interior and War de
partments at war's end,

THE INDIANS IN 1865
In his annual report for 1865 Commissioner D, N, Cooley
indicated that the government was in charge of nearly 308,000
Indians belonging to over one hundred and eighty tribes and
bands which were assigned to sixty-four different agencies and
sub-agencies,^

Most of these native groups were governed by

one or more treaties obligating the United States to provide
them with annuities, "beneficial objects," schools, white
supervisors and so forth.

Many also had substantial amounts
7
of property or money held in trust by the government.
The

Congressional Globe. 38 th Congress,, 2 sess., appendix, 61,
^Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 1865
(Washington, 1 8 6 5 ), 58^-590, hereafter these documents are cited
CIA, followed by the year.
7Ibid., 511-9-575.
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administration of Indian affairs, therefore, was a complex
proposition*

<*
Relations with the tribes were further complicated by
the Indians' diverse character, economic Status, strength,
disposition and previous experiences with white men.

The

assumption that an Indian was an Indian was wholly inaccurate*
"This is simple truth," one nineteenth century observer asserted*
"There is as much difference between a Pueblo and an Apache,
or a Ness Perce^ and an Arapahoe, as there is between a Broad-

,.8

way merchant and a Bowery rough."In commenting on

early

tribal differences, many of which were still evident in 1865,
a modern scholar discounts the "average Indian" concept as
follows:
The Chippewas rode in a birchbark canoe, the Chicka
saw in a dugout; the Sac slept in a bark wigwam, the
Kiowa in a akin tepee, and the Pueblo in a stone apart
ment house* The Seminole hunted with a blowgun, the Sioux
with a bow* Did this average Indian take his foe's head
for a trophy, or did he content himself with just the
scalp, and did the scalp include the ears? Did he grow
corn, or dig camas roots, or spear salmon? Was boiled
puppy a delicacy or a last resort to stave off famine?
The Papagoes regarded war as a form of insanity, the Comanches gloried in it* The list of variations seemed in
finite, and well it might when it is noted tha£ perhaps
as many as six hundred cultures were involved**
There were distinctions not only among the tribes but
between bands belonging to a certain tribe*

This was evident

in means of subsistence, political organization, military capa
bilities or propensities and social standards*

In part, these

P. Dunn, Jr., Massacres of the Mountains: A History
of the Indian Wars of the Par <f/est,~T8l5-lb7$ (New York, 1886), 3 5 .
^Hagan, 0£. clt., 3*
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variations were based on the Indians’ response to the influ
ences of white men, for some adopted new tools, weapons,
techniques, customs and tastes more readily than others,
Post-war policy-makers,
on tribal distinctions.

liowever, were seldom experts

Their basic consideration was whether

tribes threatened or impeded national (white) security, ex
pansion and progress.

Hence, they gave limited attention to

weak, peaceable and sedentary bands such as the California
’’Diggers," the Colorado Hopis and Zunls, or the Klamaths of
Oregon,

Nor did they give extensive consideration to more

acculturated eastern groups such as the Lake Superior Chippewas, Green Bay Oneidas or Five Civilized Tribes of the southern
plains.

The tribes considered to be the crux of the Indian

problem were the powerful, mounted, warlike and nomadic Sioux,
Crows, Comanches, Kiowas and Apaches of the Great Plains and
Southwest.^

Many of these red men denied federal authority,

refused to be restricted to reservations, and effectively de
monstrated their military prowess against Army expeditions in
their country.

These were variously identified as "non-treaty"

or "non-agency" Indians, as "non-progressives," "hostiles,"

^®Ibid,, 3-f>» See also Frederick Webb Hodge, Handbook of
American Indians (Washington, 1907). 2 volumes; Clark Wissler,
The American Indian (New York, 1917)*
■^Jobn Collier, Indians of the Americas: The Lone Hone
(New York, Mentor Series, 195^4-)» 133; Annual ffeport of the
Secretary of the Interior, 1865 cited in benjamin PerTey Poore,
Messagesrrom the Eresldent~or the United States....(Washing
ton, lo6o"j, 3il-3l£* Hereafter these documents are cited SI,
followed by the symbol (P) If found in the Poore series and
the year.
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"intractables,” or '’blanket Indians."^
Problematic as were the wild migratory Indians, others
supposedly living at peace on reservations caused many head
aches for Indian officials through their erratic progress toward
civilization.

Agency Indians of the Pacific Northwest, for

instance, varied greatly in their conditions.

On a visit to

this area in the summer of 1865, Senator James W. Nesmith,
of Oregon, was impressed by the advancement and habits of the
Yakamas and, particularly, the Nez Perce©

The latter he

termed "the finest specimens of the aboriginal race.”

The

Walla-wallas and Umatillas appeared "comparatively wealthy,"^*had good farms and comparatively high morals, and were active
Catholics.

But, Nesmith observed, the Puyallups showed a

tendency toward ’’idleness , vagrancy, dissipation, and indif
ference upon the subject of future wants.”

The Skokomish

Agency Indians were away ”gathering berries, catching fish,
prostituting their women, gambling and getting drunk, the latter

-15

of which appears to be their favorite occupation."

Pessi

mistically the Senator concluded that all the tribesmen of
Oregon, Washington and Idaho had "savage instincts which

12CIA and SI, 1865-1887, nassira.
^■%esmlth was a veteran of Indian wars In the Northwest
in the period I 8 I4.8 to 1856 and served as Superintendent of
Indian Affairs for Oregon from 185" to 1859* (Diet. Am. Biog..
XIII, 4 3 0 ).
—
—
•^Senate Report N o , 156. 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1279), 1 86 7 , 9© Hereafter these documents are cited Sen. Rot.
l5Ibid., 5-7.
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experience has taught us the impossibility of overcoming.”
Their condition might be Ameliorated to some extent," but real
progress could not be expected.^
Although inclined to be optimistic or even over-opti
mistic about the advancement of their charges, many agents too
had their doubts.

The Ponca, Delaware and Omaha agents offered

favorable evidence of enlarged farming and stock-raising operations and growing interest in education among their Indians.

17

The Tulalip agent, however, lamented that youngsters were de~
sorting the school and fields.

18

At Port Bridger, Agent Luther

Mann, Jr. was disgusted by the Eastern ShoshonesT refusal to
shed leggings and breech-clothes and give up the chase.
,,
. 1 9
posed that they be "corralled like wild horse3.

He pro-

In general, the Indians of 1865 were an uncivilized
people.

Most of them lived in much the same way that their

ancestors lived when the United States was founded.

For every

thousand red men there were but one hundred and sixty acres un
der cultivation, twenty permanent dwellings and fewer than eight
students in agency schools in spite of the fact that the govern-

20
ment had long engaged in the work of reforming its wards,

iA

~ Ibid.. 16.
17CIA, 186$, 216 -2 1 7 , 365-366, l4.03 -ij.Olw

19Ibid., 1 5 9 .

20

Ibid.. $88, These figures include the civilized tribes
of the Southern Superintendency, which improved the overall
picture.
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PRE-CIVIL WAR INDIAN RELATIONS
Some aspects of the government’s policy toward the various
tribes were determined long before the adoption of the Consti
tution,

The first colonial powers uniformly recognized the

aborigines' right of possession, yet claimed ultimate sover
eignty and fee simple, or actual ownership of the land.

Hence,

the practice of allowing the Indians to occupy certain areas
until they formally relinquished their possessory title.

21

Aside from land titles, the tribes were treated as
separate nations, free to govern themselves, provided they did
not endanger or interfere with white settlement,
cials acknowledged the statehood

British offi

of native groupsthrough

treaties and other transactions.Colonial

governments also

had independent dealings with the red men on this basis, thereby complicating Indian relations.

22

One of the earliest Ameri

can efforts to systematize the administration of Indian affairs
came in 1775> when the Continental Congress set up three In
dian departments —

Northern, Middle and Southern —

three to five commissioners,

each under

23
J

^Laurence P. Schmeckebier, The Office of Indian Affairs
(Baltimore, 1927), 3ff,
22Ibld., 3, 12.
^ G e o r g e D, Harmon, Sixty Years of Indian Affairs (Chapel
Hill, 1 9I4-X), 1; Journals of the Continental Congress. 177fy-17o9,
(Washington, 190f? J, 175* hereafter the latter source is cited
J.C.C, The British earlier sought to improve the administration
of Indian affairs through two loose superlntendencies and
measures such as the Proclamation of 1763. See Jack M. Sosin,
Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial
Policy.
(Lincoln, 19&D7
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Various precedents for federal policy were established
in the period 1776 to 1789*

Some treaties signed by Congress,
2k
for example, contained provisions common to later agreements.

During the Revolution Indian matters were governed by a com
mittee of Congress which acted upon recommendations from the
Board of War,2"* After 17&3, though, illicit trade and negotia
tions by individuals, states and foreign powers demonstrated
the need for orderly expansion and stronger central authority
over the tribes.

Certain laws passed under the Articles of Con

federation were designed to meet these exigencies.

The Ordinance

of 1785 provided orderly survey and sale of western land; the
Ordinance of 1786 reduced the number of superintendencies to
two and made Indian superintendents responsible to the‘Secre
tary of War; and the Ordinance of 1787 included Congress’ pledge
26
to protect Indian property and rights in Northwest Territory,
If the Confederation produced an Indian policy of "con*

n

^derable direction and energy,
nonetheless an ambivalent policy.

as one author maintains, it was
27

For under the a -t i d e s of

^ T h e first treaty with the Delawares (1778) obliged Con
gress to provide the Indians with clothing, utensils and
weapons, "well-regulated trade" and an "intelligent, candid
agent" and guaranteed them possession of their land while they
remained at peace, (United States Statutes at Large. Vol, 7, 13*)
Hereafter this source is cited: volume number, Stat.L, and page,
^J.C.C., XIV, 600; Schmeckebier, op, clt,. 15>; Harmon,
op

. cit,. 5-6,

26

Harmon, op. clt.. ij-6; J.C,C,, XXXI, ij.90-lj.93; Francis
N, Thorpe, c o m p . . Federal and State Constitutions. Colonial
Charters. and Other OrganlcTaws of the States. Territories.
and Colonies Now or Heretofore forming the United States of
America (Washington. 1908). II.957ff.
^Harmon, op, clt.. 5.

4
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Confederation, a3 later under the Constitution, while ’’professing to desire to civilize and settle this hapless people, the
poliey of removing them from their homes, whenever the demands
of white settlers,..or the schemes of speculators*..were urged...

«—

/was7 persistently pursued.”

Oft

Delegates to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 did not
deliberate at length upon the Indian question.

James Madison,

however, expressed an opinion in Federalist Number Forty-Two
that the Articles were faulty regarding tribal relations.

He

noted that Congress was prohibited from infringing upon the in
ternal rights of states and trading with Indians who were ”members” of a state.

Which Indians this excluded and how those not

excluded might be regulated was not explained.

29

The Constitution offered a solution to the latter problem.
In Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 Congress was granted power
”to regulate commerce...with the Indian tribes,”
status of the Indian was not clearly stated.

But the legal

Section II,

Clause 3 of the first article excluded Indians from apportion
ment for purposes of representation and taxation.

But until

the Dawes Act of 1887 the question of Indian citizenship was a
highly controversial s u b j e c t . o t h e r provisions having

^®Sen. Rpt.. No. 268, J^lst Cong., 3 ses3. (Serial 11+43),

1870, 4 *
^ J a c o b E. Cooke, ed.. The Federalist (Cleveland. 1961).

282, 284.

---------

30„
For a discussion of Indian citizenship and the effects
of the Fourteenth Amendment see Sen. Rpt., No. 268. 4lst Cong.,
3 seas. (Serial 11+43), 1870.
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special effect upon the nation’s wards were Article II,
Section 2 and Article VI, Section 2, which empowered the
President to make treaties ”by and with the consent of the
Senate” and made such agreements the ”supreme law of the land.”3 '*'
Significantly, from the beginning, the federal govern
ment based its relations with the Indians upon moral as well
as legal and traditional grounds.

It recognized, first, that

the Indians were too uncivilized to readily adopt or compete
with the economy of white men.

Secondly, it admitted that the

untutored and inexperienced red men needed protection against
whites who sought to exploit them.

Finally, as trustees of

•?

Indian land and property which was exempted from state taxation,
it accepted responsibility for public expenses in connection
with Indian affairs.32
Credit has been given President Washington and his
associates for setting this moral tone while establishing many
fundamental procedures for relations with the Indians.

When

the War Department was created in August, 1789»33 the Secretary
was given responsibility for Indian affairs.

Secretary Henry

Knox, like Washington, advocated humanitarian treatment of the
Indians.3^ The first President signed into law many landmark
3 ^James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902, (Washington, 190? J,I,'217f.
^Sehmeckebier, ojc. clt., 9-11.
331 St at. L., ij-9*
3I1

Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Claire Clark, eds., Amer
ican State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive...1759ltil%. Indian Affairs (Washington, 1032), n , S Y *
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bills.

One provided, the first appropriations to negotiate new

treaties (1 7 8 9 ), ^ another made territorial governors Indian
superintendents (1789); a third introduced a series of inter
course laws with the tribes (1790); and a fourth furnished the
general appropriations for supporting the Indians (1793)* Wash
ington also stressed the importance of selecting "qualified and
trusty" Indian a g e n t s , F i n a l l y ,

he signed a treaty in 1790

with the Creeks which became a pattern for later treaties by
promising the Indians annuity payments and gratuitous issues
of livestock and farming equipment for land cess ions,^7
From the end of Washington’s administration until the
latter 1820*s the government continued what has been termed a
policy of "persuasion and negotiation."3®

The purchase of

Louisiana in 1803 greatly enlarged the scope of Indian rela
tions.

Subsequently, the expediency of removing the tribes

to a single large reservation beyond the Mississippi occurred
to President Jefferson and was implemented by succeeding Presi
dents.

Until about the time Jackson entered the White House,^9

removals were ostensibly voluntary.

In reality, tribesmen were

subjected to a series of "land grabs" which were, one critic ob
serves, "veiled by the quasi-legal expedient of transactions

•^Joseph Gales, comp.. Annals of the Congress of the
United States (Washington, lo3i}J, 66; 1 Stat. L.. 5 k .
•^Schmeckebier, op. clt.. 17-2 0 ; Harmon, 0£. cit.. 10-1 9 ,
377 Stat. L., 3 5 .
^®Harmon, o£. cit.. 169*
39

Ibid., Harmon dates the beginning of a "new coercive
policy" with the J. Q, Adams administration.
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under duress and of treaties that were fraught with subterfuge."^-®
Nefarious negotiations such as the Delaware and Potawatomie treaty
of 1809 and Indian Spring Treaty of l825>, relieved the red men
of millions of a c res.^
Even more severe treatment was accorded many eastern
Indians in the 1830’s and l S L ^ s .

Although President John Q.

Adams and his Secretary of War, James Barbour, criticized past
injustices to the natives, their proposed "solution” was coloni
zation in the trans-Mississippi country.^

Under President

Jackson, a former Indian fighter, an act was passed "to provide
for the exchange of lands with the Indian tribes in any of.the
States or Territories and for their removal west of the river
Mississippi."^

This program was executed forcibly by Jackson

and sanctioned, to a degree, by the Supreme Court.

In the fa

mous case, Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia (I83 I), Chief Justice
John Marshall denied a Cherokee appeal for an Injunction against
removal by the State of Georgia, characterizing the tribes as
"domestic dependent nations" with a relation to the government

^■®Walter H. Blumenthal, American Indians Dispossessed;
Fraud in Land Cessions Forced upon the Tribes (Philadelphia.

wnrki.
million
hundred
action,
William

‘U l n the former negotiations the Indians gave up three
acres for seven thousand dollars and one thousand seven
and fifty dollars in annuities. After the latter trans
some of the Creeks assassinated Lower Creek Chief
McIntosh for treason. (Ibid., 35-37).

^ H o u s e of Representatives Report N o . 9 3 , I^th Cong.,
3 sess. (Serial i 8 6 0 ), 1 8 7 9 , 5* Hereafter these documents
are cited HR Rpt.
Stat. L., lj.ll.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

15

like that of a ward to his guardian*

Eventually the "wards”

were exiled to their big "permanent” reservation beyond the
Mississippi, but episodes such as the Black Hawk War (1832),
the ”death march" of the C-herokees (1 8 3 6 ), and the Seminole
War (1835-4-2) left indelible blots on the annals of American
li£
history* ^
On the positive side of the ledger, the Twenties and the
Jacksonian Era witnessed significant changes in Indian adminis
tration*

In 182lj. Secretary of War Calhoun created the Bureau

of Indian Affairs, staffed by a head of the bureau, a chief
clerk and an assistant*^

On July 9, 1832, Congress authorized

President Jackson to appoint a Commissioner of Indian Affairs
to head the Bureau and carry out policies of the War Department.^
Two years later, after investigators described the Indian sys
tem as "expensive, inefficient, and irresponsible," two other
important laws were passed.

One enlarged and reorganized the

"Department" (Bureau) of Indian A f f a i r s * ^

The other empowered

^ 5 Peters, 16-17* In 1832 the Court ruled Georgia could
not act upon individual Indians, but Jackson refused to inter
fere with the state’s forcible removal policy.

45See,

for example, Blumenthal, op* cit*, 81-85 and passim*
In the Seminole War a bounty of two hundred dollars was offered
for dead Indians and twenty million dollars were spent fighting
the red men.
^ H R Document No. 146, 19th Cong., 1 seas* (Serial 138).

1826, 6 . ----------^ 74 Stat. L., 564*
^ 4 Stat* L., 735* The Reorganization Act of I 83 I4. primarily
affected the superintendencies and agencies.
In 1837 the "Depart
ment" was again classified as a bureau of the War Department*
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the President to regulate Indian trade by prohibiting certain
goods and issuing and revoking l i c e n s e s I n

addition, the

Secretary of War in 1836 and 183 ? issued elaborate directives
prescribing the duties of the Commissioner and other officers
who handled Indian funds, supplies and subsistence,"^
Contrary to the later claims of military spokesmen about
the efficiency and purity of the Indian service under War De
partment control, abuses occurred.

In 18^2, for example, an

investigation revealed "an almost total want of method and punc
tuality" in business affairs.

Millions had been spent without

proper accounting, to the "great loss" and "heavy responsibility"
of the government.

Likewise, appropriations had been wasted or

expended so as to "degrade" and "demoralize" the Indians,^
To reform the Indian service, Congress in 181^7 passed
laws requiring that annuities and other funds be distributed
to the heads of families or individual Indians, not chiefs,
and that tribes be given an opportunity to apply resources to
purposes conducive to their "happiness and welfare,"

Hence

forth, no money or goods might be given red men under the influ
ence of alcohol, and parties at the agencies might not hold
liens on annuities,^2

Still malpractices continued, as critics

of the Array recalled most vividly in the Seventies,

Stat. L., 729.
^°HR Rpt. N o . 93 » i4.5th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 1866),
1879, 6.
^Ibid., 7.
52Ibld.
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In 184.9 , after sixty years under tbe War Department, the
administration of Indian affairs was transfered to the newlycreated Department of the Interior.
this change, Ssci*s

A principal advocate of

of the Treasury Robert J. Walker, pro-

pQgg/j jrj 18 )1.8 that the burdensome Bureau of Indian Affairs and
other offices of the Treasury, War and Navy departments be placed
under a new executive department.^3

This was accomplished by

the Act of March 3, l8ij.9, creating the "Home,” or Interior De
partment

This change, it should be observed, was little

more than a shift in "supervisory and appellate" jurisdiction.
With few exceptions, the existing administrative machinery was
retained —

Indian superintendents and agents were civilians,

as in most prior instances.
Yet military leaders were quick to take exception to
the loss of executive authority over the Indian Bureau.

In

annual reports and public statements, particularly in the Six
ties and Seventies, they joined the chorus of frontier editors
and politicians who often condemned the Indians and Indian
officials.

Reports-^ 0f frauds and corruption by the "Indian

ring" became commonplace.

The grounds for criticism were

plentiful, but the transfer of 181}.9 could hardly be represented
as the advent of a sweeping moral degeneration In the Indian

^3HR D o c . No.

J .t

30th Cong., 2 sess., II (Serial 538),

18I|.8, 36-37*
^9

Stat. L., 395 .

55Schmeckebier,

o£. cit.. lj.2-i|.3.

-^Priest, on. cit., 15-17; Garfield, "The Indian Ques
tion," 29ff.
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service.

In the first place* the Interior Department did not

inherit a system that was chaste or faultless.

Secondly, the

transfer coincided with the beginning of a period of accelerated
expansion which taxed the administrative system and generalized
disregard for Indian "rights" on the frontier.
In the l850’s gold rushes, emigration to the territories
acquired during and after the Mexican War and competition be
tween slavery and anti-slavery interests exacerbated the Indian
problem.

To an ever-increasing extent, whites expropriated

Indian lands before the native occupants relinquished their
rights.

In California, for example, treaties were negotiated

but never ratified.

The Indian Bureau could do little more

than try to "legalize" white expansion and minimize the dangers
of inter-racial conflict.-^

In 1856, Commissioner George W #

Manypenny reported that within three years fifty-two treaties
had been negotiated —
ratification —

thirty-two ratified and twenty pending

whereby the red men gave up claim to one hundred

and seventy-four million a c r e s T h e s e

treaties Indicated a

shift from the old policy of one big reservation to a policy
of concentrating tribes away from the main lines of travel and
centers of settlement.
To deal with the rapidly increasing number of treaty
Indians, the Indian Bureau added many new agencies and sub
agencies. but the scope of operations soon became so large and
contacts between frontiersmen and natives so frequent that wars

Schmeckebier, op. cit., lj-3-ljlj.o
^ 0CIA, 18^6, 20.
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and serious conflicts could not be prevented.

The "Grattan

Massacre" (l851p); the Klickitat, Yakima and Rogue River wars
(1855-1858) and the Apache campaigns of the Fifties were but
a few of the hostilities which d e v e l o p e d , M e a n w h i l e ,

Congress

was preoccupied with a multiplicity of problems related to
slavery.

The noble cause of educating and civilizing the Indian

was all but forgotten.

Impressed by how little was done to

promote the welfare of the red men after I81j.2, one authority
states, "For over a quarter of a century, or until the be
ginning of Grant's administration, there was practically no
contribution to the betterment of Indian relations on the part
of either the executive or legislative branches of the govern
ment

INDIAN AFFAIRS DURING THE CIVIL WAR
Indian affairs were in a particularly unsettled state
during the Civil War,

Shortly after the firing on Fort Sumter,

Confederate leaders pressured and cajoled many tribes west of
Arkansas and Missouri into severing relations with Washington.
Some of the Indian nations, including the civilized Creeks,
Choctaws and Chickasaws, gave military aid to the seceded states,^
Secretary of the Interior John P, Usher felt that these develop
ments were to be expected.

In his annual report for 1861

£9see, for example, Dunn, 0£, cit.. 167-215, 3IO- 3I4.I.
^°Schmeckebier, ojd. cit.. if2-1^3,
6lSI (P), 1865, 318.
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he wrote:
Cut off from all Intercourse with loyal citizens; sur
rounded by emissaries from the rebels, who represented that
the government of the United States wa3 destroyed, and who
promised that the rebel government would assume the obli
gations of the United States and pay their annuities;
assailed by threats of violence, and seeing around them
no evidence of the power of the United States to protect
them, it is not surprising that their loyalty was unable
to resist such influences.62
Unusual difficulties were reported in remote parts of
the Indian country,

Kiowas and Comanches imperiled emigra

tion between the Upper Arkansas and Texas, and Apaches and Navajoes created havoc in the Southwest,^3

In the far Northwest

and on the Northern Plains miners, farmers and freighters were
attacked by renegades.

Union spokesmen generally attributed

these troubles to the absence of an effective military de
terrent and the conspiracy of ”disloyal persons,
One of the most shocking wartime uprisings occurred in
southern Minnesota,

What began as an isolated incident became

a bloody massacre in which six hundred and forty-four citizens
were killed.

On August 17, four intoxicated Sioux killed five

whites some distance from their agency.

Fearing reprisal, some

of the Sioux fled westward, while others under Little Crow in
discriminately murdered white neighbors and destroyed homesteads.
The town of New Ulm was devastated and Fort Ridgley besieged

62CIA; 1861, 3-1;.
61
■'An especially active campaign was in progress in New
Mexico Territory between 1662 and 1865* Col, Kit Carson per
sonally participated in over one hundred battles and helped to
force thousands of Navajoes and Mescaleros onto Bosque Redondo
Reservation on the Pecos River. (Sen. Rot, No. 156. 39th Cong.,
2 sess. (Serial 1279), 1867, 98-2lST.
^ C I A , 1861-1865. passim.
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before General H s H. Sibley’s troops subdued the rampaging
warriors.^
The outbreak had drastic consequences for the Sioux and
other tribes of Minnesota.

The public was indignant and many

openly advocated extermination of the natives.

Even the Sioux

agent declared it was time for "force and hard blows," not
"moral suasion, sugar plums and the l i k e . " ^

But when three

hundred Sioux were court-martialed and sentenced to die,
Commissioner Dole and others protested v i g o r o u s l y P r e s i d e n t
Lincoln responded by pardoning all but thirty-nine who, with
one exception, were sentto the gallows

1 8 6 2 .^

Later, not onlythe Sioux,

at Mankato

on December 26,

but the Chippewas and peace

able Winnebagoes were expelled from the state.

In addition, the

military launched a series of expeditions into Dakota Territory

6<5
to teach the red men that they could not defy the government. 7
The Sioux Massacre of 1862 was the extreme instance of
Indian hostility during the period 1861-1865.

Those who later

argued for military control and a coercive Indian policy often
cited this affair as "proof" that ,the Indians were irredeem
able savages who could not be trusted to comply with peace treaties.

65

See CIA, 1862, 13-21, 59-68. For a fuller discussion
see C, M. Oehler, The Great Sioux Uprising (New York, 1959).

6 6 CIA, 1863, 291.
67 CIA, 1862, 21.
Aft

Fdchardson, 0£. cit.. VI, ll4l}.-lij.5. One of the Indians
died before the execution. (Oehler, oj>. cit.. 221)
^ C I A . 1865, 210; Sen. Rp t . N o . 156. 39th Cong., 2 sess.
(Serial 1279), 1867, 363.
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Toward the end of the Civil War, another "massacre" in South
eastern Colorado Territory gave the post-war advocates of civil
control and conciliation an equally potent point of argument.
In I86 I4. the beginning of construction on the Union Paci
fic Railroad made federal officials especially conscious of the
necessity of placating hostile tribes of the Central Plains.
Secretary Usher proposed to end administrative and commercial
relations along the rail and mail routes and commit all Indians
70
off specified reservations to the Army for punishment . 1

The

military, however, was too undermanned to adequately protect
transportation and settlements without trying to restrict rest
less bands to limited reservations.
That spring and summer Arapaho and Cheyenne renegades
left Sand Creek Reserve in Colorado and preyed upon trains and
homesteads along the Platte as far east as the Blue River.

In

September, after unsuccessful pleas for military relief, Gover
nor John Evans of Colorado obtained permission to organize a
regiment of hundred-day v o l u n t e e r s E v a n s

then notified the

tribes under his jurisdiction to move to the vicinity of the
nearest military po 3 t or suffer the consequences.

Complying

with thi 3 order, about five hundred Cheyennes under Black Kettle
and over six hundred Arapahoes under Little Raven encamped near
Port Lyon.

72

70SI cited in CIA, 1861|, 1-2.

7^Sen. Rpt. No. 156, 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Ser. 1279),
1867, 83-3^7
72
Various estimates of the Indians’ losses were given
by eye-witnesses. See Ibid., 26ff.
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Early on November 29, Col. John M, Chivington, a Methodist
minister- turned commander of the Colorado militia, led a bloody
surprise attack on Black Kettle’s camp on Sand Creek.

His nine

hundred volunteers cornered and slaughtered about four hundred
and fifty Indian men, women and children.7-^

The red men were

killed In a barbarous manner remembered in infamy as the "Chivington p r o c e s s . T h e

Commander of Fort Lyon later stated, "...the

most fearful atrocities were committed that was ever heard of;
women and children were killed and scalped, children shot at
their mother’s breast, and all the bodies mutilated in the most
hor-r-ible m a n n e r * ^
Both congressional and military Investigations condemned
Chivington for the indiscriminate massacre.

Some army officers

a minority, insisted that Black Kettle’s band was technically
at war, having recently scalped and plundered settlers, and
deserved to be dealt with In Indian fashion.

Chivington’s

critics, however, contended that the Cheyennes, even if guilty
of crimes —

and most doubted this —

had voluntarily surrendered

and were acting in good faith under a flag of truce when the
slaughter took place.

This example of military excess and bru

tality was repeatedly cited by reformers, philanthropists and
friends of the Indian who believed the Army’s "solution" to the
Indian question to be extermination.

But this was no more true

than the allegations of Indian-haters about the Minnesota Sioux.

73 Ibid., 8 2 , 9 2 .
7^Ibid., 63.
7^See Dunn, 0£. cit.. 3lj.2-382.
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D. N. Cooley.

It took both new officers some time to get acquainted

with their duties . 79
Some of the difficulties confronting the Indian service
in 1865 have already been noted.

Many tribes were disregard

ing treaties, threatening communication and emigration, carrying
on depredations and committing acts of violence.

These activi

ties, although generally traceable to bad faith and aggravation
by white men, had to be suppressed.

Other tribes were making un

satisfactory progress toward the agricultural and pastoral pur
suits which were considered fundamental to civilization.
under ideal circumstances —

Even

with diligent and undivided efforts

by talented and conscientious men, encouraged and supported by
the general public. Congress and other branches of government -these and related problems defied easy solution.
There were many obstacles.

In the first place, there

were physical and administrative problems in supervising thou
sands of diverse Indians at extensive reservations far from
sources of supply, lines of communication, agencies of law and
order, and the comforts of civilised life.

Secondly, there were

often discouraging or evil influences to contend with:

patron-

age-mongers; underpaid, inexperienced, incompetent or dishonest
agents; unethical contractors; selfish settlers and miners; vi
tuperative editors; critical and often uncooperative soldiers;
over-zealous reformers and humanitarians and economy-minded
congressmen.

Furthermore, most agencies were set upon by predatory

79 CIA, 1865, 1*
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whiskey-peddlera, gun-runners, traders, hunters, thieves, gam tilers, wenchers and speculators.

Small wonder that Commissioner

Cooley, even with bis limited experience, was able to propose a
long list of reforms and laws needed to improve the administra
tion of Indian affairs .®0
While these difficulties of the civil department were
formidable, military leaders probably believed their situation
more perplexing.

The mighty force which defeated the Confederacy

was rapidly being demobilized.

By November 15, 1865, eighty per

cent of the over one million volunteers in uniform the previous
May were back in civilian life.®^

A year later the remnant

numbered less than fifty-five thousand, with fewer than half
that number available for field duty.

It was a ’'skeleton” army

which manned the one hundred and thirty-four posts in the South
Op

and more than eighty forts and camps in the sprawling West.
Initially the post-war Army, headed by General-in-Chief
Grant, was divided into five divisions and nineteen departments.
Three divisions included trans-Mississippi Indian country.

The

Division of the Mississippi under Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, In
cluded the vast Department of the Missouri, commanded by Maj.Gen.
John Pope and comprised of three Upper Mississippi Valley states,

8oibid:; l-i*.

8lsw (p), 1865, 561, 563.
8^William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States
Army (New York, 1921jJ, 301; T.H.S. Hamersley, Complete Regu
lar A r m y Register of the United States: (1779-1879) (Washing
ton,"IMo), 122-162.
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Kansas and the territories of Colorado, Utah, Nebraska, Dakota,
New Mexico and Montana.

The Division of the Gulf, commanded by

Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan, included the Department of Texas, or
State of Texas.

Finally, the Division of the Pacific, headed

by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, was divided into the Department
of the Columbia, commanded by Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele and
made up of the State of Oregon and territories of Washington
and Idaho, and Department of California, commanded by Maj. Gen.
Irwin McDowell and comprised of the states of California and
Nevada and Arizona Territory .®3
In the first months after Appomattox, General Grant was
preoccupied with the occupation of the South and Army reorgani
zation.

Admitting his ignorance of Indian affairs, he gave

broad discretionary powers tc his western commanders.®^- In some
cases division commanders also gave subordinates much latitude
in dealing with the Indians.

For instance, General Sherman,

though well acquainted with the West and untamed Indians,

85

allowed General Pope and the latter’s district commanders to
proceed with planned expeditions along the vital Missouri River,
O/
Platte River valley, Smoky Hill and Santa Fe routes.
Perhaps
these ambitious field commanders at times acted like nleashed

83SW (p), 1865, 528-529.
®^Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant to Maj. C-en. W. T, Sherman, Janu
ary 15, 1867, Letters Sent, Commanding General, NA, RG 108.
These records are hereafter cited as C.G.L.S,
®^Athearn, op. cit., xii-xiv.
O/
Sherman to Gen. John A. Rawlins, August 25, 1865, Letters
and Telegrams Sent, Military Division of the Mississippi, NA.
RG, 98.
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hounds, straining to break away for the hunt,” as one author
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alleged.®^

Like the Indian Bureau, the post-war Army of the West
was beset by a host of internal and external problems.

Officers

were frustrated by the usual dissensions between commands and
echelons units were undermanned and over-ranked and troops were
underpaid.

88

Also, the well-armed, hard-fighting, elusive red

men proved fearsome foes in their own environment.

Nature added

obstacles in the form of mountainous and desertous terrain,
great distances which slowed communication and supply and extremes
in temperature and weather.

89

Moreover, soldiers were harassed

by both the enemies and friends of the Indian.

The former,

especially frontier settlers, agitated for more aggressive
action, sounded false alarms, misrepresented incidents, offi
cial reports and public statements, trespassed on reservations
and engaged in illegal trade with the tribes.

The latter seemed

to apologize for everything the Indians did and likewise misstated military views.

90

Army operations, like the Indian ser

vice, were repeatedly impaired by congressional attempts to
further reduce the Army and cut appropriations.

91

Finally, as

^Athearn, ££• £!£•» 28.
®®Leonard D. White, The Republican Era: 1869-1901 (New
York, 1958). lij.0; Gance, op. cit,,
Downey, op. cit.,
19-26.
'
--89
7Ganoe, op. cit., 352; Athearn, o d . cit., 15; Downey, op.
cit., 30-31.
90
Athearn, og. cit., 29-32; Downey, ojo. cit., 31,
^Athearn, ag. cit., 15-16; White, og. cit., 13 I4..
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already indicated, the frontier force was handicapped and em
barrassed by having only partial jurisdiction over Indian affairs.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Earlier, attention was invited to Secretary Harlan’s
letter of June 22, 1865, to Commissioner Dole.

Harlan went on

to instruct Dole to proceed "with all convenient dispatch" to
Dakota, Idaho, Montana and Colorado territories to negotiate
new treaties with various tribes.

The Indians were to consent

to move to out-cf-the-way reservations and there support them
selves by civilized means.

There was no alternative,^

Commissioner Dole had often advocated such treaties in
the interest of "humanity, economy and efficiency," but at this
moment he felt too busy to go west.

Besides, he replied, there

was no money to buy presents for negotiations and no "new
general policy" ought to be adopted until a congressional com
mittee, now in Indian country, issued its report.

Meanwhile,

let the territorial governors do what they could to extinguish
Indian titles,^3
The congressional committee mentioned by Dole was a
joint committee appointed in March, after a heated debate over
Indian policy.

Headed by Senator J. R s Doolittle of Wisconsin,

this group was assigned to study the condition of the tribes,

^ H a r l a n to Dole, June 22, 1865, I.O.L.R., Misc., NA,
RG 75.
93
Acting Commissioner Charles E. Mix to Secretary of the
Interior J« P. Usher, January 21, 1865 and Dole to Harlan, July 6 ,
1865, Office of Indian Affairs, Report Book No. lip, NA,RG 75.
Hereafter these records are cited I.O.R.B.
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giving particular attention to their treatment by civil and
military authorities.

Of special interest to Congress were

the circumstances of the Chivington affair and the business
Oil
procedures of the Indian Bureau, ^ Some findings were released
in 1 8 6 5 , but the full report was not to be published until 1 8 6 7 o
In the meantime, the civil and military branches got
into a lively dispute over what tactics to use toward the roving
Indians of the plains.

While politicians were counseling with

various tribes and territorial officials were preparing for
peace talks, military expeditions were seeking to overawe and
punish some of the same Indians,

With such cross-purposes and

contradictory methods, confusion and misunderstanding was al
most inevitable.
One of the most controversial situations developed in
Dakota Territory,

In March, Governor Newton Edmunds notified

Commissioner Dole that he was anxious to utilize $20,000 Con
gress appropriated for peace negotiations with the hostile
Sioux,

An early peace, he declared, was of ”pararaount impor

tance” for two reasons.

In the first place, road-building

crews hoped to complete trails through Sioux country during
the summer.

Secondly, an end to the expenditure of millions

for military campaigns was long overdue,^5

A month later Dole approved Edmunds’ treaty plans,

”The

^ 1 3 Stat. i., 572; Dole to Indian Superintendents and
Agents, March 13, 1865, Office of Indian Affairs Letter Book
No, 76, NA RG 75* Hereafter these records are cited I,0,L.B.
^ C I A , 1865, 191-192,

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

31

valley of the Platte river, and all the country south," he admonished, "must be entirely abandoned by the Indians with whom
you treat*"

Agent W. A. Burleigh had authority to purchase

flour, bread and presents to attract the Indians,
though.

A final note,

If negotiations were to succeed, cordial cooperation

by the military authorities of the northwestern department was
essential.

96

But the Army officers were not ready to cooperate.
Angrily, Agent Burleigh on May 9 informed Senator Ben Wade of
Ohio that district commander Alfred Sully would "neither assist

nor permit" negotiations with the Sioux and allied bands.

The

military authorities, he added profanely,
,,,appear determined that this grand farce.,,this grossest
Imposition and damndest swindle that was ever practiced
upon any government or people, shall not be brought to a
close, not withstanding the Congress of the U.S., has de
clared it shall be done if possible by peaceable means and
the interests of our Territory demand it,97
Perhaps Wade could persuade the President to get rid of Sully,
Next day the department commander, General John Pope, in
a letter to Governor Edmunds, declared his opposition to nego
tiation with the Upper Missouri Sioux,

Ee maintained that the

Indians were at war with the United States and, like bands along
the Platte, were committing depredations and murders.

Generals

Conner and Sully had orders to send cavalry against the outlaw
Indians north and west of the Black Hills this summer,

"When

96 Ibld,. 192-193.
97

W, A. Burleigh to Senator Ben Wade, May 9, 1865>, Letters
Received, Department of Interior, NA, RG 75. Hereafter these
records are cited D,I,L,R.
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they signify a desire for peace,” Pope concluded, ”it will be
_.q 8
tisie enough for the Indian Department to act*
Soon the feud was discussed in the cabinet.

Secretary

Harlan reminded Secretary Stanton that Congress had empowered
Governor Edmunds to conciliate Indians of his territory.

Thou

sands of tribesmen were reported gathering for peace parleys
and a conflict of action must be avoided.

”lt is," stressed

Harlan, ”of the highest importance that the civil and military
authorities should alike conform to the policy adopted in re
lation to the Indian tribes.
But differences persisted.

On June llj. General Pope, in

a letter to General Grant, bitterly criticized the treaty-making
policy.

The Indian Office, he said, had followed the "unvary

ing practice" of briijing savages to cease hostilities.
of this sort were worthless.

Treaties

"It is a common saying with the

Sioux," he complained, "that, whenever they are poor and need
powder and lead, they have only to go down to the Overland route
and murder a few white men, and they will have a treaty to
supply their wants."

If the Army treated with these extortion

ers, it would be on the basis of peace or war alone «« no
annuities or other gifts.

Unfortunately, though, soldiers not

only had to yield to the peacemakers, but were invariably blamed
for every treaty violation.

"Either the War or the Interior De

partment should have the sole management of Indian Affairs,"
-

—

Maj. Gen. John Pope to Governor Newton Edmunds, May 10,
186^, I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75.
99

Harlan to Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, May 29, 1865,
Record of Letters Sent, Department of Interior, NA, RG 7 5 , Here
after these records are cited D.I.L.S.
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Pope demanded*

"This divided jurisdiction tends to nothing but

»—— m
Although he usually restricted grievances to military
channels, General Pope a few days later corresponded with Secre
tary Harlan.

To prove he had the Indians’ interests at heart,

the outspoken general enclosed copies of some of his earlier
statements on Indian policy.

His thesis was that the Indians,

abused by the constant encroachment of frontiersmen, should be
moved to the rear of settlement and taught to live like white
me n * ^ ^ - For the present, though, the problem was more specific.
Admitting that inter-departmental differences were "not at all
surprising," Pope called for an end to the public vilification
and abuse of Army officers by Indian service personnel.

102

Another western commander, Maj. Gen. Grenville -M. Dodge,
corresponded with the Secretary of the Interior on civilmilitary relations.

Late in June, Dodge complained to Harlan

that the Doolittle committee was trying to prevent him from
punishing marauders from the Southern Superintendency.

While

rejecting the Chivington method, he was convinced that no lasting
peace could be achieved until these warriors were soundly whipped.
The Increasing evidence of civil-military antipathy over

^-®®Pope to Grant, June llj., 1865* I.O.L.R., Misc., NA,
RG 75.
^•^^Pope to Stanton, February, l861|, D.I.L.R., NA, RG 75.

102

Pope to Harlan, June 19, 1865, D.I.L.R., War Depart
ment, Indian Division, NA, RG 75.

1 0 ^Maj. Gen. G.M. Dodge to Harlan, June 22, 1865, D.I.L.R.,
Misc, NA, RG, 75.
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3k

Indian affairs eventually prompted the Interior Department to
clarify its position vis-a-vis the War Department,
way for better relations.
with Pope,

to clear the

Secretary Harlan first communicated

In a long message, dated July 6 , he explained that

rtuncbaritable strictures” against the military were without
Msanetion or approval”; that treaties were laws no department
could disregard; that, when practicable, the Indians would be
removed from the frontier as suggested; and that, in selecting
reservations, Interior officers would henceforth take advantage
of the ”great knowledge” of military commanders In the West,

Then, summarizing the Inter-departmental understanding he pro
posed, Harlan announced that in the future Indian officials
would accept the policy of the War Department with respect to
the red men at war and expect the military to support their
policy regarding those at.peace.
Five days later, In a memorandum to bis new Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, D, N, Cooley, Secretary Harlan enlarged upon
105
this basis for relations with the War Department,
On July 17,
Cooley sent a circular to all Indian superintendents and agents,
directing them to accept military authority over all hostile
Indians and to follow normal procedures with the peaceable tribes
men,

No goods, money or property were to be distributed and no

trade or intercourse permitted with the hostiles without per
mission from the Army,

Finally, if troops Interfered with or

^°^Harlan to Pope, July 6 , 1865, D.I.L.S., NA, RG 75.
^■^Harlan to Commissioner D. N. Cooley, July 11, 1865,
I.O.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75.
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failed to properly support civil policy toward peaceable Indians,
the matter was to be referred to the department but not dis
cussed in tbe press,
Unfortunately, this directive left many questions un
answered and was never strictly enforced.

In particular, it was

vague about how "hostility" was to be determined and who was
to make the determination.

It also failed to explain when mili

tary control was to begin and end, how renegades living among
peaceable Indians were to be treated, or what should be done with
agency Indians aiding warlike brethren.

Nor was It clear how and

to what extent soldiers were expected tp assist civilian au
thorities,

Problems of this nature were to confuse Indian

relations for many years.
For the time being, though, War-Interior relations seemed
to improve.

In the late summer and fall Army officers and civil

ians worked together to negotiate treaties and preliminary agree
ments with various Upper Missouri, Upper Arkansas and southwestern
tribes.

Having stalled off the treaty-makers long enough for his

commanders to carry out planned expeditions, General Pope notified
Secretary Harlan on August 16 that a peace commission might be
sent to Fort Rice to await further word from Maj, Gen, Alfred
Sully,

Perhaps there was still time to council with the Siouxs

and Cheyennes this autumn.

If not, arrangements could be made

to meet again in the spring.10^

^■®^CIA, l865> 202-203,
are assigned to the circular,

$ h -3 »

Note that conflicting dates

10^Pope to Harlan, August 16, 1865, D.I.L.S., NA, RG 75,
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General Sully was still in the field in August, having
a discouraging campaign.

For weeks his troops hunted hostiles

before locating their main camp about sixty miles south of
Fort Berthold.

But with only eight or nine hundred men to fight

an estimated ten thousand warriors, he decided not to risk an
attack —

failure would greatly strengthen the war party.

In mid-September, with the Northwest Expedition garri
soned at Fort Sully, General Sully reflected upon past and future
Indian policy in a report to department headquarters.

The ex

peditions of the past three years, he contended, had had a
salutary effect upon the bad Indians-

It was now too late In

the season for effective negotiations, although perhaps twothirds of the hostiles would "touch the pen" to get presents.
"But what would such a treaty be worth?" he queried.

At the same

time, it was no longer practical to try to track down scattered
bands of hostiles with large bodies of soldiers.

Hereafter the

government should give food to the friendly Indians, small gifts
to the cooperative headmen and rewards to the red men who cap
tured hostiles or brought In their scalps .^-09
The peacemakers nevertheless proceeded with their parleys.
In October a six-member commission, headed by Governor Edmunds,
negotiated treaties with most of the Sioux b a n d s , T h e

terms,

lo 8 Ibid., 20!j.-209,

109 Ibid.. 209 -2 1 1 ,
^ 9The other commissioners were Edward B. Taylor, Henry
W. Reed, Orrin Guernsey, and Generals S, R. Curtis and Henry
H, Sibley.
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however, were not as conclusive as hoped.

The Minneconjous,

for example, agreed to recognize the authority of the govern
ment, cease hostilities against whites and other Indians, pre
vent crimes by other bands and stay away from overland routes
through their country.

But their "unmistakable tokens of dissent"

dissuaded the negotiators from pressing the issues of farming
and civilized pursuits.

These subjects and discussions with

other bands were deferred until the following May0^ ^
That same month other treaties were signed with certain
tribes in the Kansas and Upper Arkansas vicinity.

There had been

civil-military misunderstandings in that region too.

In May,

for example, Superintendent Jesse Leavenworth was informed that
General James H, Ford planned to make war on hostile bands,
following orders*to "pay no attention to any peace movements
or propositions,

w112

Leavenworth insisted he had no thought

of interfering with Ford's expedition against the Kiowas, who
"needed to feel the strong arm of the government,"

But most

Comanches and Arapahoes had been well behaved and must not be
harmed . 113
Later in May Senator Doolittle and some of his fellow
investigators entered the discussion of policy toward the
Indians threatening the New Mexico routes.

They asked Presi

dent Johnson to call off military operations and authorize peace
discussions with the Comanches, Kiowas, Cheyennes and Arapa
hoes,

It would take, they estimated, t 9 n thousand troops and

1 U CIA, 1865, 538, 5*2.
112 I b i d „ 389-390,

113 Ibid., 390-391.
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forty million dollars to achieve peace by f o r c e , T h e i r
quest was granted.

re

In August Superintendent Leavenworth and

Maj. Gen, John B. Sanborn, commander of the District of the
Upper Arkansas, procured pledges from several tribal headmen to
’’cease all acts of violence and injury” and meet representa
tives of the government in October to establish a "perpetual
peace.
On October llj. Cheyenne and Arapaho leaders signed a
treaty with a commission beaded by General S a n b o r n . T h e s e
tribes, the commission reported, had suffered "most gross and
wanton outrages" at the hands of the military in the Cbivington massacre.

In view of past injustices, their sacrifice of

valuable mineral lands, the importance of uninterrupted over
land travel and the cost of military action, these Indians were
promised substantial annuities,11*^
Presently similar negotiations were concluded with the
Eastern Apaches, Comanches and Kiowas.

The Apaches were con

federated with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, receiving the same
nd
terms as the latter.
A "generous course" was also followed
with the more troublesome Comanches and Kiowas because, the com
mission rationalized, peace was absolutely essential in their
country and "costly hostilities" could not bring about that resuit.

119

Finally, informal talks were held with representatives

llii.
Ibid., 392.

119

Ibid., 393-396

"^^The commission included James Steele, William S. Harney,
Kit Carson, William W. Bent, Thomas Murphy and J. H. Leavenworth.
^ ^ C I A , 1869, 919-916.
pages 917 to 527.
ll 8 ibid., 5 2 7 -9 2 8

The proceedings are reported on

119 ibid., 527 -5 3 9 .
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of the Wichita and Osage bands, with the commissioners advising
them to consolidate and settle south of the Arkansas River,

120

Still a third commission, appointed about the same time
as the others and headed by Commissioner Cooley, met with several
tribes from Kansas and the Southern Plains at Port Smith, Arkansas,

"121

The Indians involved —

Creeks, Ogages, Quapaws,

Senecas, Shawnees, Cherokees, Seminoles, Wyandotts, Chickasaws and Choctaws —

were not actively hostile and were ready

to convene in September,

The chief purpose of the talks was

the restoration of relations severed during the Civil War,

This

was accomplished through several agreements repudiating con
federate treaties and reaffirming obligations to the United
States,

122

Through "preliminary arrangements" these tribes

also abolished slavery and ceded lands outside of the area
which was formally organized as Indian Territory in 1866,
By the time that the peace commissioners had completed
negotiations with various plains and western tribes, the year
was drawing to a close.

Candid observers now realized that a

1 2 0 Ibid., 5 3 6 ,

121

See the instructions to the commission In Harlan to
Commissioners, August 16, 1865, Letters Sent, Indian Division,
Department of Interior, NA, RG lj.8,

122

Several of the tribes protested against the government's
nullification of former treaty commitments during the Civil War,
Their "disloyalty," they maintained, was involuntary. In addi
tion some of the tribal leaders expressed dissatisfaction regard
ing the commission's condemnation and con-reeognition of wartime
leaders such as the Cherokees' John Ross,

123

Schmeckebier, op, cit.. 101; Harlan to Commissioners,
August 16, 1865, Letters Sent, Indian Division, Department of
Interior, NA, RG 1*8; CIA, 1865, 296-353.
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permanent solution to the Indian question was not in the im
mediate offing.

While talking of a new and vigorous approach,

federal officials had resorted to the traditional expedients -new treaties and military expeditions.

Neither measure was con

clusive, but borrowed time for the policy-makers.

Tacitly, the

government was following Commissioner Dole’s advice to delay any
new general policy until the Doolittle Committee completed its
study of Indian affairs
Still, the leaders of both the Interior and War depart
ments cited evidences of progress and expressed optimism to
ward an improvement of relations with the nation’s wards.

The

Army, in the process of being reorganized and redeployed, served
notice to hostile bands that it was determined to protect prin
cipal settlements and lines of travel.

At the same time,

military strategists learned important lessons in the tech
niques of Indian warfare and laid plans for future campaigns.
General Sherman, for example, proposed to strengthen such out
posts as Ports Smith, Riley, Kearney and Pierre by colonizing
them with settlers to produce subsistence for sustained field
operations*^-*
Spokesmen for the Interior Department claimed ’’gratifying
progress” in reforming agency Indians, despite numerous trials

■^^Dole to Harlan, July 6 , l 86 £, I.O.R.B., No. 11+, NA,
RG 75*
12tr
-'Sherman visited Omaha and Wyandotte, Kansas, in the
fall and was much impressed with the potential of railroad
construction at these points for aiding military operations.
(Athearn, o£. cit., 18-21}.).
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and disturbances.

The recent peace talks, they maintained,

were a victory, not only for humanity and Christianity, but for
common sense and economy.

For it was impracticable to exter

minate the whole Indian race, and the cost of maintaining a regi
ment at war with the Indians was estimated at two million

a

year,^2*^ Still another hopeful development was the informal
arrangement with the Army regarding jurisdiction over the tribes.
There were indications, however, that inter-departmental
differences would continue to encumber Indian affairs.

Many

military officers had no faith in treaties with hostile tribes.
One colonel told the editor of the Chicago Tribune that such
agreements would last only until ”the grand processions of treaty
1 OR
makers shall have reached Washington.”
Senator Samuel C. Pom
eroy of Kansas agreed.

Late in the year be introduced a reso

lution stating,
...the mild, conciliatory, and even magnanimous conduct
of our government towards these savages not being under
stood or appreciated by them, but only construed to be
weakness and cowardice, should now be followed by the most
vigorous and
measures until those hostile tribes
are effectually punished for their crimes, and whipped into
a wholesome restraint and submission to the authority of
the United States.
Beyond the question of conquering or negotiating with

126SI (p), 1865, 311.
12?Ibide, 312-313*
^■2wLt. Col. James F, Tappan to Harlan, September 23, 1865.
D.I.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75.
129
Sen. Miscellaneous Document. No. 1 * 39tb Cong., 1 sess.
(Serial 1239), loo5, 1. fiereafter these documents are cited
Sen, Misc. Doc.
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warlike red men, contention between the civil and military de
partments was evident in discussions of whether to restore the
Indian Bureau to the War Department,

In a circular sent to

Army and Indian authorities in May, 1865 > Senator Doolittle in
quired, "Under what department of the government, the War Depart
ment or the Interior, should the Bureau of Indian Affairs be
placed, to secure the best and most economical administration
of it?"^30

Every Army officer who replied was in favor of trans

ferring the Indian Office to the War Department,

But the civil

ians, with few exceptions, opposed t r a n s f e r , T h i s

division

of opinion was to be the basis for repeated disputes over the
control of Indian affairs,

"There have been and must continue

to be conflicts between commanding officers of Posts, and of ex
peditions and Indian Agents, traders etc.," General Sherman
accurately predicted in November,^ 2
Thus, before the year was out, there were prospects of
a long and wearisome controversy over both the Indian question
and Indian administration.

The Johnson administration, which

had declared 1865 an "auspicious and fitting time" to settle
these issues, was neither the first nor the last to make such
announcements without definite results.

Part of the explanation

for the persistence of these problems can be found in the dnstable
and inconsistent leadership of the War and Interior departments,
~*~^ S e n , Rot, No, 156, 39 th Gong,, 2 sess, (Serial 1279),
1867, U 2 M S * .
—
131

J The civilians favoring transfer included Governor Evans
of Colorado, two former agents and a native of New Mexico,
(Ibid., 1*29-1*92).

^"^Sherman to Grant, November 6 , 1865, William T, Sherman
Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Vol. 1 7 ,
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CHAPTER TWO

LEADERSHIP OF THE INTERIOR AND WAR DEPARTMENTS, 1865-1887

Comprehensively speaking, it may be said
that hitherto the Indian Bureau has bribed them
/the Indiana/into temporary peace, while the War
Department has desired to frighten them into
permanent quiet; and between the two they have
been nearly exterminated.
(The Nation. January 25, 1865)

"It is manifest that any branch of the public service
cannot be efficiently and economically managed by two depart
ments," said Secretary of War John M. Schofield with reference
to the administration of Indian affairs in 1868,^

This opinion

was often reiterated by officials of the Interior and War Depart
ments in the period 1865 to 188?.

But their agreement seldom

exceeded the notion that two-headed government of the Indians
was undesirable.

Like competitors for a coveted prize, spokes

men of each branch demanded full control and criticized the
policies and methods of the other.

Meanwhile, the Indians won

dered who really spoke for the Great Father in Washington.
To understand the setting of the debate over management
of the nation's wards, it is necessary to know something of the
administrative machinery and problems and, especially, the lead
ers of the rival branches of government.

In some respects,

XSW, 1868, XVII.
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the two departments contended with common external influences
and internal problems.

Their personnel and activities were

substantially affected by industrialization, civil service
reform and political fragmentation —

developments of the

publican Era” only indirectly related to Indian policy.

Organic

disunity, pressure from special interest groups and inadequate
funds, facilities and qualified employees hampered the opera
tions of both branches.

In addition, each department had a rapid

turnover in leadership.

The following discussion will include

a brief comment on departmental organization and special refer
ence to the key policy-makers, the secretaries, Commissioners
of Indian Affairs and Generals-in-Chief.

THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT AND INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
The Interior Department has been variously described as
the ttDepartment of the Great Miscellany,” a ”hydra-headed raonp

ster," and the ”slop-bucket of administrative fragments.”
Established to relieve the bureaucratic burdens of the Treasury,
State, War and Navy departments, by the post-Civil War era it
had burdens of its own.

In addition to the Indian Bureau, it

included sub-divisions responsible for land, patents, pensions,
education, railroads, geological survey, census, Capital Build
ing improvements, hospitals and institutions, territories, the
District of Columbia and national parks.^

Although an Assistant

^White, op. clt., 175>$ Horace S. Merrill, William Freeman
Vilas; Doctrinaire Democrat (Madison, 1 9 ^ ) , 134®
3
White, op. clt., 176.
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Secretary and bureau chiefs aided in policy decisions and a
chief clerk handled various office duties, the secretaries were
unable to devote much time to any one of these heterogeneous
obligations.
All routine administrative and policy matters concerning
Indian affairs devolved upon the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
The commissioners, in turn, were so heavily burdened with paper
work and responsibilities regarding treaties, trust funds, con
tracts, schools, agency employment, annuities and so forth that
they often complained of being overworked, under-staffed and
underpaid,^- Reformers, notably Secretary Carl Schurz, recom
mended that the Bureau be made a separate department.

Failing

in this, Schurz and Commissioner Ezra A, Hayt set up an exten
sive staff of thirty to forty clerks, copyists, messengers,
laborers and other employees assigned to administrative divisions
for finance, accounts, land, civilization and records,^
Indian policy was usually worked out between the Secre
tary and the Commissioner,

But another central agency, the

quasi-official Board of Indian Commissioners, attempted to
influence their decisions, especially in the period 1869 to
lo7U*

The ten-member non-partisan, non-salaried board was es

tablished in 1869 to "exercise joint control" with the Secre
tary over Indian appropriations.^

Until I 87 I4. this group sought

^"CIA, 1865^1887, passim; Schmeckcbier, o]o. clt., 1)|)| 0
^CIA, I 878 , LI-LXIV,
^16 Stat. L,, 1|0.
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to enlarge Its authority, but was opposed by the political
appointees of the department.

Then six of the Board members

resigned, and the reconstituted organization confined its
activities primarily to the purchase of supplies and annuities
and inspection of agency affairs.?
Inconsistency was an unmistakable feature of federal
relations with the tribes in the twenty-two year period under
examination.

To a large extent this is explained by frequent

changes in administration, for no fewer than ten different
secretaries and twelve commissioners held office in that time.
While President Cleveland favored ho ”fixed and unyielding
plan of action,

most students of Indian policy have criti

cized the ’’convenient makeshifts for tiding over temporary
difficulties.”9
Of the secretaries who served between the Grant and
McKinley administrations, one author states:
With the exception of Columbus Delano (1870-75)»
they were men of character and high integrity, although
not particularly successful executives. All were caught
in the /"department/ machine and none seemed to sur
mount it. The post normally went to a westerner...
Most of the Secretaries had studied and practiced law.,.
Several were bankers or interested in railroads and in
vestment. Almost all were active in politics and public

?White, 02,a cites 189-1911 Annual Report of the Board of
Indian Commissioners (Washington. l&7ij.), lj!. Hereafter the latter
source is cited BIC. The six members resigned in l87l| out of
protest against Secretary Columbus Delano’s disregard for their
recommendations and a proposed removal of their headquarters
from New York to Washington. The Board and lower echelons of
the Indian service are discussed in Chapter Six.

g

Richardson, op. cit., VIII, 357 .
9Ibid., 55.
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life, attending national conventions (a mark of the pro
fessional), sitting in state legislatures and Congress,
serving as governors,
This analysis might be extended to include the two secretaries
who served under President Johnson.

Only one of the "western

ers," though, came from a state as far west as Nebraska.
Furthermore, prior to 1 8 8 7 , all but one were Republicans, and,
with regard to relations with the War Department, half had seen
military duty.1^
The twelve commissioners, mostly "indifferent” leaders,
also had varied backgrounds.

Their occupations included the

ministry, civil engineering, teaching, farming, banking and the
legal profession.

A few had Army experience, only two or

three were Democrats and none were from the Deep South or a
state west of the Mississippi Valley.

Several were accused of

incompetency or graft and left office in disgrace.

Finally,

because of various personal factors, some played a greater de
facto role in the formulation and implementation of policy
than others,

12

THE SECRETARIES OF THE INTERIOR
The head of the Interior Department at the end of the
Civil War was John P. Usher, a prominent Republican from In
diana.

After stepping up from the assistant secretaryship in

March, 1862, Usher launched an earnest but unrewarding campaign

10White, 0£. cit., 180 -1 8 1 .
1 1 Ibld.. 1 9 2 .
12Pict. Am. Biog., passim.
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to obtain larger appropriations for the Indian service.

In his

annual reports, he outlined a program whereby the Indians con
senting to withdraw from the main arteries of white expansion
were to be given extensive reservations and liberal treatment
while those molesting emigrants and frontier residents were to
be summarily punished,

13
J

About a month after Lincoln's assassina

tion, because of disagreement with President Johnson's recon
struction plan, the Secretary submitted his resignation.*^Usher's successor was Senator James Harlan of Iowa, close
friend of Lincoln and, later, father-in-law of Robert Todd
Lincoln.*^

Experienced as a State Superintendent of Public

Instruction, lawyer, and president of Iowa Wesleyan College
before entering politics, Harlan had a stormy fifteen-month
administration.

One of his primary aims with respect to Indian

affairs was to achieve “unity and harmony of action" between
the civil and military department,*^
widespread criticism.

But he soon came under

He was accused of making "spoils"

appointments and fraudulently disposing of Indian and rail
road lands.

His drastic economy program, by w h i c h as many as

eighty department employees lost their Jobs in a single day,

1 3 CIA, 1864, 1-2,
^ D i c t , A m , Blpg.. XIX, 134-135; William H, Smith, History
of the Cabinet of the United States of America (Baltimore, 1925),
454-555«
15
Raymond J, Chadwick, "Abraham Lincoln and his Friends,"
The Palimpsest, Vol. I4.I (March, I960), 161-172; William J. Peter
sen,"^TameF^Sar lan," The Palimpsest, Vol. I4.I (March, I960),
145-160,
^ H a r l a n to Stanton, December 16, 1866, D.I.L.S,, Indian
Affairs, NA, RG 75 o
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also made e n e m i e s I n
over reconstruction*

time, Harlan also broke with Johnson

After resigning, in August, 1866, he re

turned to the Senate as a leader of congressional reconstruction*

18
Next to direct the department was Orville Hickman Brownii

of Illinois,

Browning had many prominent friends in Washingtoi

and had been Johnson’s patronage advisor for his state,^9

His

administration, which lasted until President Grant took office
covered a period in which important efforts were made to re
strict the tribes to limited reservations where they were suppi

to be protected and taught to become self-sufficient farmers a]
laborers.

This he called the "best, if not the only, policy

»20

that can be pursued to preserve them from extinction.”

His

recommendation contributed to the formation of the well-known
civil-military Peace Commission which negotiated with many naPT
tive groups in 1867 and 1 8 6 8 ,
Browning attempted to improve
the workmanship of his office force by, among other things,
threatening to strike from the rolls any employees found at

1 ^Petersen, "James Harlan," 158j Diet. A m . Blog.. VII, ;
Harlan had the dubious distinction of being the Secretary who <
missed Walt Whitman, who had been employed as a $l,600-a-year
clerk in the Indian Bureau, Allegedly Harlan considered the c '.
Leaves of Grass indecent, j."Walt Whitman and James Harlan." A m
of Iowa. VI /October, 190J/, 225-227,)
’
^®3mith, op. clt.. ij.55“i|56,
19Ibid,, l+56;_Dict. Am. Blog,. Ill, 175.
20CIA, 1866, i.
^Secretary 0. H. Browning to the President, January 15,
1867, D.I.L.S., Indian Affairs^, NA, RG 75,
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also made enemies.^

In time, Harlan also broke with Johnson

over reconstruction.

After resigning, in August, 1866, he re

turned to the Senate as a leader of congressional reconstruction. 18
Next to direct the department was Orville Hickman Browning
of Illinois.

Browning had many prominent friends in Washington,

and had been Johnson's patronage advisor for his state,19

His

administration, which lasted until President Grant took office,
covered a period in which important efforts were made to re
strict the tribes to limited reservations where they were supposed
to be protected and taught to become self-sufficient farmers and
laborers.

This he called the "best, if not the only, policy

that can be pursued to preserve them from extinction.

20

His

recommendation contributed to the formation of the well-known
civil-military Peace Commission which negotiated with many na
tive groups in 1867 and 1868.^1

Browning attempted to improve

the workmanship of his office force by, among other things,
threatening to strike from the rolls any employees found at

1 ^Petersen, "James Harlan," 158; Diet. A m . Biog.. VII, 268.
Harlan had the dubious distinction of being the Secretary who dis
missed Walt Whitman, who had been employed as a $l,600-a-year
clerk in the Indian Bureau. Allegedly Harlan considered the clerk's
Leaves of Grass indecent. j^Walt Whitman and James Harlan," Annals
of Jowa. Vi /October, 190J/, 225-227.)
'
^83mith, op. clt., ij.5 5 -i4-5 6 .
1/Ibld.. ij.56: Diet. A m . Blog,. Ill, 175*
20CIA, 1866, i.
?T

^Secretary 0. H. Browning to the President, January 15,
1867, D.I.L.S., Indian Affairs^ NA, RG 7 5 .
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their desks under the influence of alcohol.

22

Throughout his

term he remained a staunch supporter of President Johnson, de
spite heavy criticism from Congress,2^
When Grant first entered the White House, he chose General
Jacob D. Cox, former governor of Ohio, to fill the Interior
post.

As an organizer of Ohio’s Republican Party, and a war

hero, Cox was a typical partisan choice.

But he turned out

to be a reformer, much to the discomfort of his party’s spoils
men,

He devised a set of competitive exams in "Arithmetic,

History, Geography, Grammer /slc.7. Penmanship and Orthography”
to give applicants for department positions,^

Moreover, he

refused to permit political assessments of Indian service per25
sonnel, ^

His reforms were, to a large extent, the basis for
26
the Indian policy popularized as ’’Grant’s Peace Policy,”
Cox
was not willing, however, to let the non-political, philan
thropic Board of Indian Commissioners dictate to the head of
the department,

27
1

Eventually the "backstairs influences" which

pervaded the Grant administration so hampered his administra
tion that, on October 31» 1^70, be resigned,

"The trouble was",

^Browning to Office Force, December 27, 1867, I,0,L,R.,
HA, RG 75.
23
Smith, oj>. cit., ij-56.
2 k

Secretary J, D. Cox to Commissioner, July
I,0,L,R., HA, RG 7^.

7 ,

1870,

2 ^Smith, op. cit., Ij.56-i4.57; Diet. A m . Blog,. IV, l4.76 -ij.7 8 ;
Mary Hinsdale, A History of the President’s Cabinet (Ann Arbor.
1911), 213.
2^See Chapter Five.
2^Cox to Felix R. Brunot, July 5, 1869, D.I.L.R., Indian
Misc., NA, RG 75.
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Grant later argued, nthat General Cox thought the Interior De
partment was the whole government, and that Cox was the Interior
D e p a r t m e n t T h e

Stalwarts tried to misrepresent Coxfs

departure from office as a dismissal brought on by his mismanagement of a California mining claim.

29

Grant picked Columbus Delano, another Ohio Republican
(but a Radical) and former general, to fill the vacancy left by
Cox,

Although noted for having reorganized the Bureau of In

ternal Revenue, Delano proved an incompetent, if not dishonest,
Secretary,

During his five-year term the annual reports gave

optimistic accounts of Indian progress under the "humane policy”
of the government,

"Industry,” the Secretary declared In 1872,

"is the great civilizer; without it no race can be permanently
benefited,"

30

During his administration the Indian policy placed

emphasis upon providing adequate subsistence, protection, edu
cational assistance and faithful administrators for the t ribes,^
But this program was implemented so unsatisfactorily that the
Indian service was widely censured and underwent a number of in
tensive investigations.^

In l873» for example, the Bouse

28

Hamlin Garland, Ulysses S. Grant: his life and character
(New York, 1 8 9 8 ), ip27•
""
^ S e n . Rot, N o , 261, l^Oth Cong,, 3 sess, (Serial 1362), 1869;
HR Rpt. rip, 2it, 111at Cong,, 2 sess, (Serial II4.6 I4.), 1871; HR Rpt,
Noa 951. afjtb Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1826), 1878; See also Serapbook, J , D. Cox Papers, Oberlin College Library, Oberlin, Ohio.

30 SI, 1872, 6 ,
31SI, 1 8 7 3 , III-IV.
32

See. for example, HR Rpt. No. 5)8 , 42nd Cong., 3 sess.
(Serial 1578). 1873; HR RptT^No. 77*87 l|3rd Cong., 1 sess. (Serial
No. 1627^ 1874; Report of the special Commission Appointed to
Investigate the Affairs of the Red Cloud Agency. July. 1875
(Washington, i875)• Hereafter this source will be cited RSC.
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Committee on Indian Affairs reported that "avaricious and un
principled" persons were plundering both the Government and the
Indians»^3

Finally, in September, 1875* amid widespread criti-

disrtis-Dver malpractices in the letting and execution of Sioux
oil
contracts, Delano r e s i g n e d . O n e biographer states that he was
"woefully lacking in high ideals of service or an appreciation
of the responsibility of the Department Chief.

^

In a move signifying the "tightening of the grip of the
politicians," Grant next chose Zacbariah Chandler of Michigan
to head the department.

36

Chandler was then Republican Party

"boss" of his state, and a man of wealth, having commercial,
banking and land speculation interests.

For fourteen years he

had chaired the Senate’s "pork-barrel" dispensing Committee on
Commerce,

37

Many, including military officers, were enthusias

tic about his appointment.

In a letter marked "personal,"

General Pope asserted, "We can now count upon a vigorous and
business administration of the office especially of that portion
yet with which we have most concern, viz. the Indian Bureau."3®
A semblance of reform was achieved.

33S

Chandler freely dismissed

RP t . No. ^8, lj-2nd Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 1578), 1873, 1*

^ D e l a n o to President Grant, July 20, 1875, D.I.L.S.,
NA, RG 75.
ffipjct. Am. Biog., V, 218.
-^Hinsdale, op. cit., 21ij..
3"^Wbite, op., cit.. 181; Smith, pp. clt.. 1j.58-Ij.59*
38
Pope to Z. Chandler, December 3* 1875* Zacbariah
Chandler Papers, Manuscripts^Division, Library of Congress.
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clerks for "dishonesty and looseness” and relieved "unsavory”
Indian officials.
teachers.

He emphasized the need for excellent agency

Still many reformers were not convinced that Chand

ler did enough to revamp the Indian system and root out evils
that cropped up time and again,

39

When President Hayes took office, in March, 1877, the
portfolio of the Interior Department was passed to an out
standing political reformer, Carl Schurz of Missouri,^®

A Ger

man political exile, experienced as American minister to Spain,
commander of volunteers in the Civil War and leader of the
Liberal Republican movement, Schurz became an energetic Secretary,
A whole chapter might reasonably be devoted to his efforts to
purify the Indian service and maintain civil control of the
Indians,

He fought the spoilsmen, streamlined bureaus, intro

duced detailed regulations for the purchase and distribution of
supplies, investigated and removed unreliable employees, pro
moted Indian education and advocated land allotments through
procedures later formalized in the Dawes Act of 1 8 8 7 , ^
Secretary Schurz encountered much opposition and made

^ G e o r g e P, Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (New
York, 1903), II, 75? SmltHT bp. clt., U.^0-k6l: C. to. Feuss,
Carl Schurz. Reformer (New lork, 1932), 21^.1,
kO
Hinsdale, o£. cit., 221-222. Having solicited much
independent backing for Hayes, Schurz was given a choice of
the Post Office or Interior Department jobs.

£.

^ D l c t .. Am. Blog.. XVI, i4.66 -l4.7 O; Smith, 0
clt., I4.6 I—
1*63; Priest, op. cltTT68. 1 3 0 , 11*2-1^3, 188; SI, lSTPlSSo,
passim. Schurz’s role in the ultimate defeat of the transfer
proposition was particularly significant and will be discussed
In a later chapter.
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some embarrassing mistakes in bis zeal to reform the Indian
policy and administration.

His failure to interdict a sche

duled removal of the peaceable Poncas from Southeastern Dakota
to Indian Territory, for example, resulted in bitter condem
nation by humanitarians

Another time, his removal of Chief

Clerk Samuel Galpin, who had referred to him as the "dam dutch
secretary,” was vigorously disputed by influential persons
Toward the end of his four year term, Secretary Schurz summarized
his experiences in a letter of advice to President-elect James
A.Garfield:
The Interior Department is the most dangerous branch
of the public service. It is more exposed to corrupt
influences and more subject to untoward accidents than
any other. To keep it in good repute and to manage its
business successfully requires on the part of its bead a
thorough knowledge of its machinery, untiring work and
sleepless vigilance. I shall never forget the trials I
had to go through during the first period of my Adminis
tration, and the mistakes that were made before I had
things well in hand. It Is a constant fight with the
sharks that surround the Indian Bureau, the General
Land Office, the Pension Office and the Patent Office,
and a ceaseless struggle with perplexing questions and
situations, especially in the Indian Service. Unless the
head of the Interior Department well understands and
performs his full duty, your Administration will be in
constant danger of disgrace...44Mindful of this admonition to choose wisely, Garfield

l.p

See Schurz Scrapbook, filed with Carl Schurz Papers,
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Schurz later ad
mitted that the Ponca removal was a mistake.
^Charles Ellison to Schurz, May 2, 1 8 7 7 , Schurz Papers,
Former Commissioner Francis A.Valker and the president of Am
herst, Julius H. Seelye, were among those who opposed Galpin1s
removal. (Priest., 0£. clt.. 69*)
^ C a r l Schurz, Speeches. Correspondence and Political
Papers. (New York, 1 9 1 3 8 I-B 2I
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appointed Samuel J. Kirkwood of Iowa as Secretary of tbe In
terior,

Kirkwood, a Republican who had served two terms as

governor of Iowa and many years in the Senate, failed to live
up to expectations

With some insight he diagnosed the short

comings of the government's Indian program —

false economy

in appropriations, too little patience in the area of Indian
labor, frequent removals or changes in the size of reserva
tions and the absence of civil and criminal law for tbe n a t i v e s , ^
He, like other secretaries, had suggestions to make, but ad
mitted the methods by which the Indian question was to be
settled was "not yet fully recognized,"^-7

Unable to resist

the "legions" of office-seekers, he selected Hiram Price of
Iowa for Commissioner of Indian Affairs and added twenty-six
other Iowans to the department r o l l s P r i o r

to Garfield's

assassination, Kirkwood became only "partially acquainted"
with his job; afterwards his tenure was too indefinite to
warrant "distinctive policies,"

In fact, it was reported that

he allowed his work to slide so much that correspondence buried
his desk and awaited attention in adjoining r o o m s I n

February,

1882, after thirteen months in office, the sixty-eight-year
old Secretary handed In his resignation,
“r"Dict, Am. Blog.. X, i|.36-ij.37; Smith, 0£. clt,, lj-63.
^ 6SI, 1881, IV-VII.
^ 7Ibid,, Ill,
^■®Dan E. Clark, Samuel J. Kirkwood (Iowa City, 1917)>
362-363,

^9
Ibld.. 363.
cn
Ibid.. 368;Smitb, 0£, clt.. I|.63»
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Senator Henry M, Teller of Colorado, remembered as a
leader of the "free silver" movement of 1896 and the author of
an 1898 amendment concerning American intervention in Cuba,
accepted President Arthur's appointment to succeed Kirkwood,
Then a Republican, Teller was the first Secretary to be se
lected from a state west of Iowa,

He had helped to defend

Denver against Indian attack during the Civil War and advo
cated the purchase of Indian lands,for a fraction of their
real value,'’1

It was not surprising, therefore, that some of

his views and policies did not coincide with those of the
theorists of bis day.

Strong measures must be taken to disarm

the Indians, he argued.

Not even Indian police could be trusted

with long-range weapons.

Moreover, allotments of land in

severalty would be a "crime" against the Indians' savage in
stincts,

Indian education was fine if it was practical and not

"literary education,"

"Heathenish" practices must be abolished.

These and other steps he defended in the Darwinian conclusion:
Civilization and savagery cannot dwell together;
the Indian cannot maintain himself in a savage or semi
civilized state in competition with his white neighbor,
and he must adopt the fwhite man's ways'or be swept
away by the vices of savage life, intensified by contact
with civilization. Humanity revolts at the idea of his
destruction, yet it is far better that he should disappear
from the face of the earth than that he a hould remain in
his savage state to contaminate and curse those with whom
he must necessarily eoiae in contact in the future,"52
At the beginning of Cleveland's first term, the secre
taryship again changed hands.

51

The new head of the Interior

PIct, Am. Blog,, XVIII, 362 - 36 3; Smith, op, cit,, 14.61}.,

*2SI, 1883, iii.
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was a Mississippi Democrat and ex-Confederate army officer
with the distinctive Latin name, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus
Lamar,

Lamar had a varied background, having taught mathe

matics, political economy, social science and law at the Uni
versity of Mississippi, served in the House and Senate, and
acted as Confederate envoy to Russia and Judge Advocate Gen
eral during the Civil W a r . ^

He accepted the appointment re

luctantly -- only to "impress the country with the desire of
the South faithfully to serve the interests of a common
country,"^

Lamar’s ambition was to obtain a seat on the Su

preme Court,

so it was with special regret that

he observed:

I eat my breakfast and dinner and supper always in
the company of some two or three eager and hungry
applicants for office; go to bed with their importun
ities in my ears,,,I have no time to say my prayers,,,
I expect you think that Iam in a bitter mood.,,but I
am not; only in a jocose one after an engagement with
eight office seekers before breakfast,55
With regard to Indian policy, Secretary Lamar took the
position that the fate of the Indian race depended upon rapid
civilization.

Incorporation of the red men into the politi

cal and social system of white society would be, he asserted,
"the crowning glory of our Government,"^
tain prerequisites.

But there were cer

The nation’s wards must be educated,

taught to appreciate individual land-bolding and brought under

'Diet. Am. Blog., X, 551-553; Smith, o£. cit., U 6I4.-I4.65.
^ E■Edward
d w a r d Mayes, Lucius Q,
Q. C. Lamar. His Life. Times and
Speeches (New York, 1896), 4 7 1 e
^Ibid.,

l4.80 -ij.8 l.

^6SI, 1886, Lj.,
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civil laws,-^

As for citizenship, the experience in the South

should be considered,

"After incorporating into our body

politic four millions of blacks in a state of slavery and inII
II
vesting them with citizenship and suffrage, he tioted, we need
not strain at the gnat of 260,000 I n d i a n s . B u t
guided zeal would do more harm than good.

such mis

The "slow-moving,

philosophical*1 Secretary maintained this somewhat conservative
point of view throughout his administration,

Finally, in early
t o

1888 he got his wish —

an appointment to the Supreme Court,

THE COMMISSIONERS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
At the close of the Civil War the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs was William P, Dole, a little-known Illinoisan,^*0

Al

though Dole headed the Indian Office from the beginning of
Lincoln's first term until early July, 1865, be is not mentioned
in standard national and state biographical sources.

One may

assume from his official reports and correspondence, however,
that he was well-informed about the intricacies of Indian re
lations and concerned about the welfare of the government's
wards.

He complained, for example, that Indian relations had

long been governed by "the course of events" rather than by a
"well-settled poli c y , " ^

It was his opinion that the key

5 ?Ibld.. i^-10,
£®BIC, 1885, 115-116j SI, 1885, 2l*-25.
^ L a m a r died before he could be installed. There were
divided views on his abilities as an administrator. For a
criticism of his work see Merrill, op, cit.. I 3I4.,
^ Register of the Department of the Interior (Washington,
I8 8 3 ), 2, Hereafter this source is cited
Register.
6lCIA, 1861*., 3,
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to this situation was scrupulous adherence to a program of con
centration.

Only in areas protected from white intrusion could

the ”rising generation” acquire the skills and habits essential
to the preservation of the red race.

62

Dole’s successor was Dennis N 0 Cooley, a Dubuque, Iowa,
lawyer.

Clearly a partisan appointee, Cooley served in 18614. as

a special commissioner for the sale of confiscated lands in
South Carolina and as secretary of the National Republican Comaittee during Lincoln’s second campaign.

6?
^

He was one of several

Commissioners who entered office with very little knowledge of
Indian affairs.

At the outset he became involved in Secre

tary Harlan’s program for improving relations with both the
tribes and tbe Army.

His principal contribution, however, was

an effort to reform the administrative procedures and conditions
of the Indian service.

He demanded punctual reports, careful

accounting and book-keeping and devotion to duty by staff and
agency personnel,^

After less than fifteen months In office,

Cooley resigned to practice law in Washington, D . C . ^
Until November first, the office of Indian Commissioner
was vacant.

Then President Johnson selected Louis V. Bogy, a

St. Louis Democrat to fill the post.

Also a lawyer, Bogy was

a veteran of the Black Hawk War and a pro-soutberner who had
62Ibid., 5-8.
^ T h e United States Biographical Dictionary and Portrait
Gallery oFlSmlnent and Self-fltade Men (Chicago. 1878). 3^-37.
^ S e e , for example, Cooley's recommendations in CIA, 1866, 1 6
^ T h e U.S. Biographical Dictionary. 37. Cooley resigned
in September for hpolitical reasonsw; namely disagreement with
Johnson’s moderate reconstruction program.
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”kept very quiet” during the Civil War*

Because of his poli

tical affiliations, the new Commissioner began bis assigned
duties without senatorial confirmation of his appointment.^Ee
was, however, an energetic leader and fought against widespread
public criticism of the Indian Bureau following the tragic
67
Fetterman Massacre in Wyoming in December, 1866,
His pleas
for justice for peaceable Indians and views concerning the
need to negotiate new treaties with various western tribes con
tributed significantly to the establishment of the Peace Commission
of 1867-1868.68
A fourth Commissioner to serve under President Johnson,
Nathaniel G, Taylor of Tennessee, was appointed March 29, 1867.
A graduate of Princeton and former member of Congress, Taylor
is described by one biographer as a man of ”much erudition and
polish, who distinguished himself both as statesman and preacher0“

69

Perhaps his most lasting contribution was his work

as president of tbe Peace Commission of 1867-1868,

An outspoken

opponent of military control, he listed and explained eleven
reasons for not transferring the Indian Bureau to the War Department in 1868.

70

Summing up, he stated:

66P lct. Am, Blog** II, lp.O-lp.1; D.I. Register, 2.
67

The Petterman Massacre is discussed in the next chapter,
/O
°°L, V. Bogy to Browning, January 3, February 11 and
March 2, 1867, I.O.R.B. No. 16, NA, RG 7
^^D.I. Register, 2: The National Cyclopedia of American
Biography (New York, 1 8 9 8 ), VlII, 3&6.
70CIA, 1868, 7 - H 4..
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It is beyond question our most solemn duty to pro
tect and care for, to elevate and civilize them, ^the
Indians/,
have taken their heritage, and it is a
grand and magnificent heritage. Now is it too much that
we carve for them liberal reservations out of their own
lands and guarantee them homes forever?,,,It remains
for us,,.to blot out their remembrance of wrongs and
oppressions by deeds of God-like love and benevolence,'
Probably the most colorful person ever to act as Indian
Commissioner was Brig, Gen. Ely S. Parker, who was appointed
shortly after Grant*s inaugural in 1869*
blooded Seneca and a sachem of his tribe.

Parker was a fullEducated in engineer

ing and law, he obtained a commission and became aide-de-camp
for his old friend Grant In 1863*

This position he held until

he resigned to enter office as Commissioner*7^

While head of

the Indian Bureau he became a leading critic of the decadent
treaty system and an advocate of reforms such as tbe establish
ment of the Board of Indian Commissioners and the selection of
agents nominated by religious organizations.

But in early 1871

he was denounced by a House investigating committee for having
been indiscreet in letting private contracts for some Sioux
agencies*

73

Parker resigned in disgrace in July, 1871* and

for about four months thereafter Henry R. Clum, a former assis
tant, acted as Comnissioner,7^
In the latter part of November, Francis Amasa Walker,

71

Ibid.. 19.

72
Diet. Am. Biog.. XIV, 219-220.
73Ihid., 220*
^Clura had acted as Commissioner during Parker’s frequent
absences, inconspicuously following the policies of his superior*
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an ambitious young statistical expert, took charge of the Indian
Office*

A Massachusetts Republican, well-educated in several

fields, Walker acquired the commissionership while serving as
jd

Superintendent of the Census Bureau.'^

Few commissioners were

able to keep up with the many responsibilities of the Indian
Bureau without double-duty, but he achieved a good record never
theless.

His yearly report for 1872 set forth the thesis that

tbe Government, for good reasons, was following two distinct
Indian policies —

one for "potentially hostile" red men and

one for traditionally friendly and weak tribes.

He contended:

It is not a whit more unreasonable that the Government
should do much for hostile Indians and little for friendly
Indians tbafc it is that a private citizen should, to save
bis life, surrender all the contents of his purse to a high
wayman; while on another occasion, to a distressed and
deserving applicant for charity, ha would measure his con
tribution by his means and disposition at tbe time . "76
Admittedly, the government was "temporizing with an evil,"
but expansion and national progress made this necessary.77 At
the same time, the nation was duty-bound temporarily to support
its wards,

"The freedom of expansion which is working these

results is to ua of incalculable value," he pointed out,78"To
the Indian it is of incalculable cost,"

Among those who were

nd

'•'Walker had had a brilliant war record, rising from
private to Assistant Adjutant General of tbe Union Army. After
the war he taught Latin and Greek at a seminary before assuming
the duties of Superintendent of the Census Bureau in 1870.
Apparently Grant gave him the appointment as Commissioner be
cause there were no more funds to pay him for bis work in the
Census Bureau. (Diet. A m . Blog.. XIX, 3 k 3 - 3 h 3 » )
He also served
as a special commissioner to the Sioux in 1871.
76CIA, 1872, 3-iN
77Ibid., 8.
78Ibid., 10.
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able to leave the Indian Office without a bad reputation, Walker,
in March, 1873? resigned to teach economics at Yale.*^
Next to head the Indian Bureau was Edward P. Smith, a
Congregational clergyman who had served as agent at White Earth
Agency In Minnesota,

As an "agent in the woods" Smith was recog

nized as a "moderate, sensible and truthful man," anxious to
obtain increased funds for houses, farms, stock and a school
for his subjects.

80

Upon taking over his new job, he termed

his duties an enormous "terra incognita," but soon generalized
about the problems and needs of the Indian service,8-*- He
recommended a revision of outdated treaty provisions, allot
ment of lands In severalty, stepped-up training and education
Qp

for the young and "vigorous treatment” of wild bands.

In bis

opinion, transfer of the Bureau to the War Department would de
feat the government's purpose of civilizing the natives.

With

limitations, however, temporary military control over uncoO^
operative tribes was a practical expedient, ^
In December, 1875? after various investigating committees
criticized bis judgments and accounting procedures, Smith turned

79pjct.. A m . Blog.. XIX, 3lUw
® ^ a l k e r to Delano, December 23, 1872, and Clum to Delano,
January 11, 1873? I.O.R.B, No, 22, NA, RG 75; Walker to Smith,
July 2 b , , I 872 , I.O.L.B. No. 107, NA, RG 75.
8^See HR Rpt. No, 778. ii3rci Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1627)

187 ^, 220-221pR3c7 1H75, 6?7-678.
82CIA, 1873, 3-9.

83cia , 187^, 13-15;

cia , 1875,* 19-20.
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in bis resignation.®^Another Smith, John Q, Smith of Ohio, headed the Indian
Bureau from December, l875» until late September, 1877*

The

Department of Interior appointment files contain some interest
ing information about his selection and role as an administrator.
Ohio's Senator John Sherman, brother of General W. T. Sherman,
solicited Secretary Chandler in Smith's behalf.

He mentioned

the latter's experience as a member of Congress, described him
as being "honest as the day is long" and emphasized that he
was presently disengaged.®^

An unsigned statement, obviously

written by a contemporary observer acquainted with the Indian
Office and its personnel, disputes Senator Sherman's views about
Smith's qualifications and integrity, stating:
When Mr. Smith came here to take charge of tbe Indian
Office he questioned several persons who knew the facts
respecting that office, and he was very fully informed
about it, but of all the men who were anxious for reform
in, and the purification of that office he has not taken
one of them Into bis confidence, but has struck at them
directly and indirectly at the same time keeping and pro
moting and preferring the men who are either known to be,
or suspected of being in league with the ring that has
been but half exposed,

^Report of Commission to Investigate Certain Charges
against Honorable E. P. Smith T Washlngton. 187b-)i
Mlsc'. D o c .
No. 1 6 7 . With Cong.. 1 sess.(Serial 1702). Reformers such as
X 7 C, Barstow of the Board of Indian Commissioners insisted that
Smith was not dishonest. After resigning, he became president
of Howard University and later died in Africa on a visit spon
sored by the American Missionary Association, (James G, Wilson
and John Piske, ads., Appleton'3 Cyclopedia of American Biography
2&ew York, l88o7, 561.)
- M 0 Sherman to Z. Chandler, December 5» 1875 > Appoint
ment Pile, of the Department of the Interior, NA, RG 75. Hereafter
this source is cited D.I.A.P.
® 6 " A n o n y m o u s Charges against J. Q. Smith et. al.,M D . I . A . P .
NA, RG 75* A. note on the outside of these records says the
charges were by a Dr. Curtis.
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As far as the author of these charges could determine, Smith’s
only concern was how the Commissioner and other officers made
their "dividends ,"®7
Judging from his published statements, though, Commission
er J. Q. Smith was much interested in the welfare of the Indians,
He expressed the reformers’ sentiment that "the adventurous,
grasping Anglo-Saxon race" had dispossessed the aborigines and
therefore ought to care for them through "good moral and Christian" officials.

88

Unfortunately, however, there was no "well-

defined, clearly-understood, persistent purpose on the part of
the G o v e r n m e n t s u c h high-sounding judgments did not deceive
Secretary Schurz, who finally invited Smith to resign.

Later,

in answer to the Commissioner’s protest, Schurz affirmed, "The
fact is, you never knew what was going on in the office under
your charge, and your clerks were well aware that you did not
know it,"9®

Revealingly, General of the Array Sherman took ex

ception to the removal of his brother’s nominee,

Sherman in

sisted, however, that he was most concerned with whether a
Commissioner would cooperate with the Army,

In this respect,

Smith was "the best Commissioner with whom I had come in con
tact for ten years," the General c o n t e n d e d , 91

87 Ibid.
8 8 CIA, 1876, VI-VII,
89 Ibld.. X-XI.
9°Schurz to J, Q. Smith, January 15, 1 8 7 8 , Schurz Papers,
and Schurz Scrapbook,
^■Sherman to Schurz, January 25, 1 8 7 8 , Schurz Papers,
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The search for another Commissioner ended in the appoint
ment of Ezra A. Hayt, a New Yorker formerly on the Board of
Indian Commissioners,
recommendations

Hayt, too, came to office with good

For example, the well-known Indian reformer,

William Welsh, studied Hayt’s background and encouraged Secretary Schurz to seek his appointment.

93

On the other hand, former

associates.on the Board of Indian Commissioners did not think
Oil

Hayt would be an asset to Schur-z's reform program. ^
it seemed that Hayt’s critics were quite wrong.

For a time

He cooperated

with Secretary Schurz by dismissing many officials of doubtful
reliability, As a result, reformers and ousted personnel alike
sought to disgrace the Commissioner,

William Leeds, a Chief

Clerk who was pressured out of office, conspired with members of
the Board of Indian Commissioners to gather evidence that Hayt
was delinquent in accounts, arbitrary in his removals and corrupt
q c

in private business transactions.
While these maneuvers were in progress, Commissioner Hayt
qp

The head of the Board of Foreign Missions for the Re
formed Church once characterized Hayt as a diligent Christian
who had made a ”handsome fortune” in dry goods and trade before
assuming the presidency of International Trust Company, In
addition, he was identified as a nfirm, courageous, clear-headed
and hearty Republican.” (The Reverend Mr, J, M. Ferris to Delano,
undated, NA, RG 75,
93.
Welsh to Schurz, October 27, 1877, Schurz Papers,
9k

E, Whittlesey to B. R, Roberts, September 2fy, 1877,
Letters Sent, Board of Indian Commissioners, Series II, Vol. IV,
NA, RG 75. Hereafter these records are cited B.L.S.
qC

^W. Leeds to C, Fisk, December 6 , 1879, Correspondence,
Board of Indian Commissioners, NA, RG 75 0 Hereafter these re
cords are cited B.C.
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was apparently busy trying to accelerate the civilization of
the Indians,

"...it is indispensable at the outset to throw

aside the sentimentality that is so fashionable in our day, and
to treat the subject in a practical and common sense way...n<^ h e
sSBerted.

Accordingly, he advocated a code of laws for the

reservations, Indian police, land allotments, compulsory edu
cation and other reforms.

To implement the Indian policy,

Hayt sought business-minded individuals, not politicians,
preachers or soldiers who lacked functional ideas

Moreover,

he was in the forefront of debate against transfer of the
Q8
Bureau to the War Department.7
All of Hayt’s efforts to defend and invigorate the Indian
service, however, could not extenuate his implication in a shady
deal to acquire a silver mine near San Carlos Agency in Ari
zona Territory.

In 1879 Inspector J. H. Hammond discovered

that Agent H. L. Hart and others were guilty of "gross frauds
and dishonesty" concerning Indian cattle shipments.

Hart had

a substantial interest in the Washington Mine, and Hammond
offered to repress this evidence if he and some of the Com
missioner’s friends were allowed to buy the mine at a discount.
Hayt's son closed the transaction, acting under the assumed
name, "Edward Knapp” (his first and middle names)#^

When the

96CIA, 1877, 1.
^ S e n . Misc. Do c . No. 93. lj.5th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
1835), 1879, 313- 3H 4T Representatives of various religious
groups were disgruntled by Hayt's disposition to oppose the
appointment of individuals with only theological training as
agents.
98Ibid., 312-338.

99bio> i 8?9 j 68_n >
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Commissioner was not able to justify this action to Secretary
Schurz, he was dismissed.

This scandal, publicized late in

January, 1 8 8 0 , touched off renewed criticism of the Indian
Bureau and induced Schurz to pay even closer personal attention
to Indian affairs
Secretary Schurz was understandably cautious about sug
gesting a successor for Kayt,

For a time Indian affairs were

directed by Assistant Attorney-General Edgar M, Marble, but
by mid-March President Hayes was anxious to settle the matter,
and gave the position to Rowland E. Trowbridge, a leading agri
culturist and former Republican congressman from Michigan,
This turned out to be an unfortunate selection, for Trowbridge
was suffering from sciatica and was ill so much that he was
unable to attend to many of his duties.

1 OP

Most of the business

of the Indian Office continued to be handled by Secretary Schurz
or by Marble,

On April 20, l 88 l, a little over a year after

taking office, Trowbridge died,10^
In May, leadership of the Indian Bureau passed to Hiram
A,Price, an elderly Republican banker from Iowa,

Although he

turned seventy while in office, Price carried on an active

3.°°Priest, op< cjt., 7 2 ,
101President Hayes to Schurz, February 19, 1880- Schurz
Papers; Priest, 0£ e cite,71; 0*1, Register, 1; S.D# Bingham,
comp,, Early History of Michigan with Biographies of State
Officers, Members of TSongress, Judges ana Legislators' (Lans
ing, 1 8 8 ), Wjlu

102
NA, RG 75.
103

S, Trowbridge to Schurz, October 16, 1880, D.I.A.F.
Bingham, op. cit.. 61^j..
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administration,-*"^'

He laid special stress upon the Indians’

need to learn to earn their own living and wrestled with the
age-old problem of procuring able agents.

On the latter point

he declared, "The impression seems to prevail to a great extent
that almost any man will do for an Indian agent, and as a con
sequence to this belief, men who are broken down physically,
financially, or politically are frequently recommended for that
position,The
the Army,

Commissioner also had his differences with

While denying any intention to start a controversy,

he entered a vigorous protest against the "reckless consumption"
of reservation timber by military detachments,^-^

Touching

upon another more general problem and an Issue with special
appeal to his prohibitionist proclivities, Price severely criti
cized an Army order excluding lager beer and malt liquors from
the list of "intoxicating liquors" banned at military posts,
Sarcastically he commented:
,.,at one of the military posts, where the troops number
less than 2 0 0 , 7 2 , 0 0 0 pints of lager beer were consumed In
three weeks, which is about 17 pints per day for each man,
I am also informed that most of the lager beer which Is
sold at these military posts is made expressly for spirits,
instead of the 5 to 12 per cent of proof beer,
I am there
fore constrained to believe that until the right to dispose
of liquor of any kind, under whatever name or subterfuge
Its sale or introduction on or near an Indian reservation
may be attempted, is forbidden by law, its sad and de-

^Qf y p i c t ." Am, Biog,, XV, 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 . Price had served
several years in Congress,

10 ^CIA, 1883, VIIIj CIA, 1881, III.
lo 6 CIA, 1881, XXX,
107In 1855 Price used cannon to defend prohibitionists
in Davenport, Iowa, against an angry mob, (B.F, Gue, "The Pub
lic Services of Hiram Price," Annals of Iowa, Series 3, I
(January, 1895 ) , 591,
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moralizing effects among the Indians will continue to
exist»10o
At the beginning of Cleveland's administration, the Commissioner
asked to be relieved,
The final Commissioner in the period 1865? to 1887 was
John D, C, Atkins, a Tennessee Democrat,

Before entering office

the former Confederate Colonel chaired the Eouse Appropriations
Committee, and during his term he was a partner of a telephone
company which Republicans tried to depiet as a "Democratic
Credit Mobilier."^0

His annual reports reveal Atkins as an

eloquent, if opinionated, spokesman of a policy of paternal re
straint toward the country's original inhabitants.

In terms

which would have stirred the hearts of Populists, he emphasized
the value of Indian homesteads and farms.
Historians, philosophers, and statesmen freely admit
that civilization as naturally follows the improved arts
of agriculture as vegetation follows the genial sunshine
and the shower, and that those races who are in ignorance
of agriculture are also ignorant of almost everything
else. The Indian constitutes no exception to this poli
tical maxim,111
10BCIA, 1883, vi.
^■^A number of the Indians friends asked Price to remain
in office, (D.I.A.F., NA, RG 75),
11®In 1883 Atkins joined the Pan-Electric Telephone Com
pany headed by former Confederate general Joseph E, Johnston, The
Bell Telephone Company sued Pan-Electric for infringing upon its
patent rights.
Congress also investigated the firm in 1886,
Attorney-General Garland, Solicitor General Goode, Railroad Com
missioner Johnston, Senator Harris of Tennessee, Secretary of the
Interior Lamar and Atkins were all exonerated of dishonest or cen
surable acts by the Democratic majority of the investigat lug com
mittee, But the minority report of the Republican members condemned
them for bribing the press and taking improper advantage of their
political influence, {Frank B. Williams, "The Pan-Electric Tele
phone Controversy," Tennessee Historical Quarterly. Il/Tune, 191*37,
11*4-162.)
111CIA, 1885, III,
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Also,in his last yearly report, he eulogized the Allotment Act
of 1 8 87 , contrasting it with the government’s previous "pauper
izing” policy.

The Commissioner affirmed that, subjected to

similar circumstances and treatment —

lands in common, annui

ties, and ministerial teachers, preachers, farmers and physicians
—

even the "enterprising Yankees" of New England would degen

ii?
erate to parasites upon the community. ^

TEE WAR DEPARTMENT AND MILITARY POLICY
The transition from full-scale war in the period 18611865 to limited quasi-war and garrison activities in the South
and West presented many difficulties for the leaders of the
War Department and its lower echelons.

A shortage of manpower,

inadequate financial support, public opposition to a standing
army and unattractive duty assignments were among the more ob
vious obstacles to effective Army operations.

Equally hamper

ing, although less apparent to the casual observer, were central
administrative and organizational problems.

In the first

place, there was rivalry for authority between the politicallyappointed Secretary of War and the top military official, the
General-in-Chief.

Secondly, both of these officers struggled

to maintain control over semi-autonomous staff agencies, such
as the Ordnance and Quartermaster departments,^^

Finally,

112

CIA, 1887 , IX. The Dawes Severalty Act Is discussed
in Chapter Nine.

113

See Raphael P. Thian, comp., Legislative History of
the General Staff of the Army of the United States Tv/ashineton.
190177^
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coodination between upper echelon authorities and field commands,
which were frequently reorganized, left much to be desired.-^4
In the military branch, as in the Interior Department,
policies affecting Indian affairs varied from one administration
to another.

While field commanders exerted considerable influ

ence upon their superiors and had much latitude in implementing
directives, the Secretary or General-in-Chief, in varying de
grees, made the important decisions.

Excluding three ad interim

appointees, the War Department, like its civilian counterpart,
had ten different leaders in the twenty-two years after the Civil
War.

The secretaries* backgrounds included business, banking,

law, state and national politics and professional military
service.

Most were Republican and all but one came from states

presently considered part of the Midwest.

In contrast to the

War Office, the office of General-in-Chief was quite stable?
only three persons were in charge between the -Johnson and Harri
son administrations.

All were West Pointers of proven ability,

and the last two were well-experienced in Army-Indian relations.

THE SECRETARIES OP WAR
One of the best known Secretaries, Edwin M. Stanton of
Ohio, headed the military department from January, 1862, to May,
1868, except for two ad interim interruptions.

Stanton’s

political ties shifted during the Civil War from Unionist to

11^Wbite, on. cit.. 134* 137-144* In 1866 the Army had
five divisions and seventeen departments; twenty years later,
three divisions and eight departments.
n ^White, op. cit., 137-11*4; Diet. A m . Blog., passim.
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Radical Republican.11^* By 1865 he had a reputation as a vigorous
and efficient Secretary,

President Johnson retained him to

handle the problems of demobilization, but in 1867 Stanton and
Johnson clashed over reconstruction policy.

The Secretary be

came the key figure in the President’s dispute with the Radicalcontrolled Congress over the Tenure of Office Act.

First, in

August, Johnson tried to replace Stanton with General-in-Chief
Grant, designating the latter as Secretary ad interim.

For

about four months Grant reluctantly acted in that capacity, but
Stanton refused to leave his desk,11^

Again in February, 1868,

Johnson tried to oust the "Black Terrier” of the War Office,
appointing General Lorenzo Thomas as Acting Secretary.

There

upon Stanton ”boled up” in the War Department building and rel*iO
mained there during the weeks of Johnson’s impeachment trial.
The crucial events of the latter part of Stanton’s term
obviously distracted him from the question of military relations
with the Indian tribes.

To the extent that he commented on the

Indian affairs, it was clear that he had little sympathy for
the religious reformers’ approach.

For instance, in antici

pation of a visit from the avid Indian reformer, Bishop Henry
Whipple, he told an acquaintance:

^ ^ D i c t . A m . Blog., XVII, 517-519? Smith, op. cit., 286291. (Earlier Stanton was a Democrat and served as Attorney
General under Buchanan.)
117
'L, D. Ingersoll, History of the War Department (Wash
ington, 1879), 53l+-535>? Diet. A m / Blog., XVll, 5l&-5>20. Stanton
originally declared the Tenure of Office Act unconstitutional.
ll8Pict. Am. Blog.. XVII, 520-521.
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If he has come here to tell us of the corruption of
our Indian system, and the dishonesty of Indian agents,
tell him that we know it* But the Government never r e 
forms an evil until the people demand it. Tell him
that when he reaches the heart of the American people,
the Indians will be saved* °
Little more than passing reference to the need for military
protection of emigrants against hostile bands is found in his
annual

r e p o r t s , 1

^

Although opinionated and strong-willed,

Stanton considered the Senate's failure to convict Johnson a
personal vote of "no confidence,” and on May 26, 1868, he submitted his resignation*

1 Pi

Little comment is necessary concerning the ad interim
Secretaries, Grant and Thomas,

Their terms were so brief and

tenuous that they made little impression upon departmental
policies.

Later, as President, Grant was to gain special

acclaim as a friend of conciliatory measures toward the tribes.
More will be said of his pre-presidential role as General-inChief momentarily.

122

General Thomas was a headstrong and argu

mentative person whose ”comic opera” attempt to ”boot” Stanton
out of the War Office cost him a week in jail at the latter's
request,
Another short-term Secretary, General John A. Schofield,

^Henry B, Whipple.Lights and Shadows of a Long Espiscopate (New York, 1902;, ll|5,
IP O

SW (P), 1866, 68, Biographical sources do not indicate
that Stanton was concerned about Indian affairs,
121 Hinsdale, o£. eit., 195-198; Diet, Am, Biog., XVIII,$21,

122

Smith, 0£. cit., 514-1.

1 2 3pict, A m . Bjpg. XVIII, I4I4.I—

s

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

75

headed the Department from May, 1868, to March, 1869.

A West

Pointer who had fought the Seminoles and commanded various
military departments, Schofield was nominated for the cabinet
by Senator William Evarts of New Y o r k , ^ ^

He had definite

opinions about the management of Indian affairs and did not
miss the opportunity to speak his mind on the subject in the
annual report for 1 8 6 8 ,

"For the sake of economy to the govern

ment, for the sake of more efficient protection to the frontier
settlements, and for the sake of justice to the Indians,” he
commented, ”1 recommend that the management of Indian affairs
be restored to the War Department, with authority to make regu
lations for their government and for their protection against
lawless whites.”'*'2'’ An able and industrious Secretary, Scho
field nevertheless preferred an active command to a desk job
in Washington,

A week after Grant's inauguration he resigned

to return to duty as commander of the Department of the Missouri,
President Grant selected General John A, Rawlins to take
charge of the War Department,

Rawlins, formerly a Douglas Demo

crat, had been a close friend and advisor to Grant during the
Civil War,

At the time of his appointment he was suffering

from a tubercular condition which continued to limit his activities.

127

Not in office long enough to submit an annual report

12i*Hinsdale, op. cit., 203; Smith, op. cit., 291-293;
Diet. Am. Biog., XVl7452-I|5l|.»
125SW, 1868, xvii-xviii.
126
Hinsdale, op. cit., 203-208, Schofield has been given
credit for helping to restore peace between the executive and
legislative branches.
127Smith, 0£. cit., 291^-295; Diet. Am. Biog. XV, Ij.02-1*03;
Hinsdale, ££. cit.. 210-211.
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which might sum up his views on control over the Indians, the
Secretary succeeded, however, in stirring up dissension over
authority within the military branch.

Much to the chagrin of

General-in-Chief Sherman, he prevailed upon Grant to remand an
order routing all official business through the head of the
Army.

123

illness.

Early in September Rawlins succumbed to his lingering
His death, one author contends, meant the loss of a

"salutary influence" upon Grant, who was subsequently controlled
by political and military "minions.
For about a month and a half, Rawlins’ vacancy was filled
by General-in-Chief S h e r m a n . On October 25, 1869, another
Civil War general, William W. Belknap of Iowa moved into the
War Office.

A former member of the Iowa legislature, Belknap

left a position as collector of internal revenue in his state
to assume the cabinet post.

His six and a half years in office

covered a period in which the civil-military dispute over con
trol of Indian affairs was particularly lively.

Still his

official reports contain surprisingly little personal comment
on the subject.

He usually endorsed the views of the General

of the Army and department commanders who, as a rule, deprecated
the actions of the Indian B u r e a u . A p p a r e n t l y he, like most

^^Athearn, 0£. clt..2H0-2li2.
■^^Hinadale, 0£. cit., 211.
^■^Sherman earlier declined to serve as Secretary under
President Johnson. He hated the political furor of Washington
and happily unburdened himself of this extra duty. (Diet. Am.
Blog.. XVII, 93ff,)
~
131SW, 1869-1875, passim.
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of his successors, was less interested in getting embroiled in
the onerous Indian service than military subordinates whose
reputation and efficiency reports hinged upon relations with
the tribes.
Ultimately, though, Belknap was ruined by his involve
ment in a scandal over the Indian tradership at Port Sill, In
dian Territory,

In 1876 the House impeached him for receiving

bribes amounting to about $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 from Caleb P , Marsh, the
nominal trader.

Only a hasty and disgraceful resignation pre

vented the Senate from bringing in a verdict of guilty,^32 Coming
at a crucial time in the contest between departments for au
thority over Indian matters, the ”Belknap Scandal” and a resul
tant investigation of the transactions of the War Department
strengthened the cause of civilian administrators.

138

The departure of Belknap brought an end to the succession
of generals in the War Department,

The next Secretary, who held

132Dict. Am, Biog.. II, 1^7-348;Smith, op. cit., 295-296;
Hoar, op. cit.. T 7 35^-368; HR Rot, No, 186, hl£th Cong,, 1 sess,
(Serial 17087; HR Rpt. No, 22^,“~i})|th CnngtJ 1 sess, (Serial 1708);
HR Rpt. N o . 3li.5T~hii.th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1709); HR Rpt. No.
7 9 l T Bith Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1713); S e n . Misc. D o c . No. 9?
W t h Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1665). Apparently Belknap *s wife
in 1870 arranged to get an appointment for Marsh, a New Yorker,
for half of the income from the lucrative Port Sill tradership.
Marsh then persuaded the incumbent trader to pay him $12,000
annually for not taking over the job. Quarterly payments of
$1,500 went to Mrs, Belknap. After her death the money was sent
directly to Secretary Belknap, who lavished it on his second
wife, the sister of his first wife. See William B, Hesseltine,
Ulysses S. Grant: Politician (New York, 1957), 395-396. For a
discussion of continuing questions about the affair see Philip
D. Jordan, ”The Domestic Finances of Secretary of War Vf. W. Bel
knap,” Iowa Journal of History.Vol. 52 (July, 195h-)> 193-202.
133HR Rpt. No. 799. hh-th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1715), 1 8 7 6 ,
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office only ten weeks, was Judge Alphonso Taft, Ohio Republi
can and father of William Howard Taft,

His stay in the War

Department was too brief to substantially affect policies or
procedures.

But General of the Army Sherman expressed plea

sure at having a less meddlesome s u p e r i o r , A s

planned in

advance by Republican patronage managers, Taft was soon trans
ferred to the Attorney General’s Office, a position "more suited
to his genius and tastes
Political repercussions followed Grant's announcement
that Taft’s successor was to be James D, (Don) Cameron, son of
the Pennsylvania Republican Party boss, Senator Simon Cameron,1 ^
Young Cameron had inherited both business and political "know
how" from bis father.

Before turning thirty-five, he demon

strated "large business capacity" as a bank president and head
of the Northern Central Railroad of Pennsylvania,^37

During his

ten-month term he achieved greater efficiency in military busi
ness activities and cut the cost of operations considerably. His
yearly report for 1876 included an endorsement of a strict
policy of disarming and dismounting all agency Indians.

"De

prived of their arms and ponies it is reasonable to expect,"

T. Sherman to J. Sherman, March 14-, 1 8 7 6 , Sherman
Papers, Vol. I42 .
^■^Smith, op, cit., 296-297? Ingersoll, op. cit.. 571+?
Diet. Am. Blog.. XvIlTT""261^-265,
1 ^6
Simon Cameron had been Secretary of War under Lincoln.
Ingersoll contends that the older Cameron had no advance know
ledge of his son’s appointment. Nevertheless, partisanship was
involved,

137 Smitb, 0£. cit., 297-298j Diet. Am. Biog., Ill, 1435.
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he declared, "that on the next outbreak of hostilities the
anomaly will not again be presented of the Government forces
being met in summer by hostile Indians sheltered and cared for
T Oft
at Government expense during the previous winter,”
Because
Cameron made federal troops available to the Republicans in Loui
siana and Florida during the investigation of disputed election
returns that fall, Pennsylvania Republicans expected President
Hayes to retain him in the cabinet.

But they were disappointed.

Consequently, it is said, Simon Cameron resigned his Senate
seat, giving it to his son as a "consolation prize."3-39
While refusing to compensate Cameron, Hayes repaid a
political debt to the author of the electoral commission bill,
Representative George W. McCrary of Iowa, by naming him to head
the War Department,

A former justice of the Iowa Supreme Court

and congressional investigator in the Credit Mobilier scandal,
McCrary accepted the appointment only because he could not head
the Justice Department,3^-0

Nevertheless, he proved an indus

trious and able executive.

Previous experience on the legisla

tive committee on Indian affairs gave him insight respecting
military difficulties with hostile bands,

"It is undeniable,"

he concluded,"that most if not all the disasters attending

138SW, 1876, 6.
139Pict. Am. Biog., Ill, 1*35-1j.36,
■^■^McCrary had disqualified himself from the AttorneyGeneral' s position by public statements about a pending mineral
land claim. Judge Charles Devens of Massachusetts would not
consent to act as provisional Attorney-General until that case
was settled.
(Smith, 0£, cit,, 298; Diet., Am. Biog.. XII,
2-3; Hinsdale, op, cit.. 223-221}..)
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Indian hostilities are the result of inadequacy of force on our
part."1^1

To be effective the Army must be enlarged and given

adequate appropriations0

In December, 1879, McCrary resigned

to find "satisfaction for his judicial aspirations in a Circuit
Judgeship."3^ 2
Next to head the department was Senator Alexander Ramsey.
Ramsey bad been governor of both the territory and state of
Minnesota and an organizer of the Republican Party in his reg i o n . ^ He had first hand knowledge of the problems of dealing
with red men on the warpath, having had executive responsibility
for calling out the militia and summoning federal troops at the
time of the Sioux Outbreak of l862,x^'

In the Senate, too, he

had agitated for greater military protection for roads and
frontier communities.3^

With some understanding, then, Secre

tary Ramsey called for additional funds to improve the conditions
and salvage the esprit of his unden|aanned and overworked western
lii6
army, ^
At the beginning of the Garfield administration Ramsey
was replaced by Abraham Lincoln's son, Robert Todd.

Before his

appointment young Lincoln was not very active in politics,

^SW,

1879, iiio

■^^Hinsdale, oj>. cit., 226-227.
^•^For the background of Ramsey's apointment see Rhoda
R. Gilman, "Ramsey, Donnelly, and the Congressional Campaign of
1868," Minnesota History. Vol. 3 6 , (December, 193>9), 300-308;
Smith, op. cit., 299.
Dili
Diet. A m . Blog.. XV, 3^-l-3^2.

■^^Atbearn, oj>, c i t . , lj.l-ij.2.
^SW,

1880, iil-v.
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He attracted the President's attention, however, by swinging
a delegation of Grant supporters to his support at the 1880
Republican Convention0^ ^

Despite the tragedy which abbre

viated Garfield's term, Lincoln served a full, if uneventful
and unimpressive, four years in the cabinet.

He was popular

with his father's old generals, particularly because he was so
indifferent toward bis job that they generally had their w a y . * ^
Each year Indian resistance seemed to lessen until in l881j.
Secretary Lincoln was able to report that the Army had "enjoyed
almost complete rest from active field operations
Last in the succession of secretaries in the period 186|?
to 1887 was William Crownlnshield Endicott, wealthy Massachu
setts Democrat appointed at the beginning of Cleveland's first
term,^^

Like Lincoln, Endicott was experienced as a lawyer.

But the latter's record as an administrator was more impressive.
He was noted, especially, for his diligent efforts to improve
the Army’s efficiency and morale.

For instance, he succeeded
1^1
in establishing higher pay for enlisted men, ^
Although active
operations against the Indians had generally ceased, it was

during Endicott's term that Geronimo and his Apache followers
were finally defeated. 152

■^■^Hinsdale, op. cit,, 23 t|.-2 3 5 ,
^ W h i t e , o£. cit,, 139; Smith, 0^
A m . Biog.. XI, 265-267.
* 9W ,

cit., 299-300; Diet.

I 88 I4., 5 .

i9o

Endicott was a direct descendant of the Massachusetts
colonial governor, John Endicott.
^Smitta, on, cit.. 300 - 301 .

^ 2SW, 1886, 7.
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GENERALS-IN-CHIEF
General Ulysses S. Grant, supreme commander of the Union
forces during the last thirteen months of the Civil War, re
mained in charge of the Army the first four years of Recon
struction,

A West Pointer, Grant’s pre-war service included

duty under General Zachary Taylor in the Mexican War and at
outposts on the Pacific Coast, but no active operations against
hostile Indians,

After L e e ’s surrender a succession of mili

tary and personal involvements prevented the General-in-Chief
from devoting much attention to Indian affairs.

Initially,

he concentrated upon disbandonment of the Army, the French
threat in Mexico and the complex question of the S o u t h I n

1866 he toured the erstwhile confederacy and struggled with
the unpleasant task of implementing the Army Reorganization
Act, which cut the military force to a fraction of its wartime
strength.

1E>5

In August, 1867, after the Tenure of Office Act

and Supplementary Reconstruction Act convinced President John
son that his chief antagonist was Secretary of War Stanton,
Grant was temporarily assigned the additional position of Secre
tary ad interim.

The next spring, following Johnson’s near

conviction on impeachment charges, Grant became the Republican ^1

l53 Dict. A m . Biog., VII, l4.92 -lj.9 3 ; Hesseltine, op, cit,,
12-15; Grant to Snerman, January 16, 1 8 6 7 , Letters Sent, Eeadquarters of the Army, NA, RG lOo, Hereafter the latter source
is cited H.A.L.S.
^^Hesseltine, pp. cit., 52 -51+.
15£SW (P), 1866, 1+65.
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candidate for the presidency,

Finally, in the ensuing months

he was elected and became involved in the selection of cabinet
and other appointive officials.^^
On a few occasions, though, General Grant expressed his
views on Army-Indian relations.

Significantly, as Commander

of the Army his attitude did not suggest that he might someday
be considered a humanitarian Indian reformer.

In his annual

reports, he echoed and underscored the demands of subordinates
who favored the transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War De
partment,

By abolishing agencies and licensed trading and

appointing a few inspectors to work with military leaders, be
argued, the government could save money and minimize conflict
between the red and white races.

197

In February, 1867, he

declared:
If the present practice is to be continued, I do
not see that any course is left open to us but to with
draw our troops to the settlements and call upon Congress
to provide means and troops to carry on formidable hos
tilities against the Indians until all the Indians or
all the whites on the great plains and between the settle
ments on the Missouri and the Pacific slope are exter
minated, ^58
No wonder General Sherman shook his head disbelievingly upon
learning two years later that Grant wanted to pacify the red
igq
men through church-nominated agency officials I

1^6
1^7

Hesseltine, 0£, cit., 93-11(4.
See, for example, SW, 1866, 17-18,

^ ® S e n . Ex. Doc. No. 13, l+Oth Cong., 1 sess, (Serial
1316), i^O-IpT
159

Sherman to Sheridan, April 10, 1869, Sheridan Papers 0

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

Grant's successor as Commander-in-Chief, General William
T, Sherman, was much more experienced in Indian affairs and
considerably more verbose about Indian policy.

Also a graduate

of the Military Academy and a Union war hero, Sherman had con
tacts with numerous native groups before the war and had cam
paigned against and negotiated with scattered western tribes
in the period 1865-1869

While commander of the Division

of the Missouri, he frequently proposed complete military
control over the red men.

The Army, he complained, was not

consulted about land sales, railroad projects or other forms
of expansion, yet was nleft in the breach to catch all the
kicks and cuffs of a war of r a c e s , C r i t i c s

often accused

Sherman of wanting to wipe out the Indians, but he insisted,
"Indian wars are all work and no glory'.*^2

On the other hand,

he could not stand to be told that, because he signed the 1868
Peace Commission report which denounced military subjugation
of the Indians, be was obliged to make concessions to hostile
bands,
Sherman's term of over fourteen and a half years was
punctuated by innumerable intra and inter-departmental crises.

Am, Biog,, XVII, 93-96; Athearn, op, cit.,
xii-xiii, 3 -2 3 1 ,
—

161 SW, 1868, 1-2.
l 62 lbid., 5 .
■^^Sherman to S. P. Tappan, July 21, 18 7 6 , Semi-official
Letters Sent by William T. Sherman, Manuscripts Division, Li
brary of Congress,

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

85
He was much exasperated, for example, when secretaries Rawlins
and Belknap by-passed him with directives to staff leaders
and field commacders.

This was a ’’double if not a treble

headed machine,*1 he later recalled, " ...tbs general often
reading in the newspapers of military events and orders before
he could be consulted or informed

in 187 U- Sherman got so

disgusted with this situation that be moved his headquarters
to St, Louis and did not return to Washington until after Bel
knap's embarrassing exit from office in early 18 7 6 ,

Even then,

he deprecated the "flatterers and clerks rnd orderlies" cringing and bowing before each Secretary,

165

Vexed by his administrative duties, life in Washington,
congressional attempts to further reduce the Army and public
criticism in the East and on the frontier, and agitated by In
dian wars and incidents, Sherman sometimes made some caustic
remarks about Indian affairs in his reports and endorsements,
"The Indian Bureau should take care of their own Indians," he
replied to a query about sending Indian prisoners to Florida,
Of agents who called for military aid and then changed their
minds, he once fumed, "It is this habit of blowing hot and blow167
ing cold which all soldiers complain of in the Indian Bureau,”
161+U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S^ Grant (Hew York.
'

1 8 8 6 ), 1+1+3 .

-^^Sherraan to John Sherman, March 1+ and 10, 1 8 7 6 , Sherman
Papers, Sherman had less difficulty with Belknap's successors,
• ^ E n d o r s e m e n t b y General W , T, Sherman, March 5, 1879,
W, T, Sherman of Congress, Herafter these records are cited
End,, Sherman, followed by the date, the symbol E.M, and the
volume number or inclusive dates,

^ ^Ibid.. December 1 1 , 1878
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Again, despairing over Indian campaigns, the General grumbled,
",,*it is a waste of life and waste of money to hunt down no®
madic Indians like the Sioux to be turned over to the Indian
Bureau, and then turned loose well supplied with food and the
means of renewing the war,"

Still another time, with refer

ence to government support for warlike Apaches, he inquired,
"Does not this magnanimity verge on the borders of folly?"

169

Yet General Sherman persevered and found satisfaction
in the Army's relations with the natives.

Upon retiring from

active duty, in November, 1883, he observed, "I now regard the
Indians as substantially eliminated from the problem of the
Army,"

In the "great battle of civilization with barbarism,"

the military, together with railroads and emigrant farmers and
«170
miners, bad been a large factor,"
Sherman's successor in the top military post was another
prominent and experienced Indian fighter, General Philip H.
Sheridan,

After graduating from West Point in 18£3» Sheridan

had an opportunity to test his tactical skills against hostile
tribes in both the Southwest and Northwest,

Achieving an im

pressive record and the rank of Major General in the war between
the states, the Irish-born officer later commanded the Division
of the Gulf and Fifth Military District before filling Sherman’s
171
vacancy as head of the Division of the Missouri,
l68Ibid,, March 16, 1 8 7 8 *
l69Ibid., March 23, 1880,

170 SW, 1 8 8 3 , lj.5-46,
17lDict. Am, Blog., XVII, 79-80,
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While in charge of this division, Sheridan became known
as a leading exponent of military control and forcible sup
pression of nomadic Indians,

Some of his caustic comments about

the "peace policy" made Sherman’s remarks seem quite innocuous.
He called the program established by the Peace Commission in

1868 an "inhuman farce," leaving "too many fingers in the pie."17^
The Indian, he generalized, was a "lazy, idle vagabond,"
schooled only in the art of taking scalps.

Yet the govern

ment persisted in giving these outlaws blankets and sending
white criminals to penitentiaries.

173

As for the Indian

Office’s common practice of repeatedly relocating its agencies,
the motive was usually "a desire tc cheat and defraud the In
dians by avoiding the presence of officers who would naturally
see and report it."^7^It would be Incorrect, however, to characterize Sheri
dan as an adherent of the principle "the only good Indian is
a dead one."

To him, the "baulky team" of civil-military con

trol and the failure to impress upon the Indians the difference
between right and wrong defeated an otherwise "liberal and hu
mane" program of Christianizing and civilizing the Indians.
Transfer would make more work for the Army but was necessary.

179

172SW, 1868, 20-21.
173SW, 1 8 6 9 , 37-38;
^^"Endorsement by General P. H. Sheridan, September lip-

1 8 7 8 , Sheridan Endorsement Book, November 27, 1877-^ecember 18,
1879, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Hereafter
these records are cited End,, Sheridan, followed by the date,
the symbol E. B. and the inclusive dates of the volume.
175SW, 1868, 21; SW, 1872 , 35-36,
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At times the General also petitioned for better treatment and
more supplies for the red men.

For instance, in 1 8 7 8 , he com

pared the pitiable condition of the White River TJtes to that of
prisoners at Libby and Andersonville prisons.

176

On many

other occasions Sheridan’s actions and statements belied the
stereotyped "Indian hater" label Indian friends gave him, par
ticularly after a rather personal dispute with reformer Carl
Schurz in the late Seventies,

177

As General-in-Chief, Sheridan took up Indian matters
left unsettled at the time of Sherman’s retirement.

Impor

tantly, certain hostile bands of the Southwest bad to be sub
dued and confined to reservations,

This problem was finally

solved through temporary military control0

Sheridan also gave

special attention to a plan to help the Indians "take up the
white man’s road,"

Describing the natives as the "richest

people in this country, as communities," he recommended that
the government locate each Indian family on half a section and
sell the balance at $1.25 an acre.

Interest on the proceeds,

invested in government bonds, would more than pay for annui
ties, subsistence and a program of civilization.^7®

Although

this scheme was not adopted, the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887
was based on some of the same principles,

i 7 ®End., Sheridan, January 3, 1 8 7 8 , E, B., November 27,
1887 - December 18, 1879*
•*-77The Sheridan-Schurz feud is discussed in Chapter
Seven,
178SW, 1885, 62 - 6 3 ; SW, 1 8 8 7 , 76-78.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

89

An examination of the succession of secretaries, com
missioners and Army commanders reveals certain practical aspects
of the government's difficulty in seeking a solution to the
Indian problem.

For various reasons, many of the leaders lacked

the talent, desire or opportunity to deal effectively with In
dian affairs.

Significantly, the process by which the political

appointees were selected was not designed to benefit the Indian
service, but political parties.

Preference was given to per

sonal friends of the Presidents and party bosses, to G.A.R.
veterans and residents of certain sections of the country.
Moreover, the appointees, with few exceptions, followed the
practice of using their office for political ends.

Secretary

Kirkwood, for example, dispensed patronage to many Republicans
from his home state.

Others, such as Zachariah Chandler, uti-

lized their position to make political assessments,

179
'

Despite

the Pendleton Act of 1883 and reforms designed to bring about
more "businesslike administration," the spoils system prevailed. 180
The leaders of the two branches were, by and large, no
better suited for their jobs than Secretary of War Daniel S.
Lamont (1893-1897), of whom Woodrow Wilson wrote:
The only criticism which his appointment prompts
Is, that he was, so far as we are able to ascertain, no
more fitted for the War Department than for any other.
He is, in short, simply a very capable man of unusual

“^^White, op, cit,, 332-335*
prominent in the late“"Eigbties,

This problem was less

l8°Ibld.. 379-388.
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executive talents*
be War minister,

He has had no special training to

Still it is difficult to determine what training would have
most effectively prepared these men for their diversified
duties.

The Generals-in-Cbief, though trained and experi

enced in military matters, were baffled by bureaucratic
involvements.

Presumably an ideal Secretary of the Interior

should have been an efficiency expert, statistician, lawyer,
geologist, business administrator, diplomat, economist,
engineer, sociologist, architect, conservationist, educator,
and politician.

Certainly the heads of the departments were

not, and could not be expected to be, experts on Indian
affairs.

Some such as Commissioner Parker, Secretary McCrary

and General Sherman, had more talent along that line than
others.

Yet all were subject to an established complex sys

tem of Indian administration which not even reformers like
Secretary Schurz could completely overcome.

For the Indians

and those who dealt with them, the implications were
momentous,

t At

Woodrow Wilson, ''Mr, Cleveland’s Cabinet," Review
of Reviews. VII (1893), 291,
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CHAPTER THREE
OLIVE BRANCH AND CARBINE:
JANUARY, 1864 TO JULY, 1867
The white man owes the Indian nothing* He is
in the way of the evolutions of progress* and when
the government pays what is to him a reasonable
compensation for his title to the territory, or
for privileges in it, the debt is as perfectly
cancelled as when a corporation pays the assessed
value of the site of a public school*
(Maj. Gen* William B* Hazen, December 1, 1866)
Our people, full of the Anglo-Saxon blood*.,
powerful, increasing, spreading, aggrandizing, press
in upon the plains and the prairies****Is it
in the sight of God or men for us to say that we owe
nothing to these people whose land we are appropriat
ing to our pleasure?
(Senator James R. Doolittle, April 18, 1866)
In 1 8 7 8 , duriDg a personal feud between Secretary of
the Interior Carl Schurz and General Phil Sheridan over the
relative merits of military or civil management of the
Indians, General William T* Sherman aptly observed, "...the
present conflict between the two systems is such that he
^Schurz7 and General Sheridan look at the same fact from oppo
site directions; both are equally honest, yet both cannot be
right.It

was standard practice for the War and Interior

departments to draw contrary conclusions from the same "facts"
where the Indians were concerned.

Certainly this was a theme

^Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 53, 45th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
1835),'"1B797“227.
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of civil-military relations between January, 1866, and July 20,
1867, the period to be considered in this chapter.

To some

extent, the two branches of government disagreed about the In
dians because of conflicting policies.

At the same time, their

policies differed because of diverse views.

The dual nature

of the Indian policy was suggested by the Army and Navy Journal,
a leading military organ, when it observed, ”We are now approach
ing the red man with the olive branch in one hand and carbine
in the other0"^
The present discussion takes the study of War-Interior
Indian relations to July 20, 1867, when President Johnson was
empowered to appoint a special civil-military commission which
helped to found a general rtPeace Policy” toward the tribes.
To appreciate the factors which influenced the government to
adopt this ”new” approach it is necessary to understand some
of the trials and errors of the preceding year and a half of
Indian affairs.

In most respects these months witnessed a

continuation of the difficulties of 1865, particularly with
respect to divided authority over the tribes.

The policy

makers also continued to concentrate upon the situation on
the Great Plains, although increasing interest was shown in
problems in the Southwest.

At the same time, growing frontier

pressures, new crises and unprecedented issues devalued past
experience as a guide for action.

p
The Army and Navy Journal. Ill (September 9, 1865),
33* Hereafter this source is cited A&N Jnl.
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PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE AND WAR IN 1866
During the winter of 1865-1866 leaders of the War and
Interior departments anticipated problems to be met when the
snow melted and emigrants resumed their march to the frontier.
Their common objective was to maintain peace with the natives,
Indian Bureau spokesmen were confident this could best be
accomplished through conciliatory means, particularly through
the implementation of existing treaties and others pending
ratification or to be negotiated.
skeptical of this approach.

Most military officers were

When the grass grew, they ex

pected to have to once more demonstrate the power of the govern
ment to unruly tribesmen.
General Sherman, commander of the vast territory stretch
ing from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains and from
Mexico to Canada had a plan of operations as early as January
13*^

Settlement would naturally extend as far west as the soil

supported profitable farming, he figured, and beyond that point
it would be necessary to designate two or three routes of
travel and guard them as well as his limited forces allowed.
If travel was restricted to key lines, blockhouses and small
cavalry patrols might provide at least a degree of security.
When the weather permitted, he would make a tour of military
posts and the territories to Inventory facilities and deter
mine where troops were most needed.

For economic reasons,though,

3SW (P), 186 6 , l|.8l.
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he would have to be "circumspect" about building new forts.^
Meanwhile in the Indian Office, Commissioner Cooley was
contemplating unfinished business in connection with treaties
made the previous fall with various western tribes.

These

agreements would have to be confirmed before he could decide
on agency officials, appropriations and supply contracts.
Also, treaty commissions would have to council with a number
of tribes this coming season.

For instance, the Northwestern

Commission would have to meet with tribes along important
routes to Montana,

It was time, moreover, to organize a

separate territory for the Five Civilized Tribes and other
native groups living on the Southern Plains.'’
As the two departments set to work, the durability of
their Informal division of authority between hostile and
peaceable Indians was put to the test.

Inter-departmental

relations began, though, on a note of cordiality.

Secretary

Harlan was unhappy that General H. H. Sibley was mustered
out of the service before completing duties with the Sioux
commission, but made no Issue of it.^

On February 28 he

thanked Secretary Stanton for the "material aid" his depart
ment gave the peace commissioners in 1865* and added,

^"Sherman to Bowers, January 13. 1866, Letters Sent,
Division of the Mississippi (NA, RG 98). Hereafter these
records are cited Div, Miss. L.S.
'’CIA, 1865, 28, 35,
^Harlan to Stanton, February 23, 1866, D.I.L.S., In
dian Affairs, NA, RG 75,
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I...aa3ure you it will be my desire and careful in
structions to my subordinates to conform the actions of
this Department with your purposes, especially with,.,
remote wild tribes, and as far as possible secure such
unity and harmony of action as to best secure the in
terests of our country and humanity.?
For the next few months the peacemakers were very active.
By July the Senate bad approved treaties with twenty-three difg

ferent tribes or bands.

In the mean time, agreements were

made with fifteen other tribal groups and forwarded to the
Senate or Indian Office in preparation for ratification.9 Com
missioner Cooley was so pleased by these results that he con
cluded that these treaties made 1866 a "memorable” y e a r . ^
While Indian officials and the "Peace Party" were opti
mistic about Indian treaties, most military leaders and frontiers
men considered them mere legal fiction.

Such agreements were

often unenforcible for a variety of reasons.

The Indians, in

the first place, seldom fully understood the documents upon
which they "touched the pen" in exchange for presents.

The

chiefs and headmen who signed were frequently unable or dis
inclined to bind fellow tribesmen to treaty provisions.

Sig

nificantly, non-treaty Indians, who caused the most diffi
culty, completely disregarded bargains with the white men by
other Indians.

Furthermore, the government sometimes made uni

lateral revisions or failed to fulfill its treaty commitments.
Under these circumstances, and abused by frontiersmen who
7Ibid., 133-13*48CIA, 1866, 2-7.
9 Ibld.. 7-15»
10 Ibld.. 2.
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freely violated the government’s pledges, even some of the
most conscientious red men acted without regard to agreements
with tbenWhite Father in Washington,
Various faults of the treaty-making system may be illus
trated by an examination of negotiations with tribes in the
upper reaches of the Platte, Missouri and Yellowstone rivers
in the spring of 1866,

Nowhere was it more urgent to estab

lish peace with the Indians, for Montana was in the midst of
a gold rush reminiscent of earlier rushes in California and
Colorado,

Aware of this situation, the Indian Bureau organized

two peace commissions, comprised, is part, of treaty-makers
who bad visited the Plains in l865>,^
One commission, including Governor Newton Edmunds of
Dakota, Maj. Gen. S. R, Curtis, Orrin Guernsey and Henry W.
Reed, was assigned to treat with tribes on the Upper Missouri,
In May, Curtis and Reed asked General Sherman to provide ra
tions for their sessions at northern forts.

Sherman, who

disdained such proceedings, at first declared he would be
damned if he would allow his posts to be eaten out of house
and home by hungry savages.

Later he relented and authorized

a loan of limited amounts of s t o r e s , ^

The obstacle overcome,

the commission traveled to Fort Berthold and signed a treaty

^ I b l d .. 168-176; HR Ex. D o c ., N o . 165, l+Oth Cong.,
2 sess. (Serial 1339)* 18'^H’, 2, 11; Frederic L, Paxson, History
of the American Frontier
12CIA, 1866, 13-34,
13
Athearn, ojo. clt., 1^9-ij-O.
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with the Arickarees, Gros Ventres and Mandans by which the
Indians ceded about 61+0,000 acres and granted right of way for
roads to the mines in return for annuities and other payments.
Later they went to Port Union and made separate treaties with
the Assinaboines and Grows, who, for similar considerations,
ceded lands between the Missouri and Yellowstone rivers and
agreed not to bother traffic to Helena,"^
On August 25, in a report to Secretary Harlan, the com
missioners generalized about their experiences.

After two

seasons in Indian country and conferences with sixteen or
eighteen tribes, they were somewhat sympathetic toward the
buffalo-hunters of the rolling prairies.

To these Indians,

agriculture was completely "alien" and peace between tribes
was "quite preposterous,”

They relied solely upon game for

existence and naturally opposed intrusions by trains, stages,
boats and white people who scattered and diminished their
sources of subsistence.

Moreover, they had earlier been abused

by "material” changes in a treaty with the government,^ duped
by persons posing as government representatives, excited by
false accounts of the Santees* expulsion from Minnesota and
cheated by whites, including agents of the Indian Bureau,
Therefore, they yielded the right of way for roads through
their lands with "some regret” and "strong protests" against

■^CIA, 1866, 13 -li+.
^ T h e Port Laramie Treaty of 1851 specified fifty
annuity payments, but the Senate cut the number to fifteen
without giving the Indians a choice In the matter,
l6CIA, 1866, 168 -1 7 0 ,
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subsequent Invasions*

These people, the commission concluded,

were more "sinned against than sinning," and the United States
must henceforth take every precaution against subjecting them
to general hostilities because of raids by a few marauders or
false rumors by "malicious, designing and heedless persons."^7
The second peace commission, consisting of Colonel
Henry E* Maynadier, Superintendent E. B. Taylor, Thomas Wistar
and Colonel R. N. McLaren, journeyed to Port Laramie in June
to negotiate with the Ogallala and Upper Brule Sioux and NorthTA
ern Cheyennes and Arapahoes#
A treaty with these Indians
was top priority because their favorite hunting grounds were
crossed by the shortest route to the Montana diggings.

The

Bozeman Trail, or Powder River Road, which ran from Port
Laramie northwest into Powder River country, east of the Big
Horns and then across the Yellowstone to the gold fields, was
about four hundred miles shorter than the route by way of Port
Hall and Virginia City.1^
Numbered among the tribes which gathered at Port Laramie
to participate in the peace t'lks were some of the most ar
dent opponents of white expansion*

The Cheyennes and Arapahoes

were not involved in the 1865 treaty made by their southern
brethren, and the Sioux bands were not among those who signed
treaties at Fort Sully the previous autumn.

PO

Opposed to

17Ibid., 171-173*
l8Ibid., lij..
^ G r a c e R. Hebard and A. R. Brininstool, The Bozeman
Trail, (Cleveland, 1922), Vol. I, 120-123.
20CIA, 1866, 2,

k*
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white encroachments of any sort, many of the red men were much
disconcerted by the commission's announcement that the Great
Father wished to build forts on the trail through their
4.

country.

21

During the course of the discussions Brig, Gen, Henry
B, Carrington arrived with about seven hundred troops.

On

June 17 Carrington was tactlessly introduced to the chiefs as
the "White chief going up to occupy Powder River, the Bighorn
country and the Yellowstone."

22

This was too much for some

of the "non-progressive" Sioux, and presently Red Cloud and
Man-Afraid-of-His-Korses stalked away from the council.

Red

Cloud left, according to one report, brandishing his rifle
and proclaiming, "In this and the Great Spirit I trust for the
right."23
Undeterred, the commission distributed food and gifts
and collected the "X's" of a number of Fort Laramie "Loafers,"
agency Indians and less belligerent Sioux and Cheyennes.

2ii

Without waiting for the outcome of the negotiations, much less
the time-consuming process of ratification, Carrington's command

2^Sen. Ex, D o c . No. 2 1 * 50tb Cong., 1 sess. (Serial
2J?0lj.), 1 8 8 7 , 3-S; tfebard and Brininstool, on. clt.. 3 6 7 *

22

Sen. Ex, Doc. No. 33. 50th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial
25010, 1887 , 67“
^^e r b e r t E, Kahler, "Relations Between the United States
and the Indians Along the Platte River and Bozeman Trail,
1866-1868," Unpublished Master's Thesis (University of Ne
braska, 1930), 3J+, Ufff.
^ “The commission reported a "partly perfected" treaty
with the Cheyennes and a "favorable prospect" of similar
terms with the Arapahoes, (CIA, 1866, 208),
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left, as ordered, to begin construction of forts on Powder
River Road.

Although the treaty gave ,!as much satisfaction

to the parties concerned...as .. .could have been expected,"
the fort-builders were soon to learn that it did not eliminate
Indian resistence to their mission.
Like the first commission, the Port Laramie negotia
tors made some general remarks about the difficulties of
obtaining effective treaties.

Particularly discouraging,

they asserted, were rumors circulated by persons "interested
in keeping up an agitation for the purpose of keeping freights
at high rates." A greater challenge to the permanence of the
treaty than the refusal of certain Indians to come to terms,
was the behavior of white men living in Indian country or
passing through it.2^
With an eye on the Indian Bureau and the peace talks at
various locations, the Army spent most of the year getting
reorganized and established on the frontier.

Late in Feb

ruary, General Sherman announced that it would take months
to recruit and train replacements for "clamorous” volunteers
who had to be mustered out as soon as winter permitted them
to come in from scattered o u t p o s t s , L o o k i n g over his map,
he also recognized that General Pope's Department of the Mis
souri was too large and unwieldy to be properly administered.

2% b i d .
26Ibid., 208-209.
27
'Sherman to J. Sherman, February 23, 1866, Sherman
Papers, Vol. 18.
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In March, at Sherman’s advice, the War Department cut down
Pope’s command by creating the Department of the Platte for
the region north of the Platte.

General-irKJhief Grant assigned

M a j . Gen. Philip St, George Cooke, a western veteran, to head
pQ
the new command.
As the weeks progressed, representatives of states in the
upper Mississippi Valley began to exert pressure on the military to safeguard sundry routes to Montana.

2°
' Still Sherman

insisted that his ’’long, thin line" could protect only the
main routes.

These would Include the Missouri Diver, the

Platte River and Bozeman Trail and the Port Pierre road through
the Black K i l l s , I n

mid-April M a j . Gen, D. B. Sackett was

directed to examine these routes and posts, settlements and
natural resources as far west as Idaho,

"I regret to say that

...we do not now possess a force adequate to the wants of this
extensive region of country," Sherman informed Sackett, "but
you may assure the people...that their safety and the pro
tection of their interests will command our attention as soon
as Congress increases the regular army, and as soon as,.,we
can act with due regard to the interest of all alike.
The following month General Sherman made a preliminary

Sherman objected to Cooke’s selection, feeling that
the latter was not firm enough to handle hostile Indians.
(Sherman to Grant, March 10, 1866, Div. Miss. L.S., NA,RG 9 8 ).
29
Sherman to G, K. Leet, April 17, 1866, Div. Miss,,
L.S., NA, RG 9 8 .

80

HR Ex. Doc. N o . 23. 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1288),

1866, 20.

31Ibld.
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inspection trip of his own.

He visited the Kansas and Union

Pacific railroad construction camps, examined the condition
of Ports Riley and Kearny and observed emigration along
various routes.

The progress of the railroads pleased him,

for they "much simplified” the logistical problems of the
Array.

It looked as though most overland traffic would be

along the Platte River, heavy wagon trains on the south bank
and lighter conveyances on the north.
While at Port Kearny Sherman conferred with General
Carrington, who was then organizing newly-inducted troops
and building crews for his fort-building expedition on Powder
River Road.

Carrington planned to take approximately the same

route Maj. Gen. Patrick Connor had taken on a foray into Sioux
country the summer before.33

His assignment was to build four

forts along the five hundred and forty-five mile trail from
Bridger's Perry, on the North Platte, to Virginia City, Mon
tana Territory.
After meeting with Sherman, Carrington and his command
proceeded with their duties.

During July and August, they

enlarged Camp Connor, renaming it Port Reno, and began work
on Forts Phil Kearny and C. P. Smith.

With the completion

of these small outposts, the Array believed it could meet most

32Ibid., 2.
33
Kahler, '‘Relations Along the Platte River and Boze
man Trail.”

3ii
Sen. Ex. Doc. No.

5>0th Cong., 1 sess, (Serial

2501^), 18BT7 2.
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exigencies in the region between Port Laramie and Virginia
City,

Events were soon to prove, however, that military pre

cautions were no more infallible than the Indian Bureau's
treaties and conciliatory measures.

35

While these fortifications were taking shape, Army head
quarters took further steps to improve military control over
the Plains and Southwest,

On August 6 the Division of the

Mississippi was redesignated the Division of the Missouri and
divided into four departments.

The Department of the Platte

was split into the departments of the Platte, under Maj. Gen,
Cooke, and Dakota, under Maj, Gen, Alfred Terry,

Further south

were the departments of Missouri, commanded by Maj, Gen, Win
field S, Hancock, and Arkansas, headed by Brig, Gen, E, E, C.
Ord.36
Shortly after this reorganization, General Sherman made
a tour of the central and western part of his command.

Accom

panied by his brother John, he first journeyed to Port Laramie,
Enroute, the General became suspicious of rumors about Indian
dangers on the eastern slope of the Rockies, for in five days
on the road he saw no Indians,

37

At Port Laramie he gave spe

cial attention to conditions on the Powder River Road,

After

talking with various Indian and white observers, Sherman con-'■
eluded that there was no danger of a general war if the new

^ Ibld,. Thirty-three whites were reported killed in the
Powder River area before the end of August,
36,
SW (P), 1866, 533.
^HR E xx , Doc, No,
37HR
No. 23
2 3 . 39th Cong., 2 sess, (Serial 1288),
1866, 308; Athearn, 0£, cit,, 56-66,
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forts were kept in readiness*

Most of the older chiefs he

interviewed made repeated declarations of friendship, hut la
mented their inability to restrain their young braves. Treaties
with these tribal leaders, he thought, were just so much
"waste-paper," for neither frontiersmen nor Indians adhered
■59

to them unless their interests were served. '
In September Sherman arrived in Denver and was met by
local dignitaries who promptly requested a military post to
protect their thriving little town from bloodthirsty savages.
He emphatically denied these petitions, arguing that Denver
could raise a thousand men in an hour and should be able to
protect neighboring settlements.^

This experience helped

to convince him that the Array had to worry about not only the
Indians, nawful distances" and interference from Utopians in
the Indian Bureau, but frontiersmen and interested parties who
exaggerated Indian dangers.
After visiting Denver, Sherman inspected posts in West
ern Colorado and New Mexico.
peculiar problem.

The latter territory was a

"There appears to be a civil government

there," he commented,"but as useless as possible, and the
military is expected to do all the dirty w o r k . " ^

Not much

38Ibid., 9,
3^Ibid.. 11 j Athearn,

1 2 8 8 ),

ojd.

clt. . 69.

^ H R Ex. Do c ., No. 23,' 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1 8 5 5 , 13.

^Ibld-, 15.
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could be done this year, though.

The troops would concentrate

on building up the "great central belt of security,” and next
year, perhaps, the division would be strong enough to provide
more comprehensive defense,^
Having obtained much first hand information and some
strong impressions about the military situation in the West,
General Sherman returned to his headquarters in St, Louis0
Most of the year had now been spent in studying frontier needs
and furnishing stopgap protection for vital settlements and
overland routes.

Now it was time to analyze the reports of

field commanders and prepare his annual report and recom
mendations for 1867©
Several other officers had also made inspection tours
and submitted reports to Sherman's office.

Some of their

findings were similar to those of the division commander.
Brig. Gen, Orville E, Babcock, for example, traveled to the
Pacific Coast and back without annoyance from hostile Indians,
In Denver, Babcock, too, was pressed for military protection
by special interest groups,

”0ne man said in my presence," he

remarked, "'money was never so plenty
an Indian w a r . ' " ^

/ a l e *7

as when there was

In the Par West the Indian situation was

not critical; there were occasional raids, but nothing small
cavalry units could not handle
Another investigator, Maj, Gen, John Pope, generalized

^Ibid., 16.
^ 3Ibid.,

k ,

12, 33-31*.

W -Ibld.. 3o
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about the Army’s ability to cope with the Indians of the Plains
and Southwest and had plans for improving protection for railroad-builders, emigrants, miners and settlers in the coming
season,^*9

closing, Grant seconded the appeal of his fron

tier commanders for military control over Indian affairs.
Such a change would save the government money and benefit

both the Indians and white people.

50

Most Indian officials were also engaged in the pre
paration of annual reports in the fall.

Many shared the

optimism of military commanders about the development of
Indian affairs over the past several months,

'’Peace appears

to have been the rule, and hostilities the exception, between
the Mississippi river and Rocky mountains," Secretary Brown-

<1

ing affirmed,"

Commissioner Cooley concurred, extolling the

success of the treaty-makers at length,

52

Cooley and his

subordinates also maintained that, for the most part, 1866
was a year of progress In the civilization of agency Indians,
Much work remained to be done, however, especially in the
Northern Plains and Far Southwest,

53

Those in charge of the Indian service, at least at the
upper echelon, were more charitable toward the officers and

^ 9Ibid., 14.80-1*85,
5°Ibid., 1*80,
^1CIA, 1866, i.
52
Ibid.. 2-16,
53
<Ibid,, passim.
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policies of the military branch than vice versa.

The Army had

been quite critical of illicit trade by Indian traders and the
administration of the agencies.

Attention needed to be given

to both problems, Commissioner Cooley admitted.

At the same

time, he suggested that the military might keep closer check
on the trade between post sutlers and Indians,''

He also re

called past misunderstandings about supplies for the peace com
missioners, but conceded that the War Department "doubtless
bad good reasons for its course

Finally, glossing over

many inter-departmental differences during the past year, the
retiring Commissioner remarked:
It gives me great pleasure to state that, for the
most part, indeed almost without exception, the relations
between the civil and military officers upon the frontier,
necessarily thrown into connexion in Indian matters during
the year, have been of the most cordial character, and
that our superintendents and agents have had frequent
occasions to express their thanks to military commanders
for prompt and efficient assistance,

THE FETTERMAN MASSACRE
The War and Interior departments’ annual reports, sub
mitted to President Johnson late in November, were mutually
optimistic about Indian relations and more or less sanguine
toward Interdepartmental relations.

This was, however, the

calm before another civil-military storm.

Presently a vigorous

dispute over Indian control was touched off by the mucb^ I b i d . , 16-17,
^ I b i d . , 20,
^ 6Ibld,
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publicized Fetterman Massacre of December 21, 1866, near Fort
Phil Kearny, Montana Territory*

Lt, Col. William J. Fetter

man and a detachment of seventy-six men, two officers and two
civilians were ambushed and savagely slaughtered by Sioux,
Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors while enroute to relieve a wood
train.

So shocking was this affair that officers of the two

57
departments found it hard to accept official reports.
Colonel Fetterman, a glory-bent recent- arrival at Fort
Phil Kearny, had previously stood off a large band of Sioux
with a small detachment and had a low regard for their
»

fighting ability.

Hence, he eagerly volunteered to command

the relief party, and, violating orders from the post com
mander, recklessly led his troops into a well-laid trap. Post
physician C, M. Hines later related the sickening details of
the scalped and torn bodies which were brought in "like you
see hogs brought to market."'’®
General Carrington immediately sent an urgent appeal
for reinforcements, declaring that his troops had experienced
a fight "unexampled in Indian w arfare."^

In response, De

partment of the Platte Commander Cooke dispatched Brig, Gen,
Henry W. Wessells to take charge of Fort Phil Kearny and

57
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 16,39th Cong,, 2 sess. (Serial
1277), 18£77 9.
—
—
<f>

Ibid., 8, 10; Sen. E x . D oc. No. 33, $0th Cong., 1
sess, (Serial 250[}.), 18877 ^0, 1+1, 61j.j Hebard and Brininstool, 0£. cit., I, 303-305; George B. Grinnell, The Fighting
Cheyennes (^ew York, 1915).
------ ----5q
Sen. E x . Doc. No. 15, 39tb Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1277), 18£77 3.
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conduct a winter campaign against the hostiles.

60

Meanwhile,

excited accounts of the massacre circulated throughout the
countr y.^

Congress, the Indian Bureau and the Army were put

under great pressure to explain the tragedy, revenge the death
of Fetterman*s command and eliminate the causes of the out
break.
Commissioner Lewis V, Bogy's first reaction was that
the Indians involved were on a "friendly visit" to Fort Phil
Kearny when met by Colonel Fetterman's force.

The latest

word from that vicinity described the red men as peaceable,
and there was no apparent reason why they should have suddenly
gone on the warpath.

"Now under these circumstances, the

question is presented," he asserted, "whether it is not the
duty of this Office, with the view of putting the blame where
Ap
it properly belongs, to have an investigation."
Generaliz
ing about the Army's treatment of the Indians, Bogy added:
The policy of the Government and particularly of
the military has heretofore been to chastise the In
dians when any white men were killed, regardless of the
fact whether they were assailants, or defending them
selves, and I am informed that this is the disposition
of the military in this very case...This policy I con
ceive to be very mischievous and has heretofore led to
a great deal of trouble.
Military leaders had various views about the causes of

60The winter campaign proved abortive because of ex
tremely bad weather. (Dunn, op, clt.. I4.3 0 )•
^ H e b a r d and Brininstool, op, pit,, I, 323 ,
62
——
Bogy to Browning, January 3, 1867 , I.O.R.B. No. 16,
1866 -1 8 6 7 , NA, RG 7 5 0
63Ibid.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Ill

the massacre.

General Cooke blamed the Interior Department

for failing to check the sale of arms to the hostiles.^

Gen

eral Sherman, embarrassed and irate about the disaster,
criticized General Carrington for taking insufficient pre
cautions and recommended that he be removed.

But he also

announced, ”We must act with vindictive earnestness against
the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women and chil
dren.

Nothing else will reach the root of this case.”^

Finally, General Grant, also convinced that the post commander
was at fault, demanded a thorough investigation.^
While the Army recognized some of its own mistakes, the
severest censure came from the Indian Bureau.

On January 23,

1867, Commissioner Bogy told Secretary Browning that he was
certain Military interference had caused the Phil Kearny up
rising.

General Cook had agitated the Indians, he argued,

by preventing them from buying arms and ammunition for hunt
ing purposes.

General Sherman was also mistaken in his plan

^ S e n . E x . Doc. N o . 1 6 , 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1277)* iB577
Athearn, 0£. clt.. 99*
69
Sen. E x . Do c . N o . 16. 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1277)> 1 8 6 7 , Jj-J AtFearn, 0£. clt.. 9 9 .

66

Sen. E x . Doc. N o . 1 6 . 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1277)» 1 8 6 7 ,
^be Army had erred in various ways in this
case. Fresh recruits had been stationed in an area where In
dian relations were most volatile, Colonel Fetterman was cul
pable for violating orders and Carrington was too preoccupied
with fort construction to maintain accurate intelligence on
the build-up of hostile strength near Fort Phil Kearny. Further
more, Generals Carrington and Cooke had been at odds for some
time, and this, too, hampered military operations and prepared
ness. (Kabler, ^Relations Along the Platte River and Boze
man Trail,” 72; Sen. Ex. D o c . No. 13, I|.Oth Cong., 1 sess,
(Serial 1277), lHFf, 33.)
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to deal "summarily” with tribesmen outside restricted areas,
Unmolested overland travel was essential, but the way to ob
tain this privilege was through treaties, annuities and "judi
cious management,” not military action,

”1 think the greatest

difficulty I encounter, in administering the affairs of this
Bureau," Bogy complained, "is the constant interference on
„67
the part of the military with all Indian affairs,"
A few days later Bogy commented further on the massacre.
Although the military exaggerated the affair, he observed,
many soldiers had lost their lives and the country demanded
to know why.

Showing his prejudice and underestimation of the

hostiles’ strength and disposition, Bogy set forth the follow
ing

"explanation":
,,,the Indians, almost in a state of starvation, having
made repeated attempts at a conference, that they might
make peace and obtain supplies for their families, and
the rescinding of the order prohibiting them from ob
taining arms and ammunition, were rendered desperate,
and resorted to the strategem which proved too success
ful, It seems as if the officer commanding could have
avoided the catastrophe; and it seems also that men thus
armed could have repelled an attack by all the Indians
in Western Dakota,
On February Ip, looking beyond the present controversy

to the general problem of Indian-white relations, Commissioner
Bogy outlined a program for the future.

The first step to

ward remedying existing difficulties, he suggested, was to
appoint several commissioners of "high character" to spend the
coming summer studying the possibility of locating all tribes
on one or two reservations where they could farm, raise live6 7Sen. Ex, Doc, No. 1 6 , 39th Cong,, 2 sess, (Serial 1277),
1867, 12-147
—
—
m ,
6 8Ibld.» 1 1 .
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stock, attend school and overcome uncivilized habits.

69

Congress was not to act on this proposal for several months,
but a special commission was soon dispatched to Montana to
investigate the Fetterman affair and the feasibility of new
treaties with tribes in that territory.

70

While this group

was engaged in its duties, civil and military authorities
continued to wrangle over the question of how to manage the
Indians,

EARLY DEBATE OVER TRANSFER OF THE INDIAN BUREAU
One result of the publicity given the Fetterman disaster
was a heated congressional debate over which executive de
partment should control Indian affairs.

Periodically, since

before the Civil War, bills had been introduced to restore
War Department authority over the Indian B u r e a u . ^

The sub

ject was widely discussed in 1865, and in 1866 two attempts
were made to accomplish transfer, or re-transfer, of the
Bureau,

The first came in May, when Senator W. M. Stewart

of Nevada introduced a transfer bill which was killed In the
72
Committee on Indian Affairs0
Later Senator John Sherman of
Ohio, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and brother of
General Sherman, tried to attach a transfer amendment to the
annual Indian appropriation bill.

Senators Sherman and

Stewart engaged in a lively argument with transfer opponent

73-Cong. Globe. 39th Cong., 2 sess., 1677*
^ C o n g . Globe. 39tb Cong., 1 sess., 2613,
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James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin before the Senate defeated the
amendment by a 21 to 12 vote.

73

In the early part of 1867 many observers maintained
that the troubles in Dakota and Montana were not due to mili
tary provocation, as Commissioner Bogy claimed, but the system
of divided jurisdiction over the Indians,

On January 17 The

Nation presented a caustic editorial on the recent Indian
hostilities, declaring, nOur whole Indian policy is a system
_7li
of mismanagement, and in many parts one of gigantic abuse," ^
It would not do to "deny or gloss /over/" the red men’s raids
and massacres or excuse the outrages which aggravated them.
Under the present policy neither civilian nor military author!
ties could be held responsible for the behavior of the nation’
wards.

This "dlvlsum imperium,t ought to be replaced by War

Department control.

Then the Army could "corral" the tribes

men, keep them in a "healthful state of non-intercourse," and
effectively protect vital overland routes, ^
A week later Brig, Gen, Ely S, Parker, later a Com
missioner of Indian Affairs, gave General Grant a detailed
list of legislative proposals relating to Indian affairs.
First and foremost on the list, which was to be forwarded to
the House Committee on Military Affairs, was a recommendation
that the Indian Office be re-transferred to the War Department
?3lbid., 3506-3^07; 3# 2 - 3 5 5 9 .

7^ h e Nation, IV (January 17, 1867)» 5l«
7^Ibld,, 51-52.
76
For a full discussion of Parker’s proposals, see Sen,
E x . Doc. N o . 13. i|.0th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1308), I|.5-ij.9*
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Parker contended that with the military branch in control of
the Indians there would be more forcible and faithful fulfill
ment of treaties, honest expenditure of Indian funds, less
illicit trade and better r elations between government authori
ties and their charges.

77

Accompanying Parker’s letter of recommendations was
one by General John Pope, the Array’s leading theorist on
Indian management.

Pope first pointed out the fallacies of

divided jurisdiction.

Two sets of officials, responsible to

different superiors, he stated, naturally could not act in
harmony0

When hostilities occurred (and what constituted

hostilities was not clear), the military usually ended up
making fruitless and costly chase.

If the Indians were

cornered, they would-go to some agent and persuade him to pro
tect them with a peace treaty, MWhlle the army is fighting
the Indians at one end of the line,” he lamented, "Indian
agents are making treaties and furnishing supplies at the
other end, which supplies are at once used to keep up the
conflict.

,.78

Transfer the Indians to Army control, and this

frustrating game would be over, because the natives knew and
respected force.

At the same time, soldiers, more than any

other group, wanted to keep the peace and avoid "arduous and
harassing field service,"

If a military agent cheated the

Indians, he would quickly be court-martialed.

"The military

are necessary," the General concluded, "— the civil officers

77Ibid., 2*2-1*$.
78Ibld., $0,
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are not; and, as it is essential that the one or the other be
displaced, I cannot see what doubt can exist as to which party
must give way."

79

At the end of January, armed with evidence such as the
letters of Parker and Pope, advocates of transfer in the House

of Representatives sought to achieve their goal by amending a
80
Senate bill to reorganize the Indian service.
The bill in
question was basically the handiwork of Senator J, R, Doo
little’s 1869 joint special committee on the condition of the
8l
Indian tribes.
Among other things, it called for the estab
lishment of five inspection boards with circuit court authority,
division of the Indian country into inspection districts, and
annual investigations by the boards*

82

Leading the fight to amend this bill were Representa
tives Robert C. Schenck of Ohio, Chairman of the Committee on
Military Affairs, John A. Kasson of Iowa, William A. Darling of
New York and Andrew S. Sloan of Wisconsin.

They appealed to

the emotions and providence of the House, presenting lurid
accounts of Indian barbarities and characterizing the administra
tive procedures of the Indian Bureau as corrupt, wasteful and

79Ibid., ij.9-^2.
^°Cong. Globe. 39th Cong., 2 sess. 8 9 8 .
SlGeneral Parker’s proposals were also introduced by
Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, a long-time advocate of
transfer. The section pertaining to transfer, however, was
dropped in the Senate Military Committee, because it was known
that the House planned to amend the Doolittle bill. (Cong.
G lo b e ,
39th Cong., 2 sess., 1677; Garfield, "The Indian Ques
tion,
31 .)
Sen. Rpt. No. 196, 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1279),
1867, 8-9c
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brother John that he soon expected to be very busy taking
charge of the Indians,
But now the bill was returned to a tougher arena, the
Senate,

Some of the same leaders who defeated similar pro

posals in 1866 were prepared to present a barrage of reasons
why the Army should not control the Indian service.

The most

formidable opponent was Senator Doolittle, a ten-year veteran
of the Committee of Indian Affairs,

He could be counted upon

to cite evidence from the voluminous testimony appended to the
OO

joint committee report which had just been completed.
The Doolittle Committee had given extensive considera
tion to the question of civil or military control of Indian
affairs.

89

It reported that arguments on each side were "not

without force,'’ Army administration would eliminate inter-departmental conflicts, facilitate necessary operations against
hostile bands and provide agents who could be court-martialed
for dishonesty.

But agency supervision required personnel who

O
Sherman to J, Sherman, February 1, 1867, Sherman
Papers, Vol. 20,

88

The report of the Joint Special Committee appointed
under the joint resolution of March 3, 1865, was accompanied
by a five hundred and twenty-seven page appendix,
(Sen. R-pt.
No. 156, 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1279),
fiq
7The joint committee also concluded: first, that the
tribes, except in Indian Territory were rapidly decreasing in
population because of disease, intemperance, wars, white en
croachment and the ’’irrepressible conflict between superior
and an inferior race1’; second, that most Indian wars were caused
by white aggression; and third, that the evils of the Indian
system could ’’never be remedied until the race is civilized or
shall entirely disappear.” To alleviate interim abuses, though
Congress was asked to provide an inspection system of the type
in the bill now before the Senate. (Ibid., 308)0
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were not subject to orders which might suddenly take them else
where.

Besides, soldiers were notorious for demoralizing

Indian women and precipitating costly wars, and Indian treatie
and lands were closely connected with other services under the

Interior Department.

90

In the final analysis, the committee

decided, the current system of divided control was not without
its advantages.
The inconveniences arising from the occasional con
flicts and jealousies between officers appointed under the
Interior and War Departments are not without some bene
fits also; to some extent they serve as a check upon each
other; neither are slow to point to the mistakes and abuses of the other* It is therefore proper that they
should be independent of each other, receive their
appointments from and report to different heads of de
partments. Weighing this matter and all the arguments
for and against the proposed change, your committee are
unanimously of the opinion that the Indian Bureau should
remain where it is
Besides the curious argument for divided control over
the Indians as a check upon administrative abuses, the antitransfer faction of the Senate presented numerous reasons why
the military might not be depended upon to improve Indianwhite relations.

The Army, they contended, often spent too

much for supplies and transportation, and its officers were
not bonded like civil agents.

Moreover, War Department con

trol in the pre-l81|9 period had not been effectual, and many
Indian

chiefs opposed a resumption of military rule.

Against

these considerations, transfer opponents, led by Nevada’s
Stewart, stressed the pride and responsibility of military

9°Sen. Rpt. No. l£ 6 , 39 th Gong., 2 sess. (Serial 1279),
9 1 Ibld.. 7 .
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officers, the ill-effects of joint jurisdiction and the preeedent of military control in the South,

92

But a majority

favored the status quo, and, on February 22, transfer was
93
again rejected by a vote of 2 i| to 1 3 ,

The defeat of the transfer amendment brought a sigh of
relief from the Interior officials and their humanitarian
supporters, but negative reactions from military leaders and
frontiersmen.

Civilian authorities, busy negotiating new trea

ties even while the congressional debate was in progress, were
now hopeful that the coming season would bring a flowering of
Q|i
civilization by tribes recently assigned to reservations.
On
the other band, western commanders now expected further frus
trations as their little army resumed its police duties in
Indian country.

General Sherman, already agitated by recent

reports that the Indian Bureau was allowing its traders dis
cretion in selling arms and ammunition, struggled to retain
his composure,

"It simply postpones the agony," he wrote John

Sherman, "But I don’t intend to distress myself, but will try
and let the Indian Bureau fulfill their destiny.

We surely

cannot be held responsible for the peace of the Frontier if
it is adjudged we are trespassers everywhere in Indian country
and have no right to pursue and prevent collision

and

------- 92--------Cong. Globe. 39th Cong., 2 sess., 1712-1719

93
Ibid., 1720, Many senators opposed transfer because
they regarded it as a proposal designed to pressure the upper
house into relinquishing its treaty power over the Indian
"nations." See below.
9k
For a discussion of treaties negotiated in February
and March, see CIA, 1867, 35, Charles J, Kappler, Indian Affairs:
Laws and Treaties ,(Washington, 190i|), Vol. II, 951-976.
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qd
troubles,”

Before long the peace-makers and war-makers were

busy at their respective tasks,

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST
In the early post-Civil War period the government ’ 3
Indian policy was geared especially to meet problems of tribes
inhabiting the Great Plains,

During the debate over transfer

of the Indian Office to the War Department in February, 1867,
however, considerable attention was given to civil-military
relations in a second trouble zone, the Southwest,

There the

military played a prominent role, because many warlike bands
persistently preyed upon mining camps, settlements and over
land transportation.

In New Mexico, by 1866, the Mescaleros,

Navajoes, Mahuache and Capote Utes and peaceable Pueblos were
assigned to reservations, and only a few groups, such as the
Gila Apaches, were on the warpath.

But the administration of

Indian prisoners at Bosque Redondo Reservation caused many
headaches for officials of both the War and Interior depart
ments,

Meantime, in Arizona, where until 1866 "a definite

policy,..remained to be charted,” there were differences of
opinion about how to deal with the warlike Hualapais, Yavaq6
pais, Mimbrenos and other wild Apache bands.
The situation at Bosque Redondo, officially under War
^ S herman to J. Sherman, February 21;, 1867, Sherman
Papers, Vol. 20.
96
Ralph Hedrick Ogle, Federal Control of the Western
Apaches, 181;8-1S66 (Albuauerque, 19^0) , 5>7;CIA, lff66, 27-28,
31-33J CIA, 1867, 10-13.
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Department control until November, 1867, was a favorite topic
with those who opposed military control of Indian affairs.
This small reservation was established near Port Sumner during
the Civil War to accommodate Mescalero and Navajo prisoners
brought in by volunteers under Maj. Gen. James H. Carleton.

97

While guarding the reservation, soldiers began the '’noble ex
periment” of teaching the Indians to irrigate, farm and improve
their livestock.

98

As critics observed, though, the cost of

food, clothing and labor for the seven thousand Navajoes was
about $1,£00,000 a year as compared to less than $ 2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
for all the Indians under the control of the Indian Bureau,

99

Bosque Redondo was not only expensive; it was an admin
istrative problem.

Although the Army had final authority, a

civilian agent was supposed to handle much of the paperwork,
"The division of authorities makes trouble constantly," Com
missioner Cooley complainedo^^

Civil authorities frequently

found fault with the Army administrators, and one superin
tendent, Michael Steck, even refused to send an agent to the
reservation.^^

To further confuse matters, "anti-Bo3que"

citizens of New Mexico Territory, continually agitated for the
TO?
removal of the Indians.xwc- The tribesmen, too, disliked the
^ S e n . Rpt. No. 156, 39th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1279),

1867, 101-102.

98CIA, 1866, 1^8-150.
99
,k
Ibig.. ll|6. The Indian Bureau’s appropriation for 1866
was $2,i}.68,656,00. For a discussion of graft and corruption in
Army expenditure of funds at Bosque Redondo, see Edward E. Dale,
The Indians of the Southwest (Norman, 19i|9)* note, 58.
fSfm,

1 8 6 6 , 31.

lulDale, o£* clt.. 56.
1 0 2 cia, 1 8 6 6 , 1 3 1 .
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location and were not quieted until the reservation was finally
abandoned in 1 8 6 8 , ^ ^
Meanwhile, in Arizona expediency governed the action of
both Army and Indian service officials.

Early in 1866 Maj,

Gen 0 Irwin McDowell, commander of the Department of Cali
fornia, ordered a series of expeditions to ’’overawe” the
Apaches, hoping they would surrender and settle on reserva
tions,

This policy was criticized, on one hand by Superin

tendent of Indian Affairs George W, Leihy, who believed such
operations "fruitless” and expensive, and, on the other hand,
by territorial officials and residents who wanted an "extermina
tion policy."10^
Late in 1866, after a campaign deep into Tonto country,
Colonel Guido Ilges of Port Grant signed a peace treaty with
headmen of the Aravapa, Tonto and Pinal Apache bands.

These

Indians agreed to live at peace on a designated reservation
10<
except when hunting or gathering food, ^ But high-ranking
officers of both the War and Interior departments rejected the
treaty.

General McDowell reprimanded Ilges for making "ir

regular, injudicious and embarrassing" commitments, declaring
that Army officers could negotiate only armistices,

^■®^Por conflicting reports on physical conditions at
Bosque Redondo see Ibid,, 1 31-1^2 and Dale, 0£, clt.. 57-58.
10 k
Ogle, 0£, clt,, 58-60,

10 ^ Ibld,. 62 -6 3 .
Ibid., 63« Although abortive, this treaty encouraged
Indian officials to make other attempts to conciliate hereto
fore intractable Apaches,
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In the early part of 1867 inter and intra-departmental
differences continued to plague government-Indian relations.
Superintendent George W. Dent, General Grant’s brother-inlaw, favored more vindictive punishment of the red men than
the department commander was prepared to deliver.

Dent advo

cated ’’active, offensive, persistent, combined and simultaneous
war,” not ’’ostensible d e m o n s t r a t i o n . S o m e district com
manders, such as General J. E. Gregg of the District of Pres
cott and Upper Colorado, wanted to make war on all Indians
off specified reservations, but General McDowell opposed
’’wholesale war against a large body of friendly Indians,
facing starvation because of congressional negligence , ”^®8
Subsequently, Army operations were limited to minor "spirited”
engagements which, in tbs opinion of Acting Commissioner
Charles Mix, did little to improve the state of affairs ,^-®9

FURTHER DIFFICULTIES ON THE PLAINS
During the early months of 1867 General Sherman was
again preparing to defend emigration and overland trans
portation in the Division of the Missouri.

This year he

planned to protect four principal routes:

a new road from

Minnesota to Montana, the Platte Valley road, the Smoky Hill
^®^Ibid., 65o Dent arrived at his post on December 19,

1 8 6 6 , to find that his predecessor had been murdered by
Apaches. Undoubtedly this experience affected the policy
he proposed.

108 Ibid., 6 6 .
1 09 CIA, 1 8 6 7 , 1 0 .
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trail to Colorado and New Mexico, and the Arkansas route through
Kansas to Port Union, New Mexico,

Travel would be restricted

in accordance with an order put out by General Pope,

Among

other things, there would be specific rendezvous points for
each route, trains would have to consist of at least twenty
wagons and thirty armed men, and escorts would be furnished
upon formal notification,^^

c
In the absence of other forms of

111

law, the Army would govern and "use the musket pretty freely,'
Sherman had other plans, too,

"I will remark," he

affirmed, "that defensive measure. / J i s J will not answer
Tip
against Indians,"
There are many hostiles northwest of
Port Laramie and on the Central and Southern Plains who needed
to be brought to terms, chastised perhaps, for crimes and vio
lations of treaties.

General Alfred Sully with about two

thousand troops would deal with the hostile Sioux and Northern
Cheyennes and Arapahoes in the northern theater and General
W, S. Hancock with the Cheyennes and Kiowas in the South,
Certainly military officers were the proper judges of Indian
hostility; civil agents did not live among the roaming bands.
There was but one effective way to treat warlike red men,
Sherman concluded.

Troops "must get among them, and must

kill enough of them to inspire fear, and then conduct the

•^^ S e n . Ex, Doc. No, 2, l^Oth Cong,, 1 sess, (Serial
~

1 3 0 8 ), 1867, 2-£7

1:L1Sherman to G. K. Leet, March 1 3 , 1867, Letters Re
ceived, Military Division of the Missouri, Special Pile, NA,
RG 9 8 , Hereafter these records are cited Div. Mo. L,R#

112 Ibid.
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remainder to places where Indian agents can and will reside
among them, and be held responsible for their conduct
The implementing of these plans, however, proved dif
ficult

First of all, there was the ever-present problem of

intervention by the Interior Department, which was hesitant to
recognize a state of hostilities.

In some cases agents seemed

to fabricate reasons for wanting a truce to parley with the
natives.

"So long as the Indian Agents have the disburse

ment of annuities,” Sherman exclaimed, "Indians are meant to
be killed, and citizens are forced to expose themselves
It would much "simplify the game," he told Secretary Stanton
in June, if the President would consign the nomadic plains
Indians to the Army,

As matters stood, fifty braves wandering

between the Platte and Arkansas rivers could "checkmate"
three thousand soldiers by forcing them to guard every train,
lid
station and railroad crew,
To really do an effective
job, the military ought to have five thousand mounted volun
teers and authority to invade north of the Platte and south
of the Arkansas, where the hostiles took refuge from Army
patrols
Handicapped by a shortage of manpower, division of
authority and treaty restrictions, the Army was also harassed

•^Ibid.
^■^Sherman to J. Sherman, April 3, 1867 , Sherman
Papers, Vol. 21,
1-^Sherman to Stanton, June 17, 1867, I.O.L.R., Cen
tral Superintendency, Vol. I,
^^Sherman to Grant, June 2£, 1867 , Div. Mo. L.R.,
Special File, NA, RG 9 8 .
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by tha actions and antagonism of territorial leaders and resi
dents.

Frontiersmen never seemed to be satisfied that the

military was doing enough to protect their settlements and
embryonic enterprises.

Governors, such as Acting Governor

Thomas Francis Meagher of Montana Territory- were constantly
sounding the alarm and demanding more regulars.

11? Sometimes

the complaint was that Army officers did not understand or
appreciate the dangers facing border towns.

For example, a

citizen of Denver who grieved the plight of his "unfortunate
and used up community” sarcastically advised General Sherman
against judgments based upon "flying visits” to the W e s t , ^ ®
In addition, westerners often agitated the tribes or spread
disconcerting false rumors about military disasters, such as
the "Fort Buford m a s s a c r e L i k e

it or not, the terri

tories bad to provide much of their own defense in 1867,
While Sherman and his subordinates wrestled with the
problems of guarding an extensive frontier, officials of the
Indian Bureau, temporarily caught up in their treaty-making,
busied themselves with sundry routine duties.

The letting of

contracts for annuities, supplies and miscellaneous purchases
the appointment of agency officials, the planning of building

■'"^Athearn, op,, cit., 139-li|iu
XlS
M. K, Delano to Sherman, June lip, 1867, Sherman
Papers, Vol. 21,
119
There was a false rumor in the spring of 1867 that
the entire force at Fort Buford, Dakota Territory,had been
wiped out.
(Robert G. Athearn, "The Fort Buford 'Massacre,'"
Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XLI /March, 195^7,
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educational and economic programs and the handling of stacks
of correspondence and records were unglamorous but vital as
pects of federal Indian relations.

At remote reservations,

agency employees, most of them honest, underpaid and over
worked, labored to teach their subjects to sow wheat or raise
cattle, speak English, care for the sick or improve sanitation and overcome superstitions and vices.

120

During the spring, special commissioners visited the
Northern plains to inspect the progress and problems of the
government’s wards.

Father P, J, DeSmet, who traveled to

various agencies along the Missouri, found most of the Indians
well-disposed and interested in "stirring up the ground,"
Likewise, Generals Parker and Sully were gratified by the b e 
havior and ambition of certain tribes in Nebraska and Dakota
Territory,

1 PI

Encouraged by such reports and signs of im

proved relations under a policy of conciliation, Interior
Department spokesmen expressed a continuing concern over in
discriminate military expeditions.

Secretary Browning set

the tone for critics of the war policy, maintaining that the
Army should confine itself to the protection of roads and let
civilian negotiators take care of the establishment of peace
between the Platte and Arkansas,

122

120CIA, 1867, 30-37ff.
121Ibid., 2l].l-2i^.
•^^Browning to
Special File, HA, EG 98,

ott°, June 3, 1867, Div, Mo, L,R.,
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THE PAWNEE PORK INCIDENT AND
ESTABLISHMENT OP THE PEACE COMMISSION
Relations between the civil and military branch were
again strained by an incident which took place about thirty
miles west of Port Larned, Kansas, in the spring of 1867*

On

April 19, after unsuccessful attempts to council with Southern
Cheyenne and Sioux leaders, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock,
commander of the Department of the Missouri, ordered his
troops to destroy their villages on Pawnee Pork.

Two hundred

and seventy-two lodges were burned or removed and great
quantities of supplies and equipment were destroyed or con
fiscated as punishment for the Indians* "bad faith.”123
a result of this arbitrary action, Hancock was criticized
by Indian officials and high-ranking Army officers alike*
The details of this affair were later revealed by a
congressional investigation.

For months the government had

attempted to persuade the Cheyennes to leave the vicinity of
the Republican and Smoky Hill rivers in compliance with their
treaty of October, 1865*

But many influential red men had

not signed that agreement and refused to be bound by i t . ^ *
While no serious difficulties arose in 1866, settlers and
military officers complained of the presence of armed tribes
men in the path of Kansas Pacific construction crews*

Ulti

mately, frontier pressure led Congress to appropriate #150,000

Ex. Doc. No. 2k0, ijlst Cong., 2 sess* (Serial li*25)>
1870, 29, 657 B5*
■^■^Grinnell, ££. clt., 2ij5-2lf6.
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for a military expedition into the Central Plains, and in
February, 1867, General Sherman directed Hancock to put his
troops in readiness.12'’
Hancock sent advance notification of his plans to
Colonel E. W, Wynkoop, agent for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes,
and Colonel J. R. Leavenworth, agent for the Kiowas and Comanches.

The expedition, he explained, did not necessarily

mean war, but was intended to "show the Indians,,,we are able
to chastise any tribes who may molest people who are traveling
across the plains,"

126

the Indians wanted it —

Thus, with professions of peace —

if

Hancock marched a fourteen-hundred-

man force to Fort Larned in early April,

127

On the 12th, after delays caused by bad weather, a few
Cheyenne leaders came to the post and listened to the soldiers
demands that they leave Kansas,

Professing their intention

to remain at peace, the chiefs then returned to Pawnee Fork,
where their people and a party of Sioux were camped.

There

upon Hancock, disappointed by the turn-out for his council,
led his command to the vicinity of the Indians’ villages.

Be

fore further talks could be held, though, many of the red men
hastily packed up and fled.

The tribal spokesmen apologized,

saying that their followers feared another Chivington massacre
12^

£bid,, 2)4.6 ; Sherman to Grant, February 1 8 , 1867>
Telegrams Received, Office of the Secretary of War, 1867 , NA,
RG 9 8 , Hereafter these records are cited W.D.T.R.
126HR E x . D o c . H o . 2liQ. 1+1 Cong., 2 sess. (Serial llj.25)
1870, 92.
127
A 'Grinnell, o£0 cit., 21+7 - 2 )4.8 .
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But Hancock insisted that they were anxious to get away be
cause they had been plotting to make war and sent Maj. Gen#
George Custer with a detachment of cavalry to try to cut off
their escape*
Custer had a fruitless chase.
of recent raids by a war-party —
burned buildings.

He found only the results

several murdered whites and

Although there was no specific proof,

Custer informed his commander that there was "no doubt” that
the Indians from Pawnee Fork were responsible for these
crimes,

129

Hancock then proceeded to destroy the villages,

having previously written,- "It is a cheap victory to burn
this camp, but I feel it a.e imperative duty to do so.

Its

destruction will be of great loss to the Indians, unless the
Indian Department restores it, as I understand it has done in
other cases heretofore,n^30
Hancock was right about the reaction to be expected
from the Interior Department.

He was severely criticized by,

among others, Acting Commissioner Charles E. Mix and Agents
Leavenworth and Wynkoop.

In Wynkoop1s opinion, for instance,

the expedition had been a "mistake" from start to finish. The
troops had given every indication of re-enacting the Sand
Creek massacre to the very Indians who recalled that in
famous affair most vividly.

In short, Wynkoop commented:

-L28
HR Ex, Doc. No. 240. i^Ist Cong., 2 seas. (Serial
1425), 1870, Fo-82}' Grinnell, op. cit.. 248ff.

129

HR Ex. Doc. No, 2k0, i).lst cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1425), 1 870 , £ 9 .
13°Ibid., 67, 85.
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The nation knows and I know who General Hancock is —
know him for the good, brave, faithful soldier, who has
won the proud position he now holds through gallant and
meritorious services; but the Indians were not aware of
General Hancock's antecedents, and had no means of dis
criminating between him and Colonel Chivington, or dis
tinguishing the man from monster0131
Such censure greatly irritated Hancock,

He defended

his actions in a letter to Army headquarters, maintaining that
the Indians were in effect at war.
prove that they were not
by General Custer,

Nothing had been shown to

to blame for the crimes discovered

In addition, a long list of unprovoked

murders and depredations in 1866 and 186? justified the punish
ment which had been meted out.

Lastly, because the peaceable

intentions of the expedition had been announced, there was no
excuse for the behavior of either the Indians or their agents,^32
In General Sherman’s view, the military report on the
Pawnee Pork affair was ’’satisfactory.”^33

yet General Han

cock later heard rumors that the division commander had
changed his mind and requested another vote of confidence,

1%

Even more distressing to Hancock, though, was General Grant’s
reaction.

Grant rejected his explanation and proposed to

reimburse all the Cheyennes and Sioux who could not be convicted of specific crimes against white people,

13^

131lbid,, 4,-26, 37-41.
132Ibid,, 111-118,
133sherman to Leet, July 1, 1867, Letters Received, Ad
jutant General’s Office, NA, RG 94, Hereafter these records are
AGO, L,R.
-^Hancock to Sherman, May 24, 1868, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 23,
-^Hancock to Grant, May 23, 1867; Grant to Hancock,
May 23, 1867, Div, Mo, Special Pile, Selected Documents on
Indian Affairs, 1867-1869, NA, RG 9 8 .
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In the wake of VTar-Interior contention sover the Pawnee
Pork episode, Congress took steps to secure peace and more
systematic management of Indian affairs.

On July 8, the

Senate requested the Interior Department to submit reports
and information pertaining to existing difficulties and the
disposition of different tribes, along with suggestions on
how to achieve a ”speedy termination of pending hostilities
and prevent Indian wars in the future,”

A few days later

Acting Secretary W. T, Otto forwarded investigation reports
on the Fetterman and Pawnee Pork incidents and recommendations
by the new Commissioner, N, G. Taylor,
The report on the Port Phil Kearny affair exonerated
all living military officers, but questioned General Cooke’s
judgment in not sending more troops to the unsettled Powder
River region.

137

It was especially critical of certain non-

military groups which seemed to encourage Indian wars.
Freighters, contractors and speculators wanted hostilities,
because they profited from shipping army supplies.

For ex

ample, Union Pacific Railroad officials and employees favored
war, since the government paid two cents a pound for freight
and ten cents a mile for troops carried from Omaha to North
Platte,

In fact, two-thirds of the Union Pacific’s business
T oA
was with the War Department,

138S e n , E x . Dpc. N o , 13, i;Oth Cong., 1 sess. (Serial
1308), 1867, 1.
137ibid.. 66,
-l38Ibid., 60,
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Maj. Gen, John B, Sanborn's report on the treatment of
the Sioux and Cheyennes at Pawnee Pork was a denunciation of
General Hancock, western interest groups and the war policy.
Imagining how Hancock’s speeches may have sounded to the rela
tives of Sand Creek massacre victims, Sanborn stated, "You
Indians permitted our army to visit your villages, supposing
it friendly, and we killed your women and children and old
men, captured and drove away your ponies, burned your lodges,
How^.we are going to visit your village again, and if you do
not trust us, and dare leave before our arrival, we will burn
it up and wage a war of extermination against you."1 ^

This

"revolting" war policy was not in the public interest, he con
tended j it was a mockery practiced by contractors, ranchers
and certain military leaders.

The argument for war to safe

guard travel and transportation was an "absurdity," for the
prerequisite of safety was peace,
Summing up these and other reports, Commissioner Taylor
further deprecated the use of force.

Most Indian troubles

could be traced to white injustices, he argued.

To prevent

a tragic and expensive general war, the government must ter
minate military operations and conclude new, comprehensive
treaties,These

agreements should consolidate all the

tribes on a few large reservations where the natives could be
educated, trained to provide for themselves through industrial
139Ibld., 112.
^Ibid.,

11-113.

^Ibid., 1-5.
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pursuits and prepared for citizenship.

It was advisable to

locate these reservations north of Nebraska and west of the
Missouri for Indians living north of the Platte and east of
the Rocky Mountains; south of Kansas and west of

Arkansas for

Indians living south of the Platte and east of Arizona and
at other selected points west of the mountains for far west
ern tribes
Congress was impressed by Taylor’s suggestions.

Most

of his proposals were encompassed in the act of July 20 which
authorized President Johnson to appoint a special commission
•>I a

to negotiate peace treaties with hostile tribes.

The re

nowned ’’Peace Commission” was to include Commissioner Taylor,
John B. Henderson, chairman of the Senate Committee on In
dian Affairs, S. P. Tappan, Maj. Gen, Sanborn, Ma j • - >n.
' William S. Harney, Lt, Gen, Sherman and M a j . Gen. A, H, Terry.
This group, destined to spend many weeks in Indian country in
1867 and 1868, was instructed tot
...make and conclude with said /Eiostile/ bands of tribes
such treaty stipulations, subject to the action of the
Senate, as may remove all just causes of complaint on
their part, and at the same time establish security for
person and property along the lines of railroad now being
constructed to the Pacific and other thoroughfares of
travel to the Western Territories, and such as will most
likely insure civilization for the Indians and peace
and safety for the whites.*45
The degree to which these objectives were accomplished would be
a decisive factor in future relations of the War and Interior
departments with the red men,

^Ibid., 5-6.
l!+3i5 Stat.

L t ,

17.

^Ml-Maj. Gen. Christopher C. Augur filled in for Sherman
on various occasions. See next chapter,
i^5l5 Stat. L., 17.
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CHAPTER POUR
OUR MOST SOLEMN DUTY
JULY, 1867, TO MARCH, 1869

For nearly three hundred years our people have
blundered on this Indian question.••eFame consists
in doing what has not been done before....
(Samuel P. Tappan, July 20, 1868)
It is more humane and economical to subsist
Indians than to fight them. A wise and just policy
will soon relieve us from either necessity.
(Secretary 0. B. Browning, November 30, 1868)

For more than two years after the close of the Civil
War, the Interior and War departments pursued semi
independent, stopgap programs toward the hostile Indians
who challenged westward expansion.

The small western army

sent out expeditions, built forts and struggled to police
the principal overland thoroughfares and settlements.

Repre

sentatives of t-he Indian Bureau counciled with tribal leaders,
concluded treaties and promised to subsist the natives who
moved to scattered reservations where they were less likely to
collide with white men.

But neither approach to the Indian

question was more than partially successful, and tragic,
costly conflicts continued,

Moreover, as Indian disasters

recurred, the two departments were often openly critical of
each other and the Indian ^system.”
Meeting in special session in the summer of l867>
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Congress was under great pressure to find an effective means
of pacifying the warlike red men of the Plains and Southwest,
President Johnson called for an early termination of frontier
wars, westerners clamored for more protection and freedom to
expand and easterners and humanitarians demanded justice for
the natives and restraint upon the Army,

Acting upon the re

commendations of Indian officials and special commissions, the
law-makers passed a bill which was supposed to serve the
interests of all parties, including the Army and the Indians,
The Act of July 20, 1867* provided for the appointment
of a civil-military commission to work toward three principal
goals:

first, elimination of the causes of conflict with the

Indians; second, greater security for frontier settlements and
railroads being extended toward the mountains and, third, per
manent settlement of the natives on small reservations where
they might take up the white ma n ’s ways,"^

In theory, this

program would bring peace between the races, help the Indians
to achieve a higher level of civilization, open new regions
for settlement and travel, improve the administration of In
dian affairs and relieve the Army of many dangerous and onerous
responsibilities.

In practice, for a variety of reasons, it

was of limited success.
Many of the shortcomings of the government's efforts
to solve the Indian problem by conciliatory means are beyond
the scope of the following discussion.

Consideration will be

^Stat. L,, CIA, 1868, 26, See also Browning to Tavlor,
August 87"TH67, D.I.L.S., NA, RG 75,
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given to civil-military Indian relations during the last twenty
months of' the Johnson administration.

Traditionally this has

been interpreted as a period in which the War and Interior
departments resolved their differences and agreed upon the
principle that it was cheaper and more effective to feed hos
tile Indians than to fight them.

Actually, the truce between

the two branches was very tenuous, and bickering continued
even while their representatives worked together on the peace
commission.

Shortly before Grant entered the White House,

the inter-departmental controversy became particularly heated.
While Commissioner N, G. Taylor insisted that the nation
p
could fulfill its Mmost solemn duty” of uplifting the red
men only through civil control, advocates of military control
disagreed and made another concerted effort to transfer the
Indian Bureau to the War Department.

THE PEACE COMMISSION OF 1867-1868
To a large extent, the future of federal Indian rela
tions and administration depended upon the views of the
heterogeneous group selected to serve on the Indian Peace
Commission.

At first glance, there was more or less a balance

of civil and military representation, with three civilians,
known to be Indian sympathizers; two —

later three -- active

military officers who favored a coercive policy; and two
former military officers believed to have divided opinions about

2CIA, 1868, 19.
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the tactics to be used against the wild tribesmen of the West.
As it turned out, the commission, by a split vote, supported
a conciliatory policy and civil administration until the
course of events changed their minds.
Heading the commission, which was to be engaged in its
various duties for about fifteen months, was Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Nathaniel G. Taylor.

Taylor, a Methodist mini

ster by profession, was described by some as a man with a
”warm heart” and sympathy for the red men but criticized by
others as a ”simpering White House courtier."^

His humani

tarian inclinations and concern for his position made him the
leader of the faction that voted for liberal treatment of the
Indians and civil control.

Another ardent, at times fanatical,

friend of the Indians was Samuel P. Tappan of Colorado.

A

transplanted Bostonian, Tappan was described by one author
as a "mysteriously inclined g e n t l e m a n . H e had long been
identified with the Indian reformers, and there was no doubt
5
how he would vote.
^Carl C. Rister, Border Command: General Phil Sheridan
in the West (Norman, 194H-), 571 quotes from '"Bohemian" of the
Leavenworth Bulletin. See also A&N Jnl., V(December 7.
1867), 251.
^Rister, c>£. clt., 57*
^In 1876 Tappan explained his views on Indian affairs to a
reporter for the Philadelphia Daily Press, indicating that his
sympathy for the red man dated from his own misfortunes as an
early "free-stater" in Lawrence City, Kansas.
In i860 he moved
to Colorado and, during the Civil War, commanded volunteers at
different posts in the Indian country. Colonel Tappan observed
the Htes, Comanehes, Apaches, Cheyennes and other tribes during
this tour of duty.
In 1865 he appeared before a joint committee
of Congress and proposed a bill *to establish civil law among
the Indians similar to the "English system” used in Canada.
The scheme received support in the Senate but was blocked by the ;
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A third Peace Party member of the commission was Senator John
B. Henderson, chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs and author of the bill creating the commission,

A

wealthy bachelor-lawyer, Henderson was the ”student" of the
group; while others nfelt inclined to indulge in barroom philo
sophy, he was up and stirring, taking notes, receiving and
analyzing evidence.”^

The Army and Navy Journal stated of

him, ”.,.tbe peace makers in the East may thank their stars
•7
that he was on the Peace Commission,”
Aligned against these civilian Indian enthusiasts were
three generals characterized as ”true members of their profession —

,,8

alert, watchful, meticulous."

Leading this group

was Lt, Gen, Sherman, commander of the Division of the Mis
souri and opponent of ’’bribing” treaties,

Sherman served on

the commission because be was detailed by the President and
q
General Grant,
Not an advocate of all-out Indian extermina
tion, as some maintained, he nonetheless was ready to use force
against marauders who defied the government, molested travel and

^(continued) Military Committee of the House, While
on the Peace Commission, Tappan’s favorite plan was a separate
Indian Department, Failing in this and disappointed in efforts
to conciliate the hostiles, he later advocated military con
trol,
(S e n . M i s c . D o c . No. 5>3> l+^th Cong., 3 sess. /Serial
183^7* 203-21277"
—
—
^Rister, op,. c i t .. £7; Athearn, op. c l t .. 172.

7A & N Jnl., V (December 7, 1867), 2£l.
O
Rister, op. c i t ., £7*
9SW, 1868, 381.
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endangered the construction of the Pacific railroads

Siding

with Sherman was Maj, Gen, Alfred H. Terry, commander of the
Department of Dakota,

Terry, a handsome, forty-year-old

bachelor and former law student at Yale, had an outstanding
military record and a reputation for getting along with other
Army leaders.

He shared Sherman's views about the necessity

of whipping intractable red men before coming to t e r m s , T h e
third professional soldier was Maj, Gen, Christopher C, Augur,
commander of the Department of the Platte,

Called upon at

first to substitute for Sherman at certain talks, Augur later
served as a regular member of the group.

12

He, too, believed

the War Department should control the Indians and that force
was necessary where wilder bands were concerned,

13

.

Tne two commissioners who held the ttswing vote” were
retired General William S. Harney and former Maj, Gen, John
B, Sanborn,

Harney made his home in St, Louis and was a well-

to-do cotton and sugar plantation owner.

Nearly seventy years

old, he had fought against the Indians, but probably had more
IQa & N J nl,, V (December 7» 1867), 2£l; Atbearn, op.
cit,, 172ff. Sherman expressed bis views about the other
commissioners in a letter to his brother, Senator Sherman. He
observed: "Henderson is the best and most thoughtful man on
this Commission. Sanborn does very well.
Commr. N. G. Taylor
is a good-hearted man but a perfect stereotyped edition of the
old Indian policy. Gen, Terry is a first rate office, but
Harney is of no account. Tappan /is" J a mere nothing,
(Sher
man to J. Sherman, September 28, 1867 > Sherman Papers, Vol. 21)
"^Athearn, o£. cit., 173;
12
Athearn, up. cit,, 184-199.
13SW, 1868, 356.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

personal Indian friends than any other member of the commission.
It was questionable where the old gentleman’s sympathies would
lie,^

Sanborn, a native of Minnesota, had a lucrative law

practice in Washington, D.C.

He was the nbusiness man” of the

commission, hiring helpers, purchasing supplies and "sitting
up all night to look after things..."1^

Some questioned his

sympathies, but his vigorous condemnation of General Hancock’s
action at Pawnee Pork in April suggested his opposition to
military control and the use of force.

17

Most of the peace commissioners convened at the South
ern Hotel in St, Louis on August 6,

There, they threshed out

questions about making contact with the scattered hostile
bands.

One problem was whether or not to travel in the company

of troops, for their intentions might thus be misinterpreted
by the Indians,
worked out.

Ultimately a "p’
e rfect concert of action" was

General Sherman and Commissioner Taylor were to

notify their respective subordinates of plans to meet the
western Dakota tribes at Port Laramie on September 13 and the
tribes south of the Arkansas near Port Larned, Kansas, on or
about October 13,

18

Only a limited number of troops would go

Ik
A & N Jnl.. V (December 7, 1867)* 2£l; Athearn, op.
cit., 173.
l^General Sherman told bis brother John that be expected
Harney to vote with him against the other four civilians —
Taylor, Tappan, Henderson and Sanborn. (Sherman to J. Sherman,
August 3* 1867, Sherman Papers, Vol. 21).
16A & N Jnl.. V (December 7, 1867), 2£l,
17Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 13, i^-Otb Cong., 1 sess (Serial
1308), 18S-7, 111-113.
l8CIA, 1868, 27 - 28 .
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along, and, for the duration of the negotiations, General
Sherman announced, operations by departmental commanders would
be "purely defensive,"^9
Before going to Port Laramie, the peacemakers journeyed
to Port Leavenworth to interview General Hancock, Governor
Crawford, Father DeSmet and others and stopped at Omaha to
discuss the Indian situation with General Augur.

They then

sailed by steamboat up to Port Randall to pick up General
Terry and observe the progress of tribes along the Missouri.
At

Ports Sully and Thompson and at Yancton, Ponca and Santee

reservations the commission held talks with the Indians.
Many tribesmen were found in need of "prompt and serious
attention" because of inappropriate provisions under current
treaties.

Moreover, some of the agents, the commission decided,

needed to be replaced by persons with greater honesty and ambi,, 20
tion.
On September 11 the government's delegates headed west
on the Union Pacific.

Eight days later at North Platte, the

end of track, they parleyed with Spotted Tail, Man-Afraid-ofEis Horse, Swift Bear, Pawnee Killer and other Sioux and Chey
enne spokesmen.

The Indians soon announced that they came to

receive powder and lead and still opposed travel on the Powder
River and Smoky Hill roads.

21

On the 20th Sherman was stern

with the demanding chiefs, deprecating their argument that trains
19 SW, 1867, 381.
20

CIA, 1868, 28-29.

2 1 Ibid., 29.
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and wagons ruined hunting and reminding them of agreements
22
with other commissioners.
Little was accomplished. Scouts
reported Red Cloud and the northern Sioux busy fighting in
the Powder River region, too occupied to come in to Fort Lara
mie for some time.

Therefore, the would-be treaty-makers

postponed the Laramie meeting until November first and, after
some objection by the military commanders, passed out limited
amounts of powder and ball to the chiefs whose followers had
been best behaved.

The commission rationalized the distri

bution of ammunition on the basis of the Indians’ need for
meat and the biblical injunction, (this may have been Taylor’s
contribution) "do good to them that hate us,'* J
The commissioners minus Sherman,

2L

then headed south

to try their luck with the southern tribes.

Their caravan

consisted of several hacks, a few howitzers for display, and
wagons heaped up with ten thousand dollars worth of presents
for the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Apaches and Comanches,
Accompanying the party were interpreters such as George Bent
and a number of reporters representing Boston, New York,
25
St, Louis and western newspapers,
pp

Atbearn, 0£. cit.. 1 8 0 -1 8 1 , An interested spectator
at the North Platte parleys was Henry Morton Stanley, who later
gained fame for finding Dr, Livingstone in Africa, See Henry
M, Stanley, My Early Travels and Adventures in America and
Asia (New York, 1895), Vol. I, 197-^16.
2 3 CIA, 1868, 29.

^•Sherman was called to Washington by the President
and Augur was sent to fill in for him.
2^Rister, op. cit.. 53» 56,
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Arriving at Port Larned before the scheduled meeting
date, the negotiators waited for Superintendent Thomas Murphy,
agents Leavenworth and Wynkoop and interpreters and runners
to assemble the tribesmen at Medicine Lodge Creek, about se
venty miles to the south*

For several days the main body of

red men camped at a distance, leery of another "talk" such as
General Hancock conducted in April.

Finally, the stage was

set and the peacemakers moved to the council site with gifts
and ready-made treaties.^
A number of preliminary meetings were necessary before
the formal discussions got under way on October 19.

Then

Senator Henderson, dressed in the latest eastern fashion,
announced the Great Father's wish that the Comancbes, Kiowas
and Kiowa-Apaches settle down and farm on a three-million-acre
reservation between the Red and Washita rivers and ninetyeighth and one hundredth meridians.

The Cheyennes and Ara-

pahoes were to occupy a reservation about half again as large
further north.

The United States, Henderson and others ex

plained, would provide beef, flour, coffee and sugar; blankets
and clothing; farm tools and seed; teachers, carpenters and
blacksmiths —

everything the Indians needed to become happy
27

and prosperous like white men.
One by one the blanketed Indian headmen rose to object
to the terms offered.

Ten Bears, an influential Comanche, de

cried the loss of his prairie homeland.

Satanta, the Kiowa

2 6 CIA, 1868, 30; Grinnell, o£. cit., 273-271}-.
2 ^Rister, op. cit.,

55, 57; Grinnell, op. cit.. 27k*
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"Orator of the Plains," complained long and bitterly about the
wrongs suffered by his tribe before consenting to the govern
ment’s demands.

After Black Kettle of the Cheyennes, Little

Raven of the Arapahoes and others made their speeches, the
ceremony of touching the pen was held.

28

On October 21 two

separate treaties were concluded with the Kiowas and Oomanches
and with other Kiowa, Comanche and Apache bands.

A few days
29
later the Cheyennes and Arapahoes came to terms.
In ex
change for their "signatures" the red men collected more
blankets and other gifts than they were able to carry away.

30

The Medicine Lodge treaties were reported as "very
11 31

satisfactory ,

yet further trouble was forecast by some of

the documents' provisions.

Tribes which had for generations

roamed the buffalo country of the plains were suddenly re
quired to confine themselves to relatively limited areas,
forego hunting and revolutionize their way of life.

There

was, though, no effective barrier against renewed excursions
into Texas or Kansas, and, as one author put it, "...the
-commissioners did little more than create an unworkable
arrangement.
^Rister, 0 0 . cit., 5 8 -5 9 .
29jCappler, 0£. cit., II, 977-989.

30Grinnell, 033. cit.. 275J CIA, 1868, 30. Among the
items distributed were annuities which had been delayed at
military posts since spring. Rister adds, "The commissioners
winked at other gifts of whiskey, guns, and ammunition."
(Rister, 0£. .cit., 59).
31CIA, 1867, lj..
32 Rister, 033. cit.. 59; Atbearn, 033. cit..

183.
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Leaving Medicine Lodge Creek, the commission returned
to North Platte and then proceeded to Port Laramie, where they
hoped to meet Red Cloud and other leaders of hostile Sioux
and Northern Cheyenne bands.

The only Indians found at Port

Laramie, however, were Crows, most of whom had not been at war*
Of Red Cloud’s absence the commissioners stated, "We greatly
regret the failure to procure a council with this chief and
his leading warriors.

If an interview could have been ob

tained, we do not for a moment doubt that a just and honorable
peace could have been secured.”

33

In fact, Red Cloud noti

fied the commission that he would not give up his war until
the Bozeman Trail forts were removed.

Again frustrated, the

peacemakers re-scheduled their meeting with the Sioux and
other northern tribes for spring, appealed to the Indians to
live at peace, and adjourned,3^"

It seemed, Acting Commis

sioner Mix noted in his annual report for 1867, that the work
of the treaty-makers would take "longer...than was at first
supposed *

35

During the ensuing winter the commission bad time to
review its initial efforts and plan future sessions with the
hostiles.
quiet.

Encouragingly, the frontier remained relatively

Still, General Sherman made preparations to reinforce

his outposts in the spring, believing that if these installa
tions were not needed for defense, they could become "nuclei"

33qia, 1868, 30.
3^~Ibid.. 31.

3^cia, 1867, 5.
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for new settlements.

The troops would remain "as much on the

defensive as possible.
Meanwhile various observers commented upon the work of
the peace commission.

The Nation, taking a conciliatory line,

pointed out that it was easier, cheaper and more honorable to
"regenerate" the nation’s wards than to coerce them.

37

On the

other hand, Maj. Gen. Henry K. Sibley, veteran of many cam
paigns against the Sioux, argued against not only civil con
trol and "purchased peace," but also against defensive or
limited military operations.

He demanded a full-scale Indian

war, with the Army capitalizing upon the natural enmities
within the red race.

"Eight or ten millions wisely expended,

would," Sibley figured, "...suffice to close the war within
two years...."
On January 7, 1868, the peace commission made its offi
cial report to President Johnson.

The report was deceptively

sympathetic with the Indians and civil control.

It mentioned

the "heartrending" consequences of the Chivington massacre;
the "utter futility of conquering a peace;" the illogic of
punishing whole tribes for the crimes of a few; the wrongs
which "compelled" Indian outbreaks such as the Fort Phil Kearny
affair; the provocative action of General Hancock at Pawnee

36SW, 1867, 381.

^ The Nation. V (October 31, 1867), 356. The journal
estimated that it cost seventy thousand dollars to kill each
Indian.
•^Sibley to Sherman, December 6, 1867, I.O.L.R., 1867,
NA, RG 75.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

lif.8
Pork and the ’’many noble qualities” of the Indian.

39

It placed

emphasis upon the necessity for prompt congressional action
to ratify and fulfill the provisions of peace treaties. Also,
it made the following suggestions for improving the Indian
service:

(1 ) revision of the laws on intercourse with the

Indian tribes; (2) continuation of Interior Department juris
diction over the Indians, except for temporary military control
over "unmanageable" tribesmen;

(3 ) dismissal of all incompe

tent and unfaithful agents and superintendents by February 1,
1869; (i|-) creation of a new Department of Indian Affairs;

(5>)

prohibition of organized Indian war by state or territorial
governments; (6 ) tighter restriction upon licensing of In
dian traders; (7) new laws to authorize the Army to oust
white intruders from Indian reservations; (8 ) removal of the
Bosque Redondo Indians; (9) appointment of Indian inspectors
and (1 0 ) appointment of a new commission to meet with the
Sioux, Navajoes and other tribes, including some "confessedly
at peace,
The commission’s comments on the "much mooted ques
tion" of civil or military control of the Indian Office were
quoted time and again by defenders of the status quo In
Indian management because Generals Sherman, Terry and Augur
and former Generals Harney and Sanborn all signed the report.
Particular note was given to the statement:
We have the highest possible appreciation of

, , ^3.

39cia 1868 26
^°Ibid., V / H 8 .
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the officers of the army, and fully recognize their
proverbial integrity and honor; but we are satisfied
that not one in a thousand would like to teach Indian
children to read and write, or Indian men to sow and
reap. These are emphatically civil, and not military,
occupations .4-1
But these remarks did not represent the views of the
entire peace commission.

A year later General Sherman ex

plained to Senator E. G, Ross of Kansas how the members voted
on the document.

Although General Augur signed the re

port, only the seven original commissioners had a vote.
Henderson, Tappan, Taylor and Sanborn supported it, and
Sherman, Terry and Harney opposed it.

"We did not favor the

conclusion arrived at, but being out-voted," the General
explained, "we had to sign the report."**2
On one thing the commission was

unanimous,

however.

They believed it was necessary to collect the Indians east
of the Rockies on reservations north of Nebraska and south
of Kansas as rapidly as possible.**^

As soon as the Senate

confirmed the Medicine Lodge Creek treaties, measures could
be taken to implement the concentration program on the South
ern Plains.

But negotiations still had to be completed in

the North, and success there depended to a large extent
upon whether or not the government would give up the forts
on the road to Montana.
Already in August, 1867, General Grant suggested to
^ I b i d . , I4.7 -I4.8 .
^ S h e r m a n to Ross, January 7, 1869, Div. Mo. L . S . ,
NA, R G 98.
^ S W , 1868, 331*-.
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Sherman that the extension of the Union Pacific was beginning
to delimit the value of the Powder River road and that it
might be practical and diplomatic to retract the posts north
west of Port Lara m i e . ^

But Sherman demurred*

To give in to

•k5
the hoatiles was to encourage their resistance, he thought.^
In the January report, the Peace Commission proposed to
route travel to Montana from a more western point on the Union
Pacific and along the west side of the Big Horns

By late

February Sherman, too, was in accord with the removal scheme
and solicited General Augur’s suggestions on how to proce e d * ^
Finally, on March 2, Grant wrote Sherman, ”1 think it will be
well to prepare at once for the abandonment of the posts,
Phil. Kearny, Reno and Fetterman and to make all the capital
with the Indians that can be made out of the change,"^®
As soon as the weather permitted,yarious "ehiefcatchers,” including Father DeSmet, Reverend S. D # Hinraan,
and a number of traders and interpreters, were sent out to
invite the Sioux and Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes to
JiQ
Fort Laramie for a big council in April, 7 Sherman announced
^•Grant to Sherman, August 26, 1867, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 21.
^ S W , 1867, 392-393.
^ 6CIA, 1868, lj.2*
^Athearn, op. cit., 19U-*
^•®Grant to Sherman, March 2, 1868, Letters Sent, Com
manding General, NA, RG 108. Grant also indicated that other
posts might be ooeded west of the Powder River region.
^ G e o r g e E. Hyde, Red Cloud’s Folk (Norman, 1937), 163l61i. See, for example, Taylor to Rev. P. DeSmet, February 17,
1868, I.O.L.B., No. 17, HA, RG 7$.
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that he would go along with further attempts to pacify the
hostiles, holding his troops in reserve until the agents had
to

S6n&*

confess an inability to manage their Indians... y

tor Henderson made the necessary business arrangements, and
in early April the treaty-makers again set out to try to
rendezvous with the warriors of Powder River country.

51

Once more the warlike bands failed to meet the appoint
ment set by the Great Father.

Nevertheless, the commission

was determined to negotiate treaties.

Dispensing liberal

amounts of rations, blankets, utensils, arms and ammunition,
they induced many leaders of the friendly Brule and non
belligerent Sioux bands to sign the white man's paper on
April 29*^^

The agreement pledged peace between the white

and red races; fixed the boundaries of the Sioux reservation;
authorized the natives to hunt north of the Platte and in the
Republican and Powder River regions nso long as the buffalo
may range therein in numbers as to Justify the chase”;
offered awards and financial and technical assistance to
Indians taking up farming; promised rations to all settling
on the reservation and, finally, provided for an annual

^ S h e r m a n to J. Sherman, March lij., 1868, Sherman
Papers, Vol. 22.
^ S h e r m a n was called to Washington to testify in John
son's impeachment trial and did not go west until later.
52

Brule, Ogallala, Minieonjou, Yanktonnai, Hunkpapa,
Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arc and Santee Sioux
bands and a few Arapahoes eventually signed the treaty. Many
of the signatures were collected at Forts Rice and Sully or
at scattered Indian camps weeks after the formal council was
held* (Kappler, 0£. cit.. II, 998; Hyde, o£. cit., 16lj.-l67)*
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clothing allowance and cash-equivalent annuities for thirty
years

53
While awaiting the appearance of Red Cloud and headmen

of the various hostile bands, the commission on May 7 con
cluded treaties with the Mountain Crows and on May 10 came
to terms with the Northern Arapahoes and Cheyennes.

The

latter agreement was similar in most respects to the Sioux
treaty; the former provided for a different reservation and
hunting restrictions.^
It soon became evident that it would be difficult to
treat with the wilder Sioux, who were the chief concern of the
government.

The decision to withdraw the Bozeman forts had

been announced, but Red Cloud1s Bad Paces and some of the
Oyuhkpe and Miniconjou Sioux were unwilling to come to terms
until the soldiers left their bunting grounds."

The dis

mantling of the posts began on June 1 and took several weeks.
A few of the hold-outs were coaxed into signing the Sioux
treaty during the summer, but the leading Northern Sioux, no
tably the Influential Red Cloud, did not sign until November,
after the vacated forts bad been burned to the ground.^*

-^Kappler, pp. cit., II, 998-1007.
^ I b i d ., 1008-1015. The Crows were to live along the
Yellowstone and the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were given a
choice of settling on the Sioux Reservation or with their
relatives in the South.

55e x . D o c . No . 239. ij.0th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1 3I4-I)»

1868, 1-3.

^ H y d o , op. cit.. 166-167.
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General Sherman, who arrived at Port Laramie in early
May, was irritated by the uncompromising attitude of some of
the red men*

He did not believe, for example, that they de

served the privilege of hunting outside their reservation.

”1

think it would be wise to invite all the sportsmen of England
and America there for a Grand Buffalo hunt," he suggested,
"and make one grand swap of them all.

Until the Buffalo and

consequent

Indians are out from between the roads we
_*7
will have collisions and trouble. ^
There was little time for second-guessing, however.
The peace commissioners, together with other treaty-makers,
bad a great deal of negotiating to do before the end of summer.
Some went south to treat with the Osages and Chippewas; others
journeyed to Montana Territory to meet with the Blackfeet,
Gros Ventres, Missouri River crows and Northern Bannocks and
Shoshones; still others traveled to Utah Territory to confer
with other Bannock bands and the Eastern Shoshones and to
Idaho Territory to talk with the Nez Perce*!

The chief ob

jectives of the treaties made with these tribes were, Com
missioner Taylor reported, "the binding

the Indians,

parties, thereto, to keep the peace, the providing for the
several tribes a suitable reservation, and the means for their
education and civilization."^
Commissioners Sherman and Tappan drew the assignment

£7sherman to Sheridan, May 10, 1 8 6 8 , P. H. Sheridan
Autograph Letters, Sheridan Papers.
£8 CIA, 1868, iw
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of parleying with the Bosque Redondo Navajoes and Utes of New
Mexico,

They began talks with the former at Fort Sumner on

May 28,

From personal observation and the comments of Bar-

boncita and other Navajo headmen, both decided that Bosque
Redondo was a miserable location,

Sherman tried to persuade

the red men to select a reservation in Indian Territory, but
encountered such strenuous objections that he concluded
”nothing less than absolute force” would get them to move
east.^

On June 1 the Navajoes signed an agreement to re

locate on a six-million-acre reservation in their homeland,
west of the Rio Grande,

At that location they were entitled

to one hundred and sixty-acre farms, up to five dollars
worth of clothing and goods apiece each ysar^ a hundred dollars
worth of seeds and tools per family and a total of fifteen
60
thousand sheep.
In mid-June the two peace-makers conferred with Ute
leaders north of Fort Union,

Representatives of the Colorado

Utes had visited Washington in March and made a treaty which
allowed the Capotes, Weminuches and Mobnanebes of New Mexico

to share their reservation in southwestern Colorado Territory.
ment,

61

But the New Mexico Utes objected to this arrange
Reluctant to settle down and unhappy that the com

missioners had talked with the Navajoes first, they refused
to make specific commitments,

62

Sherman’s one consolation

S i EJx. Doc. N o . 308. IpOth Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
131*5), 1*

6oKappler, op. cit., II, 1015-1020; CIA, 1868, 16I}-165.
6lKappler, op, cit., II, 990-996; CIA, 1868, 182.
62CIA, 1868, 167-169.
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with reference to these natives was that time was on the aide
6^
of the government*
By late summer Sherman, Tappan, and others had nearly
completed the treaty-making phase of the governments program
to conciliate hostile tribes, and major peace agreements,
except those with the Sioux, N©z Perc©/ and the Eastern Sho
shones and Bannocks, had received senatorial a p p r o v a l * ^

The

Peace Party was enthusiastic, anticipating a new era in In
dian relations*

Before the year was out, however, events

were to dampen their optimism.

In the meantime, the policy

makers endeavored to implement the concentration scheme
recommended in the Act of July 20, 1867*

EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OP THE PEACE TREATIES
Both civil and military officials recognized the need
for early, adequate appropriation of funds to implement the
peace treaties of 1867 and 1868.

In his annual report for

1867 Secretary 0. H. Browning urged, w *..no consideration of
the**,expenditure likely to be required should be suffered
to defeat an object ^peace7 of such surpassing impor
tance*5^

In its January, 1868, report the commission gave

special attention to the necessity of congressional action
to finance the reservations and civilisation programs it
^ S h e r m a n to J. Sherman, June 11, 1868, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 23.
^Kappler, o£. cit., II, 977-102£.
^ Q u o t e d in CIA, 1867, II*
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proposed,^

After mid-February, Commissioner N. G. Taylor

repeatedly commented on the ”grave importance” of pro
curing money at an early date ”in order that the faith of the
Government and the promises of the Indian Peace Commission,
may be kept good...."^7

Taylor insisted that his office

should not be held liable for hostilities or depredations by
/Q
needy red men*
Finally, General Sherman informed his brother
John, "I feel reluctant to go further in these,..promises as
I fear our Government is becoming so complicated that it is
very venturesome to make promises in advance.

n

69

At last, on July 27, the annual Indian appropriation
bill was passed.

One clause provided that half a million

dollars was to be disbursed under the direction of General
Sherman,
...for carrying out the treaty stipulations, making
and preparing homes, furnishing provisions, tools and
farming utensils, and furnishing food for such bands
of Indians with which treaties had been made and not yet
ratified, and in defraying the expenses of the commission
in making such treaties and carrying their provisions
into effect.78
This was not the kind of transfer of authority Sher
man had so often recommended, but it was not unexpected. A
few days earlier he learned from Samuel Tappan that Congress-

66CIA, 1868, l*l(.-lj.6.
^ T a y l o r to Browning, April 6, 1868, I.O.R.B. No. 17,
NA, RG 75.
68CIA, 1868, 52-53.
^ S h e r m a n to J. Sherman, April 26, 1868, Sherman
Papers, Vol. 23o
70SW, 1868, 338.
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Ben Eutler of Massachusetts was supporting the appropriation
bill on condition that the General would hold the purse
strings.^'1' On August 6 Secretary Browning delicately ex
plained Sherman*a duties*

"I have neither the right nor wish

to give you instructions,® Browning stated, before listing ex
penditures to be made*

The subordinates of the Interior

Department, still in general control of the Indians, would do
everything to cooperate*

"There is no reason why there

should be interference or conflict between you and the Agents
72
of this Department," the Secretary added somewhat hopefully,
Sherman realized that it was essential to expend the
Indian funds as promptly and judiciously as possible*

The

season was growing late, and in many places there were signs
that the Indians were losing faith in the government's treaty
promises*

For example, Superintendent Thomas Murphy some

time earlier reported the Cheyennes, Arapahoes and Apaches of
the Southern Plains near starvation and in a state of unrest.

In addition, the Sioux, now being coaxed and cajoled

toward agency sites along the Missouri River, would be very
upset to find that no preparations had been made for their
7k
settlement and subsistence*
^ T a p p a n to Sherman, July 20, 1868, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 23.

72Browning to Sherman, August 6, 1868, D.I.L.S., In
dian Misc. BA, RG 75.
73c i a , 1868, 60.
^ R a y H. Mattison, "The Indian Reservation System on
the Upper Missouri, 1865-1890," Nebraska History. XXVI (Sep
tember, 1955)* 145 -114-6 ; Hyde, on. clt.T~l69-17o.
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To meet th e s e p r e s s in g needs and govern In d ia n d i s 
b u rsem en ts, G eneral Sherman is s u e d G eneral Order No, i|., dated
August 1 0 , 1 8 6 8 ,

D epartm ent, d i s t r i c t and p o s t commanders

were d ir e c t e d to a c t tem p o ra r ily as a g e n ts f o r th e pu rp ose o f
moving t r i b e s to t h e i r new homes and is s u in g s u p p l ie s .

Regu

l a r a g e n ts were n o t t o be in t e r f e r e d w ith , b u t "any n e g le c t s
or i r r e g u l a r i t i e s ” by Agency o f f i c i a l s or t h e i r s u b j e c t s were
t o be r e p o r te d ,

Maj, Gen, W. S , Harney was to be in charge

o f e x p e n d itu r e s f o r r e lo c a t in g th e S iou x n a tio n ; Maj, Gen,
W# B , Hazen th e Cheyennes, A rapahoes, K low as, and Comanches;
M aj, Gen, George W. G etty th e N a v a jo es; Major R, S , LaMotte
th e Crows and M aj. Gen, C. C, Augur th e S h osh on es, Snakes and
a llie d tr ib e s .

P urchases o f r a t i o n s , c lo t h in g and s u p p lie s

were t o b e handled through th e Army’ s q u arterm aster and commis
sa r y c h a n n e ls , and is s u e s t o In d ia n s were to be w itn e s s e d by
two o f f i c e r s w ith th e rank o f c a p ta in or a b o v e.
In h is y e a r ly r e p o r t , Sherman e x p la in e d th e breakdown
o f d isb u rsem en ts by h is a s s i s t a n t s .

F i r s t , th e h a l f m illio n

d o lla r s was reduced by $ 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 to s e t t l e o u tsta n d in g accou n ts
a g a in s t th e p eace com m ission.

The rem ain in g $ 3 5 0 ,0 0 0 was

s p l i t up, a llo w in g G eneral Harney $ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 and G eneral Hazen,
G eneral Augur and Major LaMotte $ 5 0 ,0 0 0 e a ch .

G eneral G etty

handled s u b s t a n t i a l se p a r a te funds f o r r e lo c a t in g and p ro 
v id in g f o r th e N avajoes o f New M exico,

While th e In d ia n s were

75

Quoted in Browning to S c h o f ie ld , August 2 1 , 1 8 6 8 ,
D#I , L , S , , In d ia n M is c ,, NA, RG 7 5 , The e x p ir a t io n d a te fo r
th e ord er was to be June 30, 1869*
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due t o r e c e iv e "the b e n e f i t o f every c e n t," th e r e was not
enough money t o p r o p e r ly p r o v is io n th e p e a c e a b le red men d u rin g
th e w in t e r .

I t was " in d is p e n s a b le ," Sherman co n ten d ed , to

have an a d d it io n a l a p p r o p r ia tio n o f $ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 fo r Harney and
$ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 fo r G eneral Hazen,

Many m ilit a r y le a d e r s r e g r e t t e d t h i s tem porary e x p e r i
ence in managing p a r t o f th e fin a n c e s and l o g i s t i c s o f th e
In d ia n s e r v i c e .

In th e f i r s t p l a c e , d e s p it e S e c r e ta r y Brown

i n g ' s c a l l f o r c o o p e r a tio n , c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s f r e q u e n tly com
p la in e d about tb s ariay?s v i r t u a l "care and c o n tr o l" o f t h e i r
77
w ard s,
S e c o n d ly , G eneral Sherman r e a l iz e d t h a t th e In d ia n
funds were n o t alw ays p r o p e r ly managed,
a n y th in g ," he grum bled,

"Harney never reads

"I saw a t once he was g iv in g out

ord ers o f p u rch ase f a r in advance o f h is m o n e y ,,,I d id n ot
and do n o t approve h is la r g e p u rch a ses / a l t h o u g h I do b e l i e v e he w i l l th ereb y p rev en t s u f f e r in g ,"

In F ebruary,

1869, When Harney ask ed fo r a d e f ic ie n c y a p p r o p r ia tio n o f

o v er $i|.85,000 and a lm o st $ 2 ,^ 0 0 ,0 0 0 f o r th e coming y ea r and
G en eral Sanborn r e q u e ste d a d e f ic ie n c y payment o f $ 2 3 ,0 0 0 and
a llo w a n c e o f $365,000 f o r th e so u th ern In d ia n s f o r th e y e a r ,
th e House Committee on A p p ro p ria tio n s was in a quandary.

Of

th e d e f i c i e n c y r e q u e s ts th ey r e p o r te d , " , . , t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s , , ,
76sw, 1 8 6 8 , 339; CIA, 1868, 62-63,
77cia, 1868, 231, Taylor to Browning, January 9, 1869,
I.0.R,B, No, 18, NA, RG ?5.

7®Sherman t o S c h o f ie ld , January 28, 1869, L e t te r s Re
c e iv e d , S e c r e ta r y o f War, NA, RG 107, H e r e a fte r th e s e reco rd s
w i l l be c i t e d S.W ,L,R.
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a re so g r e a t , th e amounts ask ed f o r s o l a r g e , th e e s t im a t e s
a re s o c o n t r a d ic t o r y , and th e e v id e n c e so u n s a t is f a c t o r y th a t
g7 •**aro u n ab le t o make any recommendation in which th e
com m ittee f e e l any c o n s id e r a b le d eg ree o f con fid en ce* * " ^

With

a s e n s e o f r e l i e f , Sherman in A p r il r e q u e ste d a f i n a l r e p o r t
on In d ia n e x p e n d itu r e s by th e m i li t a r y so t h a t he m ight " c lo s e
th a t b u sin e ss* "

80

THE RENEWAL OP HOSTILITIES

For about a y e a r th e Peace Com mission’ s cru sad e to
c o n v e r t th e In d ia n s i n t o " p e a c e fu l sh e p h e r d s, h erd ers and
81

farm ers" seemed t o have p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s * “

C o l l is io n s b e -

tw een th e w h ite and red ra ce s c o n tin u e d , b u t th e r e were no
m ajor In d ia n ou tb reak s or m i li t a r y cam paigns*

The Army, as

announced, m a in ta in ed a s e m i-tr u c e by c a r r y in g on la r g e ly d e
f e n s i v e o p e r a tio n s*

T e r r i t o r i a l v o lu n t e e r s , a lth o u g h i n c li n e d

toward a g g r e s s iv e a c t i o n , were checked by a la c k o f p e r s o n n e l,
fu n d s , r e s o u r c e s and f e d e r a l su p p ort*

82

W hile c e r t a in n a t iv e

bands p e r s i s t e d in

d e p r e d a tio n s and a c t s

h e r e to fo r e w a r lik e

groups c o n se n te d to l i v e

and e a t th e w h ite man’ s food*

o f v i o le n c e , many
onr e s e r v a t io n s

By November, 1867# a c c o r d in g

7^HR RPt * No* 2 9 , l|.0tb Cong*, 3 s e s s * ( S e r i a l 1 3 8 8 ),
1869, 1 , ^ 7
““
80
Sherman t o S h e r id a n , A p r il 1 0 , 1 8 6 9 , S h erid an A uto
graph L e t t e r s , S h erid an Papers*
83.SW, 1 8 6 8 , 33k*
82SW, 1867,

376-379*
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to General Sherman, peace prevailed except on the Arkansas
and Smoky Hill, and there, too, prospeots for a settlement
were good.0^

Secretary Browning later reported nnot a single

act of depredation or violence” by Indians subsisted by the
government during the winter of 1867-1868.0^

Finally, General

Grant, in May, 1868, stated his belief that the peace commis
sion was doing ”real and lasting good” as well as ”incidental
good” by distracting tribesmen and frontiersmen during ”the
season practicable for making war.
But In the latter part of 1868 the illusion of per
manent peace was abruptly dispelled by renewed war with the
Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Elowas and Comanches.

Before the year

was over, General Sherman again ordered his field commanders
to

n
M
86
obliterate the hostiles.

Likewise, some of the Indians1

friends, including members of the Peace

Commission, changed

their minds and called for a policy of coercion and military
control over Indian affairs.
The war with the Southern Plains tribes was touched off
by an outbreak on August 10 on the Saline and Solomon rivers
in Kansas.

A party of two hundred Cheyennes, together with a

few Arapahoes and Sioux, unexpectedly went on a rampage,
killing fifteen men, violating women, capturing children and

03Ibia.. 381.
®^CIA, 1868, I.
0^Grant to Sherman, May 19, 1868, C.G.L.S., NA, RG 108.

86

Sherman to Gen. Hazen, September 20, 1 8 6 8 , SemiOfficial Letters Sent, W„ T. Sherman, Vol. 1,
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destroying property*

87

Civil and military officials did not

agree in all respects on why the Cheyennes became violent*
Commissioner Taylor believed that their action, although in
excusable, was based on a "spirit of revenge" over not
receiving arms and ammunition promised by the Peace Commission
and disgust over insufficient supplies.88

General Sherman was

convinced that they had heard of the government's concession
to the Sioux on the Bozeman forts and hoped to achieve similar
results along the Smoky Hill.
tated crime."

The atrocities were "premedi

he insisted*

Investigations proved "beyond
M
Qo
dispute" that whites had not provoked the uprising*
E. W, Wynkoop, the Cheyenne and Arapaho agent, ad
mitted that the Cheyennes were guilty and needed to be punished*
In response to a letter from General Phil Sheridan, commander
of the Department of the Missouri, he tried unsuccessfully to
get his charges to deliver up the guilty parties.

"Let those

who refuse to respond to my call and come within the bounds
prescribed be considered at war," the agent proposed, "and
„qo
let them be properly punished."
Although he believed war "inevitable," General Sheridan
notified the Cheyennes and the Arapahoes, Kiowas and Comanches
several times to move to the vicinity of Port Cobb, Indian
87

SW, 1868, 335* There were four Arapahoes and twenty
Sioux with the Cheyennes when they left Pawnee Pork on
August 3 or Ij.*
88CIA, 1868, 2-3.

89sw, 1868, 335.
90CIA, 1868, 71.
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Territory, to avoid conflict with the military.

Young hostiles,

growing bolder every day, spurned these instructions and com
mitted murders and depredations all along the Smoky Hill and
Arkansas roads.

91

Soon, in General Sherman’s words, there was

"open war, all the way from Port Wallace to Denver...,”

On

August 27, the acting governor of Colorado reported Denver
"completely surrounded" by hostiles.

Eight days later

Governor S. J. Crawford of Kansas declared scalping and
burning "an almost? daily occurrence" in his state, adding
"I cannot sit by and see our people butchered...."9^
Tinder pressure of this sort, General Sheridan requested
additional cavalry and prepared to conduct a vigorous campaign
against the hostiles.

The Indian Bureau and its superinten

dents and agents supported this move, provided precautions be
taken not to harm innocent Indiana.93

One of the few objec

tions to war came from S. P. Tappan, who warned General
Sheridan that a southern "conspiracy" was seeking to involve
bis troops in a general Indian war to "compromise the generals
of the Army and carry the South against Grant" in the coming
9k
election.
By late September, Sherman was anxious to put an end
Q1
SW, 1868, 336. A total of seventy-nine deaths were
attributed to the Cheyennes in August and September.
92Ibid., 336-337.
93CIA, 1868, 7k-76.
9k
Tappan to Sheridan, August 26, 1868, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 23.
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once and for all to Indian resistance along the southern routes#
"I propose that Gen, Sheridan shall prosecute the War with
vindictive earnestness," he wrote, ",,,all who want peace must
get out of the theater of war.

Troops would keep after

the wild braves right up through the winter if necessary, "We
must not let up this time," he told Senator Sherman, "but
keep it going till they are killed or humbled,"^
In answer to repeated protests from the "fanatic,"
Tappan, Sherman sent a scorching letter,

"Of course our views

on this Indian question are irreconcilable," Sherman asserted.
The reformer’s judgments amounted to "mono-mania,"

Even the

Indian Bureau admitted there was not a "jot or tittle of provo
cation" by whites against the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, Forty
million people could not be "cowed" by a few thousand savages.
Moreover, this business about a southern conspiracy was utter
nonsensel

"At our meeting of Oct, 7th in Chicago you can

produce your evidence in one case, and I in the other," the
General concluded.

97

The Chicago meeting was a session at which the peace
commission was to review its work and make final recommenda
tions to the President,
man another letter.

Before squaring off, Tappan sent Sher

He thought the general’s plainness and

^ S h e r m a n to Hazen, September 20, 1868, Semi-Official
Letters Sent, W. T. Sherman, Vol. 1,
^ S h e r m a n to J, Sherman, September 25, 1868, Sherman
Papers, Vol. 21#,
^ S h e r m a n to S, F. Tappan, September 21#, 1868, SemiOfficial Letters Sent, W. T, Sherman, Vol, 1,
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"decidedly refreshing*"

But could Sherman not understand

that Indian wars inevitably brought harm to innocent Indians
and were as unjust as hanging another member of the white
race for John Wilkes Booth*a crime?

Maybe he was mistaken

about some of the persons involved in the Indian war plot,
for It was "the work of more daring and desperate politicians."
Finally, Tappan admonished Sherman to avoid those trying to
"trap" him into becoming another Chivington and to prevent the
n
„qR
army from becoming a curse."7
This kind of talk only made General Sherman all the
more determined to present a strong case against the concilia
tory policy at Chicago.

All the commissioners except Senator

Henderson were present when the peace commission convened on
October 7*

99

The discussions went on for three days, but from

the outset it was evident that all but Taylor and Tappan were
convinced that force and military control were the only
effective means of dealing with the wilder Indians.
Completely reversing itself in some respects, the com
mission on October 9 passed six resolutions.

The first recom

mended that provisions and supplies be furnished to eleven
tribes which had settled or were scheduled to settle permanently
on "agricultural reservations."

The second proposed recog

nition of only those treaties, ratified or pending, which

98

S. F. Tappan to Sherman, September 29, 1868, Sher
man Papers, Vol. 2I4..
^^Athearn, on. cit.. 227-228. General Grant sat in on
the meetings and supported Sherman's recommendations for a
coercive policy toward hostile tribes.
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affected these same tribes.

The third called for an end to the

recognition of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations"
(except in implementing current treaties) and the application
of civil law to Indians.

The fourth recommended that, because

of treaty violations, tribes under the Medicine Lodge Creek
treaties no longer be permitted to roam and hunt outside their
reservations.

The fifth proposed the use of military force to

compell unwilling natives to move to reservations after due
notice and provision for rations and protection.
cantly, the last resolution stated:

Signifi

"...in the opinion of

this commission the Bureau of Indian Affairs should be trans
ferred from the Department of the Interior to the Department
of War«"^°^

Commenting on these resolutions, one of Sherman's

biographers remarks, "Sherman went back to St. Louis with
several scalps, including Taylor's and Tappan's hanging from
his belt."101
As president of the peace commission, Commissioner
Taylor signed these resolutions, but he did not personally
approve of some of them.

Like Sherman, Terry and Harney in
102
January, 1868, he was outvoted.
The Commissioner was still
upset six weeks later when he commented upon the results of
the Chicago meeting in a letter to Secretary Browning.

Among

100CIA, 1868, 371-372.
^^Athearn, op. cit.. 228,
102HR R p t . No. 351i. i&th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1709),
1876, 212. Sanborn later said that only Taylor opposed the
resolutions.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

167

other things, he had become convinced that the Army was engaged
in an unnecessary war against the tribes of the Southern Plains,
Only a few Indians were guilty of atrocities, and, given more
time, the chiefs would have turned the criminals over to
Agent Wynkoop.

In summary Taylor remarked:

..,1 must take occasion to say to you that while I
regard Lieut. Genl. Sherman and the gallant officers
commanding under him utterly incapable of for one moment
entertaining the disgraceful idea of perpetrating a
massacre upon peaceful Indians invited to our protection,
nevertheless this Department as their lawful guardian is
bound to take every necessary precaution to shield the
Innocent and helpless against the fearful punishment now
pursuing the actual oriminals,l°3
A few days after writing this the Commissioner was to wonder
whether some of Sherman’s officers were so "gallant” after all*

THE BATTLE OP THE WASHITA
In late November, when the weather turned cold and
snowy, General Sheridan decided it was time to launch the
vigorous winter campaign prescribed by General Sherman.

On

November 21 he arrived at Camp Supply, Indian Territory, to
find Maj. Gen. George Custer’s Seventh Cavalry making final
preparations.

Two days later, although Colonel S. J. Craw

ford’s Nineteenth Kansas militia regiment had not yet
arrived, Sheridan ordered Custer to set out against any Chey
ennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas or Comanches off their reservations.
With eleven companies and Osage scouts, Cnster headed south

103

Taylor to Browning, November 21, 1868, I.O.R.B.
No. 18, 1868-1869, NA, rg 7 5 .
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through a fresh twelve-inch blanket of snow.^^The morning of the 26th the expedition struck a day-old
trail, left by a Cheyenne war party returning from a raid on
the Smoky Hill River.

Leaving wagons, tentage and heavy equip

ment, the cavalry set out in "rigorous pursuit."

The chase

lasted on into the night, and at 1:30 a.m. the Osage trackers
spotted a large encampment of Cheyennes, Ar&pahoes and Kiowas
along the banks of the Washita River, about one hundred and
twenty miles upstream from Port C o b b . ^ ^

Situated nearest to

the advancing troops was the village of Black Kettle, the
Cheyenne leader whose village four years earlier, almost to
the day, had been overrun by Colonel Chivington’s volunteers
at Sand Creek.^0^
After withdrawing to avoid discovery, the officers of
the command reconnoitered the Cheyenne village and planned the
attack.

At dawn, four columns would strike simultaneously;

Custer would lead the frontal assault.

Meanwhile the Indians

were oblivious of the presence of white soldiers, their sen
tries having gone to their lodges to escape the bitter
cold.10?
At last the hour for the attack arrived, and, with the
band striking up "Garry Owen," the troops rushed Black Kettle’s
settlement from several directions.

"Caught napping,"

the

^■^Grinnell, op. cit., 298-300; HR Ex. D o c . N o . 2 k 0 «
2j.lst Cong., 2 a ess. TSerial 12*25), 1870, 162-163®
1q5hR Ex. Doc. Nq. 2ii0. l*lst Cong,, 2 sess.
Hi25), 1870, 163.

(Serial

lO^Rister, 0p o cit.. lQl*, 107.
iftvn
IFf**
%
21^0, M a t
1870, 163; Rister, 0£. cit.. 101*.

Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 11*25)
^
’
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the red men grabbed up their arms and ran for cover, some to
the underbrush and nearby ravines, others into the ice-filled
river.

While the soldiers "gallantly" charged again and

again, the red men fought back in a manner "rarely, if ever...
equaled in Indian warfare.”

By mid-afternoon the battle was

over, and Custer was able to inventory the "fruits of vic
tory.”

Black Kettle and one hundred and two ”warrlors” were

dead; fifty-three women and children were taken captive and
n aD
fifty-one lodges were destroyed.
Eight hundred and seventyfive horses, ponies and mules; a vast amount of robes, equip
ment and clothing; and a whole "winter supply" of meat and
food were seized and/or d e m o l i s h e d , A l s o found in the
village were four white captives, but two were killed before
they could be rescued.

Almost Incidentally, Custer added in

his report, "In the excitement of the fight, as well as in
self-defense, it so happened that some of the squaws and a few
children were killed and w o u n d e d . " ^ 5
The Battle of the Washita produced another violent dis
pute between the officers of the War and Interior depart
ments.

Almost two weeks before Custer’s attack, Superintendent

Thomas Murphy of the Central Superintendency stated his concern

HR Ex. Doc. No. 2k0« lp.st Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
llj.25), 1870, T 6 3 . RIster, op. cit.. 108. RIster estimates
that a third again as many were found dead miles from the camp.

109
1) &

$ ),

HR Ex. D o c . , N o . 2k0 . Ijlst Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1870, 153-155.

^ ^Ibld.. 16k. Custer's losses were two officers and
nineteen men killed and three officers and eleven men wounded.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

170
over military movements while he made preparations for peace
and promises of protection."

Murray had no doubt that A. G.

Boone, agent for the Kiowas and Comanches, and E. W, Wynkoop,
agent for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, could persuade their
charges to move peaceably to Fort Cobb.

But he wondered what

would be in store for them there.
In all these military movements I fancy I see another
Sand Creek massacre. If these Indians are to be congre
gated at Fort Cobb or elsewhere, under promises of pro
tection, and then pounced upon by the military, it were
far better that they had never been sent for, or any such
promises made*111
Just before learning of the Washita affair, Agent Wyn
koop, too, sensed an impending crisis.

No friend of the hos-

tiles, he nevertheless had special reasons for wanting to
protect the innocent Cheyennes.

In l86ij., as the military

officer responsible for bringing Black Kettle’s people to
Sand Creek, he found it very difficult to convince the Indians
that he had no part in the disaster that followed.

Again,

after Hancock’s expedition in April, 1867, be had to talk fast
to regain the confidence of the Cheyennes.

Now undisciplined

volunteers and TJtes and Osage scouts, the "deadly enemies of
the plains Indians," were headed for the vicinity where he was
supposed to gather his subjects.

"...I most certainly refuse

to again be the instrument of the murder of innocent women
TT ?
and children," he exclaimed prophetically*
In his initial report on the Custer expedition, General

m

ibid., 3-if*

112Ibid., 5.
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Sheridan was laudatory.

After recounting the losses imposed

upon the Indians, he remarked, "The highest credit is due
General Custer and his command.

They started in a furious

snow-storm and traveled all the while in snow twelve inches
deep.“

The Black Kettle band had been justly punished for

depredations on the Saline and Solomon rivers in Kansas.

"We

will soon have them in good condition," Sheridan predicted.
"If we can get one or two more good blows there will be no
more Indian troubles in my department.

«113

Superintendent Murphy r ead of what Sheridan called "the
opening of the campaign against the hostile Indians" in the
newspaper and became, as he put it, "sick at heart."

Most of

the Indians killed in the village were not involved in the
crimes in question.

Particularly appalling was the killing

of Black Kettle, "one of the truest friends the whites have
ever had among the Indians of the plains."

Black Kettle, even

after Sand Creek, had intervened to prevent widespread trouble
in the spring of 1867 and had worked "assiduously" to make the
Medicine Lodge Creek negotiations a success.

Probably there

would now be an alliance between formerly friendly and hos
tile tribes and a costly and bloody war.^3^
Reverberations of the argument over Custer’s action were
heard from the Plains to the Potomac and lasted for many weeks.

113Ibld.. 347.
* ^ T b i d .. 5-6. Murphy reported the Cheyenne village
within seventy miles of Port Cobb, figuring land miles in
stead of distance by boat, as cited by the military*
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One of the first to attack the Army, of course, was Samuel
Tappan.

On December l\. he condemned the "stupid and criminal

blundering” of the officers involved.

By waging war on

villages inhabited by women and children, they left no doubt
in the minds of the Indians that extermination was the govern
m e n t s objective.

The only hope for salvaging the work done

by the Peace Commission lay in "immediate and unconditional
abandonment of the present war policy” and the discharge of
volunteers, control of the Army and its field officers and
H<
just fulfillment of treaties.
Presenting a contrary view was General W. B, Hazen,
the officer in charge of implementing the Medicine Lodge Creek
treaties.

The military’s strong stand was just beginning to

have a "salutary effect,” he noted.

The victory over the

Cheyennes was fine, but General Sheridan should not relax his
campaign.

To have a lasting effect, the work of subduing

the tribes of the Southern Plains must be done " thoroughly
On December 23, shortly after the Senate had begun an
investigation of the V/aahlta attack, Sau6i;al Sherman Informed
Generals Sheridan, Hazen and Grierson that he was behind Custer
one hundred per cent.

He wanted them to "go ahead, kill and

punish the hostile, rescue the captive white women and children,
capture and destroy the ponies, lances, carbines, etc..,"

1X% I

(P), 1868, 1012-1016.

•ii c__

iSL iS* Dge « Ho. 2ii.0.iilst Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1h2$), 1870, Uj.8 - 1 5 0 . In fact, Sheridan on December 19, 1868,
indicated that he would have acted more vigorously, particu
larly against the Xiowas, but for Hazen's appeal in their be
half. (Ibid., 151}.).
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One of the first to attack the Army, of course, was Samuel
Tappan,

On December Ij. he condemned the ‘’stupid and criminal

blundering” of the officers involved.

By waging war on

villages inhabited by women and children, they left no doubt
in the minds of the Indians that extermination was the govern
ment's objective.

The only hope for salvaging the work done

by the Peace Commission lay in "immediate and unconditional
abandonment of the present war policy" and the discharge of
volunteers, control of the Army and its field officers and
11<
just fulfillment of treaties.
Presenting a contrary view was General W, B, Hazen,
the officer in charge of implementing the Medicine Lodge Creek
treaties.

The military's strong stand was ju3t beginning to

have a "salutary effect," he noted.

The victory over the

Cheyennes was fine, but General Sheridan should not relax bis
campaign.

To have a lasting effect, the work of subduing

the tribes of the Southern Plains must be done "thoroughly."-5- ^
On December 23, shortly after the Senate had begun an
investigation of the Washita, attack, CouCi-al Sherman informed
Generals Sheridan, Hazen and Grierson that he was behind Custer
one hundred per cent.

He wanted them to "go ahead, kill and

punish the hostile, rescue the captive white women and children,
capture and destroy the ponies, lances, carbines, etc,,,"

13^SI (P), 1868, 1012-1016.
116

HR Ex, Doc. No. 2ii0.li.lst Cong,, 2 sess, (Serial
ll\2$), 1870,
-150. In fact, Sheridan on December 19, 1868,
indicated that he would have acted more vigorously, particu
larly against the Hiowas, but for Hazen's appeal in their be
half. (Ibid.. I5i|-).
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Tappan, Taylor and company were making "bald and naked asser
tions** in the papers about Black Kettle's friendliness, but most
of the public would not be "humbugged,"

If there were re-

percussions he would accept full responsibility,

117

A refutation of the charge that Black Kettle's camp
was friendly was issued by General Sheridan on January 1, 1869,
There were two major flaws in the allegation, he maintained.
In the first place, the Oheyenne village was not near Port
Cobb, as claimed, but far up-river.

Secondly, there was

definite proof that a number of young bucks from the village
were raiding at Dodge at the very time the camp was wiped out.
Evidence that they used the Washita settlement as a base of
operations included stolen mules, mail and photographs found
by Custer's men.

In addition, the Indians’ own illustrated

history of murders and depredations (drawings on hides and so
forth) had been found and would be at the "service of any
n nO
one desiring information on the subject,"
As the mutual recriminations continued, General Sherman
was at times tempted to declare war on the Indian BureauI
Such was the case when Agent Wynkoop, through channels, asked
President Johnson to direct the Army to release the widow of
"guiltless" Black Kettle from imprisonment at Port Hay3,
117
'Among other things, Sherman said that he did not
want agents to have charge of the Cheyennes and Klowas until
Bull Bear and Satanta, leaders of the respective tribes, had
been killed, (Sherman to Sheridan, Hazen and Grierson, Decem
ber 23, 1 8 6 8 , Letters Sent, Division of the Missouri, NA, RG
98), Hereafter these records are cited Div, Mo. L.S.
Ex. D o c . Ho. 2lt0. l*lst Cong., 2 sess, (Serial
11*25), 1870,
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It would be but a "small tribute” to the memory of the great
cbief, Wynkoop submitted, to send her to her daughter, Mrs.
George Bent, on Purgatory River, Colorado Territory.

119

Com

missioner Taylor and Secretary Browning endorsed the appeal,
and Johnson Issued an Executive Order for the woman's release.
Sherman declared that Wynkoop had gone "out of his way"
to send such a petition to the President.

The agent's

reference to the "murdered" chief and Taylor's comment about
the former's "manly and magnanimous appeal" were simply cal
culated to embarrass the Army.
in good keeping.
would be released.

They knew that the squaw was

But, if George Bent would have her, she

121

Only time and new controversies quieted the charges
and counter-charges.

The Washita "battle" or "massacre" was

neither the first nor the last occasion for dispute between
leaders of the War and Interior Departments over the question
of punishing large groups of Indians for the action of un
manageable young tribesmen.

A factor which made civil and

military authorities especially critical of one another in
this case, though, was the concurrent resumption of congres
sional debate over which branch should control the Indian
service.

^•^Ibid., 9. George Bent was a son of "Colonel"
William Bent, founder of Bent’s Port, Colorado Territory.
For further information see Allen H. Bent, The Bent Familv
in America (New York, 1900).
129sherman to Townsend, January 28, 1869, Div. Mo.
L.S., NA, RG 98.
121Ibid.
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17f>
REVIVAL OP THE TRANSFER ISSUE
The advocates of military control over Indian affairs
remained relatively quiet for many months after their trans
fer proposal failed in the Senate, In February, 1 8 6 7 * They
assumed a wait-and-see attitude toward the joint efforts of
top civil and military officials to negotiate a peaceful
settlement with the hostile tribes.

Some were skeptical about

the Peace Commission’s report of January, 1868, which rejected
the transfer proposition.

But the fact that Generals Sherman,

Terry and Augur signed the statement prevented any attempt
to revive the Indian control Issue.

123

The turn of events in the fall of 1 8 6 8 , however, led
many policy-makers to reconsider the government's system of
Indian administration.

Once more the threats and violence

of native war parties endangered westward expansion and de
velopment.

With some tribes, at least, peace treaties seemed

a waste of time and money*

In October, disillusioned by the

apparent failure of conciliatory measures and civil control,
the Peace Commission recommended the use of force and War
Department control over the Indian service.*^On November 1, in his annual report, General Sherman
followed up the Chicago resolutions with a vigorous appeal

122

See Chapter Three.

123

Priest, op. cit., l4.7-ii.8j Cong. Globe. i|.Otb Cong.,
3 sess., 17.
12i<-CIA, 1 8 6 8 , 371-372; see above.
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for transfer*

Only the War Department, he argued, had the

requisite force to carry out the commendable objectives of
the Peace Commission*

Many people, especially in the East,

thought that whites always caused Indian wars, but this was
not the case in recent developments on the Plains*

Transfer

and early appropriations were the "only hope” for ending this
"eternal” conflict on the frontier.^ 5
Commissioner Taylor delivered a nine-page rebuttal in
his yearly report*

"In view of probable action upon that

/£ransfer 7 recommendation, and impelled by solemn convic
tions of duty, I feel called upon to offer some facts and
arguments," he began.

First, the proper management of Indian

affairs was "too large, onerous, and Important a burden" to
add to the Secretary of War*s many dutie3*

Second, transfer

would necessitate a large, expensive standing army in peace
time, and a "magnificent array of bayonets" was not the way to
safeguard the nation*

Third, in contradiction to the "true

policy" of peace, transfer was "tantamount.**to perpetual
war."

Fourth, military management had been tried for a long

time without success*

Fifth, military government would entail

"inhuman and unchristian" treatment and would "destroy a
whole race by*..demoralization and disease*.•"

Sixth, In

dian affairs were "incompatible" with the training and ob
jectives of military men.

Seventh, transfer would offend the

Indians and, as a consequence, bring injury Upon their white
neighbors*

Eighth, the Peace Commission in January, 1868,

12^SW (P), 1 8 6 8 , 3 3 8 .
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advocated an independent department in preference to military
control.

Ninth, it was impossible for the Army to fulfill

the "sacred and responsible" trust of Indian guardianship.
Tenth, war management would be much more expensive than the
existing system.

Lastly, the change would violate republican

principles of civil supremacy and personal liberty.

126

The Reverend Mr, Taylor was most anxious to save the
"unlettered children of the wilderness" from the "blighting
sceptre of military despotism,"

His solution to the Indian

problem was an independent department, presumably governed
by men of high Christian character and missionary zeal,*2 ^
Others also advocated a separate Indian Department or other
reforms, but in terms less offensive to those connected with
the military.

The Commissioner1s idealistic and Impassioned

argument may have swayed some in Congress, but westerners and
practical-minded politicians undoubtedly felt the Indians
could do without "friends" such as Taylor.
In late November and early December the inter-depart
mental altercation was lively.

President-elect Grant threw

his support behind War Department control, stating that the
necessity for a change was becoming "stronger and more evident every day,"

126

General Sheridan complained of agent

absenteeism, charging, "...the whole Indian management is a
notorious fraud."

In reply, Commissioner Taylor asserted

126CIA, 1868, 7-15>.
12?Ibld.. 13-15.
^2®Grant to Schofield, November 21j., 1868, C.G.L.S.,
NA, RG 108.
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that Sheridan’s '’ungenerous attack" was false and "discreditable to its author*
On December 8 the controversy was shifted to the House
of Representatives.

Congressman James^A. Garfield of Ohio,

chairman of the House Military Committee, introduced H,R.
Ilj.82, a bill to restore the Indian Bureau to the War Depart
ment as of January 1, 1869*

Among other things, the bill

proposed to empower the Secretary of War to detail military
superintendents and agents and to appoint a colonel or higher
ranking officer as Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

This

change, Garfield argued, would eliminate expenses for the
salaries of many civil officials and prevent corruption, by
making Indian authorities subject to courts-martial.

"Gen

eral Grant, General Sherman, and General Sheridan, and nearly
all the leading officers of the Army connected with the Indian
service," he argued, "recommend this as the initial step,""^0
Representatives Sidney Clarke of Kansas, Robert C,
Schenck of Ohio and Halbert Paine of Wisconsin were among
those who backed the bill.

Clarke said that the Indian

question was not a matter of philanthropy, but practical
administration, that expansion was Inevitable and that the
government was obliged to protect it,

Schenck insisted that

nine out of ten Indian wars were caused by "conniving"
agents, sub-agents and contractors, rather than by troops

7Taylor to Browning, December 5, 1868, I.O.R.B.
No. 18, NA,RG 7^.
*30 Cong. Globe. lj.0th Cong., 3 sess., 1 7 ,
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stationed in the Indian country.

Paine qualified his support

by suggesting that military agents be bonded like quartermaster or pay officers#

131

The leading opponent of the measure was William Windom
of Minnesota, chairman of the House Committee on Indian
Affairs.

”1 believe if there is any Department of this govern

ment in which we find the great maelstrom of the treasury,
where money is sunk by millions and never accounted for, it
is the War Department,” be contended.

To Windom, transfer

meant all-out war on the Indians, and in his own state, six
millions were spent In I86ij.-l86'> to kill two red men I

But

this case was weakened when he admitted ignorance of the latest
peace commission resolutions.'*'3^
Pew others disputed the bill.

Representative William

Higby of California debunked the idea that Army officers were
more virtuous than civil agents, and Representative William
Munger of Ohio charged that Congress had itself caused the
recent Indian war by delaying the 1868-1869 Indian appropria133
tion bill.
These arguments were to no avail, for the
House passed the Garfield bill by the overwhelming margin
of 116 to 33.13^
On December 10 H.R. Uj.82 came up In the Senate, where

131Ibid.. 18-19.
132
Ibid., 17-18
133Ibid.. 20.
13^Ibld.. 21.
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its fate waa determined by a vote on committee reference.
Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts moved that it be referred
to the Committee on Military Affairs because it originated in
the House military committee and would not get a fair hearing
in the Committee on Indian Affairs,

Senators Orris Perry of

Connecticut and Roscoe Conkling of Hew York agreed that
reference to the latter committee would be

fatal,

^ During

the discussion, Senator William Stewart of Nevada, long-time
advocate of transfer, offered his views on the evils of di
vided authority in the West,

"All over that country there is

a jealousy between the two Departments," he observed, ” ,,,each
laying all the blame on the other, and it is difficult to
investigate and ascertain where it really is."*3^
Senator John Thayer of Nebraska countered with a mo
tion to send the bill to the Committee on Indian Affairs,
remarking that any other course would be "irregular,n

Sena

tor Lot Morrill of Maine concurred, criticizing Wilson’s
comment that the measure was "recommended by the generals
of the Army,"

Strong objection to the inference that the

Indian Committee would "smother" the bill came from Senator
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois,and Senator James R, Doolittle
of Wisconsin, head of the special committee which investigated
Indian affairs in the period 1865-1867*

Finally, Senator

Thomas Hendricks of Indiana interjected the popular argument,

*

3-35
Ibid,, 39-14-0.
136Ibld*. L».l.
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"It Is known.,.that It has cost this government much more to
fight the Indians than to feed them —

very much more; and I
„1 “37

think this a question whether they shall be.,.fed or fought.
When the debate ended, the Senate voted to send the bill to
its grave, the Indian Committee.'*■3®
The session was not over, though, and proponents of
military control hoped to accomplish their goal by other
means.

Senator E. G. Ross of Kansas sounded out General

Sherman on certain alternatives.

He asked, for example, if

the same purpose could not be served "without incurring any
of the responsibilities" if a pro-military man, such as
Governor S. J. Crawford, was made Indian Commissioner and
Army cfficers were utilized as agents.

139

Sherman, who was busy with other matters, including a
"grand" army re-union in Chicago, did not reply for some time.
Then, on January 7, be sent Ross a detailed explanation of
his views on the Indian problem.

The worst part of the pre

sent system, he asserted, was that the Array was unable to
forestall hostilities.

Agents always lived as far as possible

from their charges and ministered to their "savage wants."
The alternative of an independent department would not remedy
this, for politicians would still have the upper hand. "No
amount of virtue or intelligence seated in Washington," Sherman

137Ibld., 1(2.

138Ibid. Senator John Sherman voted for submission of
the bill to the Military Committee.
■^^Ross to Sherman, December 12, 1868, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 21*.
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emphasized, "will change the state of facts on the Plains or
in the Mountains...and the men who are to save any part of
the wild tribes of America must live among them.

Our Army

is there and we have the power to keep them there....”* ^
New maneuvers were tried by Ross and his associates.
In February attempts were made in both the House and the
Senate to achieve transfer by amendment.

On February

Representative Garfield resubmitted his December bill as an
"amendment” to H.R. 1738, the Indian appropriation bill.
Garfield blasted the existing control of the Indian service,
alleging that in all branches "fraud ’creams and mantles’
and is a stench in the nostrils of all good m e n . " ^ ^ Windom
discounted the amendment as not "germane" to appropriations
and sarcastically asked why soldiers "clamored" to take over
such a corrupt bureau.

Significantly, Ben Butler, in opposing

the amendment, suggested that the time might come when the
House would resort to withholding Indian supplies to "wrest"
Dip
power from the Senate.
Although most of the members of
the House favored transfer, they did not accept legislation
by amendment*

The proposal lost by a vote of 93 to

Two weeks later Senator Stewart introduced a similar
amendment to the Indian appropriation bill in the upper house.

^■°Sherman to Ross, January 7, 1869, Div* Mo. L.S.,
NA, RG 98.
• ^ Cong. Globe. I^Oth Cong., 3 sess., 8 7 9 , 8 8 1 .

^ I b l d .. 879-882.
^ 3Ibid., 8 8 3 .
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T ryin g to e s t a b l i s h a c o n n e c tio n b etw een War Departm ent con
t r o l and th e measure under c o n s id e r a t io n , he conten ded th a t
on e-d ep artm en t a d m in is tr a tio n would red u ce th e "mountain
h ig h ” s ta c k o f money b i l l s

S e n a to r M o r r ill was p a r t i 

c u la r ly c r i t i c a l o f S te w a r t’ s argum en ts, rem ind in g th e l a t t e r
t h a t i t was "not a d ecorou s t h in g ” t o s o l i c i t v o te s by de
s c r i b in g h is p r o p o sa l as th e w ish o f th e P r e s i d e n t - e l e c t ,
The v o t e , 36 to 9 a g a in s t th e amendment, l e f t no doubt th a t
th e S en a te was a bulw ark a g a in s t t r a n s f e r .
The d e f e a t o f S en a to r S te w a r t's t r a n s f e r amendment
e lim in a te d any chance th a t th e War Departm ent would g e t
a u t h o r ity over In d ia n a f f a i r s d u rin g th e F o r t ie t h S e s s io n
o f C o n g ress.
o p tim is tic .

S t i l l th e a d v o c a tes o f m ilit a r y c o n t r o l were
In two weeks G eneral Grant was due t o be In 

a u gu rated as P r e s id e n t , and he had o f t e n spoken in fa v o r o f
th e a d m in is t r a t iv e change th e y p r o p o sed .

The Grant a d m in is

t r a t i o n was to b r in g reform s In In d ia n p o l i c y , b u t n o t th e
kin d m ost o b se r v e r s e x p e c te d .

m

ii£

I b i d . , 1 3 7 6 -1 3 7 7 .
I b i d . . 1 3 7 7 -1 3 7 8 .
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CHAPTER FIVE

INAUGURATION OF TEE "GRANT PEACE POLICY":
MARCH, 1869 TO MARCH, 1871
I***hop© th e p o lic y now pursued w ill* * * b r in g
a l l th e In d ia n s upon r e s e r v a t i o n s , where th e y w i l l l i v e
in h o u se s, have sc h o o lh o u se s and c h u r c h e s, and w i l l
be p u rsu in g p e a c e fu l and s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g a v o c a tio n s ,
and where th e y may be v i s i t e d by th e la w -a b id in g w h ite
men w ith th e same im punity t h a t he now v i s i t s th e
c i v i l i z e d w h ite s e t tle m e n ts *
(P r e s id e n t G rant, December 5>, 1870)
«00t h i s govern m en t•••h as p r a c t i c a l l y exem pted th e
red men from th e o p e r a tio n o f th a t law w hich sa y s
"In th e sw eat o f th y fa c e s h a l t thou e a t bread*"
he i s reg a rd ed , in o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s , n o t o n ly as a
n a tio n a l pauper b u t a n a t io n a l p et*
(Denver D a lly Rocky Mountain News,
March 2 0 , lB59T

On March ij., 1 8 6 9 , a f t e r ta k in g th e o a th o f o f f i c e ,
P r e s id e n t U ly s s e s S* Grant r e a d , " in low v o ic e ," a b r i e f
in a u g u r a l ad d ress*^

The l i s t e n e r s who knew th a t he had p r e 

v io u s ly ad vocated a m i li t a r y - c o n t r o l l e d , c o e r c iv e In d ia n
p o lic y and th a t he planned t o a p p o in t form er g e n e r a ls Jacob
D. Cox and E ly S . Parker as S e c r e ta r y o f th e I n t e r i o r and
Coim alssioner o f In d ian A f f a i r s , r e s p e c t i v e l y , were p rob ab ly
s u r p r is e d by h is remarks*

"The proper trea tm en t o f th e

o r ig i n a l occu pants o f t h i s la n d — th e In d ia n s — i s one

^ H e s s e lt ln e , op.* c i t *, llj.3*
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d e s e r v in g o f c a r e f u l s t u d y ,” Grant a s s e r t e d .

”1 w i l l fa v o r

any co u rse toward them which ten d s t o t h e i r c i v i l i z a t i o n . ”

p

The s o ld ie r - P r e s id e n t was v a g u e, bu t was not r a t t l i n g s a b r e s .
”Any c o u r s e ” d id not ex clu d e th e m i li t a r y th e o r y t h a t th e
p r e r e q u is it e fo r reform in g In d ia n s was to make them f e e l th e
power o f th e governm ent.

But contem porary In d ia n sy m p a th izers

th o u gh t s o , and s e v e r a l s c h o la r s have s i n c e a s s e r t e d or im
p l i e d t h a t th e s e in a u g u ra l remarks were th e p r e lu d e t o a
b e n e v o le n t, e n lig h te n e d In d ia n program known as th e "Grant
Peace P o l i c y . ”3
Volumes have been w r it t e n on th e governm ent’ s s h i f t
t o a more p a t e r n a l i s t i c and c o n c i l i a t o r y approach t o th e In 
d ia n problem during G ran t’ s a d m in is t r a t io n .

Grant h im s e lf

has som etim es been d e p ic te d as th e le a d in g s p i r i t in a move
ment to sp a re th e n a t io n ’ s wards from th e ”f i r e and sword"
p o l i c y o f th e Army, th e c o r r u p tio n o f th e " In d ian r i n g , ” and
th e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f fr o n tie r s m e n .

The q u e s tio n a b le im p li

c a t io n o f t h i s in t e r p r e t a t io n i s t h a t he not o n ly underwent
a sudden and dram atic c o n v e r sio n a f t e r le a v in g th e o f f i c e o f
G e n e r a l-in -C h ie f but fo llo w e d sta n d a rd s in In d ia n a d m in is tr a 
t i o n in s t r i k i n g c o n tr a s t to th e g r o s s fra u d s and mismanage
ment he e v id e n t ly condoned in o th e r p h ases o f govern m ent.

^R ichardson, £2* c i t . , V II, 8 .
^ S ee , f o r exam ple, Manypenny, op. c i t . ; E l s i e Rushmore,
The Indian Policy During Grant’s Admlnls tratIona (Jamaica,
New York, l 9 l 4 ) ; F l o r a W. Seymour, In d ia n Agents of th e Old
F r o n t ie r (New York, 1 9 k l) and Law rie Tatum, Our Reel B roth ers
and t h e “P eace P o lic y of P r e s id e n t u ly s s e a S. Grant ( P h ila d e lp h ia .
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The fo llo w in g d is c u s s io n w i l l d e a l , b r i e f l y , w ith th e
o r ig i n and e a r ly developm ent o f th e le a d in g f e a t u r e s o f th e
f e d e r a l In d ia n p o l i c y o f th e p e r io d March, 1 8 6 9 , t o M arch,1871*
The l a t t e r d a te c o in c id e s w ith th e a d o p tio n o f one o f the
l a s t m ajor a s p e c ts o f th e s o - c a l l e d p ea ce p o l i c y , a b o l i t i o n
o f th e In d ia n t r e a t y system *

W hile c o n c e n tr a tin g upon th e

i n t e r a c t io n o f th e War and I n t e r i o r departm ent In th e s e two
y e a r s , th e w r ite r w i l l attem p t t o q u a lif y th e t r a d i t i o n a l view
t h a t th e "Grant Peace P o lic y " was an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f
C h r is tia n and p h ila n th r o p ic I d e a ls and a c r e d i t t o th e s t a t e s 
m anship and b u m anitarian ism o f P r e s id e n t Grant*
I n i t i a l l y , I t sh o u ld be n o te d , how ever, th a t contem
p orary and modern a n a ly s t s have u sed th e term "Grant Peace
P o lic y " in v a r io u s w a y s.

Some have r e f e r r e d to th e c o n c i l i a 

t o r y elem en ts o f th e In d ia n p o l i c y a t t r ib u t e d t o Grant
p e r s o n a lly , o th e r s to a l l n o n - b e llig e r e n t methods u sed w h ile
he was in o f f i c e and s t i l l o th e r s t o th e g e n e r a l p o l i c y a f t e r
1869# I n c lu d in g c o e r c iv e and p a c i f i c m easures*

k

H erein th e

b r o a d e st d e f i n i t i o n w i l l be u se d , f o r th e governm ent sou gh t
p e a c e through a mixed program w hich combined o ld and new t a c 
t i c s and d i f f e r e n t i a t e d betw een th e tre a tm e n t o f p e a c e a b le and
h o s t i l e In d ia n s*

xt

^■Hyde, on, c i t . . f o r exam p le, em p hasizes th e word "peace"
and d a te s th e p o lic y from 1 8 6 5 , w h ile Seymour, op* c i t *.
t y p i f i e s t h o s e who s t r e s s G rant’ s' p e r s o n a l r o l e . R obert M,
U t l e y , "The C e leb ra ted Peace P o lic y o f G eneral G ran t," North
Dakota H isto r y * XX ( J u l y , 1953)# I 21-U 4.3 and Lucy E. Text o r ,
6‘f f l c l a l R e la tio n s Between th e U n ited S t a t e s and th e S iou x In 
d ia n s (P a lo A l t o , 1896) , g iv e more com prehensive in t e r p r e 
t a t io n s *
* S I , 1873, I I I - I V .
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THE PEACE POLICY
An Initial feature of the peace policy was the estab
lishment of an unpaid, non-partisan Board of Indian Com
missioners to advise the Secretary of the Interior and "exercise
joint control" with him over Indian appropriations.^*

This

organization, comprised at first of nine leading philan
thropists, was more the result of humanitarian pressure and
political exigencies than the charitable ingenuity of Presi
dent Grant,

Long before it was created, Colonel Ely S, Parker,

G r a n t s military aide, the Doolittle Committee of 1 8 6 5 -1 8 6 7 ,
the Peace Commission of 1867-1868 and others recommended such
an agency to improve and exert a "moral influence" upon the
Indian service.

The immediate impetus for the organization

of the Board, though, was a House-Senate dispute over the
Indian appropriation bill for the fiscal year beginning July 1,

1869.
At the end of the fortieth session of Congress, the
House refused to approve a Senate amendment to add to a pro
posed Indian appropriation of $2,312,21^.0,12 over four and a

^16 S t a t , L *, lj.0.
^Parker to G rant, January 21+, 1 8 6 7 , I.O.L.R., M is c .. NA,
R£ 75 ; S en , R p t. No, 1 5 6 . 39th C o n g ,, 2 s e s s . ( S e r i a l 1 2 791,
1 8 6 7 , 8 -1 0 ; HR Ex. Doc* No. 9 7 . lj.0th C on g,, 2 sess. (Serial
1 3 3 7 1 , 1867, 2 2 ; S l i p ) , 1869, 613; P r i e s t , 03. c i t . , 1^2. One
o f th e o r g a n iz a tio n s w hich brought p r e s s u r e upon th e govern 
ment t o e s t a b l i s h su ch a board was t h e "U nited S t a t e s In d ia n
Com m ission," a twenty-member group o f prom inent clergym en and
r e fo r m e r s , .T h is group in c lu d e d P e te r C ooper, fou n d er o f Cooper
Union in New York, Henry B ergh, o r g a n iz e r o f th e S o c ie t y fo r
th e P r e v e n tio n o f C ru e lty o f A n im a ls, James A R o o s e v e lt , Rev
erend Henry Ward B eech er and s e v e r a l welHioown r e l i g i o u s and
form er a n t i - s l a v e r y c r u s a d e r s ,
(CIA, 1869, 9 5 - 9 6 ) ,
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t h ir d m i l l i o n d o lla r s to f u l f i l l th e peace t r e a t i e s o f 18671868.

The H ouse, je a lo u s o f th e S e n a te ’ s t r e a t y and r e l a t e d

powers over In d ian a f f a i r s , h e ld out so stu b b o rn ly th a t
Q

C ongress adjourned w ith o u t p a s sin g an In d ian b i l l *

E a r ly in

th e f o r t y - f i r s t s e s s i o n , th e House r e -in tr o d u c e d i t s o r ig i n a l
b i l l , and th e S en ate a g a in amended i t to a llo w f o r im plem enta
t i o n o f th e peace t r e a t i e s *

As a com prom ise, Congress f i n a l l y

p a sse d th e measure w ith a su p p lem en tary, u n a llo t t e d $ 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
and an a d d it io n a l $2f>,000 f o r th e e sta b lish m e n t o f a board
o f "not more th an te n co m m issio n ers* . .em in en t fo r t h e i r
i n t e l l i g e n c e and p h ilan th rop y" t o h e lp s u p e r v is e In d ia n e x p e n d itu r e s*

Q

A c c o r d in g ly , on June 3 , Grant is s u e d an e x e c u t iv e
ord er a p p o in tin g th e Board o f In d ia n Comm issioners and v e s t in g
i t w ith v a g u e, s e m i - o f f i c i a l d u t i e s .
to :

The Board was in s tr u c t e d

e s t a b l i s h i t s own o r g a n iz a tio n ; examine rec o rd s and

in fo r m a tio n p e r ta in in g t o th e a c t i v i t i e s o f th e In d ia n O ff ic e ;
in s p e c t a g e n c ie s , w itn e s s a n n u ity d is t r ib u t io n s and c o n fe r
w ith f i e l d o f f i c i a l s ; s u p e r v is e th e purchase o f In d ia n good s;
a d v is e th e heads o f th e departm ent and bureaii on app ointm en ts
and pu rchases} and make recom m endations on In d ian management*

^Cong. G lob a, ifOth C ong., 3 s e s s . , 1698, 1 8 1 3 , 1891.
H e s s e lt i n e , op*' c i t . , and A th earn, ojd. c i t . , are in e r r o r in
s t a t i n g t h a t two m i ll i o n d o lla r s were a p p ro p ria ted in th e f o r t i e t h
s e s s io n and t h a t Grant had a f r e e hand in expending i t * The
House and S e n a te , as shown by d eb a tes over t r a n s f e r , had lo n g
d i f f e r e d over th e l a t t e r 1s power to approve t r e a t i e s and In 
d ia n appointm ents and to c o n t r o l In d ian la n d c e s s i o n s . See
below*
9 16 S t a t . L ., ij.0*
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In abort, it was to bave a auperviaory, not an executive,
role*

10
Among the first commissioners were some outstanding

humanitarians:

William Welsh of Philadelphia, John V, Par-

well of Chicago, William E. Dodge of New York, Silas E. Tobey
of Boston, Nathan Bishop of New York, Robert Campbell of
St* Louis, Henry S. Lane of Indiana, Felix Brunot of Pitts
burgh, George H, Stuart of Philadelphia and Vincent Colyer
of New York,

These men had such varied professional experience

as manufacturing, retailing, shipping, education, real estate
and banking*

Several were prominent in the Y,M,C,A. movement

and the organization of Sunday school, Bible and missionary
societies*
the House of

Lane, the only active politician, had served in
Representatives.

Robert Campbell, a colorful

Irish Immigrant who had been a partner in the Sublette and
Campbell fur-trapping firm, was the only "westerner” in the
group*

11
Although the Board was active in Indian affairs until

193 ^, it had difficulty from the very beginning over its
powers and responsibilities.

Secretary Cox, Commissioner Par

ker and their successors often complimented the philanthropists

1 0 CIA, 1869,

k k -h $ *

^ M a r s h a l l Dwight Moody, "A History of the Board of
Indian Commissi Ouw !Tw aud Its Relationship to the Administration
of Indian Affairs, 1869 -1 9 0 0 .” (unpublished master's thesis,
American University, undated), 7 - H *
Campbell's fur company
was active near Fort Laramie, and he was one of the commis
sioners who negotiated the Sioux treaty of l8 £l* See LeRoy
R. Hafen, Fort Laramie and the Pageant of the West. 1 8 3b.-lo90
(Glendale, 1938).
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for their advice and assistance, but always insisted upon
keeping them in a subordinate position."^

William Welsh,

first president of the Board, resigned when the Indian Bureau
purchased some Indian goods without consulting his group*

13

All of the original commissioners except Bishop unsuccess
fully agitated for coordinate control of the Indian service*
"The commission," they reported in November, 1869, "••.considers
itself clothed with full power to examine all matters apper
taining to the conduct of Indian affairs

Secretary Cox

maintained, however, that President Grant had not intended to
create a "double-headed" administration.^*
This intra-departraental feud continued for many months
because Congress failed to clarify the Board's powers.

The

commission Interpreted the Indian appropriation act of July

1 5 , 1 8 7 0 , as giving it supervision over "all expenditures;"
Commissioner Parker said it could consider only annuities
In 1871 the organization's executive committee was authorized
to revise, approve or disapprove all accounts, but the Secre
tary of the Interior retained the right to reject their

12 SI, 1869, x-xi; White, oja. cit., 189-191.
^■3j* p. Cox to Win. Welsh, June 2, 1869, D.I.L.S.,
Indian Misc., NA, RG 75.
^ C I A , 1869, l£.
^ N a t h a n Bishop to Cox, July 2, 1869, D.I.A.F. and
Cox To Felix R. Brunot, July 5, 1869, D.I.L.S., Indian Misc.,
NA, RG 75.

^ 1 6 Stat, L., 335; BIC, 1873, 8 ; N.p, Chipman, "Argu
ment of N. P. Chipman on Behalf of Honorable E. S. Parker,"
(Washington, 1870), 105-108.
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recommendations.

While struggling to gain official stature,

the Board, in 1871, discovered that Commissioner Parker had
approved some large beef and flour contracts without adver
tising them.

Its subsequent investigation induced Parker to

resign.1^
But this "victory” was short-lived.

In January, 18?2,

Secretary Delano flaunted the opinions of Vincent Colyer, the
ng

Board secretary, so openly that the latter resigned.
more, in May,

lQ 7 k $

Further

when Delano tried to bring the Board under

closer restriction by moving its headquarters from New York
to Washington, six members submitted resignations.

The Secre

tary, they explained, overruled so many decisions and recom
mendations that their labor was rendered "as useless as it is
»19
arduous and vexatious." 7

After 18714. the Board consisted of

persons more amenable to the rule of the politicians and acted
in a strictly advisory capacity.

20

The Indian Commission also had other problems to contend
with.

Much criticized by westerners and military control

. ^ S e n . Ex. Do c . N o . 39. 14.1 st Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
II440 ), 1871, 5 } Priest, op. cit., ij.5; Moody, "History of the
Board,” 63.
TO
Brunot to Delano, January 1 3 , 1872 , and Brunot to
Vincent Colyer, January 19, 1 8 7 2 . B.C., Tray 2, NA, RG 75.
19
7Brunot et. al. to President Grant, May 27, I 87 I4.9 Board
of Indian Commissioners Miscellaneous Correspondence, Tray
117, NA, RG 7 5 . Hereafter these records are cited B.C.M.
Those resigning included Brunot, Campbell, Bishop, Dodge,
Farwell and Stuart. Among the proposals Delano rejected was
one to create an Independent Indian Department.
Priest, op. cit.. I4.8 .
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advocates in Congress, it had considerable difficulty getting
funds for operational and travel expenses,

"Congressional

opposition to the commissioners,11 one author observes, "was
abandoned only after the Board had been reduced to impotence
/about 18827 by lack of authority and f u n d s S t i l l

the

Board made significant contributions to Indian administration
through its publicity of the Indian problem, Investigations and
reform of contracting and accounting procedures.

22

Relations between the commission and the military were,
as a rule, less than amicable.

The Board at times accused

the Army of wanting to slaughter the Indians,

In its first

annual report it commented:
Against the inhuman idea that the Indian is only
fit to be exterminated, and the influence of the men
who propagate it, the military arm of the government
cannot be too strongly guarded. It is hardly to be
wondered at that inexperienced officers, ambitious for
distinction, when surrounded by such influences have
been Incited to attack Indian bands without adegnate
cause, and involve the nation in an unjust war, 3
Some western commanders, on the other hand, regarded the east
ern Indian sympathizers as crackpots,

General Sherman once

shocked a group of New York philanthropists by declining to
appear before them unless they retired to Ports Sully or Rice,
2 k

where the "poor Indians" lived.

Speaking for the military

21Ibid., ^0,
22tfhite, on. cit.. 190; Moody, "History of the Board,"
15-29.
23ciA, 1869, 1*7-48.
^■Denver Dally Rocky Mountain News. May 19, 1870,
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profession, the Army and Navy Journal asserted that the
“ignorant” humanitarians succeeded only in "harassing” Gen
eral Sheridan and others who understood the Indian problem
and wanted to take positive steps to solve it,

29

A second aspect of the peace policy, one which grati
fied contemporary humanitarians and reformers, was the nomina
tion of Indian officials by religious societies.

Like the

appointment of the Board of Indian Commissioners, this measure
was designed to purify the Indian service.

26

Actually, the

government had informally consulted church groups in selecting
agents for many years.

Moreover, in February, 1 8 6 7 , transfer

opponents discussed the possibility of a formal religious
nomination system in both houses of Congress,

27

But only the

Society of Friends, or Quakers, had the initiative to request
regular appointment responsibilities.

In January, 1 8 6 9 , a

delegation of Orthodox Friends visited President-elect Grant
in Washington and offered to assist him in agency appointments
by submitting a list of trustworthy persons.

28

This group

also memorialized Congress, citing their success with the red
men since the days of William Penn,

",,.we are confident,"

they remarked, "that the faithful exercise of the principles of

2% & N Jnl, VII (May 28, 1 8 7 0 ), 6 3 7 .
^ C I A , 1869, x-xi; Peter J. Rahill, The Catholic Indian
Missions and Grant1a Peace Policy, l870-188k TWasfalngtono 1993.
32,
^Priest, op, cit., 29; Cong. Globe. 39th Cong., 2 sess.,
892-898, 1 7 H u
28Rahill, 0£. cit., 32-33«
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our Lord Jesus Christ will be found sufficient to solve the
29
Indian question without military aid*”
t

Soon after Grant was inaugurated, the Quakers asked
the Indian Bureau how many agents it could use.

30

The In

terior authorities, supposing that religious agents might
provide honest and more economical administration, encouraged
the President to appoint Friends for the agencies in Nebraska,
Kansas and Indian Territory,

31

Meanwhile, though, Grant

appointed sixty-eight Army officers, rendered "surplus" by
an act of Congress approved March 3, 1869, as superintendents
32
and agents,-^

Since about four times as many military men

as Friends filled key agency positions, the President, at this
point, was hardly following a “Quaker policy," as is sometimes
suggested,^

On March 29, 1870, Commissioner Parker explained

the basis for appointing a military agent for the Cherokees
in this way:

29

HR Mlsc, Doc, 2 9 . lj.0th Cong,, 3 sess, (Serial 1385)*
1869, 1-3, For a summary of the views of the Central Executive
Conanittee of the Seven Yearly Meeting of the Friends Society
see Se n . Misc. Doc. No. $3.
tb Cong., 3 sess, (Serial 1835)*
1879, 397-399.
^ J o h n Butler to N. G. Taylor, March ll|, 1869, I.O.L.R.,
Indian Affairs, Misc., NA, RG 75,
^ S e n . Misc. Do c . N o . 9 3 . i|5th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
1835)s 1879s 396-397; CIA, 1869, 5. These states comprised
the Northern and Central superintendencles which Included, ex
cept for the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Comancbes and Kiowas, peace
able and sedentary tribes,
^ W i l l i a m T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sher
man (New York, 1891), II, 1+36; Ganoe, op,, cit.. 32i}.«
^Schmeckebier, op. cit,, for example, while mentioning
the military appointments, states that Grant "...promptly adopt
ed a new policy...by delegating...nomination to the several
religious organizations interested in mission work among the
Indians."
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This has been done in conformity with the policy now
in force, to appoint Officers of the Army to such posi
tions, in preference to civilians, except the Indian
Agencies embraced within the Northern and Central Superin
t e n d e d ies, which are In charge of members of the Society
of Friends *34In his annual message of December 6, 1869, Grant com
mented on the "most satisfactory" results of his "new policy"
of appointing Friends to manage a few agencies*

Their "strict

integrity and fair dealings," he said, fitted them for such
service*

At the same time, for superintendents and agents

"not on the reservations," Army officers worked best*

They

were needed in Indian country anyway, held positions for life,
were most anxious to avoid war and could be court-martialed
for fraud*
Still, a few months later, Grant and his advisors ex
panded the "Quaker policy," giving the right to nominate all
Indian officials to various religious denominations*

Grant*s

reasons for making this change, however, were evidently more
personal and political than humanitarian.

Congress had taken

exception to the appointment of military agents, because the
Indian service was a favorite outlet for patronage*

To pre

serve this power, the politicians passed the army appro
priation act of July l£, 1870, which stipulated that officers
accepting civil appointments had to relinquish their

^•Parker to John B, Lawley, March 29, 1870, I.O,R,B,
No* 9k, NA, RG 75.
^Richardson, og* cit*, VII, 38-39*
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■3A
commissions.

Sherman's memoirs give a secondhand account

of the President's reaction to this move.

When the sponsors

of this act visited Grant and announced their design to pre
vent the use of Army officers as agents, he replied:

"Gentle

men, you hav© defeated my plan of Indian management; but you
shall not succeed in your purpose, for I will divide these
appointments up among the religious churches, with which you
dare not contend."37

Subsequently, the agencies were appor

tioned among the Quakers, Methodists, Catholics, EpiscoOQ
palians, Presbyterians and other groups.
"This may be good
politics," General Sherman later complained, "but surely is
bad statesmanship."39
Prom the viewpoint of westerners and military leaders,
church-nominated officials were little better than those
chosen under the old spoils system.

General Sheridan insisted,

3 16 Stat. L. 319* Apparently the bill was also backed
by certain former volunteer officers who failed to gain per
manent rank at the end of the Civil War. (Athearn, op. cit..

2514.-257)•
37sherman, 0£. cit.. II, lf.37*
3®In 1872 the Hicksite Friends were in charge of six
agencies; the Orthodox Friends, ten; Baptists, five; Presby
terians, nine; Christians, two; Methodists, fourteen; Catholics,
seven; Reformed Dutch, five; Congregationalists, three; Episco
palians, eight; American Board of Foreign Missions, one; Uni
tarians, two; and Lutherans, one. (Scbmeckebier, oj). cit.,
5 5 * note.)
er.c, Misc. P o o . No . £ 3 , l|5th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
There is evidence that Grant's role with
respect to, especially, the church nomination system and Board
of Indian Commissioners has been overrated. Subordinates,
particularly Secretary J. D c Cox, were the planners who made
the "Grant Peace Policy" possible. Indeed, various reforms
were achieved in spite of, rather than because of, Grant. He
enlarged the church scheme to defy those who opposed military

1 8 3 5 ), 1879, 2?7*
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f o r ex a m p le, t h a t p h ila n th r o p y and C h r i s t i a n i z a t i o n c o u ld n o t
s u c c e e d u n t i l th e s a v a g e s had b een l i c k e d and f o r c e d t o l i v e
p erm a n en tly on r e s e r v a t i o n s by th e ArmyJ *0

In f a c t , th e

r e l i g i o u s a g e n ts d id much e x c e l l e n t w ork , b u t th e n o m in a tio n
sy ste m f a i l e d t o r e n o v a te t h e I n d ia n s e r v i c e t o th e e x t e n t
t h a t r e fo r m e r s h o p ed .
knew l i t t l e

In t h e f i r s t p l a c e , many a p p o in te e s

o f I n d ia n s and la c k e d th e f o r t i t u d e to c o n t r o l

t h e i r c h a r g e s and a g e n c y " h a n g ers-o n " and t h e i n t e g r i t y t o
r e s i s t t h e te m p ta tio n t o m is a p p r o p r ia te I n d ia n s u p p l i e s and
fu n d s.

S e c o n d ly , some c h u r c h e s p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e program

w it h l i t t l e

e n th u sia sm b e c a u s e o f l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s and

govern m en t a i d , d i s i n t e r e s t among t h e i r p a r is h i o n e r s and th e
d iffic u lty
m en,

o f r e fo r m in g u n tu t o r e d , n o n -E n g lis h - s p e a k in g t r i b e s 

T h ir d ly , t h e r e was in t e r - d e n o m in a t io n a l s t r i f e , in c lu d in g

j e a lo u s y o v e r a s s ig n m e n t s , P r o t e s t a n t d is p u t e s w it h th e
"R om anists" and v i c e v e r s a and in t r a - c h u r c h a l t e r c a t i o n s , ^

^ ( c o n t i n u e d ) a p p o in tm e n ts , b u t l a t e r b eg a n t o compro
m ise w it h th e p a tr o n a g e -m a n a g e r s , A f t e r Cox r e s ig n e d i n t h e
f a l l o f 1 8 7 0 , C h a r lie Cox, h i s b r o t h e r , a sk e d him t o e x p o s e
G ra n t’ s h y p o c r i t i c a l s ta n d on I n d ia n p o l i c y . Of a c o n v e r s a t io n
w it h a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f H arp er’ s W eek ly. C h a r lie w r o te : "I
t o l d Mr, N o r d h o ff t h a t I had h eard you s a y t h a t you had t o
f i g h t w it h G rant a lm o s t e v e r y w eek w h ile you w ere in t h e C a b in e t,
t o p r e v e n t him from a b a n d o n in g th e I n d ia n P o l i c y o f w h ich he
now p r o f e s s e s t o have b e e n th e a u th o r and e a r n e s t s u p p o r t e r , , ,
I rem arked t o Mr, N, t h a t o f c o u r s e i t w ou ld now b e th e P r e s i 
d e n t ’ s b e s t p o l i c y t o c a r r y o u t c a r e f u l l y th e I n d ia n program on
w h ich you w ere a t w ork," ( C h a r lie Cox t o J 0 D , Cox, November
1 2 , 1870, Cox P a p e r s ) ,
1*0
A th e a r n , op. c i t . . 2ij.8-250,
^ " P r i e s t , 0£ , c i t , . 3 0 - 3 6 , An i l l u s t r a t i o n o f th e i n t r a ch u rch p ro b lem was t h e c o m p la in t Grant r e c e iv e d from a Quaker
a f t e r th e i n i t i a l a p p o in tm en ts t o th e e f f e c t t h a t th e P r e s i 
d e n t had b ee n " w ic k e d ly im posed upon" by " se c e d e r s " from th e
London Y e a r ly M e e tin g , (W illia m F , H arvey t o G ra n t, May 13 , 1 8 6 9 ,
I . 0 , L . R , , M i s c ., NA, RG 7 S ) .
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Finally, several churches clashed with interior authorities
over control of the agencies, trying to obtain the power to
regulate and remove agents*

After Secretary Carl Schurz took

office, in 1 8 7 7 , church nominations were gradually and quietly
discontinued, and, with closer restrictions, political appoint
ments were resumed.

Army criticism, to be discussed in

connection with debate over civil or military control of the
Indians in the late Seventies, played an important part in
the eventual elimination of this church-state experiment,
A third phase of the peace policy was a multi-purpose
program intended to placate and acculturate the tribes.
Essentially, what may be termed the "acculturation process,"
entailed the fulfillment of peace treaties, not only to re
imburse the Indians for losses of land, freedom and subsistence
but also to pacify potentially hostile tribesmen and lead the
red race upon

«t
ah 3
a new course of life.

Secretary Cox

described this as less a new policy than an enlargement and
"enlightened application of the general principles of the
old one,"^- The government, by various means —

locating

the Indians permanently on limited reservations, temporarily
subsisting and caring for them and teaching them the white
man's language, tastes, customs, religion, views toward indi
vidual ownership and techniques of farming, herding and self

IiP
Priest, op, cit,, 36-39,
^ 3 CIA, 1869, 5o
viii.
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support —

hoped to achieve lasting benefits for both races.

While the Indians were protected and "uplifted,” frontier con
flicts would be terminated and national expansion would be
facilitated,^
The military was involved in this program in several
ways.

First, as already mentioned, Army officers, until July

1, l869s supervised the settlement of tribes on new reserva
tions, helped to build agencies and purchased and distributed
Indian supplies.

Secondly, until July, 1870, military appoint

ees administered many agencies, experiencing the satisfactions
and disappointments of trying to reform the red men.

Al

though they noted many signs of progress, these agents often
complained of inadequate funds, poor facilities, unhealthful
locations, interference by recalcitrant Indians and white
intruders, tribal relations, the Indians’ vices and the
intransigence of older tribesmen,
A third way in which the Army participated was through
its commissary department.

Commissioner Parker argued that

the military’s subsistence branch was able to provide
supplies with "greater economy and more satisfaction" than
it 7
the Interior Department.
Most of the two million appro-

^Ibid., 1*9-50; CIA, 18 7 0 , 9; SI (P), 1 8 7 1 , 1*78-1*79.
^ C I A , 1 8 6 9 , passim. The Whetstone Agent, Captain DeWitt C. Poole, was perplexed, for example, by his charges’
alteration of twenty-five thousand dollars worth of pants,
dress coats and overcoats to resemble their traditional attire,
(DeWitt C, Poole, Among the Sioux of Dakota j f f i e w York, l88l7,
61*—66 .).
^ C I A , 1869, 5*
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priated In 1869 to fulfill new peace treaties went to the Army
for furnishing provisions at Port Sill, Camp Supply and the
k8
Missouri River agencies*
The military continued to handle
Indian requisitions until the fiscal year 1871, when, over
taxed by its own requirements and hampered by insufficient
funds, the commissary department dropped this service.

k9

Finally, in this same connection, Army officers were
involved in the distribution of Indian rations and annuities*
After 1869 Indian appropriation bills required department
commanders to detail officers, not below the rank of captain,
to witness all such issues.
criticized by

This responsibility was often

Army spokesmen as an unnecessary burden and

duplication of authority which might be eliminated by military
control over the Indians.

The system did, however, check many

discrepancies and abuses in the Indian service.

For example,

General D. S. Stanley, commander of the Middle District, the
Department of Dakota, reported that contractors accustomed to
charging the government for beef at an average of thirteen
hundred pounds a head were forced to settle for less than a
thousand-pound average after military scales and weighing

^3SW (P), 1 8 7 1 , 323 .
^ Commissary General A. B. Eaton to Secretary Belknap,
June 27, 1870, I.O.L.R., Misc. 1870, NA, RG 75. The Army
continued to furnish supplies in case of emergency. Another
factor in the 1871 change was the Improvement of purchasing
procedures under the supervision of the Board of Indian
Commissioners.
^®The inspection rule is cited and discussed in Parker
to Cox, May 22, 1869, I.O.R.B. No. 18, NA, RG 75.
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procedures were introduced.

5l

In general, both military and civil authorities supported
the government's efforts to control and reform the Indians
by subsisting, educating and civilizing them.

A few Army

officers, such as General Stanley, complained that the more
the United States provided for the red men, the more insolent
52
they become*
But others, Including Stanley's superiors,
General Hancock and General Sheridan, believed that the
acculturation process, properly administered, offered the best
possibility for eventually solving the Indian p r o b l e m , ^ Like
wise, Interior officials, in their periodic reports, indicated
that a steadily growing proportion of the native population
was being weaned of old habits and that the younger genera
tion, In particular, showed "encouraging evidence of the
practicability of their elevation to the dignity of citizen
ship...,1* ^
A fourth feature of the peace policy was the discon
tinuance of the traditional practice of recognizing Indian
tribes as "domestic dependent nations" through treaties.

The

Indian appropriation act of March 3, 1 8 7 1 , included the
statement, "...hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the

^ D s S. Stanley to Gen. H e C. Clarke, June 20, 1869,
I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75,
^ 2A&N Jn l . VI (May 8 , 1869), 600,
S. Hancock to AAG, Division of the Missouri, June,
1870, I . O . L . R . , Misc., NA, RG 75; SW (P), 1869, 38,

^CIA, 1870, 9.
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territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recog*
nized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the
United States may contract by treaty.

This provision,

while leaving confirmed treaties intact, at least nominally
abolished the basis for government-Indian relations which had
for years caused complaint by many military officials, some
Indian authorities and, especially, a majority of the lower
house of Congress.
Generals Sherman, Sheridan and Pope were among the
western commanders who contended that, with powerful tribes,
it was a waste of time and money to bribe Indian leaders to
sign documents they did not understand and could not or did
not intend to enforce*

56

In his first annual report, Com

missioner Parker also reproved the "cruel farce” of treatymaking.,

"A treaty Involves the idea of a compact between two

or more sovereign powers," he contended, "each possessing
sufficient authority and force to compel a compliance with
the obligations incurred.

The Indian tribes of the United

States are not sovereign nations...as none of them have an
organized government of such inherent strength as would secure
a faithful obedience of its people in the observance of com
pacts of this character .tt^ 7

Furthermore, the Board of Indian

Commissioners, shortly after it was organised, recommended

-^16 Stat. L,, 566.
^ S e e , for example, Pope to Grant, June lip, 1865,
I.O.L.R., Misc., HA, RG 75.

^7CIA, 1869, 6.
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abandonment of treaty relations "as soon as any just method
can be devised,,

„58

But some of the most vigorous demands for abolition of
the treaty system were made in the House of Representatives,
The House, as mentioned, was envious of the Senate's ratifica
tion power and dissatisfied with its own legislative impotence
regarding the "foreign" tribes and Indian land cessions.

Its

delay of Indian appropriations for 1869 was the opening round
in the culminating battle over tribal treaties.

During debate

on March 12, 1869* Representative John F. Farnsworth of
Illinois declared:
If we go on making treaties and recognizing the right
of the President and Senate to make treaties with every
little wandering tribe of naked savages in the country,
treating with them as independent nations, treating away
portions of the public domain and buying land from little
wandering tribes of savages, and agreeing to give them
annuities and clothing and agricultural implements and
ministers and schoolmasters and everything else per
petually, why it is becoming a great whirlpool in which
we shall sink,
A stop has got to be put to this thing
sooner or later,59
But most members of the House were unwilling to risk an In
dian war by withholding peace treaty funds.

Instead, a

section was included in the 1869 bill stating that appropria
tions did not constitute approval of agreements made since
July, 1867 ,60
A similar dispute arose over appropriations for the
HO
Ibid,, 50, The Peace Commission in October, 1868,
made a similar proposal (CIA, 1868, 371*)
^ C o n g , Globe. l*lst Cong,, 1 sess., 58,
6016 Stat. L,, 1*0.
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fiscal year 1870,

The Senate amended the Indian bill by adding

itemized amounts called for in peace treaties, but the House
rejected the amendment and again left the expenditures to the
President's discretion.^"

The representatives' frustrations

over the Senate's treaty power were palliated, though, in
December, 1870, when the Supreme Court ruled that Congress
might refuse to provide money to implement treaties or. in
62
some cases, repeal Indian agreements.
Fortified by this
decision, the House was virtually in a position to dictate
the termination of the treaty system in 1871,

nThe conse

quences will be far-reaching," Representative Aaron A.
Sargent of California predicted in supporting the change,
"It will save millions of money to the Treasury,

It breaks

up a most improvident system, and admits the right of the
House of Representatives to deal with these questions by
legislation."^
The prohibition of Indian treaties, however, did not
immediately alter the relations between the government and
its wards.

For one thing, the United States continued to

negotiate "agreements" with the heads of tribes and bands,
promising them federal support and annuities for land cessions.
In addition, because Congress did not clarify the legal status

61

Cong. Globe. ij.lst Cong., 2 sess., 5>607ff; Priest,
cit,, 9 9 , Ey an oversight, a provision repudiating the
peace treaties was not Included in the 1870 measure,
op

.

62XI Wallace, 616,
^ C o n g . Globe, Iflst Cong., 3 sess., 1811,
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of the red men, the courts held them to be neither citizens
nor aliens, but anomalous subjects of the white man's
government.^Paradoxical as it may seem, a final integral phase of
the peace program involved the use of military force.

The

process of civilizing backward tribes depended, to a con
siderable extent, upon the government's ability to secure
reservations and agencies against disrupting outside influences,
such as hostile non-agency Indians and white intruders.

The

agency Indians also had to understand, Indian officials main
tained, that there were negative as well as positive induce
ments for remaining at peace on the lands set aside for them.
In a sense, the carrot and stick method was applied, with the
Army performing a "legitimate and essential" police function.^
This dual approach, evident from the outset of Grant's ad
ministration, was perhaps best explained by Commissioner
Francis A, Walker, who took over the Indian Office in Novem
ber, 1871*

In defending the use of force to make the policy

of peace "effective and universal," Walker asserted:
Such a use of the military constitutes no aban
donment of the 'peace policy* and involves no dispar
agement of it. It was not to be expected.,.that the
entire body of wild Indians should submit to be re
strained in their Isbmaelitish proclivities without
a struggle on the part of the more audacious to main
tain their traditional freedom. In the first announce
ment of the reservation system, it was expressly
declared that the Indians should be made as comfortable

^Schmeckebier, op. cit., 6L.-66; Friest, op. cit,.

100-105.

--

6^CIA, 1872, 6.
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on, and as uncomfortable off, th8ir reservations as it
was in the power of the Government to make them; that
such of them as went right should be protected and fed,
and such as went wrong should be harassed and scourged
without intermission*,*.Such a use of the strong arm of
the Government is not war, but discipline. Yet It
would seem impossible for many persona to apprehend the
distinction between a state of general Indian war, and
the occasional use of the regular military force of the
country In enforcing the reservation policy, or punish
ing the sporadic acts of outrage,on the part of dis
affected individuals and bands ,ob
Since the Army continued to play a key role in federal
Indian policy, the basic problem of civil-military relations
persisted.

When Grant took office, western commanders,

through General Sherman, demanded a specific definition of
their authority over the tribes.

67

Grant referred the matter

to Secretary Cox and his former military aide, Commissioner
Parker.

On May 26 Parker informed the prospective members of

the Board of Indian Commissioners that one of their first
duties would be to study inter-departmental relations.
"Great mischief, evils, and frequently serious results follow
from friendly Indians leaving the reservations, producing con
flicts between the citizens, soldiers, and Indians," he stated.
"At wbat time and point shall the civil rule cease and the
military begin?"88
This was probably one of the toughest questions In the
administration of Indian affairs, and the Board had no ready

66 Ibld.. 5-6.
6?Cox to Secretary of War Rawlins, June 8, 1869, filed
with AGO L.R., 1877-1878, NA, RG 9^*
68CIA, 1 8 6 9 , ij-3*
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solution.

For advice, the commissioners turned to an ex

perienced staff officer, Inspector General Randolph B, Marcy.
General Marcy expounded at length upon the history of Indian
relations, praised the work of the philanthropists, noted the
efficiency of military Indian control in the pre-l8ij.9 period
and predicted eventual resolution of the Indian problem.

But

he failed to come to grips with the real issue and gave no
formula for joint control
Finally, on June 8, Parker set forth his own recommenda
tions on civil and military jurisdiction in a letter to
Secretary Cox.

The most troublesome tribes, he concluded, were

the Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches and
Apaches.

These Indians had been notified that the govern

ment wanted to locate them in permanent homes on large
reservations where they could be fed and clothed and avoid
conflict with white man.

Some obediently settled in desig

nated areas, but others continued to commit hostile acts.
Hence, Parker proposed:
...I would respectfully recommend that for the present
it be understood that such portions of the above-men
tioned tribes as have or shall come in, and remain upon
the reservations, be regarded as friendly and under the
care of the Interior Department, and the Indians of the
said tribes who remain out be regarded and treated as
hostile while so remaining out, and be subject wholly
to the supervision of the military branch of the
Government.

69

Ibid.. 110-119* Marcy’s one proposal was to have
civil and military authorities hold chiefs responsible for
the acts of young hostiles — hardly an original suggestion.
?°Parker to Cox, June 8, 1869, I.O.L.B. No. 18, NA,
RG 75*
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Meantime the Army should be cautious in dealing with indivi
duals from friendly tribes who occasionally committed
depredations.

Tribal leaders, to keep their people eligible

for annuities, would be required to turn criminals over to
civil authorities.

The military was to be called upon to

intervene only as a ”last resorto”7^
This basis for dividing War and Interior authority was
promptly adopted by both departments.

It was similar to the

civil-military understanding of 1865, except that the dis
position of tribes was to be determined primarily by their
location.

Parker, in a June 12th circular to all Indian

superintendents and agents, slightly modified this arrange
ment.

Military officers, he indicated, did not have to treat

Indians off their reservations as hostile, but were free to
use their discretion.

At the same time, agents were to do

everything possible to control their subjects without military
assistance and were to withhold presents and provisions from
all tribesmen whose friendship and inclination to become
civilized were in doubt.7^
General Sherman gave a broader interpretation to this
understanding to his division commanders.

Any Indiana outside

their reservations, he said, not just those mentioned by
Parker, would be under original and exclusive military control.
Department and post commanders were free to judge their

71Ibid.
72CIA, 1869, k-52.
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character and take any action deemed necessary.

Ag a rule,

though, it would he beat to try to arrest and return firstoffenders to their agents, notifying the wanderers that a se
cond offense would definitely be punished.

rtThis is the first

time within my experience that this division of powers has
been clearly made,” Sherman told General Sheridan, ”and I think
it will much simplify your labors and duties.

.*71
^

The western commanders, in turn, issued general orders
stating the obligations of field commanders regarding reserva-

7h
tion and non-reservation Indians.

General Sheridan, for

instance, ordered that, after proper warning, Indians away from
their reservations were to be “regarded and treated as hostile,
wherever they may be found, and particularly if they are near
settlements or the great lines of communication."

■75

To avoid

any misunderstanding, department commanders were to give “de
tailed instructions" to troops operating in the field.

Com

missioner Parker, upon reviewing these orders in November,
1869, confidently annjunced that a "perfect understanding"
between his officers and those of the military was producing
"harmony of action."7^

But subsequent events disclosed that

7^Sherman to Sheridan, June 11, 1869, filed with AGO
L . R . , 1877-1878, NA, RG 9l|-.
7^See, for example, General Order No. 20, Division of
the Pacific, August 8, 1 8 7 0 , and General Order No. 28, Depart
ment of Dakota, September 29, 1870, filed with AGO L.R.,
1877-1878, NA, RG 9lj-.
75
General Order No. 8. Division of the Missouri, June 28,
1869, filed with AGO L.R., 1877-1878, NA, RG 94*
76CIA, 1869, 5-6.
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the entente was leas than perfect and that opportunities for
disharmony were plentiful.

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN 1869
While some aspects of the peace policy were still in
the planning stage, the military was busy with Its assignment,
the punishment of roaming, recalcitrant Indians.

The year

1869, according to Commissioner Parker, witnessed widespread
Indian hostilities, though not to the extent of war by tribes.
Among the hostiles were:

Cheyennes and Arapahoes, who mur

dered, pillaged and captured whites along the Republican,
Smoky Hill and Saline rivers; Sioux, who committed occasional
acts of violence in Dakota and Wyoming territories; Piegans,
who took to the warpath in Montana; "wild and intractable"
Apaches, who caused a "continual state of warfare and outrage"
in Arizona; Kiowas and Comanches, who attacked and robbed
citizens of Texas and Southern Apaches and Navajoes, who were
declared outlaws by the governor of New Mexico.

77

While

General Sheridan considered conditions "very much better" than
78
in 1 8 6 8 ,
General Sherman paid special tribute to the
frontier army for its continuing sacrifices In the interest
of national security.

Over half of the United States,troops

were exposed, Sherman observed, "to labors, marches, fights,
and dangers that amount to war,"

If they were withdrawn,

77Ibld.. 7-8.
78SW, 1869, 17.
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"anarchy” would he the probable result®

79

The regions in which the Indians were most troublesome
were, as in previous years, the Southwest and Great Plains.

In

Arizona and New Mexico some efforts were made to establish a
comprehensive reservation and feeding system, but few tribes,
except the Navajoes, Hopis, Pimas and Puebloes, resided on
reservations or belonged to agencies®

Not all of the non

reservation tribesmen were hostile, but the Apaches, the largest
group, were extremely w a r l i k e ® ^

These "Arabs of Arizona,"

wrote Brig. Gen. E.O.C. Ord, commander of the Department of
California, "have heretofore neither given nor asked quarter;
their hands have always been bloody; their favorite pursuits
killing and plundering, their favorite ornaments the finger
and toe nails, the teeth, hair, and small bones of their
v i c t i m s B u t to fight them was so expensive and difQ*j
ficult
that General Sherman at one point proposed to with
draw settlements and military posts and "leave the country to

_82

the aboriginal inhabitants."

No such drastic step was taken, but efforts to subjugate
or conciliate the Apaches of Arizona were particularly unsuc
cessful during the first year of the Grant administration.
General Ord wavered between all-out war to "root out and hunt
the Apaches as...wild animals," and an attempt to establish

7 9 Ibid.,

2 k*

80 Dale, on. cit.. 95.
8 lSW, 1869, 121-122.
8 2 0 gle, 02 * cit., 73.
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a large reservation where they might be supported and en
couraged to plant crops.

Meanwhile, the Yavapai took the

offensive in Western Arizona, killing scores of whites, prey
ing upon the Overland Route and interrupting the mail*

In

addition, the Tontos of the central part of the territory and
Cochise's Chlricahuas in the southeast were so bold and
belligerent that troops sometimes retreated to their outposts
Q^
for cover*
"The general situation at the end of 1869" one
analyst states, proved that no substantial progress had been
made in Apache management.
In New Mexico, on August 2, after a series of outbreaks
by Navajo and Gila Apache bands, Governor R, B. Mitchell
proclaimed that any of these tribesmen found off their reser
vations without military escort were to be punished.

Com

missioner Parker protested this declaration and instructed
Superintendent William Clinton to "disavow the pernicious
tendency of the proclamation."

The Army, not territorial

officials, he argued, were to decide how to deal with wander85 „
ing Indians.
Eventually, the Indian Office had its way and
sent a new agent, Lieutenant Charles E. Drew, to try to
placate the Southern Apaches.

After eounciling with his

charges, Drew informally agreed to request federal support for
any Indians settling in peace at Canada Alamosa, a twenty by
8^
Ibid., 7l*-75. About one hundred whites were killed
in a short' time in 1869 in western Arizona.
81*
Ibid., 75.
•^Parker to W. T. Otto, August 11*, 1869, I.O.R.B.
No. 18, NA, RG 75.
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thirty mile tract between the San Mateo and Mimbres mountains*

8

By winter, Indian relations in the territory were somewhat
improved.
On the Plains, one of the most decisive military actions
of 1869 was an expedition against hostile Cheyennes who had
been threatening settlement and travel between the Platte and
Arkansas rivers.

On July 11, Maj. Gen# Eugene A. Carr led

eight companies of the Fifth Cavalry and two companies of
Major Frank North*s Pawnee scouts in a surprise attack on a
large Cheyenne village —
Ogallala Sioux —

Tall Bull’s Dog Soldiers and some

near Summit Springs, in Northeast Colorado*

The Indians, caught by surprise, were severely beaten.

87

Carr’s

command, which suffered only one injury, killed fifty-two
Indians, captured seventeen women and children and confis
cated or destroyed more than four hundred horses and mules,
eighty-four lodges and large quantities of meat, arms, amraunition and other property.

88

The Battle of Summit Springs, according to one author,
had ”a marked effect upon the conduct of the whole Cheyenne
tribeJ*89

These nomadic red men soon sued for peace and moved

860 gle, o£. cit., 8 3 .
87carr»s command included two hundred and forty-four
troops, fifty Pawnees and, besides Major North, such noted
frontier scouts as William 8Buffalo Bill” Cody and North's
brother, Luther* For a detailed discussion see James T. King,
"The Republican River Expedition,” Nebraska History. XLI,
Part I (September, I960), 165-199 and Part il (December,
I960), 281-297.
ftft

Bvt. Maj. Gen. E. A. Carr to Bvt. Brig. Gen# George
Ruggles, July 20, 1869, Division of the Missouri, Letters Re
ceived, NA, RG 98*

89 Rister, 0£. cit*. 153*
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to their reservation south of the Arkansas or joined relatives
on the reservation in Dakota*

Since the Indians' death toll

was relatively small, the campaign? drew little more than reQO
gional acclaim*
But both peaceable and threatening tribes
were rendered more receptive to the government's peace pro
gram, and travel and settlement in the Central Plains was made
more secure*
Throughout the year, in spite of crises in Colorado,
Arizona and other parts of the Indian country, there seemed to
be a growing rapport between the War and Interior depart
ments*

"It is very clear," Commissioner Parker told Secretary

Cox in November, "that where this Department receives the
active cooperation of the military branch of the government
comparative peace can always be maintained on the frontiers,"7
A month later General Sherman furthered good relations with
the Indian Bureau by ordering his western commanders to pro
tect the Indians from outrages by whites and make full reports
92
on all inter-racial conflicts.
Within a matter of weeks,
however, there was again strife between the two departments,

THE PIEGAN "MASSACRE" AND RENEWED DISPUTE
Early in 1870 , an incident in northern Montana pre------urp

■■ —

..... .

King, "Republican River Expedition," II, 293*295*
^ P a r k e r to Cox, November 1, 1869, 1*0.R.B, No* 19# NA,
RG 75*
92
Circular, Headquarters of the Army, December 2, 1869,
I,0,L*R., Misc., NA, RG 75 ,
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cipitated another heated civil-military controversy over the
treatment of hostile Indians®

On the morning of January 23,

in sub-zero weather, Colonel E, M. Baker struck a village of
Piegans (a Blackfoot tribe) on Marias River, killing one hun
dred women and children, destroying forty-four lodges and
seizing provisions and three hundred horses ^

The attack,

heralded by General Sheridan as a "complete success," pro
duced another "massacre" outcry by the Indians' friends and
opponents of military control over the tribes.
Since the snmmer of 1869, young renegade Piegans under
Mountain Chief, Bear Chief and Red Horn had been causing
trouble around Port Benton*

9k

Intoxicated by cheap whiskey

and armed with the latest rifles —
whites —

both acquired from lawless

they stole stock, raided settlements and killed a

number of frontiersmen.

On August 31j Superintendent Alfred

Sully, former commander of campaigns against the Sioux, called
for military re-enforcements, conceding that the Indians were
in a "state of w a r * " ^
But the Blackfoot agency officials and the District of
Montana commander, Brig* Gen. P. R. DeTrobriand, hesitated
to propose an expedition against the Piegans.

93

Lieutenant

HR Ex. Do c * No* 269. IjJLst Cong., 2 sess. (Serial li|.26),

1870, 16-17.—
9li

^In some cases the Indians had been agitated by unpro
voked killings by whites. Mountain Chief was aggravated, for
example, by an attenqpt on his life just after he had signed a
peace treaty at Port Benton In 1868.
95

HR Ex, Doc, No. 269. lj.lat Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
llj.26), 1870,X
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William B. Pease, the acting agent, argued that the peaoeable
Bloods and other Blackfeet might be injured, and Alexander
Culbertson, who lived with the Piegans, insisted that only a
w
n
96 few, the "young rabble," were committing depredations.
DeTrobriand contended that most Montanans were going about their
business as usual and had a known propensity for sounding
false alarms
Commissioner Parker, however, solicited aid from the War
Department, contending that his subordinates were "powerless"
98
against the hostiles of the northern frontier.7

The Bureau*s

appeal was relayed through military channels to General Sheri
dan, who proposed to use the same tactics which had been so
effective against the Cheyennes in 1868.
January they /the hostile s

/

"About the 15th of

will be very helpless, and if

where they live is not too far from Shaw or Ellis," he re
marked, "we might be able to give them a good hard blow, which
will make peace a desirable object.

•.99

ft

In December and early January, while the military laid
its plans, Superintendent Sully made last-minute appeals to
the Indians to turn over their criminals and make restitu
tion for stolen stock.

The chiefs* only response was the

usual excuse that they could not restrain their young men.*00

96M

m

5-6.

97ibid., 57,61.
98Ibid..5.
" i b i d . , 7.
35-37.
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Consequently, General DeTrobriand determined to make an "ex
ample" of the most conspicuous hostiles, Mountain Chief and
his followers.

He instructed Colonel Baker exactly where to

strike to get the "chief culprit."

Baker attacked as ordered,

but Mountain Chief was elsewhere and most of the red men
killed were members of Red Horn’s band.^°*
The controversy which followed the "Baker affair"
centered upon two questions.

First, there was a difference

of opinion about the age and sex of the Indians killed, with
Army and civil authorities giving contradictory versions of
the Piegans1 losses.

Secondly, there was much discussion

about whether the expedition had been necessary.
On February 1, Superintendent Sully informed General
DeTrobriand of disturbing reports from citizens, half-breeds
and Indians to the effect that the soldiers had killed mostly
women and children.

102

DeTrobriand promptly denied this and

warned Sully against the "idle rumors and false reports" of
whiskey smugglers and camp "croakers," who feared that Army
operations would disrupt their nefarious business.

No doubt

these people wanted to make the Superintendent the "point
d ’appui" for their misrepresentations,

he remarked.

103

But Sully continued to receive reports that the "Piegan
war" was another Sand Creek.

Agent Pease interviewed various

1 7 , 1*0.
102Ibid., 11.
103Ibid., 11-12.
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tribesmen who were in Red Horn’s camp when the cavalry in
vaded,

They claimed that the dead Indians included only

thirty-three men, eighteen over "fighting age," ninety women,
mostly aged, and fifty children, including many papooses. The
camp, moreover, had been suffering from smallpox for two
months, they said, with about six persons succumbing to the
disease every day,
DeTrobriand was so infuriated when Pease publicized the
Indians’ biased account, that he ordered the agent never to
set foot inside Port Shaw unless official business made it
mandatoryThe

district commander not only defended the

attack on the village, but recommended Colonel Baker for a
promotion "as a Just acknowledgment of his excellent conduct
in this circumstance,"

Baker, he explained, did his best to

spare non-combatants, destroyed the village to rid it of
smallpox and released the captives rather than taking them
10£
to Port Shaw, where there was no food for them.
Colonel Baker made an investigation of his own.

After

questioning the men of his command, he announced that approxi
mately one hundred and twenty warriors had been killed.
other casualties, he insisted, were purely accidental,

The
In

dian authorities circulating "maliciously false" stories

1(^Sen. Ex, Doc. No, 39, Ijlst Cong,, 3 sess, (Serial
U440), 1871, 89.
10% b l d . , 90,
^°^HR Ex, Doc, No, 269. I(.lst Cong., 2 se9s. (Serial
ll|26), 18707 I ? , ------------
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about the Piegan fight were probably trying to divert attention
from their own "manifest irregularities,"

It was inconceiv

able to him that the public would accept the assertions of
ill-informed, interested parties rather than those who were on
the scene and had nothing to

n

t»107

palliate.

Apparently both sides overstated their case.

For cen

sus purposes, agency authorities normally figured two fighting
men per lodge.

The death-rate of nearly five per lodge for

the thirty-seven lodges in Red Horn’s camp, obviously included
a high percentage of aged, young and female Indians

Even

Colonel Baker’s estimate of fifty-three non-combatant deaths
indicted the troops for indiscriminate killing.
On the question of whether the expedition had been
justified, the War Department had more convincing arguments.
In the first place, Superintendent Sully and Commissioner
Parker had asked the Army to use force against the hostiles.
Secondly, after careful investigation, Inspector General
James A«Hardie of the Division of the Missouri held that the
expedition had been warranted and "probably as efficacious as
more extended operations,"

It was impracticable to surprise

and capture hostiles without bloodshed, he concluded.

Loss of

life was "inevitable
107Ibid., 73,
10®One author concludes that the "fairest inference"
was that sixty warriors and one hundred and thirteen others
were killed. Seven of the lodges destroyed were some distance
from the village and were unoccupied, (Dunn, op , cit., i*5l).

!09h r

D o c , H o , 269. iflst Cong,, 2 sess. (Serial

llj.26), 1870, 1 9 - 3 E T
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Still, Indian sympathizers such as Vincent Colyer of
the Board of Indian Commissioners criticized the Baker expe
dition and circulated Agent Pease’s version of the "massacre,"
General Sheridan was enraged by Colyer’s attempt to "deceive"
the "kind-hearted public," and charged that the philanthro
pist was mixed up with the old Indian ring,

"So far as the

wild Indians are concerned," he asserted, "the problem which
the good people of the country must decide upon is, who shall
be killed, the whites or the Indians; they can take their
choice,"1^
General Sherman knew exactly how Sheridan felt.

After

giving Colonel Baker a vote of confidence, he summarized th9
dilemma of the frontier army as follows:
The army cannot resist the tide of emigration that
Is following toward these Indian lands, nor is It our
province to determine the question of boundaries. When
called on, we must, to the extent of our power, protect
the settlers, and, on proper demand, we have to protect
the Indian lands against the intrusion of the settlers.
Thus we are placed between two fires, a most unpleasant
dilemma, from which we cannot escape, and we must sustain
the officers on the spot who fulfill their orders,111
By coincidence, the dispute over the Piegan affair
0

occurred just at the time when congressional advocates of
military control of Indian affairs were preparing to make
another bid to transfer the Indian Office to the War Depart
ment,

Reports of Army brutality to diseased women and children,

however, cost them much potential support.

110

The affair was

Ibid,. 9-10,

li:LIbid,, 72,
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inconclusively debated in Committee on the whole, with Repub
licans alleging that the Democrats exaggerated the Army’s
severity to embarrass the administration and head off reform,
and Democrats intimating that the Republicans wanted a
whitewash.

112

The Board of Indian Commissioners was convinced that the
Piegan affair saved the Indian service from the clutches of
the military.

The commission noted that, on March 10, Repre

sentative John A. Logan of Illinois, chairman of the House
Committee on Military Affairs, was ready to present a bill for
transfer when he heard of the Montana incident,

IJpon reading

an account of the "massacre," his "blood ran cold in his veins
and he went and asked the committee to strike out that sec
tion and let the Indian Bureau remain where it is," the Board
reported, "and the committee agreed to t h a t . " ^ ^
Not until the bloody Sioux war of 1876 were the
supporters of War Department management of the Indians able
to muster another strong effort to achieve transfer.*"^

The

Piegan incident also had at least two other significant
effects.

Both military and Indian authorities noted that it

had "salutary effects" upon the wild Indians of Montana.1^

112Dunn, o£. cit., l*52-!j.£3.
•^ S e n . Ex. Do c . 39. lp.st Cong., 3 sess. (Serial Hjlj.0),
1871, 89-9“
i:^Priest, op. cit.. 19. The Modoc War of 1873 revived
some interest in military control.
n *SW (P), 1870 , 277; CIA, 18 7 0 , 1 9 1 .
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Furthermore, as one student of Indian affairs observed, ”...as
a probable result of the criticism...there has not occurred
since that time any such indiscriminate attack.

TEE STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN COOPERATION
After the Piegan dispute, military and civil officials
frequently clashed over procedures to use in managing the
Indians.

An exception was the Indian Bureau’s consent to

give the military a comparative free hand to establish and
temporarily control new agencies in Arizona and New Mexico.

117

Under the supervision of Maj, Gen. George Stoneman, commander
of the newly-created Department of Arizona, an extensive area
ll8
was set apart for the Apaches in western Arizona.
Stoneman,
who contended that it was easier to feed the hostiles than to
prevent them from stealing, provided rations and supplies for
the red men who moved to the vicinity of Camp Crd (later Fort
Apache) and ordered a vigorous campaign against non-reservav ^ 119
tion bands.
^^Dunn, eg,, cit.. 1|55*
X17Parker to Cox, March 22, 1 8 7 0 , I.O.L.B. No. 19, NA,
RG 7 5 . The new agencies were to be turned over to the Interior
Department after peace was fully established. Apparently there
was some dispute between civil and military officials over
when this change-over was to take place. In April. Parker
forwarded copies of bis instructions of June 12, 1869 , to Pima
and Maricopa Reservation to ’’remedy existing evils,” (Parker
to COX, April 26, 1870, I.O.R.B, No. 19, NA, RG 75).
The Department of Arizona, which included southern
California, was established on April 15, 1 8 7 0 .
119

Ogle, 0 2 * cit., 77 .
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Meantime a similar policy was followed in New Mexico, where
other groups were given presents and brought under the "feeding policy" at a southwestern reservation.

Since the Indian

Bureau was short of funds, this program depended largely upon
borrowed Army supplies*

120

Elsewhere, Army and Indian authorities quibbled over
many things.

121

The chief issue, however, was the question

of dealing with Indians who spent much of their time away from
the reservations or used them as a refuge or base of opera
tions for hostile forays.

Late in 1869 Maj. Gen. J . M, Scho

field, commander of the Department of the Missouri, proposed
that male Indians be required to report to nearby military
posts for regular head-counts.

Commissioner Parker opposed

this scheme on the grounds that the Indians would regard It
as an "act of oppression and designed to restrict or deprive
them of their liberty ."^"22
In the spring of 1870, the military announced its deter
mination to act vigorously against Indians off their reserva
tions, particularly near the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific
railroads.

123

Many observers feared trouble from the Sioux,

Southern Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches and

120 Ibid., 8 I4.-8 5 .

121

See, for example, Parker to Gen, W. B. Hazen, January
10, 1870, I.O.L.B. No* 93* NA, RG 7 5 , for discussion of Hazen1s
efforts to issue orders to civil agents.
Parker to Cox, March 1, 1870, I.O.R.B. No. 19, NA,
RG 75.
123

Parker to Superintendent Burbank, May 20, 1 8 7 0 ,
I.O.R.B. No. 95, NA, RG 75.
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12k

Osages,

The Sioux problem was moat pressing, for about a

third of the twenty-five thousand members of that tribe still
spent much of the year bunting buffalo in the country west
or south of their Dakota reservation.

Commissioner Parker and

others feared, especially, that the "lawless and ungovernable”
Sioux would be provoked into a general uprising by a Wyoming
association, the "Big Horn mining expedition,” which was pre12<
paring to explore their northern hunting grounds, ^
«»

Serious trouble with these Indians was averted by a
series of negotiations with the "notorious" chief, Red Cloud,
and other non-agency leaders.

In June, Red Cloud, with a dele

gation of Oglala head chiefs and squaws, and Spotted Tail, with
a smaller delegation of Brule chiefs, were taken to Washington
to council with President Grant and Interior officials.

126

The

Sioux leaders were feted and shown the wonders of the East,

qThe Osages were threatening because thousands of
squatters were settling on lands which they claimed despite a
treaty signed by some of their headmen in 1869, The treaty,
which they called "fraudulent," ceded eight million acres to a
railroad corporation for nineteen cents an acre. Trouble was
finally averted when Congress increased the compensation and
promised to assist the Osages to get re-established in Indian
Territory, (Sen, Ex, Doe, No* 39, i^lst Cong,, 3 sess, ^Serial
U & O J , 1871 ,“ 75-777.
12^CIA, 1869,

k*

■L<IOThe government frequently brought Indian leaders to
Washington to Impress them with the white man*s strength and
advancement, Sioux Chiefs, for example, also made such trips
in 1872, 1875 and 1877* For a discussion of the 1870 visit
see Sen, Ex, D o c , No, 39, lj.lst Cong,, 3 sess, (Serial 14 J4.O),
1871, 38-49 and HycTe, o p , cit,, 175»-l8l, A broader analysis of
these activities is presented in Katharine Turner, Red Men
Calling on the Great White Father (Norman, 19^1)•
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including New York City*

But they still demanded concessions —

closing of the California road on the north side of the Platte,
abandonment of Port Fetterman. ammunition annuities and trade
at Port Laramie —

which the government refused to make*

Maj.

Gen. W # S. Hancock, who followed these proceedings from St. Pail,
maintained that the Indians had already been given too much
latitude.

"It...is not practical or wise to make these con

cessions,” he declared.

”It is the cutting wedge which will

let /in 7 the horde....
In early October, several weeks after the delegations
returned to the West, a special commission again conferred with
Oglala leaders at Port Laramie.

Another stalemate developed,

with the Indians renewing their earlier demands and rejecting
X28
agency life.
The commissioners finally dispensed several
wagon-loads of presents, admonished the Sioux to live in peace
and promised to resume talks in the s p r i n g . A l t h o u g h
these negotiations were inconclusive, Interior officials were
pleased that the Sioux had been kept from the warpath and
hoped that they would soon accept the peace policy,in toto.

130

While these diversionary tactics were being used with

■^Hancock to Sherman, June 27, 1870, Sherman Papers,
Vol. 28.

x28

The commissioners, Felix Brunot and Robert Campbell
even proposed an agency off the Sioux Reservation, not far
from Port Laramie. Later, In July, 1871* a temporary agency
was set up thirty-two miles east of the post.

129

Sen. E x . D o c . No . 39. 1+lst Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
U 4J4.O), 1871, £lffj Eyde, 0£. cit., 182-181+.
130
Sen. E x . Doc. No . 39. 1+lst Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
11+1+0), 1871, 2-3; CIA, 1^70, 1+.
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the Sioux, the Army employed more direct methods with other
tribes.

Late in May, Kiowa, Comanche and southern Cheyenne

and Arapaha

renegades, discontented witt their reservations

and anxious to avenge past defeats by the military, began to
attack their agencies and commit depredations in Texas and
Kansas.*^1

General John Pope, who resumed command of the De

partment of the Missouri in May, announced that he could not
intervene on the southern reservation, but sent cavalry units
under General Custer and Major Marcus Reno to punish the
marauders causing trouble along the Kansas Pacific Railroad
and Republican River*

132

On June 8 Pope criticized the existing civil-military
division of authority in a letter to division headquarters.
The current system, he said, left him with ”mucb uneasiness
for the future.”

In his opinion, the Army could undertake

its duties of protecting railroad and overland transportation
in two ways.

It could station strong detachments on the

reservations, empowered to supervise and watch the Indians
to prevent them from leaving on hostile expedition.

Or, as

was the practice, it could assemble troops at the most exposed
settlements and lines of travel and hope to reach trouble
spots In time.

The former was clearly "most effectual.” As

131CIA, 18?0, 263-261+; Colonel A. D. Nelson to Maj.
Gen. John Pope, May 28, 1870, I.O.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75.
A principal source of complaint by the Cheyennes and Arapahoes was the removal of the agency from Camp Supply to the
North Pork of the Canadian, along the road from Port Harker
to Port Sill.
"^^Pope to Gen. G, L. Hartsuff, June 6, 1870, I.O.L.R.,
Misc., NA, RG 75.
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matters stood, the military could not repress disorder or
properly protect reservation Indians from intruders or each
other*

Under this policy the Army was no more liable for

Indian crimes than the police of a city, if prevented from
acting upon burglars and murderers until after their evil
deeds had been accomplished*

133

General Sherman agreed.

The reservation system put

the Army at a great disadvantage, but, for the moment, the
Army could do nothing but grin and bear it.

When Indians left

the confines of their reserves, though, the liberal use of
force was in order,

”1 have long been convinced that no In

dian should be allowed to remain at rest for an hour between
the two Railroads,” Sherman commented, ”and I understand
that such is the policy of the Government.”13^The Army and Navy Journal also criticized the present
system of Indian management.

The mixed policy it stated, was

characterized by ”ignorance, timidity and vacillation,”

A

conciliatory program impressed only "a few squaws and super
annuated warriors,nll^

What was needed was more troops to

conquer the red men so deciseively that they would never again
dare to venture forth from their reservations.

136

In spite of such protests, the joint jurisdiction
133

Pope to Hartsuff, June 8, 1870, I.O,L«R., Misc,,

NA, RG 75.
^•^■Sherman endorsement, June 9, 1870, on Nelson to Pope,
May 28, 1870, 1*0,L.R,, Misc., NA, RG 75.
Jnl* VII (May 28, 1 8 7 0 ), 637.
136Ibid., VII (July 2, 1870, 721.
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agreement of 1869 remained in force.

In his annual report

for 1870, though, Commissioner Parker suggested that it might
become necessary to mike an exception to exclusive civil
control of the reservations in the case of the nviciou3 and
incorrigible* Kiowas and Comanches,

If they did not change

their ways, the Army might have to take charge of them and
build a rtcordontt of forts around their reservation*

137

General Sherman devoted most of his yearly report to
administrative problems, principally the pending reduction
of Army enlisted strength.

138

But General Pope, as usual,

had a good deal to say about Indian affairs.

He approved of

the policy of subsisting the Indians on limited reservations,
yet felt it would be cheaper and more effective to move the
agencies to the vicinity of navigable rivers and railroads.
As for relations between the Army and Indian Bureau, literal
observance of the present dual policy was agreeable except
with the wilder tribes.

Common sense dictated that the Army

be given authority to dismount and arrest bands preparing to
leave their reservations and pursue hostiles who retreated to
reserves to escape p u n i s h m e n t . ^39
In these remarks Pope touched upon problems which were
to complicate the administration of Indian affairs long after
the government ceased to formally recognize the tribes as

137

CIA, 1870, 6.

^ S W (p), 1870, 256-258. Effective July 1, 1871,
enlisted strength was set at thirty thousand.
139Ibid., 259-261|..
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"domestic dependent nations,"

During the winter of 1870-1871

there were no major Indian conflicts or inter-departmental
disputes.

But in the spring both branches planned to bring

pressure upon non-agency bands to accept the peace policy and
will of the Great Father,

Whether this could be accomplished

without further War-Interior discord remained to be seen.
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CHAPTER SIX

QUEST FOR THE "DAY OF DELIVERANCE":
MARCH, 1871, TO MARCH, l 8?6
During the last seven years, under many difficulties
of administration, there has been a set purpose to im
prove their (the Indians’) condition, which has borne
fruit, and has succeeded beyond any reasonable expec
tation., .
(Board of Indian Commissioners.
January 1, 1876)
The observation of many years...has left the impression
that this system of civilizing the wild portion of our
Indian inhabitants has not met with success which gives
a fair equivalent for the expense, trouble and blood
shed which has attended it.
(Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan.
November 2, 1875'

The half decade from March, 1 8 7 1 , to March, 1 8 7 6 ,
was an important, if not distinctive, period in the history
of United States Indian relations.

Earlier frustrations con

vinced the government that it was more economical, practical
and just to isolate and conquer the Indians with rations,
blankets, teachers and persuasion than with physical force.
In practice, if it was any consolation to those who opposed
the moral suasion approach, this was a mixed policy.

Concili

atory measures had priority, but force was used when Indians
refused to live at peace on the reservations.

The peace

policy was founded upon the civil-military division of au
thority over the red men and its results hinged upon
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cooperation between the Interior and War departments.

Con

tinuing differences between the two branches, therefore,
impeded the quest for what Commissioner Francis A. Walker
called the "day of deliverance," or final solution of the
Indian question.^
March, 1 8 7 6 , has been chosen as the dividing point In
this study for two reasons*

First, in that month the House

committees on military and Indian affairs published reports
which recommended transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War
Department and signalized a new drive by the advocates of
military control.

Second, at about the same time, the Army

began active operations against the Sioux in a war which not
only had a profound impact upon governraent-Sioux relations,
but also increased interest in military administration of the
Indians.

The present discussion takes into account a number

of significant developments in the early Seventies which
tested the stability and effectiveness of the peace policy
and posed serious problems for civil and military officials.

PEACE POLICY WITHOUT PEACE
The defenders of the "poor Indian" and the peace policy
cry "peacet peace I" a Kansan complained to President Hayes as
late as 1 87 8 , "but there is none."

Military authorities,

westerners and proponents of a coercive Indian policy often
expressed such sentiments in the early Seventies.

Similarly,

iciA, 1872, 9.
^Thomas Hindman to President Hayes, October 13> 1 8 7 8 ,
I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75.
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Tbe Nation observed that while the government theorized about
how to civilize and Christianize Its wards, it continued to
exterminate them, thus adding the "element of hypocrisy" to
*
an already unenviable record of Indian administration.^
Wars, skirmishes and lesser conflicts pitting Indians
against troops, frontiersmen and other Indians persisted in
the period 18?1 to I 8 7 6 .

Optimistic observers noted, however,

that the number of hostile red men was diminishing.

Speaking

in relative terms, civil and military officials frequently
stressed the peaceful conditions within their jurisdiction.
Western commanders used such comments as "generally quiet,"
"trifling depredations," "no...marked features," "remarkably
quiet," and "closing operations" to describe Indian affairs
in various annual reports.

14-

Likewise, Interior spokesmen

announced that efforts to convert the Indians into tranquil,
civilized subjects were having results which were "encouraging,"
"most gratifying" and "beyond expectations."^
If the picture was becoming brighter, incidents in
volving the "irreconcilables" of a few tribes still received
wide publicity and had a substantial effect upon the govern
ment’s Indian program.

Sioux, Kiowa, Comanche, Cheyenne,

Modoc and Apache tribesmen frequently caused trouble on and
off their reservations.

A brief consideration of the most

notorious episodes will spotlight civil-military problems in
3The Nation. XIII (August 17, I 87 D ,
^SW,

100.

1 8 7 1 , 35 ; sw, 1 8 7 2 , 7 0 ; sw, 187 *4., 21*, 6 0 .

^BIC, 1872 , 1*; SI (P), 1871*, 531; SI, 1875, V.
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these years.
In the Southwest, the experiment of settling the wild
Apaches on reservations was being continued with considerable
difficulty and inter-departmental controversy.

During the

winter of 1870-1871 several bands were controlled through
the "medium of their bellies" at designated areas near Army
posts in Arizona and New Mexico,^

This arrangement was jeo

pardized, however, by the infamous "Gamp Grant Massacre" of
the following spring.

On April 30, about one hundred and

fifty citizens of Tucson, aroused by recent Indian depreda
tions, killed and mutilated eighty-five peaceable Arivaipas,
all but eight women and children, and carried off twentynine children,*^

This attack, defended by most Arizonans and

western newspapers, produced a loud outcry in the East,

Con

sequently, President Grant threatened to put Arizona under
martial law unless the guilty parties were brought to trial;
Department of Arizona commander Maj. Gen. George Stoneman was
replaced by Maj. Gen, George Crook and Secretary Vincent
Colyer of the Board of Indian Commissioners was sent to

60gle, ojD. cit., 79*
^About five hundred and fifty Arivaipas and Pinals had
come to Camp Grant for refuge at the invitation of Lieutenant
Royal E. Whitman and were being fed and engaged to cut hay
for the post. White and Mexican settlers who had supplied the
troops apparently circulated rumors that these friendly In
dians had been Involved In raids near Tucson. The attack was
led by prominent members of the "Committee of Safety," a
group which advocated vigorous military action against the
Indians.
(BIC, 1871 , 60-67; Ogl®» ©£* cit.. 79-81; Dale, on.
cit.. 96; James R. Hastings, "The Tragedy at Camp Grant in
1871," Arizona and the W est. I / S u m m e r , 19527* I4 6 -I 6 O . )
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investigate and reorganize the reservation system of the
Q
Southwest,
While Colyer was enroute to Arizona, General Crook,
a veteran described by one author as "the greatest Indian
fighter the United States Army ever produced," prepared to
conduct a "sharp, active campaign" against the non-reservation
q
Apaches,
Like many officers, Crook believed that Array men
made the best Indian agents and that most Indian officials,
like contractors, traders and whiskey peddlers, detracted from
good relations with the red men**0

But, upon learning of the

mission of "Vincent the Good" Colyer, he reluctantly deferred
active operations***
Colyer first negotiated with Apaches in New Mexico,
arranging for the establishment of a reservation in Tulerosa
Valley, near Port Craig,

By the time he reached Arizona, the

commissioner realized that the peace policy, so popular in the
East, was not well received In the remote territories,

12

3

Governor A,K,P, Safferd bad one hundred and four men
tried, but all were perfunctorily acquitted, (Ogle, oj), cit,.
8lj Dale, o£, cit,, 96) Stoneman, long criticized for opposing
an extermination policy, was blamed in this case for failing
to prevent the incident. The Board had earlier decided to
send Colyer to the Southwest to study the possibility of en
larging the reservation system,
*Dale, o£, cit.. 97; SW, 1871, 78,
* 0See George Crook, General George Crooks His Autobio
graphy, Edited by Martin P, Schmitt (Norman, 1914-5TT

11

Crook to Rutherford B # Hayes, January 28, 1871, R. B.
Hayes Papers, Hayes Library, Fremont, Ohio; SW, 1 8 7 1 , 7 8 ,
*2BIC, 1 8 7 1 , 1|B,
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He was vilified for his conciliatory efforts in several terri
torial newspapers*

One proposed:

We ought, in justice to our murdered dead, to dump
the old devil into the shaft of some mine, and pile
rooks upon him until he is dead* A rascal who comes here
to thwart the efforts of military and citizens to con
quer a peace from our savage foe, deserves to be stoned to
death like the treacherous, black-hearted dog that he is *3-3
Undaunted, Colyer toured the territory and decided that there
should be reservations at Camps Apache, Grant and Verde and
three temporary locations*"^
That fall the military bided its time while Colyer,
back in Washington, submitted his proposals to conciliate and
subsist the Apaches at these sites.

His views were no more

popular in the War Department than in the West*

Of an acci

dental meeting with Secretary Belknap, Colyer reported:
I*..was greatly troubled in speaking a word to him
to see that he was Intent on strengthening General
Crook*s hands for continuing the present expensive,
utterly uncalled for, and wicked wars, against the
poor Apache Indians of Arizona* He spoke angrily, as
if I was interfering, and said he only awaited the
President’s order to go on with that war more earnestly
than ever*l5
But his recommendations, endorsed by the Interior Department,
were approved by the President.

Accordingly, the War De

partment ordered its southwestern commanders to organize and
supervise the Apache reservations*^
13Ibid., 57-58.
^Ibid., 73-7lf.
^ C o l y e r to Delano, October 30, 1871, D eI*L.R., Misc.,
NA, RG 75.
l6BIC, 1871, 83-86.
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General Crook was unhappy, for he had hoped to concentrate
on the roving bands during the winter.

Although some called

him nthe great North American Butcher, ** Crook did not hate
all Apaches

In fact, he felt they were painted in ndarker

colors” than they deserved.1®

But be bad no faith in nthe

President’s ’Pet Theory'” of bribing marauders to behave,
noting that the wilder Indians interpreted Colyer’a visit as
a sign of fear.

"...I think my policy is to hold on until the

termination of the fight between ’Policy Ken’ and the citizens,”
he remarked to the Division of the Pacific commander, Maj. Gen.
Schofield, ”besides, I can accomplish nothing so long as Mr.
Colyer is sitting on and controlling the valves.

«19

In 1872 Crook experienced further frustrations.

He

planned to take vigorous measures against the renegades who
collected rations at the reservations, yet continued to raid
surrounding communities.

But this action had to be suspended

when he was informed that Maj. Gen. Oliver 0. Howard, the
"Christian Soldier” who formerly headed the Freedman’s Bureau,
was to bring another olive branch to Arizona.

Patiently,

Crook cooperated with Howard, who counciled with territorial,
military and Indian leaders, revised reservation boundaries,

^ C r o o k to Schofield, October 10, 1871, AGO L.R.,
NA, RG
Crook was attacked for requiring hostiles to
bring in the heads of their leaders before being re-admitted
to reservations*
l8sw, 18 7 1 , 7 8 .
■^Crook to Schofield, October 10, 1871, AGO L.R.,
NA, RG 94*
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took a delegation of Apaches to Washington, then set aside
a refuge for Cochise’s Chiracahuas and ordered the concentration of small reserves*

20

Finally, in mid-October, 1872, after Apache bands again
took to the warpath, Crook was authorized to deal with the
Indians in his own way*

21

Using organized Apache scouts, he

waged a relentless offensive, following the warriors to their
mountain hide-outs and killing scores who refused to capitu
late*

By April, 1873# most of the hostiles had enough and

came to Camp Verde to beg for peace*

22

To avoid further inter

vention by the Indians’ friends, Crook permitted them to settle
on reservations, warning them to stay there or be killed.

In

spite of such harshness, he became known among the Indians as
a man who kept his promises and rewarded those who lived at
peace with fair treatment®

As a result, until General Crook

left the Department of Arizona, early in 1875# the Apaches,
for the first time, were generally s u b m i s s i v e . ^
Meanwhile, the government became embroiled in a war
with the heretofore peaceable Modocs of upper California and
20
Howard, vested with broad powers, enlarged Fort Apache
(White Mountain) Reservation and created San Carlos Reserva
tion, south of Fort Apache, for Indians formerly located at
temporary sites*
(0.0. Howard, My Life and Experiences Among
the Hostile Indians /Hartford, 1 W 7 / # Chapters VII-XlV; CIA,
1872, 176; ctA, 18?3# 289; Dale, og. cit., 99-100}®
210gle, 0£. cit*, 113-lllj.®
^ I b i d . , 116-117; Dale, o£. cit*, 101*
2^Crook, op* cit., l8l-l82; Dale, op. cit., 101-

102,
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and lover Oregon.

A small tribe, which traditionallv lived on

lake plants, camas roots and small game and inhabited conical
mud-covered huts, these people had signed a peace treaty with
the government in October, 1861|..

Although the treaty, be

cause of amendments, was not confirmed until February, 1 8 7 0 ,
most of the tribe tried to live quietly on their assigned
reservation in Lake County, Oregon.

But they were constantly

harassed by their old enemies, the Klamaths, who claimed that
region.

After being moved to two objectionable agency sites,

many Modocs, under Captain Jack, deserted the reservation and
went to their old homes on Lost L a k e . ^
Still the tribe caused no major trouble until late in
1872.

Meantime, their friend, Brig. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby,

commander of the Department of Columbia, ordered his subor
dinates to guard against Modoc-Klaraath collisions and, to
gether with Superintendent A. B. Meacham, proposed that they
be given a more suitable separate reservation.

25

In the spring

of 1872 Meacham was replaced by T # B, Odeneal, who had in-

^ F o r a detailed discussion of the Modocs and the
Modoc War see Keith A. Murray, The Modocs and their W ar
(Norman, 195>9)« Chapters I-III give background information.
An illustration of the Modocs1 friendship was their assistance
to whites during the disastrous fire at Yreka, California,
on July^., 1871.
^ C a n b y to Acting Adjutant General, February 7* 1872,
Military Division of the Pacific. Hereafter these records
will be cited Div* Pac. HR Ex. D p c . No. 122. l|3rd Cong. 1
sess. (Serial 1607)* 1875T appendix, Official Copies of
Correspondence Relative to the War With the Modoc Indians in
1872-1873*”
Hereafter this document is cited as "Modoc
Correspondence."
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and lower Oregon*

A small tribe, which traditional!1 lived on

lake plants, camas roots and small game and inhabited conical
mud-covered huts, these people had signed a peace treaty with
the government in October, l86ij..

Although the treaty, be

cause of amendments, was not confirmed until February, 1870,
most of the tribe tried to live quietly on their assigned
reservation in Lake County, Oregon.

But they were constantly

harassed by their old enemies, the Klamaths, who claimed that
region*

After being moved to two objectionable agency sites,

many Modocs, under Captain Jack, deserted the reservation and
went to their old homes on Lost L a k e . ^ Still the tribe caused no major trouble until late in
1872.

Meantime, their friend, Brig. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby,

commander of the Department of Columbia, ordered his subordinates to guard against Modoc-Klamath collisions and, to
gether with Superintendent A. B. Meacham, proposed that they
29
be given a more suitable separate reservation.
In the spring
of 1872 Meacham was replaced by T. B. Odeneal, who had in-

^"For a detailed discussion of the Modocs and the
Modoc War see Keith A. Murray, The Modocs and their War
(Norman, 1959)* Chapters I-III give background information.
An illustration of the Modocs’ friendship was their assistance
to whites during the disastrous fire at Yreka, California,
on J u l y & , 1871.
29
^Canby to Acting Adjutant General, February 7, 1872,
Military Division of the Pacific. Hereafter these records
will be cited Div. Pac. HR Ex. D p c . N o . 122, ij.3rd Cong. 1
sess. (Serial 1607), 187^7 appendix, Official Copies of
Correspondence Relative to the War With the Modoc Indians in
1872 -1 8 7 3 *” 5-6. Hereafter this document is cited as "Modoc
Correspondence 0"
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structions to determine whether or not the Modocs shonld be
required to return to Klamath Reservation.

26

Odeneal

decided that these "desperadoes” should be forced to go to
the reservation and asked the military to arrest them at their
camp on Lost River.

27

On November 29, in attempting to comply

with the request, a detachment of troops met resistence and
became involved in the opening battle of the Modoc War of
1872-1873.28
After the fight on Lost River, the wily Modocs with
drew to an almost impregnable stronghold, the lava beds on
the south side of Tule Lake,

In mid-January, four hundred

troops, with howitzers, struck fifty to seventy-five warriors,
with outdated small arms, and were repulsed.

This experience

convinced military leaders that it would take seven hundred
29
or more men to defeat the hostiles*
Hence an effort was
made to negotiate a settlement.

On April 11, after a delay

in selecting a delegation and meeting place acceptable to the
Indians, six Modoc chiefs, led by Captain Jack, met six
peaee-makers, headed by General Canby.

But the council ended

in tragedy, for the Indians suddenly turned on the delegates,
killing Canby and Dr. Eleasar Thomas and seriously wounding

l

i

28Walker to T. B. Odeneal, April 12, 1 8 7 2 , I.O.L.B.
(Land and Civilization),No. 106, NA, RG 75.
27
Odeneal to Lt. Col. Prank Wheaton, November 25,
1 8 7 2 , "Modoc Correspondence," 3^4-*
pQ

Capt. James Jackson to Major John Green, December 2,

1 8 7 2 , "Modoc Correspondence," 142-Iilj..
^ " M o d o c Correspondence" I4.9 -6 3 .
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former superintendent A, B. Meacham.

30

Almost overnight the tragedy was In the headlines and
Indian critics and sympathizers alike demanded r e v e n g e . A
few days later a company of infantry, two companies of artillery
and a number of Warm Springs scouts set out to hunt down the
renegades, but were ambushed and driven back with heavy
losses*

32

Finally, Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis took command

of operations, and, by bivouacing troops in the lava beds,
forced the Modocs into the open.

Early in June the Modoc

?
33
headmen were captured and the costly little war was over.
The Modocs paid heavily for their resistence.

The

principal hostiles were tried by a military commission and
sentenced to hang.

Two later had their sentences commuted to

life imprisonment at Alcatraz, but Captain Jack and three others
were executed in October at Port Klamath.

The tribe, except

for a few who were confined at Port Marion, Florida, was
3k
exiled to Quapaw Agency, Indian Territory.
To military officials, notably Generals Sherman and
30

Col; Aivan C. Gillem to Adjutant General, Hqs.Army,
April 11, 1873* "Modoc Correspondence,” 75-76. The other
delegates were L. S. Dyar and interpreters Prank and Toby
Riddle.
31
Athearn, 0£* clt.. 300-301; Sherman to Sheridan,
June 6 , 1873* Sherman tapers, Vol. 35.
32
^ In one engagement thirty-six enlisted men were killed
or wounded.
(General Jefferson Davis to Acting Adjutant
General, Div. Pac., May I4., 1873* "Modoc Correspondence,” 33-314-.)
Hereafter Adjutant General will be cited A.G,
33
Sherman to Belknap, June 3* 1873* "Modoc Corres
pondence,” 814.-85?; Ganoe, oj). clt., 333#
^■"Modoc Correspondence," 95-113* 133-203.
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Schofield, the Modoc War was a case of Interior Department
bungling.

It cost over a hundred and sixty white casualties

and more than half-a million dollars, whereas a few thousand
dollars would have provided the Modocs with a decent reservation and agency,

35

Schofield attacked the Indian Bureau for

rejecting General Canby’s alternative recommendations and
allowing a superintendent to take steps which were bound to
36
start a war,
Upon receiving pungent complaints from Gen
eral Sherman, Secretary Delano, In August, 1873, sent Acting
Commissioner H, R. Clum these instructions:
I have,,,determined that in all cases hereafter where
it becomes necessary to require the aid of the War De
partment in removing Indians, that a communication re
questing such aid be sent to the War Department by this
Department, and that no efforts to obtain this inter
position of the military be made in any other way,37
The Modoc War was a brief, but dramatic, affair,

A

more enduring conflict, involving the Kiowas and Coraanches
and, to a lesser extent, the Cheyennes of the Southern Plains,
reached a climax in the Red River War of 187^-1875•

On

numerous occasions warlike braves from these tribes went on
horse-stealing, murdering sprees in the country bordering
their reservation.

The problem was most acute in Texas, and

# by 1870 Generals Sherman and Sheridan were beseiged with

^ F o r a break-down of the casualties see ”Modoc Corres
pondence,” llij.; Dunn, op. cit., lj.92. See also Athearn, op.
clt., 30 I4., for Sherman^s reactions.
^Schofield to Acting A.G., Div. Pac., July 2, 1873 ,
D.I.L.R,, War Dept,, Ind. Div., NA, RG 7 5 .
^ D e l a n o to Clum, August 6 , 1873 , I.0,L,R., Ind.
Affs., Misc., NA, RG 75.
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complaints, petitions and proposals from residents and officials of that state.

38

To obtain first-hand information, General Sherman,
together with Inspector General R. B. Marcy and other military
leaders, toured northern and central Texas in the spring of

1871.

Sherman found visible evidence of Indian raids and his

party narrowly missed an attack by a band of Kiowas.

39

In

May, he reached Fort Sill, where the Kiowa and Comanche agent,
Lawrie Tatum, readily admitted his inability to control many
of his charges.^®

Upon hearing Satanta and other Kiowa head

men boast of killing and robbing whites, Sherman ordered
their arrest.^

Satanta and Big Tree were later tried and

sentenced to hang*

But President Grant, Secretary Delano and

others challenged the legality of this decision and the two
42
were sent to the state penitentiary.
During the next two years, there were fewer Indian
raids 3outh of Indian Territory.

This was attributed, in

part, to the punishment of the Kiowa c h i e f s I n

addition,

38RIster, 0£. cit., 172-173*
3^Sherman to Col* VJilliam H. Wood, May 19, 1871, Sher
man Papers, Vol. 30.
^•°Athearn, o£. cit., 291.
^ S h e r m a n to Commanding Officer, Ft. Richardson, May
28, 1871, Semi-Official L.S., W. T. Sherman. See also Ex
tract Marcy Journal included with above. Marcy stated that
the peace policy had not had the ’’slightest effect” on
these southern tribes.
^ 2Rister, 0£. cit., 182-185.
^ 3Ibid., 186. Minor raids are mentioned in SW. 1872.

46-47*
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the Army discouraged such activities through an active cam
paign against the Indians who left their reservations*

In

September, 1872, for example, Colonel R» S. Mackenzie attacked
a Comanche village of two hundred and sixty lodges on a tri
butary of the Red River, killing more than twenty warriors,
capturing a hundred and thirty Indians and three thousand
horses and destroying a great deal of property*
In the summer of 1873, though, the Kiowas and Comanches
began extensive depredations.

Frontier observers insisted

that these troubles were precipitated by the release of Sa
tanta and Big Tree,

Already in 1872 Governor Edmond J,

Davis of Texas had suggested the freeing of these warriors
on condition that they bring the remnants of their tribe to
Fort Sill Reservation,

Interior authorities at first opposed

this idea, but in April, l873» Commissioner Edward P, Smith
gave his consent.
but to no avail.

General Sherman protested vociferously,
"I have no more faith in their /the Indians/7

sincerity than I have in the

prario / I i c / 7 wolves,” he re

marked to General Sheridan, ”and as I once risked my life to
test their sincerity, I do not propose again to expose others
to a like danger, and hope the Indian Bureau will manage
them without the aid of the Army.”^

^ R u p e r t N. Richardson, The Comanche Barrier to South
Plains Settlement (Glendale, 1 933J, 361-362.
^ W a l k e r to Delano, June 5, 1872, I.O.R.B, No, 21;
Delano to Davis, June
1872, D.I.L.S., Ind. Misc,, Smith
to Delano, April 18, 1873, I.O.R.B. No. 22, NA, RG 7 5 .
^ 6 E&M*, Eqs. Army, Vol. 1, NA, RG 108.
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Commissioner Smith soon realized the error of trusting
the Kiowa chiefs, but the damage was done.

Within a year

after they were released, the Southern Plains Indians killed
about four times as many persons as in 1872.

Ii7

In the spring

of 1874* Kiowas and Comanches, along with some Cheyennes and
Arapahoes, began raids in Texas, Kansas, Colorado and New
Mexico .^-8

In June, a Cheyenne and Comanche war party boldly

attacked a settlement on the South Canadian River inhabited
by white buffalo hunters who had intruded on the Indians’
hunting grounds.

kb

The following month, hostilities were so

widespread that, as General Sherman commented, "the Indian
agents confessed their utter Inability to manage their respec
tive tribes by the usual humane and Christian treatment . . . . ”'’0
On July 21, the Interior Department gave the War Department
a free hand to deal with the Indians in and around Indian
Territory
With this authority, the military launched the most
comprehensive, and last, major Indian war on the Southern
Plains.

About three thousand troops from Ports Sill, Concho,

Union and Griffin and Camp Supply, led by five commanders,
converged on the Red River Valley.

Within five months, after

a series of hard-fought battles, most of the nomadic bands were
k7

Rister, op. cit., 191.
See Sm ith to Brunot, De
cember 23 , l873» T.O.R.fe. (Land and Civilization), I.O.R.B.
No, 116, NA, RG 75.

^ 8 SW, 18714.,

k ,

29 - 30 .

^ 9 Grinnell, pp. cit., 319-327.
^°SW, 18714., iu
^ 1 Ibid., 2 6 .
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beaten and ready to go to their reservations.
Sheridan insisted on doing a thorough job.

But Sherman and

The fighting con

tinued until the following summer, when, in accordance with a
"punishment-must-follow-erime policy," hostile leaders were
court-martialed and sent to prison in St. AugustiDe, Florida.
Thus, in the opinion of many Army officers, part of the Indian
t o

problem was solved in a practical, effective manner.-^
War Department spokesmen argued that the methods which
ended difficulties with the southern tribes -- unrestricted
warfare on hostiles on and off the reservations —

would work

equally as well with the troublesome Sioux in the North.

De

spite the efforts of Indian reformers and peace policy
supporters, various Sioux bands continued to roam the country
beyond the boundaries of their reservation, endangering white
settlements and, in general, disregarding the government’s
wishes.

These tribesmen were probably no more guilty of

violating treaty commitments than the white men who invaded
their supposed sanctuary.

But, by late l87£, the patience of

civil and military officials had worn thin, and rumors of im
pending Sioux hostilities gave point to arguments for for
cibly "educating" these Indians in the advantages of quiet,
sedentary life.
The Sioux problem was exacerbated by several peculiar
»

circumstances.

First, some of the most "non-progressive"

Sioux frequented agencies located outside their Dakota

*2SW, 1875, 20-21; Rister, 0£. clt.. 193-197; R. N.
Richardson, Comanche Barrier. 388-397.
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reservation,^

Second, until 1875, many of the Indians took

advantage of a provision In their treaty of 1868 which permltted them to hunt along the Platte and Republican rivers.

■5k

Third, the northern part of the Sioux Reservation was in the
path of the projected Northern Pacific Railroad, and the
presence of survey crews agitated some of the tribesmen.

5 5

Fourth, some of the Sioux agencies were involved in muchpublicized investigations which reaffirmed the Indians1 sus
picions that the Great Father was not keeping faith with them.
Finally, the gold-laden Black Hills, the heart of Sioux country,
were a magnet to white poachers,

While the Army labored with

partial success to stem the tide of gold-seekera, the govern
ment engaged in negotiations which finally, in September,
56
1 8 7 6 , legalized another Indian land-grab.
Hostile Sioux occasionally caused trouble during summer
hunts and often disrupted agency affairs in the winter, but
the Indian Bureau was slow to admit the seriousness of the
situation,

”,,,there has /si c

j

been more people killed by

Indians during the last 12 months in my command than for any

-'-'The Red Cloud Agency, established in the summer of

1 8 7 1 , was not located on the Sioux Reservation until late in
1877* The Spotted Tail Agency, established as Whetstone Agency
in the fall of 1868, was moved outside the reservation late
in 1871 and was not returned until 1 8 7 8 ,
^Happier, op, cit,, II, 998-1003, This subject is
enlarged upon below,
55
The survey was made under military escort. Construc
tion of the road was delayed by the Panic of 1873#
56
The Sioux investigations and the Black Hills prob
lem are discussed further below, Kapler, oj>. clt,, I, 168-171.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without p erm ission.

t

like period since 1867,” General Sheridan declared in May,
1873*

”Still the good old Peace Cornrais si oners according to
t.n

their report think Indian affairs lovely,"
The following February, large war parties stole stock
at the Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies, shot at agency
buildings and, within a few days, killed five whites, in
cluding two soldiers and the chief clerk at Red Cloud Agency,
Thereupon, the agents anxiously appealed for military assis
tance,^®

In response, General Sherman directed General

Sheridan to send troops from Fort Laramie,

This action was

strenuously opposed, however, by Felix Brunot of the Board
of Indian Commissioners,

Just a few weeks earlier Sheridan

had expressed a desire to compel the Sioux to be counted, and
if they resisted, to "make it lively for the squaws, papooses,
ponies and villages?^

Sioax alarm, Brunot argued, was merely

the "manipulation of the Telegraph," and if the Army took
aggressive measures a general war would r e s u l t , ^
General Sherman assured Brunot that his apprehensions
were unfounded.

He further observed:

^Endorsement to Report of Col.

P, Carlin, May 17,

1 8 7 3 , E&M., Hqs, Army, Vol, I, NA, RG 108.
-*®Agent J, J. Saville to Commissioner, February 9, 1875,
Red Cloud Agency L.R, NA, RG 75; 0. B. Unthank, "Red Cloud
Agency and Fort Laramie, 1867-1871;," Nebraska History.VII
(January-March, 1921}.), 28; Hyde, o£. cit,, 211,
^ B r u n o t to Delano, November 21, 1873, I.O.L.R.,
Misc., NA, RG 7 5 .
Ln

Brunot to Grant, February 11)., I 87 I}., D.I.L.R., War
Dept., Ind. Div., NA, RG 75.
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At present the military commanders,..know nothing
of the orders and instructions of the Indian Bureau to
their agents, and consequently don’t know whsn their
.joint action is harmoneous
otherwise; and...
the first thing they know is some event like the killing
of some soldiers or citizens such as recently occurred
...when the Indian agents.call for help, and help in
general terms is ordered.®1
After all, he added pointedly, there was no need for this
«62
double authority.
Secretary Delano, too, seemed concerned over the A rmy’s
intentions.

He wrote Secretary of War Delano, reminding

him that the troops were being called out to prevent, not
cause, hostilities.

63
J

To Sherman, such statements were typical

of the two-faced approach of the Interior Department.

He

confided in General Sheridani
That letter of the Secretary of the Interior was
meant to throw on us the blame in case of an Indian war...
Everybody, even Mr. Delano, would be made happy if the
troops should kill a goodly portion of those Sioux, but
they want to keep the record to prove they didn’t do
it. We can afford to be frank and honest, for sooner
or later these Sioux have to. be wiped out, or made to
stay where they are put....®^
After all this wrangling, the military expedition
arrived at the agencies too late to deal with the hostlies,
who had gone north to hunt buffalo.

To prevent a recurrence

of these difficulties, though, military camps were established

^ S h e r m a n to Brunot, February 17$ 1871+, Sherman Letter
Book (February 11, 1866 to July 8, 1878)*
62Ibid.
^^Delano to Belknap, February 25, 1871+, D.I.L.S., Ind.
Misc., NA, RG 75.
^•Sherman to Sheridan, March 6, l87i+, Sheridan Auto
graph Letters, Vol. I.
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near Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies.^

The troops

stationed at these posts occasionally intervened to discipline
belligerent braves at the agencies and were generally kept
active with patrol and escort duties.

But a full-scale cam

paign against the roving warlike Sioux was deferred by nego
tiations for the Black H i i l a * ^
In November, 1875, Inspector 3?.C, Watkins reported
that warriors under Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse were on the
verge of an outbreak, and recommended decisive military
action*

This proposal was approved by the new Interior

officials, Secretary Zachariah Chandler and Commissioner
67
John Q. Smith.
Subsequently, the Sioux agents were told to
notify the Indians to be on Sioux reservation by January 31,

1 8 7 6 , or be considered hostile,®®

Not all of the Sioux who

were hunting in Wyoming and Montana received the govern- .
ment's instructions, but most of those who did either
65
• Camp Sheridan was established near Spotted Tail
Agency and Camp, later Port, Robinson near Red Cloud Agency.
(Roger T. Grange, Jr., "Port Robinson Outpost on the Plains,"
Nebraska History. XXXIX(September, 1958), I 91 - 23 I4..)
®®A minor crisis, requiring military intervention,
occurred at Red Cloud Agency in October, 18714.* See Report of
the Special Commission Appointed to Investigate the Affairs of
the Red Cloud Indian Agency. July. 1&75 (Washington, 1 8 7 ^),
309 - 3114.. Hereafter this document is cited RSC, See also
Saville to Commissioner, October 21*., 187 )4., Red Cloud Agency,
L eR e, NA,RG 75.
®?ciA, l875> 7-9; Smith to Delano, November 27, 1875,
Sheridan Papers, Pile on Indian Affairs.
®®CIA, 1 8 7 6 , XIV-XV. General Sherman unsuccessfully
tried to have this deadline advanced to allow for a longer and
more effective winter campaign*
(Rister, oj>. cit*. 2014.).
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disregarded them or decided not to move in bad weather*

Hence,

many were still off the reservation in early March, when Gen
eral Crook, now commander of the Department of the Platte,
and General A. H. Terry, commander of the Department of Dakota,
began the first expeditions of the bloody Sioux War of 1876 1877 . 69
DUAL AUTHORITY AND PEACE POLICY PROBLEMS
Implicit in the "peace policy” was the idea that Indian
wars, such as those just cited,were to be minimized*

The

government sought to .place the Indians on reservations; to
temporarily feed, clothe and equip them; to teach them to farm,
raise livestock or engage in other industrial pursuits and
to bring their social, cultural and religious life into con
formity with that of white society.

Under the supervision of

the Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
advised and assisted to some extent by the Board of Indian
Commissioners,

there was an extensive system of superinten-

dencies and agencies*

In the Seventies, Indians were subsisted

and managed at more than seventy agencies and sub-agencies.

70

These establishments, generally located in remote areas, were
like rude little towns.

They usually included an office,

one or more storehouses, a barn or stable, carpenter and black
smith shops, traders1 stores, a school, a church or mission

69

Hyde, op. cit.* 2£l-2£3*

See Chapter Seven.

7°See CIA, 187 I, 606 - 637 .
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house, residences for agency employees, corrals and various
other structures.

71

The responsibility for administering these Indian cen
ters fell primarily upon the church-nominated agents or sub
agents,

The agent, or "little father," had a multitude of

duties.

For #1,500 a year, more or less, he was expected to

keep the Indians quiet and content, supervise the distribution
of rations and annuities, represent the government, enforce
treaties and Indian service regulations, settle Indian dis
putes, check the encroachment of outsiders, look after the
Indians* morals and promote his subjects' education and civilizatlon.

72

For assistance, most agents relied upon a sizeable

staff, consisting, in some cases, of interpreters, a chief
clerk, issue clerk, corral master, storekeeper, farmer, butcher,
blacksmith, physician, in addition to teachers, engineers,
carpenters, mill hands, herders and laborers, ^
Although conditions varied from place to place, most
agency administrators had to contend with numerous problems.
Many agents, in the first place, were ill-equipped by training
and temperament to manage uncivilized Indians,

Ik

Their

7lEverett Dick, The Vanguards of the Frontier (New
York, 191*1), 10l*-105j I,O.L,R, Misc, 1%71-1876. passim.HA.

RG 75 *
72SI, 1876, 382; CIA, 1 8 7 8 , 28-29; Dick, op. cit..
105-117* See also Ruth H. Gallaher,
"The Indian Agent," The
Iowa Journal of History and Politics. XIV (April, 1916),

173- 238.

73

See, for example, quarterly payrolls, Red Cloud and
Spotted Tail agencies, 1871 - 1 8 7 8 , NA, RG 7 5 ,
7^CIA, 1 8 7 6 , IV; Poole, og>. clt.. 227-229.
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position exposed them to physical hardships and "ever-ready
suspicion, detraction and calumny0n
beset by "hangers-on” —
half-breeds —
ders,*^

The agencies were often

traders, contractors, squawmen and

as well as unruly young braves and intru

The Indians, moreover, were generally unenthusias-

tic about the government’s reforms.

77

Finally, the agents

grappled with such "hindrances" as the continuing recognition
of tribal sovereignties, the absence of clearly-defined laws
78
, and inter-tribal feuds,
While the military branch was not directly concerned
with most of these administrative questions, it had certain
functions essential to the maintenance and operation of the
peace program at the reservations and agencies,

Indian Com

missioner Francis A. Walker once stated that the government,
to save its wards from extinction and degradation, should
place them under a "rigid reformatory discipline,"

79

In a

sense, this was attempted, with Indian officials depending
upon the Array to keep their "inmates" at peace on the reserva
tions and free from outside interference.
omits a vital point.

But the analogy

The Indians owned the reservations, and

7*SI, 1876, 382.
7^ Ray H e Mattison, "The Indian Reservation System on
the Upper Missouri, 1865-1890," Nebraska History, XXVI (Sep
tember, 1955)# 158,
77CIA, 1871 -1 8 7 6 , passim.

7 8 CIA, 1873, 3-9.
79ciA, 1872 , 5 .
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it was also tbe duty of the military to protect their land
and property.

The story of the Army’s efforts to carry out

the dual assignment of controlling and protecting the reserva
tion Indians is a revealing commentary on the question of
civil or military control of Indian affairs.
According to Secretary Delano, the "first step" in
promoting peace and civilization among the Indians was to
keep them on the reservations*

80

Similarly, Commissioner

Walker suggested that the nation’s wards be made as corafortable on, and as uncomfortable off, their lands as possible*

8l

Under the civil-military agreement of 1869, troops policed the
country around the reservations, chasing or escorting wayward
tribesmen back to their agencies.

In view of these services,

civil authorities reported "cordial and earnest co-operation"
by the soldiers and thanked them for "prompt and efficient
O p

aid,"

At times, however, there was friction between mili

tary commanders and agents, and the former were dilatory or
uncooperative.

This occurred, especially, when Indian ad

ministrators were Indecisive or had a propensity for giving
O^
false alarms.
After 1870 western commanders became increasingly cri
tical of the Inter-departmental understanding which prevented

80SI, 1872 , VI.
8lCIA, 1872 , 6.
82SI, 1873, XI; SI, 1875, IX.
83CIA, 1875, 20, 33 - A .
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them from dealing independently with Indians on the reserva
tions.

Indian raiders took advantage of this arrangement, using

the reserved areas as refuges, sources of supply, and rest
and recuperation centers*

This was such a problem along the

southern boundary of Indian Territory that, in 1871, Army
officers refused to act until Commissioner Parker revised the
instructions he had sent to Indian superintendents and agents
on June 12, 1 8 6 9 . Given little choice, Parker informed
Secretary Belknap that it seemed "advisable and expedient"
to allow troops to follow criminals into Indian Territory to
arrest them and recover stolen property*®^
Still the military was not certain of its power to pur
sue Indians under all circumstances.

"The general instruc

tions to our troops involve the protection of Indians inside
their reservation, by prompt and rapid pursuit of all marauders,"
General Sherman wrote in 1873# "even if their route leads
O/
inside a Reservation."
Six months later, though, he com
plained that another Indian Bureau circular on inter
departmental jurisdiction was "merely advisory" and left many
post commanders in doubt. A comprehensive, legal definition of
the respective powers of the War and Interior departments was

®^See Chapter Five.
^ P a r k e r to Belknap, June 21, 1871 , I.O.R.B. No. 102,
Land and Civilization, NA, RG 75*
®^End., Sherman, to letter of W.P. Carlin to Acting AG,
Department of Dakota, May 17# 1873# NA, RG 108#
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87

Now and then politicians proposed solutions to the
Early in I 87 I4- Representative DeWitt

jurisdictional question.

C. Giddings of Texas suggested that the War Department be
given exclusive authority over the unruly bands living in In
dian Territory.

Commissioner E. P. Smith rejected this scheme.

To commit the control of a portion of a tribe to military control would simply bring confusion, he argued.

88

„

Governor

S. P. Potts of Montana Territory offered an alternative plan.
If Indians committed crimes and others In their tribe refused
to surrender them, let the whole tribe be turned over to the
Army.

This proposal was opposed by Acting Commissioner Clum,

who maintained that agency Indians could not, and should not
be expected to, control the actions of relatives living
89
elsewhere*
The Kiowa and Comanche troubles in the summer of I 87 J4forced the issue.

Commissioner E. P. Smith finally approved

unrestricted pursuit of evil Indians, insisting, however, upon
military commanders cooperation to separate the friendly Indians from the hostiles.

90

General Pope objected to this

87Sherman to Sec. War, November 2, 1873* I.O.L.R., Misc.,
NA, RG 7 5 .

88

Smith to Delano, January 21, 187^, I.O.R.B. No. 21},
NA, RG 7 5 .
®^Clum to Delano, May 9, 187U> I.O.R.B. No. 21}., NA,
rg

75.

9®The friendly Indians were to be enrolled and required
to answer daily roll-call. No Indian was to be allowed to join
them except by special permission. (Smith to Delano, July 18,
l87i}, cited in Pope to Sheridan, July 22, l87l}» Div, Mo. L.R.,
Special Pile, NA, RG 9 8 .)
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"carefully guarded" permission, particularly the requirement
that the Army notify friendly Indians to go to the agencies
before pursuing bostiles0

By giving such notice, troops would

practically disarm themselves and defeat their object.

While

old Indians went to the agencies to create a "semblance of
peace," hostiles would scatter to the four winds and to find
them would be as hard as "looking for needles in a hay-stack."^
It should be the agents responsibility to bring In the peaceable
Indians and discover the Identity of criminals.

"What chance

would the police of New York have," Pope asked, "if all the
people of their vilest districts were to be notified when the
police force was about to move upon them and /told that/ all
who wanted protection must assemble in certain buildings and
localities where they would be unmolested, or disperse for the
occasion?"9^

But Interior authorities insisted that there were

friendly Indians in every district and continued to demand
precautions for their safety.
Another problem which stemmed from police action against
undisciplined tribesmen was the disposition of Indian pri
soners.

In some military departments, when competent civil

authorities were unavailable, t r o ^ s were expected to "confine,
hold and release" Indians upon application from the agents.

^ P o p e to Sheridan, July 22, 18714., Div. Mo. L.R.,
Special Pile, NA, RG 9 8 .
92Ibid.
91
^Instructions, Acting A.G, Pry, Dept, of Dakota, De
cember 6, l871> Sheridan Letter Book, General Correspondence.
Sheridan recommended these instructions for army-wide
issuance.
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This created additional expense and extra duties which were
oh

not always appreciated by the War Department. ^

Moreover,

civil and military officials did not always agree on the proper
treatment of prisoners.

For example, in 1872, Commissioner

Walker consented to the imprisonment of whole families at Fort
Sill, but opposed military suggestions that parents and childran be permanently separated*

95

On the other hand, two years

later Commissioner E* P. Smith rejected General Sheridan*s
96
plan to confine families on military-occupied islands*
The Army might have had fewer prisoners to worry about
if the Indians had been more effectively supplied at the
agencies.

Officials of the Indian Bureau recognized the im

portance of feeding the Indians to keep them at the reservations during their "transition of life."

97

"Should the

feeding of these Indians be stopped," Commissioner Parker said
of the Southern Plains tribes, "...they will again scatter to
the plains...and the labor and expense of locating them where
they now are will have been of no use or permanent benefit,
9^When funds were available, the Indian Bureau re
imbursed the Army for subsisting prisoners.
(Walker to Delano,
November k , 1872, I.O.R.B. N0 . 22, NA, RG 75.)

9% b i d .
9^Smith to Delano, November 20, I 87 I4., February 2, l875>
I.O.R.B. No* 25, NA, RG 7 5 * Smith argued that this would be
too expensive and that soldiers would debauch the Indian women.
97
The prescribed daily ration for the Sioux before 1876
was a pound and a half of fresh beef, a quarter pound of corn
or meal, and half a pound of flour per person; four pounds of
sugar per hundred persons and, four times a month, threefourths of a pound of bacon per person. Other items, such as
coffee and beans, were common.
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either to the Government or the Indiana....

ofl

Yet supply

shortages were common, and, as Parker predicted, many tribes
men left the reservations in search of food.
Several factors contributed to the 3upply problem.

First,

Congress, more correctly the House of Representatives, often
delayed and substantially reduced recommended appropriations
99
for the Indian service.
Second, many of the Indians contributed to their own needs by improvident eating habits.^00
Third, agents did not always anticipate and properly assess
the Indians needs and tastes.10^"

Fourth, fraud, mismanagement

and profiteering in supply, annuity and transportatisn con
tracts sometimes deprived the agency wards of the full benefits
of federal support.

102

Fifth, traders, and "hangers-on"

pestered the Indians to exchange their food or supplies for
non-essentials.^0^

Finally, the remoteness of the agencies

and bad weather frequently caused delays in supply deliveries.^0^

98Parker to Delano, March 13, 1871, I.O.R.B. N0 . 20,
NA, RG 75.
^Priest, o£. cit., 106-120.
10°Rations were normally issued every five to eight days,
but the Indians often devoured them in a day or two. (Poole,
oo. clt.. lj.5-it.6; RSC, 2I4.2 ; Priest, o]o. clt., 1114.-1 1 5 ).

101S e e , fo r exam p le, CIA, 1875, 19 2 ; SW, 1871, 73.
•^O^RSC, passim. Henry G. Waltmann, "The Subsistence
Policy with Special Reference to the Red Cloud and Spotted
Tail Agencies," M.A. Thesis (University of Nebraska, 1959),
1 2 0 -l6Lj..
103Walker to SI, November 20, 1871; M cC„ Foot to Com
missioner, September 9, 1 8 7 6 , Red Cloud Agency, L.R., NA
RG 75; RSC, 2 5 2 .
^°^See, for example, SW, 18 7 2 , 8 6 .
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In spite of these circumstances, though, the Indians were
usually well supplied,

109
v

Throughout the Seventies, commanders of military posts
near the agencies distributed emergency rations to needy Indians.

Under military regulations and orders, bulk or

daily issues were forbidden.

107

Still, many officers consid

ered the temporary distribution of military stores a "humane
and economical mode of preventing war,"

and provided as much

relief as possible, assisting, too, such wretched, weak bands
as the Mission Indians of California and Tonkawas and Lipans
of Texas,108
Army officers were at times extremely critical of the
Indian Bureau and its supply system.

In 1875, Ma^, Gen, Nelson

A, Miles complained, for instance, that the Indians of the
Central Superintendency, "half fed and half starved," were
forced into annual outbreaks with "accompanying horrors."109
Commenting on the same problem, General Pope declared that

10-*Hyde, op, cit.. 260, 229, note footnote 9* This
view does not comprehend the Indians' wanderlust and tradi
tional hunts,
lo8In 1871-1872 about $300,000 worth of rations were
dispensed by the Army,
(Walker to Delano, January 3, 1 8 7 2 ,
I.O.R.B. No. 21, NA, RG 75),
10?General Order No. 514-, War Dept., June 25, 18?2 in
"Brief on the Indians at Port Griffin,
I.O.L.R., War Dept.,
Misc., NA, RG 75. These rules were not always observed.
108Ibid,; SW, 1872, 86; BIC, 1871 , 9, The military
frequently complained that the Indian Bureau gave more
rations to potential hostlles than submissive tribes.
109SW, 1875, 85,
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it was "revolting” for troops to have to commit violence on
hapless, hungry Indians,

They were charged with "assassina

tion" If these poor people were killed and "inefficiency" if
they were not.

nc

Summarizing this dilemma, Pope asserted:

It is the misfortune of the present administration of
Indian affairs that Indians are driven by starvation at
the agencies, where by treaty stipulations they are re
quired to remain, to seek food in places where they are
prohibited from going, and whilst the permits for this
purpose given by the agents are wholly illegal and un
authorized, common humanity dictates that no forcible
^.n
measures be taken against them under such circumstances.
The Sioux, who by their treaty of 1868 were entitled to
hunt on the Platte and Republican "so long as the buffalo
range thereon in sufficient numbers as to justify the chase,"
were a special problem.

112

By 1871 the War Department and

residents of Nebraska and Kansas were agitating for the repeal
of this privilege, because the Indians were deemed a threat to
peace on the Central Plains,

General Sherman, who signed the

Sioux treaty against his better judgment, recommended that the
buffalo be slaughtered and the meat transported to Dakota,

113

Indian friends, such as William Welsh of Philadelphia, also
opposed the buffalo hunts, contending that they promoted vallit
grancy and postponed reform.
Interior authorities agreed,

110 I b i d „ 76-77.
11 n

Endorsement, Pope, January 23, 1876 , to letter,
Lt, Edwin P, Andrus to A .G ,, Ft, Wallace, January 17, 1 8 7 6 ,
I . O . L . R . , NA, RG 7 5 ,
^%appler,

oj>. cit., II, 998,

^■^Belknap to Delano, March 27, 1871, D , I , L , R , , War
D e p t o , Ind, Div,, NA, RG 7 5 ,
^^•Williara Welsh, "Report of a Visit to the Sioux and
Ponka Indians on the Missouri River," (Philadelphia, 1 8 7 2 ), 3 1 ,
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but insisted that the government keep faith with its subjects
until they consented to forego their hunting rights*11^
An incident which gave new point to arguments for ending
the hunts was the "massacre ,*1 in early 1 8 7 3 , of fifty to a
hundred and fifty Pawnees by Sioux hunters near the present
town of Trenton, Nebraska,11^

In the exchange of reports which

followed, Secretary Delano referred to the hunting privilege as
part of the treaty "made in 1868 by General Sherman."

Sherman

refuted this "offensive" remark, stating that he had stead
fastly opposed concessions to the Sioux in 1 8 6 8 .
strong an advocate for peace as he /Delano7

*

"I am as

or any

the

attaches of the Indian Bureau,” he asserted to Adjutant Gen
eral E. D. Townsend, "but am not in favor of a cowardly peace,
where savage Indians remain at war, leaving our troops to be
their victims."^^

A few months l a t e r , p a r t l y b e c a u s e o f m i l i t a r y and
f r o n t i e r p r e s s u r e , i n t e r i o r o f f i c i a l s b eg an n e g o t i a t i o n s t o
r e s c i n d t h e S io u x h u n tin g p r e r o g a t i v e .

A n o th er c o n s i d e r a t i o n

w h ich l e d t o t h i s a c t i o n was th e r a p id d is a p p e a r a n c e o f b u f f a l o
and s m a l l gam e.

I n d ia n r e fo r m e r s r e c o g n i z e d th e e x t i n c t i o n

n *si, 1 8 7 2 , 7; SI, 1873, VII.
^ ^ R e p o r t 0f Captain Reinhold, Port McPherson, Feb
ruary 25. 1873 , BIG, Misc. Pile, Tray 2j Ashton C 4 Shallenberger, "The Last Pawnee-Sioux Battle and Buffalo Hunt,”
Nebraska History. XVI (July-September, 193^), 138-Uj.9.
^ ^Sh e r m a n to Townsend, May 31, 1873, G.G.L.S., NA,
RG 108.
TT ft
S e v e r a l f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e d t o th e e x t i n c t i o n o f
t h e a l l - i m p o r t a n t b u f f a l o . W hite h u n t e r s , a id e d by b u s i n e s s minded I n d i a n s , s l a u g h t e r e d m i l l i o n s i n t h e r e g i o n b etw een
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of the buffalo as a "blessing in disguise" for the Indians,
whose inclination toward agency life increased as their hunt
ing excursions yielded diminishing r e t u r n s I n

June, l87lf,

Congress appropriated twenty-five thousand dollars to liquidate the pertinent clause of the Sioux treaty*

120

A year

later, Red Cloud and other Sioux leaders, while in Washington,
agreed to cease hunting south of Dakota*

121

Besides responsibilities directly involving the Indians,
the Army had the onerous duty of protecting the reservations
and agencies from trespassers.

"The Government cannot enforce

^ (continued) Canada and Indian Territory in the early
Seventies, just to procure merchantable hides or tongues.
Sportsmen, participated in the wanton slaughter. Likewise,
nature took a heavy toll, particularly during the blizzard of
January, 1872. Finally, the Indians' biennial hunts helped
to make the bison scarce*
(Mari Sandoz, The Buffalo Hunters
/flew York, 195|t7» 9^-99; 128-130; Ashton' Shallenberger, rtrfhe
Last Pawnee-Sioux Battle and Buffalo Hunt," Nebraska History.
XVI /July-September, 1 9 3 ^ > 138-H|-9; Bayard 5. Paine. Pioneers,
Indians, and Buffaloes /Curtis,Nebraska, 193£7> 178-179*)
119
The extinction of the buffalo bad a profound Impact
upon the domestic life of the Sioux and other plains tribes.
Buffalo — traditionally a symbol of prowess, longevity and
worship — were "nature's storehouse" for them. The red men
relied upon these migratory beasts for many necessities of
life. The meat, including the viscera, was eaten boiled,
dried, roasted, raw or as an ingredient in soup. In addition,
the buffalo provided hides for bedding, tentage and clothing;
sinews for bowstrings; bones for tools and pipes; horns and
hooves for vessels, spoons or glue; tallow for salve; brains
for tanning hides and even "buffalo chips" for fuel or a smoking
mixture. (Sandoz, on. cit.. 91+-95* Paine, ojj clt. 137J
Everett P. Wilson, The &tory of the Oglala and ferule Sioux
in the Pine Ridge Country of Northwest Nebraska in the
Middle Seventies," Nebraska History. XXII /Tanuary-March,
191*17, 16; Edgar I.' Stewart, duster's Luck /Fforman. 195^/, 8 .)

*

.

120CIA, 1871*, 87; Nebraska History. XVI (July-September, 1 9 3 5 ), 1 6 8 *
121
Nebraska History. XVI (July-September, 1935),
168-169*
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this preservation/ policy upon the Indians," Secretary Delano
remarked in 1873, "unless it is equally determined in its
policy of preventing white people from going upon Reservations
that have been solemnly guaranteed to Indians by treaties or
otherwise,"

122

The intruder problem was so persistent and com

plex, however, that military leaders sometimes despaired of
their ability to cope with it.

For example, in 1 8 7 1 , Gen

eral Pope described the "most difficult and vexatious" assign
ment of protecting reservations along the Kansas Pacific as
follows:
,.,tbe throng of laborers and employees of the roads,
as well as the adventurers, prospectors and squatters,
and the fine agricultural country occupied by these reser
vation tribes, bring about relations between the whites
and Indians on thousands of points, which involve trouble
some and complicated questions, and constant difficulties
which cannot be adjudicated or settled by the military
authorities, and which are altogether beyond the manage
ment, or even the comprehension, of the average Indian
agent,123
Among the trespassers and agency parasites who created
headaches for civil and military authorities were: traders,
cattlemen, miners, hunters, freighters, speculators, railroad
workers, squawmen and Indians from other reservations.

Ex

cept at agencies with organized Indian police, agency officials

121l

were more or less powerless against these elements, ^

The

agents, who repeatedly solicited Army assistance to arrest or

IP?

Delano to George M, Robeson, April 2k, 1873> E.I.L,S0,
Ind, Misc., NA, RG 7 f>,

123sw, 1871, l|i.
of the agencies with Indian police in 1875 were
Great Nemaha and Omaha, (BIC, 1875, 6k-&7.)
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expel unscrupulous outsiders were, at the same time, insistent
that such intervention be under their direction*

Many

accepted Commissioner E. P. Smith's view that the presence of
soldiers on reservations brought "evils as well as benefits”
and should be as brief as possible.

125

^

Perhaps the most difficult intruders to eliminate were
the whiskey and arms traders*

The illegal sale of these two

items, General W. S. Hancock affirmed in 1872, had long been
a fruitful source of difficulty for the Army.

The Indians

had a notorious weakness for intoxicants, and regulations
£
against the liquor traffic, despite the efforts of Indian reformers, were weak and hard to enforce.

127

'

Attempts to control

the sale of arms, prohibited to Indian traders in 1873* were
complicated by the Indian Bureau's policy of arming friendly
4 AO

Indians for protection against hostile neighbors.

In 1871

Secretary Delano Indicated, for instance, that the Crows,
enemies of the Sioux, had more modern guns than warriors.

129

12 *CIA, 1871*, 13.
12% a n c o c k to Acting A. G., Div. Mo., October 10,
1872, I.O.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 7$.
^■2 ^Priest, op. clt.. 156-157J Sehraeckbier, op. clt..
I*2l*-k25; HR Ex. Doc. No. 177. l*3rd Cong., 1 sess. TSerial
1610), 1871*, 1 ; and BYE, 1 8 7 2 , 19.
lpo
17 St at. L., 1*59. See Cong. Globe, l*2nd Cong.,
3 sess., 3 k 7-^*8, 379-380, 1*28-1*25. For a discussion of arms
for the Poncas' use against the Sioux see Walker to Delano,
May 27, 1872, I.O.R.B, No. 21; Col. E. 3, Otis to Acting A.G.,
Dept, of Dakota, June 18, 1872, D.I.L.R., War Dept*, Ind.
Div., HA, RG 7 5 ,
129

Delano to CIA, March 20, 1871*, D.I.L.S. No. 13,
Indian Commissioner, NA, RG 75.
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While Army officers attacked the Interior Department for
indiscriminately distributing weapons and Indian inspectors
blamed the military for failing to check the sale of arms at
military posts, warlike Indians continued to acquire weapons
without much difficulty.

130

Another persistent class of trespassers were the miners.
"This wealth is hidden away in gorges and is doing the Red
Man no good,” an advocate of free exploitation of mineral lands
asserted to Commissioner Parker in 1871*

"Mining parties In

those mines could...by mutual and friendly agreement...prove
beneficent to...the Red and the White Man.”^ ^

This argument

appealed not only to prospectors, but most citizens, including
federal authorities.

But the government was pledged by treaties

to defend the Indians’ interests until they agreed to further
cessions.

Furthermore, the peace policy placed special em

phasis upon keeping faith with the tribes In this respect*
The supreme test of the government’s determination to
prevent trespassing by prospectors began In I 87 IJ-, when goldseekers began to infiltrate the Black Hills.

For years It had

been rumored that the Sioux hill country contained gold, much
to the dismay of Interior authorities.

1^2
J

In the summer of

^ ^ H a n c o c k to Acting A.G., Div. Mo., October 10, 1872,
I t0.L.R., Misc., HA, RG 75* inspector J. W. Daniels to Smith,
December if, 1873, I.O.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75*
131J, W. Field to Parker, April 28, I 87 I, I.O.L.R.,
Misc., HA, RG 75.
^■^See Walker to Delano, March 26, 1 8 7 2 , I.O.R.B.
No. 21, HA, RG 7 5 .
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18714- Maj. Gen. George A. Custer led a "military reconnaissance”
— twelve hundred troops and mining experts -- into the Hills.
Custer’s report of "gold among the roots of the grass” con
firmed earlier rumors and aroused the depression-ridden
public*

133

Were it not for military intervention, a full-

scale invasion would be begun that fall.^^k
The following year hundreds of miners slipped past Army
patrols and panned for gold along creeks in the Black Hills.
President Grant directed the War Department to redouble its
efforts to intercept trespassers, but the rush continued.1^
Meanwhile, the Interior Department, bowing to the inevitable,
negotiated with Sioux leaders and sent out a party of scien
tists and miners to determine the accuracy of Custer’s report.^ 8
When the Jenney mineralogical expedition substantiated the
presence of gold in paying quantities, General Sheridan de
nounced the Indian Bureau.

Overlooking the excitement Custer

had created, Sheridan declared that now his most conscientious
efforts would not suffice to hold back the miners.^-37

^ ^ S e n . Ex. D o c . No. 32, k3rd Cong., 2 sess. (Serial
1629), 18757~8.
— "
13k
CIA, l87k»
Doans Robinson, "A History of the
Dakota or Sioux Indians," South Dakota Historical Collections
(Aberdeen, 1 9 0 k ), k07»kl5#
135

Sherman to Commanding General, Div. Mo., March 17,
1875, Div. Mo. L.R., Special Pile, NA, RG 98.
^ ^ D e l a n o to Belknap, January 22, 1875, Div. Mo. L.R.,
Special File, NA, RG 9 8 ; Hyde, 0 0 . clt., 23-k. The scientific
expedition was headed by Professor V. P. Jenney of the New
York School of Mines.
^^Sberidan to Sherman, July 2, 1875, C.G.L.S., NA,
RG 108.
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In September a commission headed by Senator William B.
Allison of Iowa, held a "grand council" with some of the Sioux
chiefs.

The commission tried to lease or buy the gold fields,

but found the Indians’ demands too taigh*^®

Subsequently, the

Army looked aside while thousands of prospectors entered the
Sioux reservation to stake their claims.

The United States'

failure to protect the Indians' lands or achieve an amicable
settlement was to have disastrous consequences in the spring
of 1876.
GROWING CRITICISM OP THE PEACE POLICY
AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
Reforms introduced in the early part of President
Grant's first term —

the Board of Indian Commissioners, church

nomination of agents, discontinuance of the treaty system and
enlargement of the reservation and feeding policies —

tem

porarily alleviated criticism against the Indian service. Con
gressional agitation for transfer abated.

Military leaders,

mindful that former general Grant was associated with the
conciliatory Indian program, mollified their complaints. Humani
tarians expressed satisfaction with the work of the churches
and Indian Board.

Even some westerners were optimistic about

the Army-enforced reservation system.
Several additional reforms were adopted prior to 1 8 7 6 .

•^®The commission offered to lease the Black Hills
for $i|.00,000 a year or buy the area for $6,000,000. (CIA,
1875, 183-191. Hyde, o£. cit., 21^.1-2lj.6.)
t
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In 1871 the procedure for letting Indian contracts was placed
under stricter regulations*

139

Two years later the President

was empowered to appoint five Indian inspectors to investigate
Indian affairs at regular intervals.^^Moreover, in 1875, a
version of the Homestead Act was adopted to allow qualified
Indians to obtain title to one hundred and sixty acre farms
and most able-bodied male red men between the age of eighteen
and forty-five were required to work in order to receive ra
il^
tions and annuities*
During Grant’s second term, however, there was growing
criticism of the federal Indian policy and civil administra
tion.

Critics contended that the Indians were not becoming

civilized and self-sufficient rapidly enough and that recurrent
wars

and administrative problems at the agencies were an in

dictment of the existing system.1^-*

To add to these complaints,

the Indian service was disgraced by frequent reports of fraud
and mismanagement.
rtThe best and almost the only safeguard against pecula
tions and frauds in these remote stations,” Acting Secretary

13916 Stat. L., 51*1}..
1^'°17 Stat. L., U37.
U A i q Stat. L., ij.20.
^•^18 Stat. ^L.. I4J4.9 - Less civilized Indians were ex
empted by written order from the Secretary of the Interior.
^ ^ A special source of complaint in connection with
supply procedures was that red tape often delayed contract
payments for many months. See RSC, 61j.O and G.N. Goodale to
E. P. Smith, January 18, 1875, I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75.
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of the Interior B. R. Cowen asserted in 1872, "must be in the
honesty of the Agents themselves....""*-^

That agents, con

tractors and others involved in Indian affairs were not always
honest was revealed by numerous congressional and special in
vestigations.

In 1871, for example, the House Appropriations

Committee found Commissioner Parker guilty of "irregularities,
neglect, and incompetency, and, in some instances, a departure
from*, . l a w . T w o

years later, the House Committee on In

dian Affairs conducted a hearing designed fco "rid the Indians
and the Indian service of ...heartless scoundrels...."

Its

findings cited "great frauds and wrongs" by men acting as
Indian attorneys and condemned the activities of claim-agents
and middle-men*"*"^

The Board of Indian Commissioners also

found evidence of unscrupulous activities by Indian "rings."
They insisted, however, that these groups were no more pre
valent in the Indian service than other phases of government
in the Grant era, observing, "Where there is a carcass, the
vultures will gather."^-7
One of the most spectacular investigations of the
Seventies was conducted at Red Cloud Agency in July, 1875.
■^■Cowen did make other suggestions. He recommended
that Indian transactions be given maximum publicity and that
funds be provided for the expenses of witnesses in Indian
investigations. (Cowen to J. P. Shanks, December 31» 1872,
D.I.L.S., Indian Misc., HA, RG 7 5 ).
^ Sen. E x . D o c . No. 39. lj.lst Cong., 3 aess, (Serial
I4IJ.0 ), 1 8 7 1 , 11. This criticism induced Parker to resign.
^ H R
1873, 1-3.

Rpt. Hp. 9 8 . ij.2nd Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 1578),

W b i c to "the Christian Public," July 29, 1 8 7 5 ,
B.C.M., Tray 3, NA, RG 75.
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A special commission examined charges by Professor Othniel C.
Marsh, an eminent Yale College paleontologist, that agency
T lifi

officials and contractors were guilty of ttgross f r a u d s . " ^

Marsh alleged, among other things, that the Indians suffered
for want of food and other supplies because they were cheated
out of annuities and beef cattle and were issued inedible pork,
inferior flour, poor sugar and coffee and rotten tobacco.
Upon confirming many of these accusations, the commission re
primanded Commissioner E. P. Smith and recommended the removal
of Agent J. J. Saville, the exclusion of various contractors
and inspectors and the adoption of remedial administrative
and supply procedures.

1? 0

The shortcomings and abuses of the Indian service re
ceived widespread publicity and stimulated much discussion.
Civil and military authorities, politicians, editors and selfappointed "experts" advanced all sorts of theories on how to
improve Indian administration and hasten the solution of the
Indian question.
with

General W. B. Hazen, who believed the trouble

Indian affairs was simply "want of persistence," called

for more diligent use of the combined "moral-force" and "pbysical-force" a p p r o a c h . T y p i c a l of the reaction of western
-^®Marsh visited Red Cloud Agency in
geological trip to the Badlands of Dakota.
a Statement of Affairs at Red Cloud Agency
President of the United States by Professor
Washington, 187^7, 3.)

l87ij. during a
(O.C. Marsh,
Made to the
O.C. Marsh,"

^ I b i d . , 14.-6.
I^Or s g , ixxiv-lxxv. The Red Cloud investigation was a
factor in the resignations of Commissioner Smith and Secre
tary Delano.
^ ^ -The Nation. XVIII.

(January 15, I 87 I}.), I4.O.
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extremists was a Texan’s demand that the government either
adopt the ’’Shovington /Chivington7 process” or send the Indians to state prisons east of the Mississippi,
erner suggested the "agriculturalogizing”

152

An east

of the

nation's wards by a four-thousand-nan corps of farmers and
mechanics (Nineteenth Century Peace Corpsmen) selected to
153
live among the aborigines for five years.
Several persons
petitioned the President and Interior Department to apportion
the Indians among eastern states.

l^k

Finally, humanitarians,

such as Bishop Henry Whipple of Minnesota, memorialized the
Indian Office, suggesting that the Indians be given farms, be
placed under state laws and be assisted to establish selfgovernment.155
After 1873 the scheme discussed most, largely because
of renewed Indian hostilities, was again transfer of the

152 j. Miles to Secretary of Interior, March llj., 1875*
1.0.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75.
^-’■^Thomas P. McManus to Commissioner, October 28, 1873,
1.0.L.R., Misc., NA, RG 75*
for example, Gustavus Oborn to Z, Chandler,
December 16, 1875* Chandler Papers; Duncan McPherson to
Grant, March 1873; I.O.L.R., Misc., 1873* Obviously, the
advocates of this and other schemes did not appreciate the
complexity of the Indian problem. One of the most unrealis
tic arguments received by the Indian Bureau was from a student
of tribal origins who proposed that, in view of the Indians'
oriental extraction, they be sent "camels, alpacca Lammas and
Yaks" to restore them to their "hereditary serenity." (Israel
S. Diehl to Taylor, January 10, 1868, I.O.L.R., Misc., NA,
RG 75).
^^Whipple to E. P. Smith, December 5* l87lj-> I.O.L.R.,
Misc., NA, RG 75.
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Indian Bureau to the War D e p a r t m e n t A t

first, in I 87 I4, the

discussion centered upon a proposal to establish Army control
over just the hostile and semi-hostile tribes,

A bill intro

duced in the House Committee on Indian Affairs in February
proposed military authority over Fort Sill Reservation,

1<7

The

only result of this measure, since it failed, was another
disagreement between civil and military leaders.

General

Sheridan backed the proposal, arguing that the Army's power
and "carefully systematized machinery" could prevent war and
158
save money, ^

Commissioner E, P, Smith acknowledged the

ineffectiveness of divided control over turbulent tribes, but
insisted that the discretion to designate certain Indians as
"hostile" be retained by the Interior Department.^*®

Lastly,

Secretary Delano maintained that partial transfer would be
even more objectionable than complete military control .* ^ 0
The following year, the "much-mooted" question was de
bated in more general terms.

In their annual reports for

1875, General Schofield presented a lengthy argument in favor
of transfer while Commissioner Smith and the Board of Indian
156

The Modoc War was a decisive factor in the revival
of this issue. See, for example, Gen, J. M. Schofield to
Assistant A,G., Army, D,I,L,R., War Dept,, Ind. Div., NA,
RG 75* 1*7
biddings to Delano, April 29, I 87 I4, D.I.L.R.,
MiSCa, NA, RG 75a
■^^Sheridan to J, J. Averill, June 27, 187^, Sheridan
Letter Book,' Vol. 1.
■ ^ S m i t h to Delano, February 10, 18714., IiO.R.B. No.
NA, RG 75.
^ ^ e l a n o to Giddings, May I4, 18714, D.I.L.S., Ind.
Misc., No. H 4, NA, RG 75.
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Commissioners opposed it*

Schofield stated that he advocated

military management with "much reluctance,” because the duties
of Indian agents were distasteful and burdensome.

But the

system of joint administration was nothing more than a nmost
efficient mode of producing war.”

The conflicts which "ir

responsible” civil agents caused brought no glory or satis
faction to troops.

By putting the military branch in charge

of the Indian Office, the government would not be departing
from the peace policy, but insuring its more "economical, just,
uniform, and consistent execution."

In short:

Military management means peace and security;
giving even a greater opportunity for the labors of Chris
tian missionaries to civilize and Instruct the savage
tribes. Let these worthy philanthropists be relieved
from the responsibility and contamination of more worldly
matters, and their influence for good cannot thereby be
diminished.161
Commissioner Smith first reminded the proponents of
military control that in 1868 the Peace Commission, including
four top Army officers, had opposed transfer.

At that time

there was no definite plan for Indian civilization, civil
management was in a "most unsatisfactory condition," and half
the Indians of the country were .at war.

If civil government

seemed proper then, it was hard to see why it was otherwise
now.

"So far...as eleven-twelfths of the Indian agencies are

concerned," Smith remarked, "the question of putting them
under the control of the War Department has no more pertinency
than of putting the alms-house and city schools under the

l At

SW, 1875, 122-123.
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metropolitan police.

A standing army and an ordinary Indian

agency have no common end in view."

162

On the other hand,

temporary transfer of the wilder tribes was desirable, and
rations and supplies might be handled with more "regularity
and system" by the Army’s quartermaster and commissary de4.
41
partments.

6 3

The Board of Indian Commissioners expressed respect for
military officers, but generalized that peacetime enlistees
were "among the most vicious of our population."

Where en

listed men lived in close proximity with the Indians, the
debauchery of the women and demoralization of the men was
inevitable.
sults.

Army administration would magnify these bad re

Moreover, military rule was by nature arbitrary and

would goad the Indians into devastating wars.

The Board

emphasized:
It can hardly be a question with thoughtful men,
whether it is not better to educate the Indians, to
build houses and schools and churches for them, to teach
them to cultivate the soil and acquire useful trade, to
civilize and Christianize them, than to hand them over to
a government that we do not choose for ourselves and our
children....The Army is admirable in its place, but its
function is,not that of civil government in a republic
like ours.16i*
To support these views, the commission published the
results of a recent survey on the role of military forces in
Indian country.

On August 1, 1875, a questionnaire was sent

•1 /Lp

CIA, 1875, 19.
l63Ibid., 20.
l6l^BIC, 1875, 15.
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to all Indian agents to determine whether a change in the rela
tion of the military to the Indian service would ’’promote the
efficiency and purity of the service,”

After a preliminary

query about the proximity of military installations, the cir
cular asked:

first, if troops served a useful purpose;

second, what the Indians thought of soldiers and what in
fluence the latter had ”in respect to morality, good order
and progress in civilization" and third, whether it was feasible
to replace the military with organized and properly admin
istered Indian police*^'’
Indian authorities from forty-six regular or special
agencies west of Minnesota responded to the questionnaire*

166

On the question of the utility of the Army, the agents had
mixed views.

Six reported that troops were needed to protect

government employees and agency Indians; seven thought them
occasionally useful in maintaining discipline at the agen
cies; eleven considered soldiers only a salutary restraining
influence; sixteen believed them ineffectual and four had no
opinion.

Answers to the questions concerning the Indians’

reactions and soldiers’ influence varied, to a degree, accord
ing to the proximity of Army posts.

Officials at sixteen

agencies within thirty-five miles of a garrison were gener
ally of the opinion that troops were tolerated by the Indians,

16*BIC, 1875, 61*.
I66tj>here were seven other replies from eastern
agencies having little contact with the military.
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were a bad moral influence and did nothing to promote the work
of Indian civilization, although they helped to preserve
order.

Authorities at the agencies farther from military es

tablishments agreed that soldiers degraded, rather than reformed,
the Indians,

But they believed the Indians too fearful of

troops to live near them and had divided opinions about whether
the military was conducive to law and order.

Finally, a ma

jority of the agents favored the use of Indian troops, although
many were hesitant to begin the experiment at once.

l67

These reports were convincing to the Board and others
who opposed military control over Indian affairs.

If soldiers

were essential in so few places and had bad effects upon the
Indians; if the Indians were approaching the stage where they
could enforce law and order themselves, it would be a great
injustice to place the Indian service under the War Depart
ment,

But transfer advocates were gathering strength in

Congress,

The next four years were to be decisive in the

debate over civil or military control.

167

Ibid,, 614.-1 0 3 , The agents included various off-hand
comments about the military. The Santee Agent; for example,
termed soldiers "the lowest and worst class of white men,”
(Ibid.. 67-68), The Yankton agent said Fort Randall troops
were "constantly in the habit of visiting Indian women for
no good or moral purpose, disturbing the good order by coming
on the reservation intoxicated, inducing them to drink, so
retarding progress in civilization.” (Ibid.. 7 6 ). On the
other hand, George P. Litchfield, the Alea agent, was compli
mentary toward General 0. 0. Howard's troops; the Klamath agent
reported that his subjects enjoyed having soldiers around to
buy their crude products and the Uintah agent expressed grati
fication at having troops nearby for "moral support." (Ibid.,
98, 8 0 , 8 3 ),
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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE GREAT DEBATE: MARCH, l 8 ? 6 , TO MARCH, 1879
The work of civilization of the Indians has been
greatly hindered by the agitation of this question by
Congress as to transfer* If you are going to consign
them to the sword, do it...but If you are going to
follow up this tedious life-long work of elevating
these poor oreatures...let it be a settled policy...
(E, M. Kingsley, December k , 1878 )

The recurring debate over civil or military control of
Indian affairs reached a climax In the period March, 1 8 7 6 ,
to March, 1879.

Inasmuch as the "spirit" and "methods of en

forcement" of the Indian service depended upon which branch
was in control, the welfare of about a third of a million
Indians was affected by this vital discussion.*

Earlier,

various transfer proposals, based upon the House of Representa
tives' opposition to Senate treaty power, had been defeated
in the upper house.

In I 87 I the controversial treaty-making

process was discontinued, and during the next few years, un
der the peace policy of the Grant administration, the control
2

issue was suppressed.

But early in 1876 transfer advocates

launched a final energetic campaign.

For many months the

great debate over Indian management was in doubt.

Although

the drive for military rule failed and had immediate negative

*Priest, op. cit., 15.
33ee Chapter Six.
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effects upon Indian progress, it ultimately benefited Indian
relations by drawing public attention to the Indian problem.
The present discussion takes note of, first, developments 1
affecting civil-military relations in the period under con
sideration and, second, congressional reactions to the transfer
question.

WARS, POLITICS AND COMPETITION FOR CONTROL

In the late Seventies the era of the great Indian wars
reached a climactic finale.

The Army had conflicts with bands

of Apaches until 1886 and a last battle with more than a
hundred Teton Sioux in 1890, but after the Sioux War of 18?6l877> the Nez Perce" War of 1877 and the Bannock Outbreak of

1878 the danger of a general Indian war was over.^

These cam

paigns of I 876 -I879 placed a great strain on War-Interior
relations.

Coinciding with the final strong movement to trans

fer the Indian Bureau to the War Department, they had a con
siderable influence upon the government’s choice between civil
or military Indian control.

% storians disagree as to which was the last important
Indian war. For a discussion of the White River Ute uprising
of 1879, see Robert Emitt, The Last War Trail (Norman, 195^)*
Apache campaigns are treated in J'obn G7 Bourke, An A-pache Cam
paign (New York, 1866) and George Crook, GeneralH5eorge fcrook:
His Autobiography, edited by Martin F. Schmitt (Norman, I 9J4.6 ),
The feattle of wounded Knee of December, 1890, is described in
Elaine Goodale Eastman, ”The Ghost Dance War and Wounded Knee
Massacre of 1890-1891# Nebraska History. XXVI (January-Mareh,
19i+-5>)> 26-lf2. One author dates the last'war in the Twentieth
Century. See Forbes Parkhill, The Last of the Indian Wars
(New York, 1961).
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Many aspects of the much-publicized Sioux War are common
knowledge.

The fighting began in March, 1876 , when MaJ. Gen.

Joseph J. Reynolds, in sub-zero weather, inflicted heavy damage
upon the village of Crazy Horse near the Powder River, in
southeastern Montana.^- In the spring, columns under Generals
Gibbon, Crook and Custer set out In pursuit of the Sioux in
the Big Horn region, farther west.

On June 17 Crook had a

perilous engagement with an overwhelming force of warriors,
but retired with most of his command.^

Eight days later, on

June 25, the impetuous Custer made his famous "last stand" in
the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

He and bis entire command,

along with fifty-two men under Major Marcus Reno, were among
the two hundred and sixty-five troops who died in the Army's
6
greatest defeat at the hands of the Indians.
After this sensational defeat, the military waged a
relentless campaign against the scattered hostile bands.

In

hard-fought battles during the following fall and winter,
Generals Nelson A. Miles and R. S. Mackenzie imposed heavy
losses upon Sioux and Northern Cheyenne encampments.

7

^Mari Sandoz, Crazy Horse, the Strange Man of the
Oglalas (New York, 191*2), 306-308; SW (P), i 6757T j.Q5.
'’Crook, op. clt.. 193-196; SW (P), lj.06; Grinnell,
ona clt.. 328 -^il}?; Silver Knight, Following the Indian Wars
TNorman, 1953), 1959-193.
^Grinnell, oj>. clt., 3lf-5-358; Stewart, op. cit.,
lj.3l-lj.63; Knight, o£. cit., 193-219; SW (p), 1876, Ijio5-lj.il.
7

Sandoz, op. cit.. 352-351f; Nelson A. Miles, Serving
the Republic (New York, 19ll), 15 lj.-l£7 .
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By the spring of 1877 most of the hostiles were out of supplies
and ammunition and surrendered at the Sioux agencies.

The

hold-outs were quickly subdued, and thus another bloody and
costly collision of the peace policy period was ended.
The Sioux War affected relations between the War and
Interior departments in various ways.

Transfer proponents

heralded the initial fighting, recommended by both branches,
as an open admission that the Indian Bureau’s conciliatory
measures were ineffectual.

Subsequent military setbacks re

inforced their determination to put the Army in charge of
Indian affairs, but, after June, they postponed legislative
q
action for the duration of the war.
Military leaders were
especially vociferous in demands f.or unlimited war and gen
eral authority over the Indians.

The only satisfaction they

received from Congress, however, was a temporary increase of
Army strength for what was expected to be the last Indian
war.'1'0
The war also led to a change in administration at the
Sioux agencies.

Shortly after Custer’s defeat, military

8SW (P), 1877, 301-302; Sen. Ex. Doc. No. j!3, l^th
Cong., 2 aess, (Serial 1780), I 8 7 8 , 3. ^he Sioux war -,ost
an estimated i»3 A 05>339 and four hundred and eight military
casualties *
Q
Priest, 0£. cit.. 20.
^ T h e Army appropriation bill of August l£, 1 8 7 6 , limited
the Army’s strength to twenty-five thousand, but a joint resolu
tion authorized the President to increase this figure by twentyfive hundred. (Cameron to President Pro Tempore, Senate, July
27* 1 8 7 6 ; Sherman to Sheridan, July 31* 1 8 7 6 , Div. Mo, L . R . ,
Special Pile, NA, RG 9 8 ; Sheridan to Sherman. July 18, 1 8 7 6 ,
I . O . L . R . , NA, RG 75; Atbearn, op> cit.. 311.)

a
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officers were put in cbarge of the agencies and served in this
capacity at least until March, l 8 7 7 « ^

General Sheridan re

garded this as a welcome, if belated, change.

And when the

Army administrators were later withdrawn, he complained that
all their fine work had ’’gone for nothing.
Another result, as in previous wars, was a dispute over
who had been responsible for the hostilities.

Military spokes

men a rgued that civilian mismanagement was to blame.

"Had our

Centennial Commissioners offered the highest premium to the
person who would invent the most speedy and effective Indian
j

M

agent exterminator," a contributor to the Army and Navy Jour
nal wrote, "they might have rendered the country an unspeakable
benefit..

In addition, there was a popular outburst

against the red men who had "massacred” Custer.

Many, but not

all,of the Indians’ friends echoed this sentiment.

"We ad

mire the gallantry of General Custer and his men," one Indian
apologist remarked, "...but who shall blame the Sioux for de
fending themselves...?"^

Finally, when Wendell Phillips,

11Most agencies were returned to civil control on March
15, 1877, tut some remained under Army supervision until the
summer of 1 8 7 8 * (J. Q. Smith to John Burke, et.al., August 1,
1 8 7 6 , I.O.L.R., Misc. and General Order No. 1, Hqs, Div. Mo.,
March 15, 1877, E.I.L.R., War Department, Indian Division, NA,
RG 75). The Sioux War also had the important effect of per
mitting the government to acquire the Black Hills through the
Sioux Agreement of 1 8 7 6 .

12

®

Sheridan to Sherman, July 22, 1 8 7 6 , I.O.L.R., NA,
RG 75; End., Sheridan, March 13, 1878 , Sheridan Endorsement
Book.
•^ a & N Jnl. (November 18, 1 8 7 6 ), 2314..
•^ T h e Nation. XXIII (July 20, 1 8 7 6 )* l;0-lp..
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a prominent Boston reformer, characterized Sherman and his men
as assassins, the General demanded that this ”infamous and un1<

warranted

assault be retracted.

Shortly after peace was restored with the Sioux, a war
/

broke out in western Montana with the Nez Perce under Chief
(Young) Joseph.

This was, General Sherman later reported, "one

of the most extraordinary Indian wars of which there is any
record.

nl6

Prom June to October, 1877, Joseph's well-disci

plined band of three to four hundred warriors fought several
pitched battles in which they were at least a match for
17
heavily-armed forces of from two to ten companies.
/
The Nez Perces, like the Modocs, had lived at peace for
many years.

A treaty which they signed in 1855 granted them

a large reservation along the Snake River, east of the Blue
Mountains.

The Nez Perce/ loved this country, especially the

Wallowa Valley, in northeastern Oregon.

In 1863, however,

some of the headmen signed a treaty by which the tribe was
assigned to the smaller Lapwai Reservation in Idaho.

Young

Joseph and others who did not sign the second treaty stayed in
the Wallowa region, where they had large herds of livestock
Tg
^Sherman to Poster Tappan, July 21, 1 8 7 6 , W. T. Sher
man Semi-Official Letters Sent, Vol. I , ’
16 s w (P),

1877 , 300.

17

There are several works on the Nez Perce and their
war. , The most complete study is Francis Haines, The Nez
Perce: Tribesmen of the Columbia Plateau (Norman, 1955)• See
also Helen A. Howard and Dan L. McGrath, War Chief Joseph
(Caldwell. Idaho, 19i|l)j 0. 0. Howard, Nez Perce* Joseph (Bos ton, l88l), Chapters VJI-XVT; Nelson C. Titus, ^The Last
Stand of the Nez Perces,” Washington Historical Quarterlv.
VI (July, 1915),145-153.
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and other property.

But whites demanded their removal, and

late in 1876 a government commission unsuccessfully tried to
1ft
persuade them to go to Lapwai,
The following May they were
given a month's notice to move.

Just as the time expired, some

of the young braves began a murdering spree which drew the
whole non-treaty band into a well-fought, but ultimately disastrous, war.

19

In eight or more engagements with the Army, Joseph's
followers demonstrated such bravery, strategy and skill, while
observing the rules of civilized warfare, that they earned the
respect of military leaders.

General Miles, who finally

forced the Rez Perces' surrender in the Bear Paw Mountains,
recommended a liberal settlement but the Indian Bureau decided
that the Indians had too many enemies to remain in Idaho,

20

Hence, more than four hundred Nez Perces were sent to Indian
Territory,

There, they were reduced by malaria and other

diseases to two hundred and sixty-eight persons before being

21

returned to the Northwest in 1881}..

The parallel with the

T ft
s
Nez Perce occupation of Wallowa had been confirmed
by Executive Order in 1873, but was withdrawn in 1875. See
John A Carpenter, nGeneral Howard and the Nez Perce'War of
l877,n Pacific Northwest Quarterly, XLIX (October, 1958),
129-1451

19BIC, 1 8 7 6 , 43-65; CIA, 1 8 7 7 , 9-14; SW (P), 1877,
293-294.
20CIA, 1 8 7 7 , 13; SW (P), 18 7 7 , 294“300j Miles to Sherman,
October 28, 1877, W. T. Sherman Papers, Vol. 46.
• 2^See Berlin B. Chapman, "Nez Perces in Indian Terri
tory," Oregon Historical Quarterly. L (June. 1949), 98-121;
J. Stanley Clark, "The Nez Perces in Exile, The Pacific North
west Quarterly, XXXVI (July, 1945), 213-232,
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Modoc War was striking, and critics of the Indian Bureau viewed
the Nez Perce^ affair as another case of civil raaladministration.

22
Before the Nez Perce^crisis was settled, the govern

ment had further difficulties with the Bannocks in southeast
Idaho.

The Bannocks, a small and normally quiet mountain

tribe, shared Port Hall Reservation with the more populous
Shoshones.

In the summer of 1877, when supplies were short

at their agency, many Bannocks left the reservation to hunt
camas roots.
teamsters.

One of them became intoxicated and killed two
Consequently, the military drove them back to

Fort Hall, burned many of their lodges, and, that winter, exe
cuted the murderer and another Bannock who had killed an
agency employee.

23

Later, in January, 1 8 7 8 , when the red men

grew threatening, troops invaded their camp, arrested several
braves and seized many of their weapons and ponies.2^
Agitated by these events, two large war-parties left
the reservation in June.
crushed.

Their outbreak, however, was quickly

On the 23rd a cavalry detachment subdued one of the

hostile groups not far from Fort Hall.

Three weeks later,

another force surprised the second party near Umatilla Agency,

22

Miles to Sherman, October 28, 1877, W. T. Sherman
Papers, Vol. 1+6. See, for example, Dunn, o£. clt.. £66-567.
General Sherman, on the other hand, agreed with the punish
ment given the Nez Perce/. (E&M, Hqs. Army, Vol. I, 173-171+,
NA, RG 108).
23CIA, 1878, XII-XIII.
^ C I A , 1878, XV.
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O regon, a n d , a f t e r a b r i e f b a t t l e , t h e r e n e g a d e s w ere su rro u n d ed
25
and ta k e n p r i s o n e r .
E ig h t y I n d i a n s , t h i r t y - o n e s e t t l e r s
and n in e s o l d i e r s were k i l l e d i n t h i s ’’l i t t l e

w a r ."

Y e t o n ly

t h e w o r s t h o s t i l e s w ere p u n i s h e d , a n d , u n l i k e t h e Nez P e r c e s ,
pL

t h e Bannocks were a l l o w e d t o rem ain a t t h e i r r e s e r v a t i o n *
Those who f a v o r e d m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l o f t h e I n d i a n s ,
a t t r i b u t e d t h e Bannock War t o d e r e l i c t i o n o f d u ty and m is 
management by t h e I n d ia n O f f i c e .

When a sk e d w h at c a u s e d t h e

u p r i s i n g , G en era l Crook a s s e r t e d , "Hunger,

N o th in g b u t

h u n g e r * ...W e w i l l c o n t in u e t o have t h e s e o u t b r e a k s . . . a s lo n g
as t h e p r e s e n t s y s t e m p r e v a i l s . " 27

C om m issioner o f I n d i a n

A f f a i r s E zra A . Hayt o b j e c t e d to t h i s c r i t i c i s m .

"I now d e 

s i r e t o p l a c e t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y where i t b e l o n g s , " he t o l d
Secretary Schurz.

"The D ep artm en t has b een p o w e r l e s s t o

a f f o r d . . . a d e q u a t e r e l i e f , b e c a u s e o f i n s u f f i c i e n t a p p r o p r ia 
t i o n s , and w i t h t h e meager a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r t h e n e x t f i s c a l
y e a r . . . n o b e t t e r r e s u l t s may b e e x p e c t e d ."

28

But armed c o n f l i c t s w it h t h e S i o u x , Nez P e r c e s , Bannocks
and o t h e r t r i b e s a c c o u n t e d f o r o n ly p a r t o f t h e g ro w in g c i v i l m ilit a r y deb ate o f th e l a t e S e v e n t ie s ,

P o l i t i c a l d e v e lo p m e n ts

25

Ganoe, o]d. c i t *. 3)4.9 ; Downey, o £ . c l t . . 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 ;
For a more c o m p le te d i s c u s s i o n s e e George F“. B rim lo w , The
Bannock I n d ia n War o f 1878 ( C a l d w e l l , I d a h o , 1914-8).
28Downey, o g . c i t . . 2 3 2 . The war c o s t th e govern m en t
about h a lf a m illio n d o l l a r s .
27A&N J n l . . XVI (A ugust 1 0 , 1878) , 5 .
28I,0.R.B. N o . 33, 1878-1882, 1+7-14-8, NA, RG 75.
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were also central to this discussion.

Prom 1875 to 1879,

while Grant and Hayes occupied the White House and Republicans
controlled the Senate, the Democrats had a majority in the
House of Representatives.^^

The Democrats on several occasions

sought to transfer the Indian Bureau to the War Department to
embarrass their rivals, who generally defended the civiladministered peace policy.

As late as October, 1879, a west-

era paper reported n ...Democrats have always held that the
only good Indian is a dead one.

They have never tolerated the

hypocrisy that underlies the Quaker policy which came into
vogue with the ascendancy of the Republican party.”

30

This

was an exaggeration, but certain Democrats were so dis
passionate toward Indian welfare as to urge transfer as a
political "duty,” or means of saving money for pork-barrel
legislation.

31

Another political event which affected the transfer
question was the Belknap scandal of 1876.

Early in March a

House investigating committee revealed that Secretary of War

^Democratic and Republican representation in Congress
for these years was as follows:
House
Senate
Dem. Rep.
Pern. Rep.
1875-1877
159
109
29
k 5
1877-1879
153
UfO
36
39
1879-1881
349
130
k 2
33
(Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to
1957 (Washington. 1960). 95T7
^^Denver Dally Rocky Mountain News (October 3, 1879).
President Hayes proposed to carry on the Indian policy estab
lished during Grant’s administration. (Richardson, Messages.
VII, lj.75-lj.76T.
31
^ Congressional Record, i^th Cong., 1 sess., IV,
2617, 2630.
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William W. Belknap and his deceased wife had accepted about
twenty-five thousand dollars in bribes from Caleb P. Karsh,
the nominal Indian trader at Port Sill, Indian Territory.

Bel

knap quickly resigned, but the House voted to impeach him.
The trial was begun in April and lasted until late in Hay,
when the Senate voted to acquit the former Secretary by a
narrow (impeachment) vote of 37 to 23.

Belknap escaped con

viction primarily because he was not in office when the House
32
passed the impeachment resolutions.
As a result of the Belknap affair, the House Committee
on Expenditures conducted a general investigation of the busi
ness transactions of the War Department.

The three Democrats

on the four-member committee attacked the "brokers of post
traders hips" in the military branch.

Among other things, they

reported "mortifying" evidence that President Grant 13 brother,
Orville, was part of a clique which monopolized trade at forts
on the Upper Missouri.

Representative Lorenzo Danford of Ohio,

a Republican, submitted a minority report.

He insisted that

the War Department’s business methods were not irregular and
scolded the rest of the committee for trying to make "politi
cal capital" for the coming election.^
Still another important political event was the

^ H R Rpt. No. 186,

Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1708),

1 8 7 6 ; HR Rpt. No. 3U5. iliith Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1709),
1 8 7 6 ; HR Rpt. ]|o. 791.
Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1713)>
1876; 3¥e also Chaffer Two.

33gR Rpt. No. 799. Ijiith Cong., 1 sess (Serial 1715)#
1876, iv-Tx,^c, m v T T - 276.
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appointment, in 1877, of Carl Schurz as Secretary of the In
terior*

Schurz, assisted by Indian Commissioner E, A. Hayt,

adopted many “sensational1’ reforms which in the long run dulled
criticism of the methods and integrity of the Indian service.
By November, 1 8 7 8 , Hayt was able to list twenty recent im3k
provements in the Indian Bureau's business transactions.
Efforts were also made to systematize the work of agency employees and encourage constructive labor by their wards.

35

Lastly, Secretary Schurz took an active personal interest in
36
Indian education and the use of Indian police.
Agitated by wars and political circumstances, the
question of Indian administration was further complicated by
a number of incidents and personal feuds.
brought criticism upon

One affair which

Secretary Schurz and the Indian Bureau

was the removal of the peaceable Poncas to Indian Territory
in 1877*

Both the Indians' friends and enemies complained

that this action was an unwarranted concession to the warlike
Sioux,

Inadvertently, both the Poncas and the more numerous,

powerful Sioux had been granted the same land in southeastern
Dakota,

The former had prior claim, but the latter threatened

^ C I A , 1878 , LXV-LXVI; Priest, 0£. cit., 22, 68-72,
See also Chapter Two, above.
^I n d i a n Bureau Circular Book No. 1, NA, RG 7 5 . A re
form which was protested by some agents was a rule that only
one member of a family could be on the agency payrolls. For
one agent's defense of nepotism, see Benjamin Tatbam to E. A.
Hayt, March 5, 18 7 8 , I.O.L,R., NA, RG 75.
^ T h e s e subjects are discussed further in the next
chapter.
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to fight for the disputed region.

To avoid war, the Indian

authorities forced the Poncas to make a tragic exodus to the
South.

Schurz later admitted that the Poncas had been wronged,

but, for months, he and his subordinates were reproached for
their ill-considered action.

37

While the civil administrators were embarrassed by the
Ponca affair, the Army was censured for another notorious in
cident involving a band of Northern Cheyennes.

Early in Janu

ary, 1879, sixty-four Cheyenne prisoners were killed trying
to escape from Fort Robinson, Nebraska.

The victims were

followers of Dull Knife who had fought their way from Indian
Territory to northern Nebraska in the fall of I 8 7 8 , hoping
to rejoin their old friends, the Sioux.

About one hundred

and fifty men, women and children were captured near old Red
Cloud Agency and held at Port Robinson,

At the time of the

attempted escape, the Army was trying to force them to agree
to return to Indian Territory by withholding food, water and
fuel.

Duringalater investigation, Indian officials condemned

this mistreatment.

"I think,” said Secretary Schurz, "that

freezing and starving them was not the way to reconcile them

3?A summary of the Ponca dispute is found in Priest,
op. cit.. 76-80; CIA, l877> 21-23, 96-102. Newspaper comments
appear in the August V. Kautz and Carl Schurz scrapbooks, Manu
scripts Division, Library of Congress.
3®CIA, 18 7 8 , XXII-XXIV. The Northern Cheyennes had been
moved from northern Nebraska to Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency
in the fall of 1 8 7 6 . Disgruntled with this location and the
treatment they received, Dull Knife's band began their north
ward dash in September, 18 7 8 . Before they were captured, in
October, they killed many whites and committed other crimes,
(Grinnell, op.* cit.. lpij-i{.16.)
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to their fate.’1"^
Disagreement about the comparative advantages rf civil
or military administration was also evident in a number of per
sonal disputes.

In February, 1 8 7 8 , for example, Commissioner

Hayt supported the Governor of Arizona in a successful cam
paign to remove Maj. Gen. August V. Kautz from command of the
Department of Arizona.

Kautz had not endeared himself to the

Indian Bureau through his attacks upon the peace policy and
IlO „
demands for military control of the Indians.
Other heated
arguments pitted Commissioner Hayt against Lt. Col. W # P.
Ill
Carlin, commander of the garrison at Standing Rock,
and
Secretary Schurz against Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commander

1+2
of the District of'the Yellowstone.
Perhaps the liveliest controversy, however, was between
Schurz and General Sheridan.

The feud began in the fall of

1878 , when General Pope told Agent P. B. Hunt of the Kiowa and

^ S e n . Misc. Doc. No . 6k. i+5>th Cong., 3 seas. (Serial
1833), 1879, 1+7* The military investigation was less critical.
See Div. Mo. L.R., Special File, Proceedings of the Board of
Officers convened under Special Orders No. 8 , Headquarters of
the Department of the Platte, January 21, 1879, NA, R G 9 8 .
kO
SW, 1877# Ik0-lk7; E. A. Hayt to the Secretary of
Interior, February 15, 1878, I.O.R.B. No. 10, NA, RG 75;
August V. Kautz Papers, Scrapbook, 1875-1886,
^ L t . Col. W. P. Carlin to Acting A 0G., Dept, of Dakota,
February 19, 1878 and March 23, 16?8, I.O.L.R., NA, RG 7 5 .
^ M i l e s to Acting A.G., Dept, of Dakota, November 11,

18 7 8 , D.I.L.R., War Dept., Indian Division; Schurz to Miles,
December 26, I0 7 8 , I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75. See also A&N Jn l ..
SVI (December U+, 1 8 7 8 ), 305»
**
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Comanche Agency that his men were too busy to help move the
agent’s subjects from Port Sill to Wichita Agency.

This re

location was undoubtedly calculated to ’’cheat and defraud the
Indians by avoiding the presence of officers,” Sheridan
asserted in an endorsement.^

On October

1 ,

Schurz retorted

that the move was based on the bad water, poor land and de
lapidated facilities at Port Sill.

The Indian Bureau, he

added, did not

have to accommodate itself to the opinions of

officers in an

"adjunct" service. "It would furthermore be

well for the Lt. Gen. to understand," the Secretary admonished,
"that...to indulge in approbrious reflection upon.../the Indian
o ffici a l s ^ motives, is an act of impropriety, so gross, that
it cannot pass without a corresponding rebuke among gentle___
me n .... »y+

Some time later Sheridan issued a blistering rebuttal.
In recent years, he argued, such posts as Port Randall, Camp
Robinson, Port Sully, Port Berthold and the camps at Grand
River and Lower Brule Agency had been built at great expense
to convenience

the Indian Bureau. In each case,

the Indians

were soon removed and then appeals were made for new garri
sons.

Now excuses were being offered to get the Indians away

from Port Sill.

Anyone who had been there knew that pure water,

rich soil and other natural advantages made Port Sill a good
agency site.

The buildings were not much worse than at

^ Q u o t e d in Schurz to Secretary of War, October 7,

1 8 7 8 , D.I.L.S., Indian Miscellaneous, NA, RG 75*
^Ibid.,

91-92.
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Wichita, where transportation costs were much higher.

If

Schurz would check into the administration of the Kiowa and
Comanche agent, he would learn the truth about the removal
scheme.

The only explanation for the Secretary’s criticism,

Sheridan concluded, was "want of knowledge on the subject,"
and that did not excuse the "stilled tone and language

used,"^
The dispute continued.

On November 16 Secretary Schurz

asked Secretary of War McCrary to have Sheridan spell out the
"sweeping and somewhat vague" charges he made against the In
dian Bureau in his annual report for 1 8 7 8 ,

"I do not depre

cate criticism at all," Schurz remarked, "I rather invite
it."^6
Sheridan reacted to this challenge by asking his subor
dinates for full reports relative to abuses or corruption on
the part of Indian a gents

1l7

On December 22, he published a

supplemental annual report containing briefs and extracts
from civil and military reports for the past four years.

These

T

reports mentioned many irregularities, particularly in the de
livery and distribution of supplies.

Although Schurz had

"disingenuously" exaggerated his original statements, Sheridan

^ E n d . Sheridan, November 15, 1 8 7 8 , Sheridan Endorse
ment Book, 255>-2£9.
^ S c h u r z to Secretary of War, November 16, 1 8 7 8 ,
D.I.L.S., Indian Miscellaneous, NA, RG 7 5 ,
^•7see. for example, Sheridan to General Terry, No
vember 2£, 1 8 7 8 , Sheridan Letter Book General Corres
pondence,
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asserted,

the facts now spoke for themselves

In the final analysis, though, Sheridan came out second
best in this contest with Secretary Schurz.

With the press

giving wide coverage to the acrimonious comments on both sides,
Sheridan presented arguments based largely upon hearsay and
li9
circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, he and many other mili
tary leaders admitted that the Indian Office was making
diligent efforts to correct the abuses which came to its
attention.^®
Inter-departmental differences on the question of which
department was best suited to manage the Indians were like
wise evident at the lower echelons.

One of the more spirited

arguments in behalf of civil Indian control, for example, was
made by Agent James McLaughlin of Devil's Lake Agency, Dakota.
McLaughlin was so opposed to "mixed military interference"
that he advocated abolition of the "humiliating" policy of
having military officers witness the distribution of Indian
9l
supplies."

At the same time, a contrary view was freely ex-

pressed by junior Army officers.

52

When one young lieutenant

sent the Secretary of War recommendations on Indian reform

^"Supplemental Report to Annual Report of Lt. Gen.
Sheridan, for 1878," D.I.L.S., Indian Division, Vol. 20, lk2162, NA, RG 58.
k 9

Ibid.j Priest, op. cit.. 22.

^"Supplemental Report," D.I.L.S., Indian Division,
passim.: Schurz and Kautz Scrapbooks.

^CIA, 1878, 28-30.
^ S e n . Mlac. Doc. N o . 53, 1^5th Cong., 3 aess. (Serial
1635), 1879, 57^52, 99-110, 1^5-150, 190-193, 197-198.
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which sounded too much like Indian Bureau talk, though, his
t-3

superiors hastened to correct him.''
Finally, before turning to congressional debate over
proposals to put the Army in charge of Indian affairs, a
comment is in order concerning public opinion on Indian adminis
tration.

An article on transfer in The Nation included the

following observation:
If there can be said to be any public opinion in the
civilized portions of the country on the Indian question
(there is, of course, plenty of opinion of a certain
sort on the frontier), it may be described on the one
hand as regarding the Indian with a spirit of philan
thropic benevolence, on the other as looking upon the
system of government applied to him with profound dis
trust.54In general, westerners supported military rule, while a majority
of easterners opposed It.

But, as one scholar states, public

opinion was "far from s t ea d y . " ^

Some of

friends, for example, vacillated in their
control as hostilities recurred.

the leading Indian
objection to Army

Moreover, political and re

ligious affiliations caused some variation in popular senti
ment in different parts of the country.

Public pressure for and against military control was
brought to bear upon Congress through informal lobbying,
petitions, private correspondence, editorials and publications
such as the pro-transfer Army and Navy Journal and anti-

S 3Lt. William Gerlach to Secretary of War, September
8 , 1 8 7 8 , with endorsements, AGO L.R., NA, RG 95*
^ T h e Nation, XXVIII (December 28,

1 8 7 8 ), 7-8.

■^Priest, op. clt.t 2 3 .
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transfer Council Fire,

The legislators’ decisions were too

partisan to warrant the conclusion that public opinion per se
decided which department was to manage the Indians.

But for

militant opposition to transfer by religious and philanthropic
groups, though, western proponents of the administrative change
might have won enough support in the East to achieve their objactive.

57

THE TRANSFER ISSUE IN CONGRESS
The events of the period from the outbreak of the Sioux
War until early 1879 excited widespread discussion of the
problem of Indian administration.

Vying for authority over

the tribes, civil and military officials frequently engaged in
bitter arguments.

The main event in this debate, however,

took place in the congressional arena.

In 1876 and 1878 -1 8 7 9 ,

after extensive investigations and hearings, legislators intro
duced various measures to establish Army control.

The out

come of the accompanying debates was of vital importance to
federal Indian relations.
Early in 1876 , the House Committee on Military Affairs,
in conjunction with a study of military pay and reorganization,
investigated the propriety of transferring the Indian Office
to the War Department.

The Committee, headed

by Represents-

Efforts of a church group to "educate” Congress against
transfer are discussed in E. A. Hayt to Reverend S. S. Cutting,
June 11, 18 7 8 , I.O.L.B. No. U 4.8 , Misc. See also Priest, o p .
cit., 26-26*
^ Priest, ojo. cit., 21;.
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tive Henry B. Banning of Ohio, consulted seventy high-ranking
Army officers through a circular-letter and personal inter
views,

Of this group, said to have greater knowledge of In

dian affairs than any class of men, all but two advocated
military control,
General-in-Chief Sherman key-noted the arguments of
these military leaders.

Transfer, he contended, would pro

duce greater economy and efficiency in the Indian service.
The Army, already dispersed throughout the Indian country,
could manage the Indians through its existing machinery and
chain of command.

Quartermaster and commissary facilities

were available to handle supplies and annuities, and post com
manders were in a position to serve as agents.

This would not

interrupt the civilization program, but allow the government
to "execute any line of policy it may deem wise and pro
per,,.."

For instance, officers could compel non-progressive

tribes to raise stock or engage in other pursuits, whereas
civil agents yielded to their obstinance.

At the same time,

military administrators would not provoke hostilities, as
some feared, because they, more than civilians, realized that
ti q
war brought hazards, hardships and no glory, 7
An even more comprehensive and forceful case was pre
sented by General Sheridan.

The proposed change, he asserted,

^®HR R p t . No, 35i>-. lli+th Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1709),
The committee’s report erroneously states that
sixty officers expressed opinions.

1876,

^9Ibld,. 8-9.
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would relieve tbe Army of “great expense and mucb annoyance,"
Fewer posts would be required; Indian wars and conflicts be
tween military commanders and agents would cease; the Indians
would be better supplied and gratified to deal with persons
who did not break promises; the civilization process would be
accelerated; the government would receive full measure for
funds disbursed by men liable to court-martial and in other
ways the nation and its wards would benefit.

Of special ad

vantage would be the discontinuance of agency removals which
increased transportation costs and required the Army to con
struct expensive new garrisons.

The one objection to transfer

was the criticism which the military was apt to incur through
the false reports of rings and disappointed profiteers.

To

minimize this problem, it might be advisable to eliminate the
Indian Bureau entirely and give the War Department discretion
to delegate responsibilities to regional commanders,^*®
Among the officers questioned were four who had served
on important peace commissions, including M a j , Gen, C. C,
*

Augur, Maj. Gen, A, H, Terry and former general John B, San
born of the Peace Commission of 1867-1868, and Maj, Gen,
0, 0, Howard, who had negotiated with the Apaches in 1872 and
Nez Perce/ in I 8 7 6 .

The first three advocated transfer,^

60

Ibid,. 10-17, General Sheridan estimated that posts
established for the protection of agencies cost from twenty to
forty thousand dollars each and that about three and a half
million could be saved annually by the Quartermaster De
partment If the transfer was made,
6lIbid., 37, lj.8, 211-212,
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Sanborn, for example, stressed that Army administration would
end the "constant change and vacillation" which now bewildered
the Indians and deterred their advancement.

In addition, the

military would be in a position to prevent wars, thus saving
the government up to eleven or twelve million

a year in

supplies and other expenses connected with field operations.

6>2

But General Howard opposed military control for two reasons.
First, it would divert the Army from its "legitimate work,"
and second, it would bring public denunciation which would
injure the reputation and morale of troops ,

^

Another officer who supported Army rule was Maj, Gen,
E,O.C. Ord, commander of the Department of Texas and veteran of
several Indian campaigns.

Nearly all Indian conflicts, Ord

maintained, could be traced to civil mismanagement.

The

Modoc War, for instance, was begun by greedy frontiersmen and
authorities who misjudged the needs and disposition of their
wards.

The red men had good reason to distrust civilian

agents.

Red Cloud once declared, "Here these

/&

genc^7 men

tell us this, that, and the other, that we don't get our ra
tions because the roads are bad.
rations.

„6k

But the soldiers get their

,,

Moreover, Indians respected force "first, last,

and all the time."

There were citizens who feared, however,

that military rule would increase immoral relations between

62Ibid., 212,21k.
63Ibid.. kO.
%bid..

ki.
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troops and Indian women.

This was nothing but speculation

which failed to take into account the Indians’ diverse charac
ter and standards.

"There is as much difference in the morality

and good conduct of Indians," Ord affirmed, "...as there is
among the different nations of Europe.
Finally, some of the most censorious remarks about
civil control were made by Maj. Gen. D. S. Stanley, commander
of Middle District of Dakota.

The Indian Bureau not only

failed to civilize many Indians, said Stanley, but condoned
appalling corruption at the agencies.

It was clear to him,

after observing tribes throughout the West for twenty years,
that each group had at least a few who would not progress
unless they underwent compulsory training.

The Sioux, ex

cept the Santees and Yanktons, were particularly backward.
"They have not advanced one inch," he insisted.

Of the

cheating which pervaded the Indian service, Stanley testified:
...I have seen agents and contractors get rich very
fast, and I knew exactly how it was done. There is very
little strict accountability on the part of the Indian
agent....He receives a certain amount of goods and pro
visions himselfj he has no commanding officer, he has
no board of survey as the Army regulations require; he
simply receipts for those goods; he is not always re
sponsible for the quality, but he is strictly for the
quantity. The issues are made, throughout the whole
Indian-agent system, at random. The only thing the agent
has to look to is to keep his papers clear...®®
Ibid., 1^3. General Ord argued that the Pimas, Maricopas and Pueblos were very strict and wholesome in their
morals, while the Pi-Utes, for example, were "pretty degraded"
and sold their women like Tahitians or Sandwich Islanders.
^ Ibld.. 206. Stanley cited the case of cattle receipts
based on fall weights and numbers despite the fact that de
liveries were made over a period of months and many animals
died or lost weight.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

299

Upon the basis of these and other arguments, the House
Military Committee, in its report of March 9, urged transfer
of the Indian Bureau to the military department.

Even civil

authorities, the Committee contended, were becoming aware of
the ineffectuality of the present system.

Past wars, expenses,

frauds and maladministration attested to the need for a
change.

With the War Department in command, this important

branch of the public service would again be ”honestly, economi-

67
cally, and firmly administered and executed,1*
While the Military Committee was occupied with its
investigation, the House Committee on Indian Affairs was
likewise considering the transfer proposition.

The eleven-

member committee announced its findings five days after the
other legislative group.

Six members signed a report recom

mending military control? the others submitted a negative
statement in which they raised several objections to the proposed administrative change.

68

The majority report stated that attention had been given
to the relative merits of the War and Interior departments
respecting cost of management, promptness and efficiency,
maintenance of peace, protection of life and property, ability
to fulfill the reservation and feeding programs and, lastly,
conduciveness to Christianization, civilization and education.
The decision for Army control was based on the testimony and
67Ibid., 6.
Rpt. No.

2 k 0 *

Cong., 1 sess. (Serial 1708),

1876, 1*7.
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statements of "distinguished, well-informed, and experienced
gentlemen" -- mostly western congressmen and territorial
60
delegates. 7

Nineteen of the twenty-six persons questioned

supported transfer.

70

Most of the testimony for, as against, military rule
was based upon Indian conditions within the witnesses’
political districts.

Representative John K. Luttrell of

California asserted that church-nominated agents, talented as
teachers and preachers, lacked the business sense properly to
administer the thousands of dollars entrusted to them.

In

fact, such men abused the Shasta Indians and misrepresented
the progress of the Klamaths and Modocs.

To make matters

worse, many of the appointees were Protestants, whereas their
subjects espoused the Catholic faith.

71

Representative James W, Throckmorton of Texas com
plained that wild Indians had been raiding settlements in bis
state since annexation.

Transfer would enable the Army to

prevent the Comanches and Arapahoes from using the Port Sill
Reservation as a base of operations.

Of course, these savages,

used to butchering teamsters, ravishing women and stealing

69

Ibid.. 1.

^Ibid., 2 -14.0 . Three of these people also presented
views to the Military Committee.
71
Luttrell offered in evidence a letter from an in
formant at Round Valley Agency who alleged that the agent,
a Methodist minister, was incompetent and devoted much of
his time to alienating the affections of a parishioner's
wife. (Ibid.. 201;).
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property almost at will, would not appreciate the change,
"They think they can manage the preachers pretty well,”
Throckmorton stated sarcastically, "and their lying and
72
deception succeeds better with them than with the military,”
A third transfer proponent was Delegate Thomas M.
Patterson of Colorado Territory who pronounced the Interior
Department’s efforts to reform the TTtes a ”great failure,”
This tribe was constantly making war on other tribes.

Those

at Los Pinos Agency worked diligently on powder-horns and
guns, but refused to spend three hours a day as apprentices
to the agency blacksmith.

On the other hand, the Indians had

reason to be uncooperative.

When they were promised "Ameri

can cows,,,for domestic use," the Indian Bureau furniohed
wild Texas cows which could not be milked unless they were
tied down.

At least "ninety-nine out of a hundred" people

in Colorado, Patterson contended, wanted military rule and
subjection of the Indians,

73

Two of the more outspoken transfer opponents were Ma
jor J, W, Powell, who had conducted an extensive study of
Indian tribes for the Smithsonian Institution, and Anson Dart,
former Superintendent of Indian Affairs for four northwest
territories,

Powell objected to military supervision pri

marily because enlisted men were a bad influence upon the red
men and unsuitable teachers.

It was shocking, but true, he

72Ibid., 5>-6.
73

Ibid.. 16-17.
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asserted, that recruits from New York, New Orleans and other
cities created a "pandemonium of prostitution" when they got
near the reservations.^

Dart argued that military adminis

trators would precipitate more hostilities than they would pre
vent.

He was convinced that Army "indiscretion" had led to

wars in Oregon in

and l85>5> in which over two hundred
75
"innocent" Indians had been killed.
l8 $ k

Such sentiments were also reflected in the Indian Com
mittee’s minority report.

The dissenters1 reasons for re

jecting War Department authority over Indian affairs included:
the divergence between military training and educational,
religious and agricultural work; prior recommendations by the
Doolittle Committee of 1865-1867 and Peace Commission of
1867-1868; a law against employment of retired military offi
cers as agents; the increased expense of supplies purchased
according to Army requirements for "superior grade" goods;
a large, growing number of peaceable and progressive red men;
the Indians’ tendency to resist force; and the principle that
military government was justified only in case of emergency.^
Closing on an emotional note, the Arm y ’s critics admonished:

Ik

Ibid.t 7-8. Powell said he had personally treated
"hundreds and hundreds" of cases of venereal disease among
various tribes. Por a-discussion of Powell’s role in western
exploration, see Wallace E, Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth
Meridian: John Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the
West (Boston. 19W F T
7^Ibld.. 32 - 3 3 .
76
Ibid., lj.l-lj.6. Refusing to concede that civil officials
caused Indian wars, the minority charged that the notorious
Modoc War stemmed from the mismanagement of Captain O.C. Knapp,
who served as temporary Modoc agent in 1869-1870.
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Divorce the Bureau from the Interior Department, if
you choose; but don't in the name of humanity, turn it
over again to the War Department, Don't do this cruel
and terrible thing, but elevate the Bureau to a Depart
ment, Emancipate it. Lift it up and place its occupant
on a level with the President's counselors, and you will
exalt the service,''
Despite this plea, both the military and Indian com
mittees were on record as advocating transfer.

As might be

expected, the lower bouse, on April 21, passed a bill to im
plement the committee's recommendations.

But the vote, 130 to

91}-, did not really indicate that most legislators were concerned about the well-being of the Indians,

In 1867 and

1868 the House approved similar bills to contest the Senate's
treaty power over Indian affairs.

79

Once more the issue was

decided other than on its merits, as partisan politics was
decisive.

Most of the congressmen who supported the measure

were Democrats; most who opposed it were Republicans,

For

that matter, the committees had shown political bias.

The

military Committee, apart from its orientation and the mili
tary background of most of its members, was composed entirely
of Democrats,

8o

The split in the larger Indian Committee was

strictly along party lines: six Democrats favored transfer

77Ibid., 1+7,
7®Cong. Record, i+l+th Cong,, 1 sess,, IV, 2868,
^^See Chapter Three,
OA
All but two of the committeemen had served as Union
volunteer or Confederate officers. Significantly, none of
these transfer proponents were westerners,
(Biographical
Directory of the American Congress. 177ii.—19lt9 (Washington.
19^0). passimTT
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and five Republicans or independents voted against it.

8l

Judging from the debate, however, transfer was anything
but a straw issue.

This question, basic to the controversial

Indian problem and relevant to current operations against the
Sioux and the impeachment trial of Secretary of War Belknap,
inspired one of the most heated, polemic arguments in the his
tory of Congress,

Many speeches, pro and con, were his.trionic,

spiced with bitter sarcasm, personal ridicule and brilliant
oratory; others were simply long-winded, extended by citations
from the works of noted poets and philosophers or detailed,
contradictory reports.
The disputed bill was introduced on March Ilf. by Repre
sentative William A, Sparks of the Committee on Indian Affairs,
but was not discussed at length until April, when it dominated
the legislative scene for several days.

82

On April 5, after

Sparks extolled the merits of his proposal, the opposition
called upon one of its few Democratic supporters, the eloquent
Samuel S, Cox of New York.

Prefacing his remarks with portions

of Hiawatha and Paradise Lost. Cox exclaimed, MIf the present
system is hell and the Indian himself is hell and the lowest
deep is in the Interior Department, where is the lower deep,
lower even than the lowest, threatening to devour him, unless
8l

Neither Army experience nor state origins were de
cisive in the Indian Committee's vote, for former officers
voted both ways and the two westerners were divided, (Ibid.).
Op

Cong, Globe, i^.th Cong., 1 sess., IV, 1701, There
was a vigorous dispute over whether the Military or Indian
committee should have "precedence” in introducing the bill.
(Ibid.. 1701-1705)•
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it be found in the War Department?”

83

It was time to stop

treating the red man with "whisky and trinkets, geegaws and
cards,” to accept him as other than a "sort of chimpanzee or
dropped stitch in the garment of humanity,” as represented by
selfish frontiersmen.8^

The Indian Bureau must not be C a p 

tured" by the War Department, "honeycombed with fraud," and
the military arm, tainted by the Sand Creek, Washita and Piegan affairs.

Concluding that enlightened civil control was

the only hope for the aborigines, Cox asserted:
...if mankind is destined to make this world better
for living in it ~ then let the very forests and plains
of our land, where the Indian roams, echo the glad
tidings of great joy which ushered into our fallen star
with angelic anthems the Prince of Peace himself, by
whom the beatitudes were so gloriously promised to the
peace-makers
One of the first speakers to deprecate Cox’s roseate
view of the Indians and Indian affairs was Representative
Philip Cook of Georgia.

Cook cited voluminous reports showing

that the Indian service was impregnated with fraud and that
various tribes were not making appreciable progress toward
civilized life.

The Sioux, for instance, did "absolutely

nothing but eat, drink, smoke, and sleep, except indulging
each day in the healthful exercise of horseback riding....”87

Q3lbid.. 2233.
%bid.,

223)+.

8^Ibid., 2236-221+0.
86Ibid.. 221+2.
87Ibid.t 21+61+.
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Interior control was not only corrupt and inefficient, but ex
pensive, costing several times as much as it did earlier under
the War Department.

Any legislator with a realistic view of

government-Indian relations would have to support the proop
posed change. °
On April 18 transfer was championed by Representative
Charles E. Hooker of Mississippi, who demonstrated that Cox
bad no monopoly on prosaic oratory.

Maintaining that mili

tary control would preserve both the red race and the American
heritage, Hooker won the applause of the House for these
ramarks:"
Everywhere all over our land, from the ice-ribbed
region of the north to where the fabled murmurings of
our own Biloxi break in perpetual ripple upon the shelving
and sloping coast of Mississippi; everywhere over the
broad land...we hear the euphonious names which the
Indian language has given...from where the spray of
Niagara catches the first beam of the morning sun to where
his last parting ray glosses itself upon the broad bosom
of the Pacific, breaking in eternal tidal flow against
the golden gates of California...his name and character
...is indisolubly mingled with the history of our own
Caucasian race, and will remain so while the Indian-named
rivers shall flow to the ocean, and while the Indian-named
mountains shall lift their granite peaks to the skies.
In striking contrast to Hooker's soothing eulogy were
the scathing comments made by the next transfer advocate,
Representative Banning of Ohio.
upon Cox.

Banning focused his attack

Let the man who recently '‘brandished his tomahawk

OQ

Ibid., 2ij.61j.-21j.66. To counter the thesis that the
Army was bent on exterminating the Indians, Cook also ob
served that in 1875 red men killed more whites and more
fellow tribesmen than the Army killed Indians.

89 Ibid., 2571+.
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in our faces...put this in his pipe and smoke it," he declared.
It cost over six million dollars more to manage the Indian
Bureau in 18?5 than in I8 I48 .

Also, there was evidence to show

that nine-tenths of the half-breed Indians' children were the
offspring of civilian agents and traders.

"And if Tammany

is not satisfied with this unprovoked and unjust attack of
her scalping-chief upon our Army and defense of the Interior
management of the Indians," continued Banning, "... then let
Tammany send for Red Cloud, Black Kettle, or Sitting Bull,
qn
to come and take the honorable gentleman’s place.
The stormy debate continued in much the same polemic
qi

vein until the bill was passed on the 21st.
the measure was referred to the Senate.

92

Four days later
There, as on pre

vious occasions, the transfer proposal was pigeon-holed by the
.Republican-controlled Committee on Indian Affairs.

On June

21, when the Indian appropriation bill was under consideration
in the Senate, transfer opponents shrewdly introduced the
transfer bill as an amendment.
not popular in the Senate.

Legislation by amendment was

But this stratagem nearly back

fired, for the vote to table the amendment carried by a margin
of only 25 to 22.

93

That same day the proposal was reported

9°Ibid.. 257iw
91Ibid.. 2618, 2661.
92Ibid., 2728.
93
^Cong. Record, l^th Cong., 1 sess., IV, 3963—39614-.
Three western Republicans voted with the Democrats who favored
the amendment.
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back to the House and further consideration was postponed. ^
This in effect ended the first legislative surge for
transfer in the period 1876 - 1 8 7 9 .

As much as they hoped for

the change in Indian administration, at least some Army leaders
foresaw this result.

General Sherman, for example, expected

no effective action until after the presidential election of

1876.

"...our interest is to simply offer to undertake the

work," he told General Sheridan in May, "but if the Christians
want the patronage let them have it.n<^
Democratic spokesmen sought to make an issue of the
bill’s defeat.

In August, when the overdue Indian appro

priation bill was up before the House, Representative William
M. Springer of Illinois complained of the Senate’s persistent
opposition to Army control.

"For the failure of this impor

tant measure the Senate is alone responsible," he contended,
"and the Republican majority of that body have assumed this
responsibility....The people will understand this fact and
will not fail to bold their public servants to a strict account
ability...."^

Indian administration, however, was not a major

issue in the ensuing election.

Moreover, the results were of

little or no advantage to the Democrats:

a slight gain was

made in the Senate, but the Republicans gained ground in the
House and retained control of the executive branch.
9lt
Ibid.. 39144.
^Sherman to Sheridan, May 22, 1 8 7 6 , Sheridan Auto
graph Letters, Vol. I.
^ C o n g . Record.' l+4th Cong., 1 sess., IV, 5602.
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The next phase of the transfer movement came after the
Sioux and Nez Perce/ had been defeated.

On February 25>, 1 8 7 8 ,

nine members of the House Committee on Indian Affairs, including
two Republicans, published a report advocating Army adminis
tration of the Indians.

This group, headed by Chairman Alfred

M. Scales of North Carolina, argued that the expenditure of
millions and the diligent efforts by many conscientious
missionaries, teachers and church-appointed agents had not
achieved expected results.

"The savages of thirty years ago,"

they reported, "are savages s t i l l . T h e

government seemed

to be faced with the choice of transferring the War Department
to the Indian Bureau or the reverse, and no one proposed the
former.

98

Military control should purify the Indian service,

save up to a million dollars a year and end the recurrent
99
Indian wars.
A minority report was submitted by Representatives N. H.
Van Vorhes of Ohio and J. H. Stewart of Minnesota.

This pro

position had been defeated several times in the past, they
noted, and there was no reason why the government should change
its mind now.

To prove their point about the constancy of the

transfer question, they published the minority report of
^ H R Rot. No. 2lil. l+fjth Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1822),

1878, 1-2 .

98Ibid., 3.
99
The majority anticipated savings in agents* salaries,
advertising, transportation, purchases and so forth.
They
also contrasted the government’s Indian expenses before and
after l8ij.9, showing that costs had more than doubled in the
latter period. (Ibid., lj.-9).
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l 8?6 verbatim.
Taking its cue from the Indian Committee, the House Mili
tary Committee on May 28 introduced a transfer amendment to the
Army appropriations bill for 1879.

The amendment, which pro

vided for Army rule over the Indians after January 1, 1879, was
agreed upon by a vote of 130 to 1

1

5

But in the Senate even

those who favored the change questioned the amendment.

Senator

Thomas P. Bayard of Rhode Island termed it a "crude, hasty,
ill-examined proposition," suggesting the need for careful
study by a joint commission.

TO?

Eventually this plan was

adopted, but not until after the supporters and opponents of
civil control had engaged in another vigorous, protracted
argument.
Most vociferous in defense of the present system was
Senator William Windom of Minnesota.

The House measure, Win-

dom asserted, practically put the Secretary of War in charge
of the Interior Department.

Besides, transfer could not

possibly improve the Indian service.

Contractors and agents

were now bonded, whereas such security would not be required
if some "young and inexperienced" lieutenant were appointed as
an Indian agent.

In fact, rumors now had it that the Indian

"rings" hoped for military administration so that they could
evade new, stringent Indian Bureau regulations.

Furthermore,

100 Ibid., 1 3 -2 0 .
10 ^Cong. Record. 14.5 th Cong., 2 sess., VII, 3876 .
102 Ibid., 14.193.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

311

the vital work of civilizing and Christianizing the red men
would be set back years by military officials, who were in
clined to return to the ”old war system."103
A contrary view was presented by Senator Richard Coke
of Texas.

The experiment of appointing church-nominated

agents, Coke insisted, was a fiasco.

Instead of elevating

the Indians, it dragged the agents down to the Indians'
level.

Civil management was a "grotesque compound of senti

mental and religious enthusiasm intensified by soft places,
fat salaries, and rich perquisites, with a villainous amount
of fraud and peculation."1 ^ - According to the latest figures,
more than thirty-eight hundred persons were employed by the
Indian Bureau.

These parasites defended the peace policy for

selfish reasons, while perpetuating romantic notions about the
red man.

Disparagingly, Coke remarked:

Speeches full of lofty eloquence, which the Indian,
so far from making, cannot in the smallest degree com
prehend, are ascribed to him and published through the
country. Novelists and poets, captivated with the theme,
have made him the hero of thrilling romance and inspiring
song. Religious societies, Young Hen's Christian Asso
ciations, and humanitarian theorists have bewailed the
wrongs of the poor Indian, and with the best intentions,
have brought their influences to the dissemination of
morbidly sentimental ideas of Indian character. The
public mind has been impressed and national legislation
molded through these agencies until the interests of the
white man have been lost sight of in an extreme solici
tude to care tenderly for the Indians.105

103Ibid., i4l.95 -ij.i9 6 .
10^Con£. Record. i4.5>th Cong., 2 sess., VII, 14.2 3 7 .
1(*Ibid.
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Too few people realized, he continued, that, considering the
Indians' extensive land holdings, trust funds and federal
support, they were among the richest people in the world and
paid no taxes
Further arguments were deferred by Congress’ decision
to appoint a joint commission, consisting of five Representatives and three Senators, to examine the transfer issue.

107

The commission, headed by Senator Alvin Saunders of Nebraska,
spent two months in the West in the fall of I8 7 8 .

They studied

conditions at various agencies and interviewed military offl
eers, Indian officials, Indians and frontiersmen, gathering
more than four hundred printed pages of testimony.

X08

A number of key witnesses recommended transfer.

Gen

eral Sherman was again in the forefront of this group.
Secretary Schurz and his subordinates bad "labored bard" for
honest administration, Sherman acknowledged.

There was no

thing personal in this civil-military dispute, but one of the
two "antagonistic systems" must yield.

Recent Indian diffi

culties had shown that civil government was ineffectual.

Ibid. Senator Coke calculated that, at five per
sons per family, the Indians bad about twenty-seven hundred
and forty acres per household. Further, the interest on
Indian trust funds alone amounted to almost seven hundred
thousand dollars a year.
107Cong. Record. l|5th Cong., 2 sess., VII, lf585l}-586: Sen. Misc. Doc. N o . £3 . h g t h Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
1835), 1879, 1.
x 08
Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 53, If-Stb Cong., 3 sess. (Serial
1835), 1879, 1-3.
—

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

313

Military administration promised to prevent a repetition of
these troubles and expedite Indian reform at a lower cost to
taxpayers.

109

A particular benefit would be the elimination

of "circumlocution” in regulating the Indians.

If a red man

sold whiskey, for example, it would not be necessary for the
agent to send a letter to Washington to get inter-departmental
approval for military Intervention.

100

To Inspector General R. B. Marcy, the "ponderating
advantage" of military control would be the unity of purpose
achieved in management of the Indians.

With dual administration,

the government received confusing and conflicting reports.
Before l81j.9, when the War Department managed the Indians,
there was not only unified action, but such forthright and
honest management that fraud was non-existent
Brig. Gen. George Crook told the commission that the
present divided responsibility over the Indians was "like having
two captains on the same ship."

By resolving this dilemma

In favor of Army rule, the government could observe the car
dinal principles of successful Indian management:

absolute

honesty, good faith and consistent, decisive regulation.
der the present system, many blunders were being made.

Un
One

mistake was the Indian Bureau’s attempt to break up tribal re
lations through directives instead of patents to farms, stock

109Ibld..Appendix. 219-220.
11°Ibid.,Appendix, 221-222.
111Ibld.. Ii(.-16.
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and other property.

Another was its effort to Christianize
112
the Indians before their physical needs were met.
^

The commission was also impressed by the views of two
lieutenants.

Lieutenant S. R. Whitall of Fort Sill described

his success in the compulsory training of Indian prisoners.
Within a few months they had been taught to farm, raise stock,
build fences and houses and carry on other industrial acti111
vities.
Lieutenant J. M. Lee, agent at Spotted Tail Agency
during the Sioux War, revealed that the former civil agent bad
requisitioned rations for ninety-two hundred Indians whereas a
later Army head-count showed only forty-eight hundred were
present.'*'^

He, too, advocated practical industrial training,

maintaining that to offer academic studies to the Sioux was
like "pouring water on a duck's back.,,1'L^
A number of civilians also recommended transfer.

One

influential witness was Robert Campbell of St. Louis, noted
fur trader and former member of the Board of Indian Commis
sioners.

The only member of the original Board who preferred

military administrators, Campbell contended that the Indian
Bureau's improved purchasing procedures did not prevent

112

Ibid.. Appendix, 113-lllj.. Although Crook argued
for military control, he said he would not want the job of
Indian agent himself.
113Ibid.. 14-2 —14-3«
^^"The civil agent bat.ed his requisition on the number
of Indians on hand to receive annuities. When the military
census was made, many of the Sioux were away hunting.
i:L%bid., Appendix, 101-102, 108.
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cheating at the agencies.
could be relied upon.

116

Commissioned officers, however,
Another transfer proponent was

Samuel P. Tappan, former member of the Peace Commission and
die-hard opponent of military rule.

While emphasizing the

basic need for civil law for the nation’s wards, he admitted
that Army officers were preferable because of their power,
efficiency and honor.

117

Heading the list of important witnesses who defended
the status quo was the Liberal Republican reformer, Secretary
Carl Schurz.

The government’s choice, Schurz reasoned, was

between "corraling" the Indians under Army or civilizing them
under the Interior Department.

But the former seemed "entirely

inconsistent” with American political institutions.^®

Many

were concerned about the present system because of "myths” which
had been circulated.
One false assumption was that "red tape" prevented de
cisive action by the Indian Bureau.

Actually, it could

communicate with the agencies very rapidly by telegraph.

119

Another misconception was that Indian officials were generally
corrupt, while Army officers were honest.
little dishonesty among the present agents.

There was, however,
Moreover, the

record of military officers’ relations with the Indians in the

ll6Ibid., Appendix, 55-56.
^ ^ Ibid.. Appendix, 20i|.-209.
ll8Ibid., Appendix, 258.
119Ibid., Appendix, 259.
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pre-1849 period were not as "angelic and clean" as represented.

120

Again, it was alleged that civil authorities caused

Indian wars.

While civil management was far from perfect, this

assumption was "historically unfounded."

X2X

On the point of

economy, some compared recent Indian service expenses with that
of the l81|0’s.

"You might as well," Schurz declared, "compare

the cost of the administration of the general government under
President Jefferson with what it costs now...,"

122

Schurz systematically debunked the arguments for trans
fer, insisting that the change would have more disadvantages
than advantages.

This whole dispute, he stressed, had nothing

to do with the situation which was at the root of the Indian
problem; namely, unbridled white expansion.1 2 ^

Finally, to

illustrate the illogic of military precedence, he stated:
You might just as well say , here is the city of
New York full of turbulent elements, and the police are
called upon to repress trouble, as the military are some
times to repress trouble on or near some Indian reserva
tions; from which others might, but I would not draw
the conclusir■■■« ohat it would be well to intrust the
general affairs of the city of New York to the police
force.124

Ibid., Appendix, 260, 263, 266. Schurz cited several
congressional investigations which condemned Army officers for
cheating different tribes. For instance, two officers mis
appropriated almost seventy-seven thousand dollars during the
removal of the Creeks in lo35>.

121

Ibid., Aopendix, 260-261. The Secretary mentioned
the Sioux War of 1852-1854> the Chivington Massacre and other
cases in which military miscalculations stimulated hostilities.
12?
Ibid., Appendix, 269.
123Ibld.. Appendix, 262.
^ ^ ~Ibld.. Appendix, 279.
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The Secretary’s views were seconded by Commissioner
Hayt.

A change in administration, he affirmed, was now more

inappropriate than ever.

In the past few months the business

methods of the Indian service had been improved and were probably superior to those of the military service.

121
^

In addi

tion the "preacher-agents" were being replaced by more effective,
practical-minded officials.

126

Lastly, a recent survey showed

that ninety-six percent of the Indians at various reservations opposed military agents.

127

Several agents also testified against Army control.

One

who was questioned at length by the commission was "Father"
James H. Wilbur of Yakima Agency.
ter, had an impressive record.

Wilbur, a Methodist minis

The thirty-seven hundred

Indians under his supervision had six thousand acres under
cultivation, raised thousands of head of livestock, pro
duced their own lumber and shingles, lived in comfortable,
well-furnished houses, dressed like white men, sent their
children to school, and to a large extent, attended church.
These people had a sad experience with military rule from 1869
129
"see above.
3.26
.
Ibid., Appendix, 313.

127

In a circular sent to the agencies in July, 1878 ,
the agents were instructed to present the question of transfer
to their charges in general council. "Free and frank" views
were supposed to be solicited. The Indians reportedly said
they feared that military control would interfere with their
progress, demoralize their women, agitate the young men and
otherwise disrupt agency life. (1.0. Circular, July 1 8 , 18 7 8 ,
Book No. 2, NA, RG 7 5 ; Sen. Misc. D o c . 93« lj.5th Cong., 3 sess.
(Serial 1835), 1879, 105-107. Military Officers thought
that to consult the Indians in this matter was a joke. See
Ibid., lj.6.
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to 1870, said Wilbur, and to again turn them over to the Army
would be a gross injustice,,

126

In addition, a number of philanthropists advised the
investigators to sustain the present Indian system.

Members

of the Board of Indian Commissioners and spokesmen of organi
zations such as the Universal Peace Union of Philadelphia and
Pennsylvania Peace Society warned against military despotism.

129

One of the most ardent transfer opponents was Alfred

B. Meacham, former superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon.
As chairman of the Modoc commission of April, l873> h© had heen
shot several times and narrowly escaped death at the hands of
Captain Jack's followers.

130

Now an invalid, he was editor of

the pro-Indian monthly, Council Fire, and was devoting his
life to the cause of Indian civilization.

Military rule was

wrong, Meacham argued, because it would antagonize the Indlans and detract from their advancement.

131

On January 31> 1879* after analyzing voluminous, con
flicting testimony, the joint commission published a divided
report.

The four southern Democrats —

and a senator —

three representatives

submitted a report favoring transfer.

Army

officers, they concluded, were men of nhigh honor and strict

128Ibid.. 21-28,

k > k $ .

129Ibld.. 14.8-50, Appendix, 238,251.
^■^See Chapter Six.

Seymour, 0£ o cit.. 212-233.

•^■^ I b i d .. 3014.. Council Fire was first published in
1878 and featured many articles opposing transfer and de
manding abolition of the Army. See, for example. Council
Fire (July, 18 7 8 ) and (April, 1879).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

319

integrity” and would give the Indians justice at minimum ex
pense to the government,,

A failure to establish military

jurisdiction would leave the red men at the mercy of white
thieves and drive them out into the ”pitiiess storm of ...
injustice and inhumanity which has well-nigh extinguished a
once proud and powerful people.,..

m132

The other four commissioners, two from each house and
all northern Republicans, issued a negative report.

There

was no doubt that the Indian could be ”Anglo-Saxonized,”
they argued, and civilians were best suited to carry on this
work.

To improve Indian administration, Congress should em

power the President to order temporary Army control in time
of emergency and take steps to consolidate small reservations,
assign the Indians' land in severalty and establish a separate
Indian department.

A permanent transfer of the Indian Office,

though, would result in no possible advantage to the red man
or the government.

133

By February, 1879, although the latest congressional
investigation was indecisive, the high-water mark of the transfer
movement had been passed.

The return of peace and the In

terior Department's program of self-improvement silenced many
of the complaints of the opponents of civil administration.
On February 8 the House, by a vote of 92 to 67, defeated an

^ ^ H R Rpt. No. 92.
1879, 20.

\\$ th

Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 1866),

133hr Rpt. N o . 9£, 14.9 th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial 1866),
1879, 19-20. Chairman Saunders of Nebraska, the only westerner
on the joint committee, voted with the transfer opponents*
He had been an outspoken friend of the Indians for some time.
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Army appropriation bill amendment to authorize the President
to proclaim temporary military rule over hostile tribes.33^
Pour days later, with Senator Saunders quoting scripture as
grounds for maintaining the "quiet example and peaceful influ
ence of civil authority," the upper house rejected a similar
measure.

11*5 H _
"The

failure of the transfer movement in this

congress is probably final," Secretary Schurz remarked grate
fully, "at least.*.as long as I am at the head of the de4. n!36
partment.

During the next five years, various transfer amendments
were proposed but received little support.

In the House,

legislators were ruled out of order for trying to bring up
transfer in connection with the Indian appropriation bills
of 1880 and 1881.

137

In the second instance, the chairman

ruled that a transfer amendment was not germane because the
change from one department to another would not reduce exT Oft
penditures.
Finally, in I 88 I4., even a proposal to appoint
military inspectors for the Indian Bureau was defeated be
cause it threatened the separate jurisdiction of the civil
branch."*-3^
13b.
Cong. Record.

k S th

Cong., 3 sess., VIII, llb.l-llij.2.

13 ^Ibid., 1221-1226.
-^Schurz to A. C. Barstow, February 15, 1879, Schurz
Papers, Private Letters Sent, Vol. IX.
^ 3 ^Cong. Record. ij.6 th Cong., 2 sess., X, 2ij.91-2b.93,
2ij.97-2b.98; b-oth (Jong., 3 sess. XL, 5>38-5>b.l; Briest,o£. cit..21.
M B q o d , . Record. b.6 th Cong., 3 sess., XI, 5iA#
139priest, oj># cit.. 2 1 .
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Authors have disagreed as to whether it was "Inertia1*
or a "sincere conviction on the part of the public that the
Army was not fitted to direct Indian affairs" which brought
about the final defeat of t r a n s f e r * F o r years this sub
ject had been debated in Congress and in public reports, the
press and private circles*.

Representative Hooker of Mississ

ippi found the political impact of this question most curious*
"It*..is so utterly foreign to all*•.differences between
existing parties," he asserted, "that it would seem it ought
to...command the calm judgment of the Representatives of the
people...*M^^-

yet prejudices were so strong that, as General

Sherman observed, the same facts were Interpreted from oppo
site directions*

On each, side, selfish, and emotional factors

affected contradictory economic, moral, cultural, religious,
military, educational and legal arguments*

Unfortunately,

while the struggle for control of the Indian service was in
progress, Indian reform was detained*

Thus the decision for

civil control was advantageous to both the nation and its
wards, although subsequent Indian relations involved other
Inter-departmental problems*

l^Oprederic L. Paxson, The Last American Frontier
(New York, 1918). 3U4: Priest, op* cit*, £6.
^^■HR Rpt. No. 1393, l+6th Cong*, 2 sess* (Serial 1937)*

1880, 1*

-

^^ Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 53, Jj-5th Cong., 3 sess. (Serial

1835), 1879, 2277

““
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CHAPTER EIGHT

A NEW PHASE IN AN OLD STRUGGLE:

1879-188?

The general topic of tbs relations of the ns.tIon
to the aborigines is one of the hopeless things which
constantly attract and as constantly baffle attempts at
solution. All struggles between different races are
guided by prejudice and passion more than by reason,
(Jacob D. Cox, April 5, 1880)
,,,the Indian race has reached a crisis in its his
tory, Surrounded on all sides by the forces of
civilization,,,the only alternative presented,,.is
absolute extinction or a quick entrance into the pale
of American civilization,
(Secretary J.Q.C. Lamar.
November 1, 188?)

The eight-year period from the defeat of the last
concerted transfer movement, in early 18 7 9 * to the passage of
the celebrated Dawes Severalty Act, in February, 1 8 8 7 , was,
in certain respects, a new phase in government-Indian rela
tions.^

The Indian Bureau formerly spent much time and

energy defending its policies and very existence; now it
could give more attention to constructive activities.

Re

forms which had been postponed or retarded were adopted or
promoted.

In addition, the military, although not fully

reconciled to civil management of the Indians, found more

^The Dawes Act, which authorized the President to
divide up the Indian lands, assigning one hundred and sixty
acre plots to families and lesser amounts to single Indians
and children, is discussed in the next chapter.
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opportunity to assist in the important work of civilizing
the government's wards.

Through the joint efforts of the

civil and military branches, substantial progress was made
toward an effective solution of the Indian problem.
Yet inter-departmental disputes persisted, for the In
terior Department's official control of the red men was not
always practicable.

Exigencies still required prompt and

decisive action by the military.

The circumstances of such

action, however, were generally subject to differences of
opinion.

These latest difficulties, coinciding with the

disappearance of the "Indian frontier," also had a material
effect upon the future of Indian affairs.^

The following

discussion takes note of both the accomplishments and failures
of this new phase of the old struggle over Indian policy.

THE TREND TOWARD REFORM
After Congress decided against military control of the
tribes in February, 1879, the government made many significant
changes in its Indian policy.

Whether the public "suddenly"

realized the need for justice toward the Indians and whether
1880 was the "turning point in the history of American Indian
relations" may be debated.^

But there is evidence that

2
President Cleveland announced the closing of the In
dian frontier in December, 1886. (Richardson, Messages VIII.
518).
----^The importance of the year 1880 is stressed by Loring
B. Priest, the leading scholar on post-Civil War Indian rela
tions. In illustrating the "turn of the tide" of public opinion,
however, Priest cites the passive reactions to the White River
Ute outbreak in Colorado, erroneously dating that affair in

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

32k

concern for Indian welfare was more widespread in the early
Eighties than in previous decades.
A number of circumstances contributed to this d e v o l u 
tion."

Clearly, Commissioner Hayt's complicity in an unethical

bargain for an Arizona silver mine, a scandal revealed in
«
January, 1880, aroused demands for administrative reform.
Public interest was spurred, too, by a continuing discussion
of the Ponca removal of 18 7 7 , a topic enlivened by an 1879
federal court ruling that the government could not force a
tL

band of fugitive Poncas to return to Indian Territory.
Another stimulus was the problem of encroachment upon Indian
reservations, dramatized by proclamations by Presidents Hayes
and Cleveland against invasions of Indian Territory by "Oklahoma Boomers.

»6

These and other developments, notably Con

gress1 unwillingness to seriously reconsider military control
of the Indians, encouraged various Indian reforms after 1879 .
Much of the impetus of the reform movement came from
new national organizations.

One, the Women's National Indian

Association, was founded in Philadelphia in 1879 and had
^(continued) in 1880 instead of 1879 . (Priest, op. cit.,
XVIII-XXXVI. See CIA, 1879 , XVIII-XXXVI.)
h-BIC, 1879, 68-71; Priest, oj). cit., 69-71. Hayt was
dismissed on January 31, 1880. See Chapter Two.
^CIA, 1877» iil7-h-19. For a discussion of the Standing
Bear case see 5 Dill, k ? 3 $ Priest, oj>. cit.. 76 -8 0 .
^Scbmeckebier, op. cit., 122; Priest, op.
72-75. See also Roy GTttinger, The Formation of
£f Oklahoma (Berkeley, 1917) and Carl C. Rister,
David L. Payne and the Oklahoma Boomers (Norman,

cit..
the State
Land feunger?
191*2) •
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chapters in twenty-seven states by 18 8 6 *

These local groups

circulated petitions, published pamphlets and corresponded
with congressmen, calling for protection of the Indians’
lands and rights.

7

Another agency, the Indian Rights Asso

ciation, was established by Herbert Welsh of Philadelphia in
1882,

Members of the I,R.A, visited Indian reservations and

published constructive criticisms and recommendations which
g

affected Indian legislation.

Also influential were the con

ferences held each fall after 1883 at Lake Mobonk, New York,
Many noted public officials, politicians, educators, religious
leaders, humanitarians and publicists attended these con
ferences and passed resolutions for practical reforms, such
9
as increased salaries for Indian service personnel.
Still
another organization, the National Indian Defense Association,
was founded in Washington in 1885 by Dr, Theodore A, Bland
of the Council Fire journal.

Members of this association,

including S, F, Tappan, George Manypenny and other long-time
- Indian friends, endeavored, especially, to check federal
action which might interfere with the personal liberties of
the red m e n . ^

^Priest, 033, cit., 8 1 -8 3 ,
®Ibid., 83 -8i|., Welsh waa the nephew of William Welsh,
the well-known Indian reformer and former member of the Board
of Indian Commissioners,

9

Ibid., 8I4.-8 5 . Proceedings of the Lake Mobonk con
ferences may be followed in BIC reports.
10
Priest, op,, cit.. 86.
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In addition to the work of these Indian organizations,
there were persistent efforts by the Board of Indian Com
missioners and missionary boards to better the condition of
the nation's wards*

Each year the Board closed its annual re

port with a list of legislative recommendations pertaining to
land ownership, education, citizenship, appropriations, criminal
laws or other subjects.

11

Meantime, the missionary boards,

after conferring with their constituents, held a joint confer
ence in Washington in each January to draft memorials to
executive officers and Congress.

"For Indians," the conference

demanded in 1882, "we want American education!
can homes!

We want American rights!

American citizenship!

We want Ameri

The result of which is

»12

While the vigorous activities of such groups indicated
a growth of organized support for Indian advancement, public
opinion was still divided along sectional lines.

Easterners,

particularly Hew Englanders, expressed strong sympathy for the
tribesmen.

Often, however, there was justification for the

charge that they based their sentimental views upon concepts
of the Indian derived from the works of James Fenimore
Cooper.

13

On the other hand, westerners were Inclined to

condemn the Indians.

The length to which Indian hatred could

be carried was demonstrated by a bill introduced in the

n See, for example, BIC, 1879,

1 $ ;

BIC, l88ij., 11.

12Ibid., 1882, 79.
■^Priest, opB cit.. 86-88.
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Colorado legislature in 1881 for the ’’Destruction of Indians
and Skunks

Nor was it necessary to go far west to find

enemies of the red men*

"Sympathy for the Indians," an Iowan

ml$
declared in 1880, "is like milk spilled on the ground."
Among the initial manifestations of the growing, al
though not unanimous, regard for Indian reformation were
efforts to further changes begun in earlier years.

An incon

sistent attempt was made, first, to end tribal autonomy.
Under a provision of the Indian appropriation act of I 87 I,
the government was officially prohibited from recognizing the
tribes as domestic dependent nations.

16

In practice, though

officials acquiesced in the old system through agreements such
as the Sioux Agreement of 1876 and Ute Agreement of 1880 and
17
various transactions with tribal leaders.
still occupied the anomalous position of
wards of the United States.
by many reformers.

Thus the Indians

"aliens" who were

This situation was criticized

Some demanded immediate abolition of the

Indians’ political systems and others requested a gradual

18
change.

»

To confuse matters, Indian authorities disagreed
■^•House Bill 178 included in D. W. Wood to Shurz
February ij., 1881, Schurz Papers.

^ E . W. Eastman, Eidora, Iowa, to Carl Schurz, Novem
ber 18, i860, Schurz Papers.
1616 Stat. L., 566.
17

The basic distinction between the agreements and
previous treaties was that the former were approved by Con
gress as a whole rather than the Senate. (CIA. 1 8 7 6 , 3ii9351; CIA. 1880, 193-198).
"Lfi
Priest, oj>. cit.. 102-103*
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about whether the tribal arrangement was harmful.

In l88l

Secretary Samuel J. Kirkwood categorically described it as a
"hinderance” (kifi.#) to Indian advancement.

19

As late as 188$-,

however, Secretary L.Q.C. Lamar opposed a general policy of
breaking up tribal relations because it might be "destructive”
to some tribes.

The rule of the chiefs extended beyond

1 8 8 7 , but by that date the policy-makers paid less attention
to the traditional Indian governments.
Revisions were made, too, in the longstanding annuity
system.

Treaties since the founding of the government pro

mised the Indians yearly gifts of food, clothing and other
items.

So long as there was a real danger of Indian war, few

questioned the maxim "it Is cheaper to feed the Indians than
to fight them.1*

Interested contractors and freighters were

especially vocal In support of this policy.

But by the mid-

Elghties the argument for annuities had been weakened by:
frauds and improper distribution of Indian goods, the Indians1
inqprovidence and misuse of various items, criticism of the
practice of dispensing more gifts to potentially-bostile than
to peaceable tribes, congressional demands for economy and,
above all, the general belief that the era of the Indian wars
was over.

21

Hence, adjustments were made to allot more of

the government’s “charity” for educational and industrial

19SI, 1881, VII.
20SI, 1885, 26-27.
^■Priest, op. cit.. 106-109.
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needs.22
In conjunction with efforts to de-emphasize tribal
relations and revise the annuity system, Indian authorities
re-examined the reservation system.

This was another well-

established federal policy based upon expediency.

Segregated,

the Indians were less apt to interfere with white expansion
and travel and were more easily managed.

At the same time,

the Indians’ friends observed, they were safer from exploit
ers and evil influences,2^
But in the Eighties reservations were criticized for
various reasons.

Westerners, anxious to acquire more land,

argued that It w'as contrary to common sense and the principles
of Christian society to allow millions of acres to lay Idle.
Reformers, on the other hand, began to advocate inter-racial
contact as an essential aspect of Indian progress.

Instead

of abandoning the reservations, the Interior Department gradu
ally reduced them through closely-regulated land sales, sub
ject to Indian approval.2**

Between 1879 and I 887 tribal

land holdings were decreased by about nineteen percent. ^
The critics were only partially satisfied by smaller
reservations.

On most reservations the Indians still followed

their ancient practice of communal ownership.

Until the red

22Ibid., 112-113; BIC, 1879-1887.
2 ^Priest, o£. cit.. 121-123,
%bid.»

12^-129.

2*CIA, 1 8 7 9 , 227; CIA, 18 8 7 , 3 1 2 .
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men enjoyed the right of private property, reformers main
tained, they could not acquire the habits of modern civili
zation.

Legislation was needed, therefore, to allot the

Indian lands in severalty.

Certain laws already provided

for individual ownership, but were unsatisfactory.

The In

dian Homestead Act of 1875? was so complex and restrictive
that few Indians benefited from it.

26

Some tribes, under

special acts or treaties, were authorized to make allotments,
and by 1885 over eleven thousand patents had been issued.

Yet

these laws were also difficult to administer, and many of the
owners were soon relieved of their property by greedy whites.
The search for a general severalty act which would overcome
these problems, already In progress in 1879, continued until
the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887.
Another important phase of the policy adopted in the
l880’s was an increased emphasis upon education.

Officials

had long recognized, as Secretary J. D. Cox stated in 1870,
that the training of Indian youth should be a "controlling
and permanent feature” of Indian relations.

28

Much of the

dispute over transfer concerned the hypothetical question of
whether civilians or soldiers made the best teachers.

Yet as

of 1879, the House Indian Committee announced, less than ten

26

18 Stat. L., ij.20; Priest, o£. cit.. 180-181.

^ C I A , 1885, 320; Schraeckibier, on. cit.. 79s
Priest, o ^ c i t . , 178-179.
pO

SI, 1 8 7 0 , IX. Most Indian treaties provided for edu
cational assistance by the government.
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percent of the Indian children were being properly educated.

29

This unfortunate situation was attributable, to a large ex
tent, to the Indians’ intransigence.

But the government was

not blameless, for, acceding to popular skepticism toward the
Indians* iraprovability and demands for economy, it failed to
provide adequate means for this work .^ 0
Eventually, however, the policy-makers began to recog
nize education as a practical and economical means of mini
mizing the Indian problem.

This change in attitude was en

couraged by the growing success of experiments with Indian
police, soldiers and freighters; the economic progress of many
tribes and self-government of groups in Indian Territory,

31

In addition, many were impressed by the advancement of Indian
students at Hampton Institute, Carlisle and other non-reserva
tion boardin._ schools.

The boarding school program, initiated

in the late Seventies by two Army officers, Captain Richard
H, Pratt and General Samuel C# Armstrong, provided training in
industrial arts and homeraaking for scores of youngsters.

32

*^HR Rpt. No. 29. i|.6 th Cong*, 1 sess. (Serial 193lf.)*
l 8 8 0 . The Indian Bureau reported an average school attendance
of about twelve percent of school-age children. (CIA, l879,2ij.f>).

3 °Priest,

02

ju

cit., 132-137.

31 Ibid., 137-Up..
-^Captain Pratt began to train Cheyenne and Kiowa
prisoners at Port Marion, Florida, in 1875. Three years later
some of these Indians were sent to Hampton Institute, a Negro
school headed by General S # C. Armstrong. Armstrong proceeded
to expand the project. Meantime, in 1879, Pratt opened a
school for more than eighty Sioux at the deserted Army barracks
at Carlisle. The government soon recognized the value of this
work, adding schools at Forest Grove (later Salem), Oregon;
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Such promising results inspired Congress to appropriate about
six times as much for reservation and non-reservation schools
in 1887 as in 1879.

Meanwhile, sixty-eight new schools were

established and school attendance more than doubled.

33

Gradual progress in Indian education, together with the
government’s tendency to discount tribal relations, spot
lighted the need for a clearer definition of the legal status
of the Indians.

For years Indian administrators had lamented

the absence of criminal laws affecting their wards.

”No good

reason can be given for not placing them /the Indians/ under
the same government as other people,” the Board of Indian Com
missioners reasoned in 1 8 8 1 . ^

Yet westerners, in particular,

opposed legal equality, and many citizens contended that the
tribesmen could not understand, much less obey, criminal
codes.

35

Between 1883 and 188£, though, measures were taken to
combat the inequity of a legal system which imposed penalties
upon Indians for offenses against whites, but failed to punish
op

(continued) Chiloeco, Indian Territory; Lawrence,
Kansas and Genoa, Nebraska. By 1900 twelve hundred children
from seventy-nine tribes were being educated at these places.
(Ibid.. llj.l-lij.3 ; Schmeckebler. on. cit.. 71. For a further
discussion see Elaine Goodale Eastman, Pratt: Red Man *s Moses
/Norman, 19357
I.R.A., Captain Pratt and Blls Work for
Indian Education /Philadelphia, 1912/).
^ C I A , 1879» 2ij-5. In I 887 the government appropriated
$1,226,ljJ.5 f o r two hundred and twenty-seven schools with an
average attendance of over ten thousand five hundred students.
(CIA, 1 8 8 7 , XVI-XVII, 313-322). For a discussion of the pro
blems of instruction at these schools, see Schmeckebler,
op. cit., 71-78.
3^BIC, 1 8 8 1 , 8.
■^Priest, op. cit.. 199-200.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

333

crimes by whites or other Indians against Indians.

Early in

1883* the Indian Office established extra-legal Courts of In
dian Offenses at the agencies.

These courts, presided over

by Indian "judges," tried cases involving misdemeanors such
as immoral dances, polygamy or other violations of rules set
down by the Bureau .

36

J

check major crimes was

Later in the year, the lack of laws to
brought out in the Supreme Court

ruling that Crow Dog, slayer of the well-known Brule Sioux
chief Spotted Tail, was not subject to United States statues.

37

As a consequence, a section of the Indian appropriation act
approved March 3, 1885, made Indians living on reservations
liable to federal laws covering murder and several other
serious crimes.3®

Closely related to the problem of criminal law was the
question of constitutional rights for the Indians.

"All who

have studied the /Tndian7 question,” wrote Secretary Kirkwood
in 1881, ”unite in the

opinion thatthe end to be attained is

the civilization of the Indians and their final absorption into
the mass of our citizens, clothed with all the duties of citi
zenship,

The difficulty lies in devising and executing the

36

Indian Bureau rules prohibited such ”barbaric prac
tices" as the burying of the dead in trees, the torturous
"sun dance" ornhighly immoral" ritual known as the "kiss
dance" and the destruction of property to revenge minor
quarrels, (I.O.L.B., Misc., 1879 -1 8 8 7 .) One agent unsuccess
fully tried to have the playing of ball on Sundays added to
this list I (R. E. Trowbridge to Agent D. B. Dyer, Quapaw
Agency, June 2, 1880, I.O.L.B. No. 159, Misc., NA, RG 7 5 .)
37109 2 a S. Reports. 556.
3823 Stat. L., 385; Priest, o£. cit.. 201-203;
Schmeckebler, op. cit., 77*
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means by which this end shall be accomplished.”

Some looked

to the courts for an interpretation which would end this
predicament.

But in l88ij., in denying the appeal of a non

reservation Indian who had been turned away from the polls at
Omaha, the Supreme Court ruled:
Indians born within the territorial limits of the
United States...although in a geographical sense born
in the United States, are no more "born in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," within
the meaning of the...Fourteenth Amendment, than, the
children of subjects of any foreign government.^0
Following this decision, reformers redoubled their agitation
for Indian citizenship.

Their goal was at last partially

achieved in the Dawes Act.

Ul

A drawback to the campaign for citizenship and other
reform movements of the Eighties was the absence of a welldefined, comprehensive Indian policy.

"The so-called ‘peace

policy,1" one modern scholar conqplains, "was more a product
of confusion regarding the proper course to pursue than of an
intelligent effort to solve Indian problems.

Instead of.setting

a goal, administrators drifted aimlessly, meeting difficulties
Jj.2
as they arose without thought of the future."
Such cri
ticism was also made by contemporary observers.

Secretary

Schurz, for instance, was irritated by charges that his ad
ministration lacked a stable, identifiable policy.

"It is

39SI, 1881, III.
^°Elk vs. Wilkins, 112 U.S. Reports. 102.
^ Z k

Stat. L., 338; Priest, op. cit., 209-213.

^ 2Priest, pp. cit., 183.
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frequently said that we have no policy,” he noted,

”This is

a mistake, at least as far as this department is c o n c e r n e d , ”^
Still, the following year he reported that he had reversed his
earlier program of altering, removing and consolidating reser
vations,^- A good deal of this inconsistency in Indian policy
could be traced to the frequent change of Indian officials.
New leaders tended to be indecisive, and many acted upon their
personal theories about the Indians,

2i6

These deviations were

corrected, to some extent, by more precise and inclusive laws
in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century,
Finally, another general problem pervading the reform
movements concerned the method to be used in dealing with non
progressive tribesmen.

Civil and military spokesmen fre

quently differed on this point.

Most Army officers, together

with a number of agents, a few Interior officials, notably
Secretary Teller, and humanitarians, such as Bishop Henry
Whipple, advocated compulsory Indian reformationc

Taking a

paternalistic and practical position, they argued that forcible
conversion was for the

Indians' own good.

i|7

On the

other

hand, other Indian sympathizers and most Indian administrators

^ S I , 1879, 5.
^ S I , 1880, k,
k5
H See Chapter Two,
k6

Compare, for example, Secretaries Teller and Lamar
on allotments in SI, 1882, VI-VII and SI, 1885, 26.
^P r i e s t , o p . cit.. 2i|l-2lf.6,
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preferred to regenerate the nation’s wards by persuasion.

In

their opinion, President Cleveland was correct in maintain
ing that it was more important to give the Indians justice
L8
than to rapidly convert them to the white man’s ways.
By
1887, though, the government decided that at least one vital
reform, land allotments, could not wait upon voluntary action.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE
The collapse of the transfer movement in the late
Seventies had no immediate effect upon the Army’s responsi
bilities in connection with Indian affairs.

Military his

tories usually refer to the last more or less minor Indian
campaigns, notably the suppression of the White River Utes
in 1879, engagements leading to the capitulation of Sitting
Bull’s followers in l88l, and the operations against the Apaches
which culminated in the surrender of Geronimo in 1886. Little
attention has been given, however, to the Army’s important,
if unglamorous, civil functions on the frontier.

li.9

In 1880 General Sheridan described the duties of his
"little army" in the West as follows:
To keep in advance of our settlers, to give pro
tection to the surveying and construction parties of

k8BIC, 1885, 134.
Ji9
See, for instance, Ganoe, op. cit., 350-363; Ameri
can Military History (ROTC Manual, Washington, 1953), 2862 8 9 , 292. The second source mentions various civil functions,
primarily in the East, but says nothing of military activi
ties in relation to the Indian service.

R e p r o d u c e d w ith p e r m issio n o f th e co p y rig h t o w n er . F u rth er rep ro d u ctio n p roh ib ited w ith o u t p e r m issio n .

337

the railways, to open new paths through the mountains and
across the plains, to open up the country and guard the
feeble settlements and mining camps from the Indians,
and to secure the Indian in his just rights against the
encroachment of white men, to keep unauthorized parties
from established Indian reservations, and generally to
give a place^of refuge to the weak along our exposed
frontier.,..5°
Thus, in one way or another, Indian relations were closely re
lated to military activities.

Indeed, frontier commands con

tinued to have a wider range of Indian-oriented functions
than Sheridan indicated.

First, troops worked to deter and

curb disturbances on or around the reservations.

Second, they

acted to enforce regulations against illegal trade with the
tribes.

Third, as a posse comitatus, soldiers protected the

Indians1 lands from invasion by cattlemen, settlers, thieves
and white exploiters.
as Indian agents.

Fourth, at times, Army officers served

Fifth, in certain respects, the military

helped to train red men in the white m a n ’s ways.

Sixth, when

the agencies ran out of supplies, post commanders, without
authority, took measures to relieve the Indians* needs.
Lastly, Army officers formally or informally advised the
government on Indian policy.
Although most agencies developed a useful Indian police
system in the l8 8 0 's, troops were summoned whenever serious
difficulty seemed imminent.

Military intervention was neces

sary most frequently, of course, at reservations inhabited by
tribes just beginning the slow transition from the life of the
nomadic hunter to that of the sedentary farmer or herder.

^°SW, 1880, ^6.
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example, Maj. G-en. 0. B. Willcox, commander of tbe Department
of Arizona, reported in 1880 that his men had "nipped in the
hud" several revolts at the Apache reservations.

Si

This duty

was complicated by recurrent rumors of outbreaks, spread by
nervous settlers, contractors and traders who hoped to pre
vent the withdrawal of outposts, publicists intent upon dis
crediting the Indian Bureau and land-seekers who were eager
52
for new agreements to further delimit the reservations.
Still, General Sheridan regarded the need for maintaining troops
to "be prepared for emergencies" as very real.

As late as

1886 he unsuccessfully requested Congress to increase the
r* *»

strength of frontier forces on these grounds,'3'*
The Army’s police duties would have been less burden
some were it not for the disrupting influence of unscrupu
lous traders.

Those engaged in the illicit liquor traffic

were, as always, an annoying and persistent problem.

Tbe

Indian’s demands for "ardent spirits" were almost insatiable,
and laws against the sale of intoxicants remained, as one
officer expressed it, a " f a r c e . " ^

There was no minimum

^ T b i d .. 205-206.
-*^In 1882 alone, the New York Herald published false
reports of the burning of Galeyville, Arizona; a Snake and
Bannock outbreak in Montana; a massacre in Foulk County,
Dakota Territory and a mass uprising of tbe Umatillas of
Oregon. (Priest, 0£, cit., 9 1 J.
qo
-^Sheridan to Senator John A Logan, March 2^, 1886,
C.G.L.S., NA, RG 108.
^ S . S, Lawson to Price, June 27, 1882, I.O.L.R.,
Civilization, File 120^, NA RG 75. The resourcefulness of
the liquor peddlers was almost unlimited. The physician who
took over at Blackfeet Agency in 1882 was astounded to learn
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penalty, and frontier courts were notoriously lax on this
matter.

Nevertheless, military officials assisted the

agents in attempting to keep whiskey from the red men, real
izing that inebriated braves were apt to disturb the peace.
Meanwhile, Indian authorities carried on a disappointing camX lL

paign for stricter regulations against the liquor traffic.
Still a problem, too, were the arms merchants,

A law

approved in 1873 prohibited the sale of weapons and ammuni
tion on the reservations, but prescribed only mild punishment
for violators and failed to cover trade in other locations.

97

Army authorities believed that the best way to check Indian
outbreaks was to disarm undisciplined bands and prevent their
re-armamentThis

scheme, Maj, Gen, John M, Schofield ad

mitted was more plausible than practicable.

But military

watchfulness, together with the disappearance of game and

(continued) that his predecessor specialized in re
medies consisting of a mixture of alcohol and peppermint or
ginger. The Indians were so anxious to obtain any beverage
with alcoholic content that the agency traders had a lucrative
business in lemon and vanilla extracts, (Dj*. Harry Stites to
Price, January 1, 1883, I.O.L.R., Civilization, Pile 1699*
NA, RG 79).
^P r i e s t , o p . cit., 1 9 7 .
96

Commissioner Price, an ardent prohibitionist, was par
ticularly active in the movement for stricter liquor laws in
the period l 880 -l 88 £, (See, for example, Price to Secretary
of the Interior, February 23, 1882, I.O.R.B. No, ifl, NA, RG 7 5 ).
Yet It was 1897 until Congress established a minimum fine of
one hundred dollars and a sentence of sixty days lru jail for
selling alcohol to an Indian. (Schmeckebier, op. cit.. J4.2 I1.—
1^26.).
17 Stat. L., i|59.

^8SW, 1879, 86.
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and reforms at the agencies, gradually limited the dangers of
CjQ
the arms trade*"'
Lawless traders, who transacted their nefarious business
on or near the reservations, were not the only disquieting in
fluences military and civil officials had to contend with*

As

the Eighties progressed, the Indians’ lands were Invaded by
a growing number of outsiders*

rtThe Indians," said General

Pope in 1881, "are...now sandwiched between the emigration
from the East and that from the West...The waves of emigration,
enormously hastened by the railroads, are now beating from •
both sides along this thin line of Indians, and,..must soon
break through . . . . " ^ 0

Pope's estimate of the situation agreed

with that of Commissioner E. A. Hayt, who earlier surmised that
hardly a reservation in the country was not subject to en
croachment,^
The intruder problem was extremely serious in a number
of places.

In 1882 the Flathead Agent requested a military

force to protect his charges from more than seven thousand
"camp followers, gamblers, ex-convicts, lewd women...merchants
and traders of all descriptions" accompanying the construction

^ S W *85, 132* Priest, op, cit.. 156. A practice which
increased the difficulty of regulating the possession of arms
and ammunition at certain Sioux and Apache agencies was the
policy of allowing the Indians to stage simulated "hunts" when
beef cattle were issued. (Secretary Teller to Commissioner,
March 23> 18 8 3 , D.i.L.S. and Indian Bureau Circular No. 106,
Finance, Circular Book No. 3, NA, RG 75).

60 SW, 1881, 122.
61 CIA, 1879, XLIV,
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crew of the Northern Pacific Railroad*

62

Three years later

another minor crisis developed near Hoopa Valley, California,
6?
where whites were crowding Klamaths out of their homes, J But
the biggest test since the mass invasion of the Black Hills in
1875 came in Indian Territory, which was literally overrun by
would-be settlers and ranchers from 1879 until Oklahoma Terri
tory was opened in April, 1889*
Organized groups of ”Oklahoma Boomers” made their
initial entry into Indian Territory in the spring of 1879 in
spite of President Hayes’ proclamation against trespassing
upon Indian lands.

The following spring, in defiance of

another proclamation, Captain David L. Payne led more emi
grants into the Territory.

Soldiers were detailed to expel

the intruders, but Congress’ failure to enact effective restrictions invited the colonists to return time after time.

6k

To add to the confusion, the Cberokees in the spring
of 1880 agreed to lease some of their grazing lands west of
the ninety-sixth parallel to cattlemen from the surrounding
62
Acting Commissioner E, L. Stevens to Secretary of
the Interior, November 17, 1682, I.O.R.B. No. 1*3, NA, RG 75.
6^
^The Klamaths were not on the reservation assigned to
their tribe, but, like the Nez Perce in 1887 , resided in an
area which they had improved and occupied for many years.
(Stevens to Secretary of the Interior, May 19» 1885. I.O.R.B.
Ho. 52, NA, RG 75).
6k
Priest, op. cit.. 7l|.-75> 160-162. The intruders
maintained that lands purchased from the Five Civilized
Tribes for the settlement of hostile bands but not used for
that purpose were public domain. (SW, l88l, 8 I4.*)
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vicinity*

The military somewhat reluctantly suspended efforts

to exclude the lessees,

’’This arrangement will prove the

Trojan Horse by which the Indian Territory will become invaded
by settlers,” General Sherman predicted, "and it will be next
to impossible for the Army to distinguish between the IIB65
censed grazers and employees and the unlawful intruders," The
Indian Bureau believed, however, that the leasing system would
provide the Indians with additional income and an opportunity
to learn how to raise cattle without losing title to their
land.^

The shortsightedness of this position was brought

out by an 1883 Investigation which indicated that about a
hundred thousand untaxed cattle were in the "Cherokee Strip"
and that many cattlemen were building ranches, fencing and
A7
rapidly depleting the timber supply, 1 Moreover, cattle
raisers were beginning to rent pasture lands from tribes such
as the Cheyennes and Arapahoes for as little as a cent and a
half an acre.

68

During the next two years the Army’s task of protecting
the reservations of the Territory grew more onerous.

Soldiers

were expected not only to expel disgruntled settlers and un
licensed cattlemen, but protect the herds from white and
Indian raiders and restrain the tribesmen who become dissatisfied

^ E n d . , Sherman, April 15, 1880, E&M, Vol. I,
^Priest, op, cit., 160-161,
^ P r i e e to Secretary of the Interior, March ll|., 1 8 8 3 ,
I.O.R.B. No. 1|4, NA, RG 75.
^ T e l l e r to E. Penlon Esq., April 25, 1 8 8 3 , D.I.L.S.,
NA, RG 75; SI, 1883, XV-XVI.
*
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because of lease violations.

Circumstances became quite

critical in tbe summer of 1885, when the Cheyennes threatened
to go on the warpath against white trespassers.

At the

eleventh hour General Sheridan made a special investigation
and recommended that all cattle be removed from Cheyenne and
Arapaho Reservation and that the region be temporarily placed
under martial law.
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These recommendations were adopted by

the order of President Arthur, and the impending uprising was
averted.

70

n

n

Subsequently, troops acquired the "unprofessional*

duty of overseeing the cattle-raising activities of the In
dians.^
Occasionally, as in the case just mentioned, the
situation at an agency was such that an Army officer was put
in chargeo

Fewer regulars acted in this capacity than in former

only five in 1879 and three in 1887 — but their ser72
vice was of special significance.
They were chosen, as a

years —

rule, for their wide experience in Indian affairs and/or the
exigencies involved.

San Carlos Agency, Arizona, for in

stance, was administered by military men because of the un-

^ Sheridan to Secretary Endicott, July 1 7 , 1885,
and Sheridan to President July 18 and 26, 1885, C.G.L.S.,
na, rg 1 0 8 .
Stat. L., 1023.
7^-See Sheridan's comment on the military removal of
cattle from Uintah Agency, End., Shsridan, December 12,
I 8 8 7 , to Secretary of War to General of the Army, H.A.L.R.,
File 2808, NA, RG 108.
72CIA, 1879, 267-269; CIA, 1887 , lj.ll-li.13.
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settled state of affairs with the Apaches.
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Similarly,

during the trouble at Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency in 1885,
the government turned to Captain Jesse M. Lee, who bad ex
perience as an agent in Nevada and at the Spotted Tail Sioux
a
7^
Agency.

Some Army personnel also acted in what they believed
to be the Indians’ best interest by training them as scouts
or soldiers or, in a few cases, by helping to educate their
youth.

Such work, though,was not a general policy, for mili

tary leaders were not unanimous about the value of Indian
troops and usually believed that academic instruction should
be left to civilians.

Incidentally, the latter position did

not represent a change in attitude since the debate over In
dian control; only transfer opponents contended that soldiers
wished to teach the Indians in person.
After 1879, many reformers showed an interest in the
establishment of an Indian army to complement the agency
police system and relieve detachments of regul a r s . ^

This

73

A special situation existed at Hoopa Valley, Cali
fornia. Most of the property of this agency was removed to
Round Valley in the late Seventies, but several hundred
Hoopas and Klamaths chose to remain at Hoopa and requested
military supervision. (CIA, 1 8 8 7 , 8 ).
^She r i d a n to President, July 18, 1885, C.G.L.S.,
NA, RG 108. Lee helped to restore order and promptly moved
the Indians from the vicinity of the agency to other parts of
their reservation where they might raise stock and farm.
(J.D.C, Atkins to Capt. J. M. Lee, September 19, 1885,
I.O.L.B. No. 70, Land Division, NA RG 75).
75

See, for example, Charles Otis to R. B. Eayes. June
12, 1880, I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75.
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movement was encouraged by General Crook's enthusiastic re
ports of yeoman service by organized scouts in operations
against the Apaches.

76

In 188 J4. the Senate Committee on In

dian Affairs unsuccessfully proposed the creation of a transMississippi military academy for Indian youths.

77

General

Sheridan was among the Army spokesmen who attacked this scheme,
arguing that the Indians had not yet reached "that plane in
their evolution” where they could be relied upon for full-time
JO

service.

Nevertheless, Indian auxiliaries were trained and

used in the Division of the Pacific.

General Schofield, the

division commander, advocated an expansion of that program as
a means of strengthening the Army with the ”best natural
soldiers in the world” and encouraging tribes to regard themselves as allies of the government.

79

The outstanding example of academic training by Array
officers, the work of Captain Pratt and General Armstrong,
has already been mentioned.

Pratt's labors, in particular,

were not appreciated by some of his superiors.

He was on

temporary duty away from his unit, the 10th Cavalry, and,upon
requesting assistance from an officer of the 11th Infantry,
he received the following caustic reply from General Sherman:

7 ^Brlg„ Gen, George Crook, "Resume of Operations
Against Apache Indians, 1882 to 1886,” (privately printed,

1886), 5-6, 21-22.

77
'Secretary Lincoln to General of the Army, February
8 , 1881]., H.A.L.R., HA, RG 108.

7 ^Ibld..End.. Sheridan, February 16, 1881]..
79SW, 1885, 131-132.
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You who are absent flatter yourselves that you
are doing work of more importance etc*, whereas the
work a man should do, is that for which he is com
missioned and paid*••*1 am really sorry to find that
you, an army officer, are already so far weaned of
your profession, as to believe the teaching of Indian
children, under & civil bureau of the Government is a
more important and honorable office than to command
men in battle, for the 10th cavalry and 11th Infantry
are today fighting the enemies of civilization*^
Still another way in which the Army indirectly, but
somewhat begrudgingly, assisted Indian education was through
the transfer of military facilities to the Indian Bureau*
In 1882 Congress authorized the Secretary of War to set aside
vacant posts or barracks for Indian schools and to detail one
or more officers to supervise the educational w ork at these
locations* x

The War Department took its time about turning

buildings over to the civil branch, chiefly because many com
manders were leery a bout renewed Indian troubles and re
luctant to part with accommodations which had been built at
considerable cost and effort*

General Sheridan even warned

against plots by Indian inspectors to embarrass the adminis
tration of post commanders and speed the removal of troops*82
Furthermore, few officers were detailed to administer Indian
education at vacated posts for any length of tlme*8^
Sherman to Capt* R.E* Pratt, March 5* 1880, Official
Letters Sent, W*T* Sherman, V* II* For Pratt's defense of his
educational activities, see Eastman, Red Man's Moses, 88*
8l22 Stat* L., 181*
82Sheridan to Sherman, January 17, 1882, I.0*L*R*,
Education, File 1888, NA, RG ?£•
^Consult the list of school personnel for 1887 in CIA,
I 8 8 7 , 322-346*
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Although certain officers were opposed to Army involve
ment in Indian education, the military was not, as a whole,
disinterested in Indian welfare.

This was clearly indicated

in expressions of concern for, especially, the physical well
being of the tribes.

For several reasons, notably Congress1

practice of cutting appropriations and fluctuations in the
price of staples, the agency wards were sometimes without
sufficient food.

Western commanders protested vigorously

about starvation or near starvation at reservations in Indian
Territory and Arizona in 1882 and in Wyoming and Arizona in
l881f.,®^

The bitterest complaints, as in earlier years, were

made by Maj. Gen, John Tope, commander of the Department of
the Missouri,

In April, 1882, when the Cheyennes and Arapa-

hoes were in need of food, Pope denounced the ’’inhuman service”
of forcing them to starve in peace and acted upon his own
85
authority to borrow beef from neighboring herds, ^

A month

later he visited Mescalero Agency in New Mexico and found
conditions "worse than,,,with the Cheyennes,"

86

To evade

regulations against the transfer of supplies from one depart
ment to another, he put troops in "nominal control” of the
Mescaleros as prisoners of war.

Although criticized for

8k
SW, 1882, 97-98; Pope to Sheridan, May 18. 1882,
I.O.L.R., Education, File 9882, NA, RG 75; SW, 188k, 117, 169,
®^Pope to Maj, William Dunn, April 3, 1882, I.O.L.R.,
Education, File 6378 and Pope to Acting A G Williams, April
17, 1882, I.O,L.R., Education, File 78 3 7 , NA, RG 75,
0/
Pope to Sheridan, May 18, 1882, I,0,L.R., Education,
File 9882, NA, RG 75,
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R7
steadfastly defended these measures.
Finally a discussion of the role of the military in
connection with Indian relations in period 1879 to 1887 should
take note of the influence of Army leaders upon Indian policy.
By virtue of their long acquaintance with frontier problems
and contacts with numerous tribes, Generals Sherman, Sheridan,
Crook, Miles Pope, Schofield and others were widely recog
nized as authorities on the Indian problem.

Civil officials

often consulted them in person or by correspondence.

They

were also selected to serve on various special commissions.
For example, Crook and Miles were members of the commission
President Hayes appointed in 1880 to study the condition of
the Poncas.

88

Furthermore, the frontier commanders’ annual

reports usually included comments and recommendations on
Indian affairs which were considered, although not always
favorably, by legislators and policy-makers.

89

While the opinions of Army spokesmen differed, many
supported the same changes in Indian policy advocated by
civilian reform groups.

For instance, General Crook dis

cussed the need for criminal laws for the Indians and noted
the Hhappy results” of trial by Indian juries .^ 0

Generals

8^Pope to Acting AG Williams, June 28, 1882, I.O.L.R.,
Education, File 12502 and Pope to Teller, April 27, 1882,
I.O.L.E., Education, File 8873, NA, RG 7 5 .
QQ

Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 30. lj.6 th Cong., 3 sess (Serial

191+1), l8HoT
89sw, 1879 -1 8 8 7 , passim.
90SW, 1 8 8 3 , 166-167; SW, 18814., 132-133*
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Miles and Schofield pointed out the benefits of practical,
industrial education for young tribesmen.

91

On questions

concerning Indian lands, military views ranged from General
Pope’s argument for abandoning the frontier reservations and
removing the Indians to the East to the contention of several
officers that the reservations should be retained, but re92
duced and allotted to the Indians in severalty.
General
Sheridan was one of the leading exponents of allotments, and
his scheme for half-section holdings by each family was one
of the alternatives considered by Congress in the debate which
led to the adoption of the Dawes Act,

93

LINGERING PROBLEMS
The Army's participation in the government’s program
of reforming the Indians, together with the passing of the
major Indian wars and decline of the transfer issue, contri
buted toward a gradual improvement in civil-military relations.
Inter-departmental disagreements became less common.

Fewer

agents complained of Army interference, while a growing num
ber expressed gratitude for the "courtesy and assistance”

91SW, 1885, 132; SW, 1886, 171}.. Miles published
various articles on military-Indian relations. See "Indian
Problem," North American Review. CXXVIII (March, 1879), 301}.311}.; "Our EElitary Past and Future," Atlantic Monthly,
(November, 1869), 561-575*

92sw, 1881 , 123; SW, 18 8 3 , 62, 131, 153-151}-.
93SW, 1885, 62; SW, 1886, 76-77; The Nation.XVII
(March 11, 1886), 215-216.
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of post commanders and their

„

gentlemanly subordinates.

9k

Some even paid special tribute to troops for helping to elevate
their wards.

”No one of practical experience on the frontier,”

the Pine Ridge agent asserted, ”can deny the fact that the
military have exercised and are exercising an important part
*95
in civilizing these people."
Unfortunately, though, the old problem of divided
authority continued to encumber Indian affairs in the 1880's.
Somewhat reluctantly, military leaders acceded to the govern
ment's decision to leave the general supervision of the tribes
in the hands of the Interior Department.

”It may be that the

Army can better manage these ^fontanaj Indians,” General
Sherman remarked to General Sheridan in 1879, ”but that is
not our province to decide.

The law places them under the

custody and management of Civil Agents, and it is our duty
to submit.

*96

But it was easier to advocate harmony and

cooperation than to practice it.There were still

two sets

of officials acting upon some of the same Indians, with re
sultant differences of opinion about the procedures to follow
with especially, the less advanced red men.
Rivalry between War and Interior authorities was
evidenced, first, by bickering over sundry matters.

One

9^"CIA, 1881- 99, 103; CIA, 1882, 69, 105, 112, 125;
CIA, 1885, 152; CIA, 1886, 262.
9^CIA, 1879, 38.
96

End., Sherman, Schurz to Secretary of War, January
11, 1879, AGO L.R., Pile 7^33, NA, RG 95*
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source of irritation was the question of how to dispose of
Indian prisoners.

The Indian Bureau declared that it lacked

the facilities to handle tribesmen arrested for criminal
activities.

The military, on the other hand, complained of

having to transport, guard and care for such Indians, parti
cularly because the Bureau so often ordered their release in
a comparatively short time.

In 1379, when Commissioner Hayt

requested the Army to send some prisoners from Oregon to a
military prison in Florida, Sherman called the proposal
n

worse than a farce.

*»97

Hayt finally agreed to confine them

in Oregon.
Spokesmen of the two branches sparred verbally, too,
over the Indians’ moral status.

Agents continued to condemn

nearby detachments for debasing Indian women.

99

Meantime,

Army leaders found fault with the religious and moral train
ing carried on at the agencies.

Sherman, a Catholic, was

dismayed by the policy of barring the Catholic or other faiths
from certain places.

But, he lamented, the Indian Bureau was

so "jealous" of the Array that it would do no good to make sug•

gestions on this score.

100

General 0. B. Willcox, moreover, denounced the Indian

*^End., Sherman, March 5, 1879, E&M, Vol. I.
98

Hayt to Secretary of the Interior, April 3, 1879,
I.O.R.B. No. 32, NA, RG 75 o
" C I A , 1883, lOij..
■^^Sherman to Rt. Reverend Bishop Lamy, March 28, 1879,
Official Letters Sent, W, T. Sherman, Vol. VII.
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system for failing to inspire virtue and sobriety among the
Arizona red men.

"As the French railroads push down into

Algeria," he reflected, "the wandering natives of the desert
settle around the wells and plant date trees.

Here they come

to squat and drink whisky."'*’0'*’
At times ostensibly trivial matters became the cause
of great contention.

Such was the case with a heated dispute

over the use of reservation timber by garrisons stationed
near the agencies to protect and discipline the tribes.

In

l88l, after numerous complaints by the agents, Commissioner
Price submitted a "serious protest" against the Army's "reckless consumption" of wood.

102

The following year, he alleged

that the Indians' timber was being wasted at ten posts and
camps.

103

At first, War Department officials tried to belittle

these charges, inferring that they represented the height of
ingratitude for military assistance.

Eventually, though,

orders were issued for the conservation of woodlands in various
districts
Still other misunderstandings arose over the problem
of determining who was to give orders in a given circumstance
and what responsibilities subordinates of one branch had toward

101SW, 1879, 165.
102CIA, 1881, XXX.
^°^Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 161. I}-7th Cong., 1 seas. (Serial
1991), 18827"
^■^■Miscellaneous correspondence, AGO L.R., File 2292,
NA, RG 9i^.
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the officers of the other*

Military authorities were some

times rankled, for instance, by the Indian administrators*
failure to keep them informed on the condition and tempera
ment of the Indiana*10^

General Pope reiterated his familiar

censure of the ’’anomolous” position in which soldiers were
placed*

Troops were held accountable for the behavior of

reservation residents, he grumbled, but could not act without
invitation from an agent*

106

Conversely, some agents were

uncertain of their relationship to high-ranking Army officers,
who at times attempted to give them directions*

”No officer

of the Army,” Commissioner J*D.C* Atkins assured the Colville
agent in l 88 £, Bno matter what his rank may be, has any
authority to give you orders...except /sic *7 they are received
by you through this Office and Department*
Competition between the civil and military departments
was indicated, further, by prolonged and stormy feuds between
certain military commanders and Indian officials.

Such a quar

rel developed between Lt* Col* w.P. Carlin, commander of Port
Yates, Dakota Territory, and J.A* Stephan, agent at Standing
Rock.

Carlin began a private campaign against the Indian

Bureau in 1876 by violating current inter-departmental agree
ments in various ways.

He held ex parte councils with the

10 ^End., Sherman, May 20, 1879 , E&M, Vol. I.
10^Pope to Acting AG, Div. Mo., October 11, 1880,
D.I.L.R., War Department, Indian Division, HA, RG 75*
107

Atkins to S.P* Moore, November 2ij., 1885, I.O.L.B.
No* 118, Finance, NA, RG 75*
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Sioux and Crows, gave them hunting passes and invited them to
"Inft

"dances" at the post against the advice of their agents*
Early in 1880, despite strenuous objections by Stephan and the
Indian Bureau, Carlin again pre-empted control over the In
dians by removing a number of families to the east side of the
Missouri, opposite Standing Rock Agency.

10°

7

Commissioner R. E. Trowbridge asked the Secretary of War
to stop Carlin's meddling.

But the Post commander disregarded

admonitions to respect the authority of Agent Stephans and his
subordinates.

In the fall of 1880, the acting agent reported

still further "subversive" activities by Cajplin.1'1'0

Finally,

after Carlin published an unsubstantiated attack against
several Indian Office employees, General Sherman directed
General Sheridan to take decisive measures.

"The Indian Bu

reau cannot possibly execute Its office," Sherman declared,
"if our Commanding Officers thus cavil at their authority.
Fort Yates must be abandoned, or some other officer sent to
command....

-111

Hiram Price, the new Commissioner, was

anxious to speed Carlin's removal, observing:

108

Hayt to Secretary of the Interior, December 31,
1879, I.O.R.B. No. 35; Carlin to Acting AG, D©pt. of Dakota,
February 19, 1878 and March 23, 1 8 7 8 , I.O.L.R.,; W. T. Hughes
to Secretary Schurz, November 22, 1 8 7 8 , I.O.L.R., NA, RG 75>*
109
R. E, Trowbridge to Secretary of the Interior, March
17, 1880, I.O.R.B. No. 36, NA, RG 75. Carlin maintained that
there were evil influences at the agency.
■^^E. M. Marble to Secretary of the Interior, October

3 0 , 1 8 8 0 , I.O.R.B. No. 37, NA, RG 75.
■^•^Instructions to Sheridan, signed by AG R. C. Drum,
December 8, 1880, I.O.L.R., Education, File 1051, NA, RG 70.
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..♦his /Carlin * s j administration has been more remarkable
than that of any other officer in the service, by reason
of the difficulties created by him, with the Agents, dis
cords among the Indians, and a constant and unwarranted
interference in the affairs of the Indians and the
Agency
Another instance of conflicting authority occurred at
Malheur Reservation in Oregon in the ear?<.y Eighties,

The

military first experienced difficulty with the Malheur In
dians in June, 1 8 7 8 , when some of the Piutes joined the Ban113
nocks then raiding nearby settlements.
At that time troops
occupied the reservation, partly dismantled the agency and
arrested the Malheur residents as "hostiles."

Subsequently,

the Indians were removed, at considerable expense, to Father
Wilbur’s model agency at Yakama Reserve in Washington Terri
tory.^^

Brig. Gen. 0. 0. Howard, the department commander,

was reportedly quite eager to ”break up” the Piutes* old
reservation, while their agent, W. V. Rinehart, agreed that
this step might be in the ”best interests of the service.
But among the red men sent to Yakama were about a hundred
followers of Chief Leggins who had not participated In the
outbreak.

1 l6

As a result, military and civil leaders became

112price
Secretary of the Interior, April 27, 1881,
1.0.R.B. No. 39» NA, RG 7 5 . Not all of Carlin's superiors
criticized his actions. (Terry to Sheridan. May 7, l88l,
1.0.L.R., Education, File 17535, NA, RG 75).
■^•^CIA, 1 8 7 8 , 119-120.

See also preceeding chapter.

13j*-CIA, 1 8 7 8 , 120; CIA, 1879, 129. Wilbur, too, is
mentioned in the foregoing chapter.
^CIA,

1879, 130.

^•^Ibld.; CIA, 1880, ll|0. Leggins and his people, in
fact saved several whites during the outbreak.
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involved in a lengthy argument over what to do with Leggins
and non-reservation remnants of the Piute tribe.
In 1880 the elderly Piute chief, Winnemucca, and bis
daughter, "Princess" Sarah, led a "self-constituted" delegation
on a much publicized visit to Washington, D.C. to ask for
justice for the prisoners and their relatives.

Secretary

Schurz reluctantly agreed that Leggins’ people could return
to Malheur if the non-reservation bands settled there, too.

117

Agent Rinehart pressed for an early end to the Piutes’ "unjust
banishment," but was disappointed.

The scattered bands re

fused to move to the reservation; Agent Wilbur contended that
the Indians were better off at Yakama; citizens of Oregon and
some military officers opposed the removal and, finally, Secretary Schurz changed his mind.

118

Later,

K

Princess

H

Sarah, the

wife of an Army sergeant, enlisted the support of a few mili
tary officers in a bold and almost successful scheme to send a
special "agent" to lead the Piutes back to their old homes,
Before this affair was settled (Malheur Reserve was returned
to the public domain by executive order in May, 1 8 8 3 ), many
derogatory comments had been exchanged between Army and civil
ian authorities.120
Even more overt than the War-Interior differences in

117CIA, 1880, XLVI,
ll8Ibld.: XLVI, lt|.0-llpL.
^ P r i c e to Dolpb, November 28, I 8 8 3 , I.O.L.B. No,
181, Misc., NA, RG 75,
120CIA, 1883,

2 .2 k .
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Dakota and Oregon, however, were those which occurred in Ari
zona in the period 1882 to 1 8 8 6 .

In the latter territory,

dual control was a recognized policy because of intermittent
warfare with the Apaches.

This situation led to numerous

controversies, the most notorious of which involved, on one
hand, General George Crook and his subordinates and, on the
other, the Indian administrators at San Carlos Agency.

Crook

had headed the Department of Arizona and conducted successful
campaigns against the Apaches from 1871 to 1875 and afterwards
commanded the Department of the Platte, where he led troops
in crucial battles with the Sioux.

121

1882, he resumed command in Arizona,

122

Then, in September,
After conferences

with various Apache bands, he issued a general order setting
forth the principles to be followed toward them:

“Justice

to all," "strictest fidelity," "no division of responsibility"
and "strict accountability by each officer."

123

Next, the

veteran commander undertook active operations against the
wandering hostiles, and, within a few months, most were de
feated and located at the large White Mountain reservation in
eastern Arizona.
At first, General Crook and his assistants got along
quite well with Agent P. P. Wilcox, who headed San Carlos, the
■*"2^See Chapter Six.
1220gle, op., cit.. 216.
12 3
^General Order No. I4.3, Hqs, Dept. Arizona- October 5,
1882, cited in Crook, "Operations," 2-3*

12 ^Ibid., I4.; SW, 1 8 8 3 , 163-165*
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White Mountain Agency.

Although Wilcox opposed a daily In

dian roll-call, he agreed to exclusive military control of
camps not in the immediate vicinity of agency headquarters.

125

But in the spring of 1883 , when Crook proposed to bring
Geronimo and his unruly followers to San Carlos, the agent
protested to Secretary Teller.

Thereupon, the department

commander was called to Washington to give account of his
activities.

He defended his policy so well that, on July 7,

officials of the War and Interior departments signed an agree
ment giving the military complete police control over the
Apaches, including those at San Carlos.

126

Agent Wilcox soon took exception to the Army’s sweeping
authority.

He wrangled with Captain Emmet Crawford, the

officer detailed to keep an eye on the agency, over the
management of farming operations and distribution of supplies.
127
He also criticized Crook for bis use of Indian juries.
nThe policy of the Interior Department,” the agent com
plained in February, 1881}., "...is not in harmony with the
practice of the military officer to whom police control of
the Reservation has been entrusted...bis acts and...his
utterances...would deprive the agent of all voice in the
management of Indian affairs....”

in the fall, following

127

Ogle, op,, cit.. 226-227.- Wilcox alleged that an
Indian jury had sentenced a murderer to be clubbed and stoned
to death. (Wilcox to Price, February 9, I 88 I1, I.O.L.R., File
3395, NA, RG 7 5 }.
1280gle, pp. cit., 227-229*
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further clashes over the sale of Indian property and hunting
permits, Wilcox resigned,,

129

The new agent, C. D. Ford, tried to reestablish civil
control, but was not supported by Secretary L.Q.C. Lamar*

130

Ford, too, bemoaned his powerless position, contending that
he was outranked by any secohd lieutenant who was backed by
the Army "calaboose."1^

Meantime, Crook waged relentless war

on the Apaches who refused to live at peace on the reservations
and persisted in his demand for undivided authority*

Army

officers should manage ration issues and discipline the tribes
men, he argued, for it was said, ttthe hand that feeds should

132

punish.”

Upon leaving Arizona, in 1886, he published a

defense of his administration, noting the obstacles and "ad
verse elements" which had to be overcome.

One of the major

hindrances, Crook concluded, was the "more or less open and
always covert opposition from the Indian Department.

«133

Thus, more than two decades after the civil War, a
veteran of many years of service in the West testified to the
lingering difficulty of dual authority over the Indians.

129

As

Ogle, o£. cit., 227-229.

^■^^Lamar to Secretary of W ar, January 31, 1885, D.I.L.S,,
Indian Division, NA, RG 75*
131
Cited in Acting Commissioner A. B, Upshaw to Secre
tary of the Interior, August 6, 1885, D.I.L.R., Misc., NA,
RG 7 5 .

132

Crook to AG, Div. Pacific, June 5, 1885, Crook Papers.
Crook discusses the problems of dual control at length in SW,
1885, 170-178.
Crook, "Operations," 5*
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long as th© red men were not amenable to civil lawa and were
acted upon by both the War and Interior departments, their ad
ministration was confused and obstructed by jurisdictional
disputes.

But these circumstances were being changed.

The

Indian frontier and th© day of tribal resistance to the govern
ment were drawing to a close; the Army was beginning to with
draw from some of its outposts and the Indians1 way of life
was being reformed.

Once the Indian race was "out of reach of

civilization," President Cleveland commented in his annual
message for 1 8 8 6 , but now "barbarism," long fostered by a
"defective system of control," was yielding to the march of
progress*

13|i

As the President spoke, Congress was in the

process of devising legislation which would revolutionize the
reservation system and the Indians1 legal status.

I 3I4.

Richardson, Messages. V I I I , £ l 8 .
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CHAPTER NINE

1887:

THE DOOR HAS BEEN OPENED

..♦the door has been opened through which every
individual Indian by proper effort may pass from the
savage life to the enjoyment of the fruits and privi
leges of civilization....The way thus opened, however,
will not be without its difficulties, its tedious pro
gress, its slow success, its sufferings, disappoint
ments, and failures„ It will be wholly unknown to many
of them, and few will be able to pursue the journey
alone and unaided.
(Secretary L.Q.C, Lamar.
November 1, 1887)

Probably many Americans would be unimpressed by the
announcement that 1962 is the seventy-fifth anniversary of
the Dawes Severalty Act, which has been called "America’s
first systematic effort to provide for Indian welfare.

nl

While some were also indifferent toward this measure in 1 8 8 7 ,
others, notably those involved in Indian administration, were
convinced that, for better or worse, it marked the beginning
of a new era in Indian affairs.

Eventually the Dawes Act,

too, was to give way to legislation charting a different
course in Indian policy.

Yet, its adoption coincided with

the decline of inter-departmental control of the tribes and,
therefore, serves as an appropriate concluding point for the
present study.

A brief comment on the origin and effects of

the severalty policy will be followed by a summarization and

■^Priest, on, cit.. 2^2.
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evaluation of the significance of War-Interior supervision
of the Indians in the period l86f?-l887*

THE DAWES ACT AND ITS EFFECTS
The Dawes Act, approved February 8, 1 8 8 7 , was a mile
stone in government-Indian relations.

It empowered the

President, at his discretion, to order the division of the
lands of most tribes, alloting one hundred and sixty acres
to the heads of families, eighty acres to orphans and single
persons over eighteen and forty acres to single persons under
eighteen, with double these amounts if the land was suitable
only for grazing.

To prevent the recipients from rapidly

disposing of their plots, titles were to be placed in trust
for at least twenty-five years.

Surplus lands were to be

sold, and the proceeds held by the Treasury for the education
and civilization of the tribe concerned.

Finally, as the

tribesmen accepted allotments or voluntarily established a
a separate residence and lived in a civilized manner, they
were to obtain the rights of citizenship.

2

These provisions had a marked effect upon the status
of the Indian and the government’s role in Indian affairs.
For many red men, private ownership was substituted for their

2

Stat, L,, 388-391• The Dawes Act did not affect
various tribes living in Indian Territory, New York or in
Nebraska along the southern boundary of the Sioux Reserva
tion, In case a tribe’s lands did not suffice for such
allotments, lesser amounts were pro-rated to members of the
tribe.
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time-honored system of communal land-bolding, a basic aspect
of tribal relations.

For the first time, too, a large pro

portion of the Indians were eligible to enjoy constitutional
privileges formerly extended to but a small fraction of their
race.

At the same time, the problematic reservation system

was subject to revision, with corresponding changes in the
administrative duties of the civil and military departments.
Although all reserved areas were not to be eliminated, those
which remained were to be smaller and easier to manage.
Yet, the provision for allotment in severalty was an
innovation only in scope, for, as was noted in the last
chapter, tribes had individual land ownership long before
1887,

Likewise, the notion that a general allotment program

might solve the Indian problem was not new, although it was
not seriously considered in Congress until the Eighties,

The

first, and perhaps most comprehensive, congressional debate
on the subject came in 1 8 8 0 , when a bill proposing severalty
3
for the Utes of Colorado was submitted for approval.
In a discussion which followed, neither party nor sec
tional lines, a variety of arguments were offered for and
against the TJte proposal.

Critics spoke of the Indians’

^Priest, o|>. cit,. 188-189* This bill was proposed to
implement an agreement made with the Utes after their out
break In the fall of 1879.
(CIA, 1879, XVIII-XXXVII; CIA,
1880, XXIV-XXV, 193-198), Among the earlier advocates of
severalty were Bishop Henry Whipple, Senator William M.
Stewart of Nevada, Representative Sidney Clarke of Kansas,
Commissioner J, Q. Smith, members of the Board of Indian Com
missioners and Society of Friends and, notably, Secretary of
the Interior Carl Schurz.
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unpreparedness for private ownership, the probability that
white neighbors would deprive them of their holdings, the
social disruption which might result from such inter-racial
economic equality and the ultimate danger of Indian extinc
tion.

Proponents described the bill as an alternative to war,

a permanent solution to the Ute problem, a means of protect
ing the Indians, a formal recognition of an inevitable change
in native customs and a basis for promoting white expansion
in Colorado.^- After the pros and cons were considered, Con
gress approved the measure, mainly because many legislators
c

felt that It was a panacea or necessity*
Oddly enough, Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts,
chairman of the Senate Indian Committee and author of the
severalty act of 1887, was among those who took exception to
the Ute bill.

Dawes had expressed an interest in allotments

almost a decade earlier while serving in the House, but be
lieved that the Utes were not sufficiently educated to benefit
from private property.^*

During the next few years, he

gradually shifted his position, but only after careful study
of the Indians' conditions and needs.
Meanwhile, Representative Alfred M. Scales of North

^Cong. Record. 46 th Cong., 2 sess., X, 2027ffi Priest,
on* cit., 189-193.
$

Priest, jog. cit.. 191*
^Ibid.. 193-195; Cong. Record. 46th Cong., 2 sess. X,
2130 and 4 6 th Cong., 3 sess,, Xl, 9 4 6 ; H. L. Dawes to H. M,
Teller, September 19» 1882, Dawes Papers.
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Carolina, Senator Richard Coke of Texas and others sponsored
general severalty bills which received committee approval but
failed to reach a final vote.

7

Characteristic of the views

presented in debates on these proposals were those set forth
in a divided report by the House Indian Committee in 1880*
The majority, in supporting a bill introduced by the chairman,
Scales, maintained that severalty was "imperative," because
it would stimulate the Indians to work, become self-reliant
g
and obtain a practical knowledge of the laws of property.
But the minority condemned the bill as the hobby of "specula
tive philanthropists," declaring that the Indian would remain
a "communist" whether he had a quarter-sectlon or not.

They

also stressed the contradiction of assuming that the Indian
was a competent citizen with respect to property but a "ward
in chancery" in other respects.

In conclusion, the dissenters

warned:
The sting of this animal is in its tall. When the
Indian has got his allotments, the rest of his land is
to be put up to the highest bidder, and he is to be
surrounded in his allotments with a wall of fire, a
cordon of white settlements, which will gradually but
surely hem him in, circumscribe him, and eventually
crowd him out,9
Cognizant of these criticisms, Senator Dawes worked on
a bill which would be practical and just for both the Indians
and frontiersmen.

His measure first passed the Senate in

"^Priest, op,, cit,, 185-186,
^HR Rpt No, 1576. lj.6th Cong., 2 sess. (Serial 1938),

1880, 6,

9I b i d „

7-10.
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February, 1866 , and, two months later, was endorsed by the
in
House Indian Committee,'’'' Subsequently, however, there was a
lengthy delay as conference committees considered various
amendments and questions about virtually every phase of the
proposal.

The conferees debated over who should choose the

allotments, when and where the choice should be made, what to
do with the income from land sales and how long the assigned
lands should be inalienable.^

So many compromises were made

that even Dawes had misgivings about the measure which
finally received the President's signature.

More Indians

were covered by the citizenship provision that he had intended,
the red men had no guarantee of getting good land and many
important matters were delegated to those who administered
the A c t , ^
For the most part, though, the Dawes Act was Initially
heralded as enlightened reform.

Many of the Indians' friends

were elated and began to laud Dawes as the savior of the red
race even before the bill was signed,

"Your Bill," wrote

Clinton B. Fisk, chairman of the Board of Indian Commissionera, "is the star in the East for the Indian Tribes,"

1886,

13

•^HR Rpt No, 1835, l*.9th Cong,, 1 sess, (Serial 2i|i|0 ),

Priest, 0£. cit,. 212-213, 228-229, 233-231*., Iron
ically, Lt, Gen. Sheridan backed an alternative plan which
would have given each Indian family twice as large an allot
ment as was finally decided upon. (The Nation, XVII (March

11, 1886), 315- 316.

5

•^BIC, 1886, 131; Priest, op, cit., 232; Dawes to E,
Whittlesey, April 21*., IB 8 7 , B.C.M., NA, RG 75.

13

Clinton Fisk to Dawes, December 21, 1886, Dawes

Papers.
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Captain Pratt, head of Carlisle Indian School, called the
severalty measure "the first enactment of any law looking to
the divorcement of the Indian from the worse than slavery of
bis old Communistic systems.

In bis annual report for

1887, Secretary Lamar termed it the most important Indian law
ever passed.*'’

Finally, a leading lobbyist for the Indian

Rights Association published a eulogy in which the new law
was compared to the Magna Charta and Declaration of Indepen
dence,*^
On the other hand, there were those who criticized the
Severalty Act as being too liberal or too radical, as adding
to the Indian problem rather than solving it.

Some, for example,

especially westerners, objected to the clause which granted
citizenship to Indian allottees, while others, including re
formers such as Professor James B. Thayer of Harvard Law
School, complained that all Indians should have been made
citizens immediately.

17

Objections were raised, too, by some

who disliked the provision which stated that if the Indians
failed to comply with instructions to choose allotments with
in four years from the date of notification, the government
would do it for them,

V

18

s. Pratt to Dawes, December 20, 1886, Dawes Papers,

*£si, 1 8 8 7 , 2 5 ,
*8Charles C, Painter, The Dawes Land in Severalty Bill
and Indian Emancipation (Philadelphia, 1 8 8 7 ), 1*
*?Priest, 0£. cit,. 212-213; J. B. Thayer to Dawes,
May 27, 1886, Dawes Papers,
* 8 2ij. Stat, L,, 3 8 8 ; Priest, o£. cit,, 2Jj.0-2lj.lt
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To the disappointment of those who bad predicted great
results frcm the Severalty Act, it soon became apparent that
it was not the long-awaited panacea for the complex Indian
problem.

Senator Dawes’ uneasiness about the extent to which

its effectiveness depended upon those who executed it was not
unwarranted.

He had hoped that the reform groups which had

championed severalty would exert a salutary influence upon the
Indian administrators, but their ardor soon waned.

19

JThe

pressure for rapid allotment to open new areas for white
settlement proved too great for President Cleveland, Secre
tary Lamar and their successors.

nBefore half a decade had

passed,” one author remarks, "United States officials had
clearly demonstrated that they were either unable or unwilling
to use the Dawes Act for Indian benefit.

20

By 1934* more

than sixty-two percent of the one hundred and thirty-eight
million acres owned by the tribes in 1887 had been alienated.

21

The Indians lost a vast amount of land not only through
land sales but through abuses under the allotment policy.
Whites quickly took advantage of loopholes in the Dawes Act,
leasing allotments at nominal figures; posing as "guardians"

•^Priest, oj3t cit., 250-251; Hagan on. cit.. llj.3*
20Priest, op. cit., 251.

21

Hagan, op. cit., Hj-7. In addition, much of the
allotted land was no longer of practical U3e to the Indians
after a few years because of multiple heirships. In many
cases, the only escape from this problem was to lease the
allotments to whites in the cattle-raising or other businesses.
(John Collier. Indians of the Americas (New York, abridged
edition, 19 5 k ) * 13^; Bluraenthal, op,* cit.. 159).
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for incompetent adults, orphans and childrenj or duping the
red men into designating them as beneficiaries of wills.

In

other cases, the Indians were ruined.by excessive taxation or

22
even

embezzled or murdered for their lands,

"Severalty

may not have civilized the Indian," another scholar concludes
sarcastically, "but it definitely corrupted most of the white
23
men who had any contact with it,"
Thus, although the door
to civilization and full participation in American society was
opened by the legislation of 1 8 8 7 , inter-racial problems,
based upon earlier conflicts, continued to hamper the progress
and welfare of the red man,

RESUME AND CONCLUSIONS
The period from the end of the Civil War to the passage
of the Dawes Severalty Act in February, 1887, was perhaps
the most critical in the history of Indian-white relations.
In these years, white migration compressed and penetrated the
remaining portions of the once vast "Indian country" of the
tr&ns-Miasissippi West, giving new point to the recurrent
question of what to do with the red man.

For the first time,

the government could not "solve" the Indian problem by re
moving the tribes to out-of-the-way places,

A majority of

Hagan, ops cit.. 3J+I4.—li+6,
23
Ibid., U 4.6 , John Collier is even more critical,
describing forced allotment as the culminating assault in an
"all-out offensive against Indian land and society." (Collier,
op. cit., 133-13^.)
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the nation's more than three hundred thousand "wards” lived
in the path of the closing frontier, and among them were
groups with the power and determination to fight for their
lands and freedom.

The latter, in particular, gave urgency to

the administration of Indian affairs.
Official responsibility for Indian relations resided
with the Indian Bureau of the Interior Department, but, for
practical reasons, tbe Army exercised authority over the more
uncivilized tribes.

This tacit division of control was de

plored by many military officials who argued that the Bureau
should have remained with the War Department, where It had
been from its inception in 1821}. until 181j.9,

During tbe hectic

post-war years, the Army and its supporters, most vociferous
in the West, made a concerted effort to restore military
management of the Indians.

As a consequence, not one, but

two, vital and perplexing questions were posed in connection
with the Indians:

what should be done with them and which

branch of the government should carry out the will of the
government?
The difficulties of divided jurisdiction over the
tribes became apparent shortly after Appomattox and lasted at
least until the Eighties.

Initially, the two departments

acted semi-independently to achieve an optimum of peace and
security on the Plains and in the Southwest.

The Army, under

manned and preoccupied in the South, was in no position to
carry on full-scale operations against the hostile tribes
which challenged westward expansion.

Yet its frontier units
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labored to prevent a general war and helped to impress the
Indians with the advisability of living at peace on assigned
reservations.

Meantime, the Interior Department, plagued

by a shortage of funds and a host of organizational difficul
ties, renewed its efforts to pacify the Indians through new
treaties.

Civil and military officials, jealous of their

respective powers and in basic disagreement over whether hos
tile tribes should be dealt with by force or negotiation,
were frequently at odds.
Although Indian administration subsequently underwent
numerous significant reforms —

the abolition of the treaty

system, the selection of church-nominated agency officials,
the creation of the Board of Indian Commissioners and the intro
duction of new business methods —

divided control continued

to complicate and trammel government-Indian relations.

Dis

cord between representatives of the civil and military branches
was so persistent that, even while serving together on the
noted Peace Commission of 1867-1868, they disputed the course
to follow toward, especially, the uncivilized Indians.

Nor

were the policy and administrative issues settled by the "Peace
Policy" of the Seventies, for the military incurred many im
portant, but ill-defined, quasi-civil obligations under this
program of isolating and acculturating the tribes.

In short,

there were controversies between the two branches as long as
their duties overlapped.
Several attempts were made to clarify the respective
responsibilities of Army and civilian officials.

In 1865,
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an informal joint agreement stated that hostile Indians were
to be managed by the Indian Bureau.

This arrangement, however,

left much to be desired, for it was not clear when Army rule
should begin and end, which tribes were "hostile,” or who
should make the final decision In these matters.

Four years

later, both branches issued directives announcing that the
Indians on assigned reservations would be supervised exclu
sively by their civilian agents and those off tribal lands
by the Army.

This scheme was also inadequate because some

tribes had treaties which permitted them to leave the reser
vations to hunt.

In addition, boundary lines were often un

marked, and Indian criminals were able to take advantage of
their immunity from military patrols in reserved areas.
Again, in the Seventies, the division of control was altered in
special cases to permit military pursuit and intervention on
Indian lands.

Still, no precise, legal definition of the

authority of each department was ever established, and con
flicts continued.
Civil-military disharmony obstructed good relations
with the tribes in various ways.

Policies devised in Wash

ington, generally no more effective than the machinery which
executed them, were often compromised or defeated.

The

reservation system, for example, depended upon close coordin
ation and cooperation between the War and Interior departments
to keep the Indians at designated locations and to satisfy
their physical needs, safeguard their interests and protect
them from outside Influences.

Repeatedly, these objectives
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were not realized, and, as a result, the red men were ex
ploited, mistreated or involved in disastrous conflicts with
settlers or the Army*

Although the Indians frequently caused

their own misfortunes, costly wars such as the Modoc War of
1872-1873 could be traced, at least in part, to inter-departmental disunity.

Almost invariably, though, Indian troubles

resulted in mutual recriminations and confusion concerning
the responsibility of those involved.
Recognizing the disadvantages of this two-headed
government, many contemporaries proposed to transfer the Indian
Office to the War Department.

Between 1867 and 1871 and again

between 1876 and 1879, Congress became involved in lengthy
investigations and heated debates over the transfer question^
Transfer advocates, notably military leaders and westerners,
condemned the existing system, contending that It was ex
pensive, inefficient, corrupt and ineffective.
trol, they argued, was the logical alternative.

Military con
The Army

had to police the frontier anyway and had the personnel and
facilities to handle the Indians.

Its superior organization

and supply procedures could provide more dependable service
at lower cost, and the liability of military men to courtmartial assured honest administration.

Finally, the Indians,

who respected only force, would be better behaved and more
content.
Those who opposed military rule, principally Indian
service employees and easterners, presented an equally force
ful case.

Soldiers, they maintained, were a bad influence on
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the Indiana and were unqualified to Christianize and civilize
them.

Atfmy rule was by nature arbitrary and contrary to the

freedoms espoused in the Constitution, and the Indians,
strenuously opposed to military control, were certain to react
against such a change of authority.

It was further argued

that the Indian Bureau was rapidly improving its supply and
business procedures, thereby overcoming any advantages the
military may have had in these respects.

Lastly, War Depart

ment control before I8 I4.9 had not been exemplary; nor had
military administrators distinguished themselves while serving
as agents in the early part of GrantTs administration.
After weighing the strong and emotional arguments pre
sented on each side, Congress decided against military manage
ment of the Indians.

Several factors contributed to the

defeat of transfer proposals at one time or another.

In the

early Seventies, the abolition of the treaty-making system and
President Grant’s apparent support of civilian control pla
cated agitation for the change by members of the House of
Representatives.

After 1876 a final surge by the proponents

of Army rule was blocked by the Republican Senate, the re
forms inspired by Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz, the
staunch opposition of the Indians’ friends, the abatement of
major Indian wars and a general consensus that the military
was not suited to govern the tribes.
By the Eighties, with the transfer issue on the decline,
civil-military relations were beginning to Improve.

The con

test for control of Indian affairs had been too long ond
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vigorous to pass without a few further incidents and disputes,
especially at the local level, but these disagreements were
more than offset by joint efforts to better the condition of
the red man*

Significantly, the annual reports of both de

partments began to devote less attention to the question of
what to do with the Indian and more to the problem of what
could be done for him*

By 1887 even some of the most ardent

former exponents of military management were reconciled to
civilian administration of the Indians*

Thus, when General

Crook proposed to publish a defense of his management of the
Arizona tribes, General Sheridan objected*

"To publish the

letter," he asserted, "would be merely to*•*re-awaken a
discussion in the public press of a subject which now appears
to have passed from their attention*
The evidence of this dissertation has demonstrated,
above all, that the complications of inter-departmental control
had a decisive and, in many respects, negative effect upon
Indian relations in the post-Civil War era*

What was de-

rogatively referred to as the "system" was marked by a con
flict of authority at every echelon*

It was costly, inefficient,

confusing and sometimes produced incidents which had disastrous
consequences for the Indians*

It was, at the same time, an

arrangement dictated by circumstances which seemed to defy
accommodation*
Those who wish to understand the origins and results
^ E n d * , Sheridan, March I4., 1887 , to H.A.L.R., Pile 52ij.*
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of the federal Indian policy in these years must consider the
activities, reports and recommendations of both the civil and
military departments.

Although voluminous, the records of

the Interior Department do not give sufficient attention to
the many quasi-civil functions carried out by the Army of
the West,

Similarly, War Department sources are often in

adequate for the study of military activities in Indian coun
try.

Many a treatise has condemned the Army or the Indian

Bureau, largely because it has been based upon one-3ided
evidence.
In general,the role of the War Department in the
implementation and- indirectly, the formulation of the govern
ment’s Indian program has been underestimated.

Troops not

only suppressed warlike tribes, but policed the reservations,
regulated trade, Inspected supplies and provided temporary
administrative and logistical assistance.

In addition, offi

cers who were well acquainted with the Indians served on
special commissions, testified before Investigating commit
tees, correspondedjwith civilian administrators and influenced
policy-makers through their criticisms and proposals.

Too

many of their suggestions were rejected to warrant tbe conclu
sion that the Army manipulated the Indian service.

Yet there

was more than a coincidental relation between the views of
military spokesmen and the abolition of the treaty system,
the establishment of limited reservations and the introduction
of experiments such as Industrial and military training and
compulsory land allotment.
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An examination of Indian affairs with reference to the
concurrent responsibilities of the civil and military branches
also sheds new light upon various traditional interpretations0
Judged from a moral, social, legal, political, military or
economic standpoint, the relationship between the United States
and its wards has been almost universally repudiated.

Al

though the cliche, nthe Indian was wronged," is supported by
overwhelming evidence, the basis for this situation cannot be
fully appreciated apart from the practical, administrative
aspects of the Indian question.
Perhaps the best Illustration of a view which is revised
by a study of the dual Indian system concerns the much-dis
cussed "Grant Peace Policy,"

The notion that former general

Grant took the lead in humanitarian Indian reforms is mis
leading,

His adoption of the church nomination of agency

officials, for example, was largely a reaction to political
a^nd administrative exigencies which prevented the extensive
use of surplus Army officers as agents.

Likewise, the

assumption that the peace program was a victory of the In
terior Department over the military branch unfairly discounts
the activities of Army leaders who helped to plan and execute
that policy,
A different perspective is gained, too, with regard to
various events.

The Indian wars, "massacres" and scandals

of the Sixties and Seventies have generally been treated as
indications of the unsettled conditions on the frontier and
the government’s failure to find a satisfactory solution to
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the Indian problem*

But these were more than isolated inci

dents, as they commonly resulted in contradictory civil and
military reports, followed by investigations and congressional
debates which determined the future of Indian relations.
Although many of the mistakes of postwar Indian affairs
may be traced to the vague division of authority over the
tribes, the modern critic must not be too categorical in
judging this arrangement.

It is easy, in the first place,

to exaggerate or oversimplify the divergence between the civil
and military departments.

The agents' annual reports, for in

stance, include numerous references to the hearty cooperation
received from post commanders and the progress achieved
through coordinate activities.

Moreover, there was, strictly

speaking, no "Array view” or ncivilian view" on Indian policy.
To be sure, the Indians' friends sometimes generalized that
military men hated the red men and wished to exterminate them.
At the same time, military spokesmen frequently characterized
the Indian agents as simpering sentimentalists or crooks.
But few Americans were more concerned about Indian welfare
A

than officers such as Generals Pope, Howard and Kautz, and
there were many practical-minded, honest and diligent agents,
such as "Father” Wilbur of Yakama Agency, who were unsung
heroes of the Indian service.
Another reason for evaluating the Indian system cir
cumspectly was suggested by former Secretary of the Interior
Jacob D. Cox in a review of Helen Hunt Jackson's A Century
of Dlshono^. a work which condemned the Indian policy and
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military activities prior to tbe Eighties.

"Tbe philanthropist

who would gain the right to rebuke must show a remedy," Cox argued, "and of remedies there has been a plentiful lack...."
Many contemporaries had opinions on how to solve the Indian
question, but few appreciated its complexity.

The Indians,

who seldom spoke English or understood or valued the white
man’s ways, varied considerably in their advancement and dis
position,

Remote from civilized laws and agitated by white

intruders and evil influences, even the progressive tribes
men occasionally caused trouble.

Simple solutions, including

undivided civil or military supervision, could not have been
applied without difficulty.
It is also important to take into account certain fac
tors which complicated Indian management.

In the early part

of the "Republican Era"(1869-1901), marked by reconstruction
of the South,industrialization, partisan politics par excel
lence. the rise of laissez falre thinking and the graft and
corruption of tbe age of "Grantism," maladministration was
commonplace.

26

Meantime, railroad construction, increasing

overland travel and the growing tide of emigration to the
frontier multiplied inter-racial conflicts.

Although the

earlier Negro problem differed from the Indian problem in
scope, in the character and development of the race in ques
tion, and in the economic, constitutional and political stakes

2^The Nation, XXXII (March 3, 1881), l£2.
26
White, op. cit.. Chapter One.
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involved, both dilemmas were compounded by sectionalism and
prejudice*

Finally, it should be noted that the difficulties

of joint administration were enlarged by the absence of or
ganic unity, capable and experienced leadership, and consis
tent, well-established policies in the War and Interior
departments.

Hence, the analyst who indulges in tbe "if’s”

of Indian management in this era, extolling, for example, the
merits of an inter-departmental staff, more precise laws or
long-tenure officials, is confronted with less amendable
factors such as the American political system, human nature
and the climate of opinion*
Many who examine Nineteenth Century Indian relations
are primarily interested in the lessons which may be found
for modern problems concerning minority peoples and the socalled under-developed nations.

Difficulties in respect to

social integration, economic opportunity and political parti
cipation are a common denominator in these cases.

Indeed,

some have found consolation in the fact that other nations,
such as Japan, Canada and Australia have had frustrations
in dealing with subject races similar to those this country
27
has undergone with tbe Indian,
The writer would stress,
however, that the uniqueness of post-Civil War circumstances
and the many difficulties of the government’s Indian policy
in that period limit the vaiue of these experiences as a guide
for the present.

MWhat has been dons in the past is of no use,

2?Hagan, 0£. cit., 170.
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Senator Dawes cautioned after studying Indian affairs for many
years, "except to teach us that something different is needed
in the future,"2®
Even negative lessons may be helpful, though, if they
are learned well.

Certainly the headaches of the inter

departmental system revealed the need for unified Indian
administration.

By the turn of the century, the War Depart

ment was, for all intents and purposes, no longer involved in
Indian affairs.

The shift to undivided civilian 'management,

however, was the result of the exigencies of the SpanishAmerican War and improved relations with the tribes, not the
government's conclusion that the change would benefit the
Indian service.
Developments during tbe period of divided control also
indicated the need for a consistent, but flexible, and strictly
enforced policy; competent, well-informed leaders; and prompt,
adequate financial support.

Unfortunately, the government

has continued to vacillate In its Indian program.

In the

Thirties, for example, stress was placed upon the conserva
tion and restoration of tribal lands; during the Fifties the
emphasis was on "terminating" government trusteeship over re
served lands; and under the present administration tbe policy
is again the "greater development of the human and natural
resources on Indian reservations.

29

As a result of civil

2®Quoted in William Barrows, The Indians' Glde of the
Indian Question (Boston, 1 8 8 7 ), 1 3 2 ,

29 Ibid., 155-162; Collier, o£. cit., I51*-l59; SI, 1961,
277-278.
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service reforms since the passage of the Pendleton Act of

1 8 8 3 , more competent and responsive Indian officials have
been appointed.

In place of the untrained agency staffs

once chosen on.the basis of availability or political or
religious affiliation, the Indian Bureau now employs trained
civil servants known as guidance counselors, social workers,
legal advisors, conservationists and the likea^O

in addition,

Congress now appropriates much more monsy for the Indian
service than in former years*31
Although the circumstances of Indian-white relations have
changed substantially in the seventy-five years since the
passage of the Dawes Severalty Act, the Indian question
persists.

In many places the Indians, a growing, very diverse

minority people, now numbering more than a half million, have
not yet achieved the social, political, legal and economic
equality which are recognized as basic to our democratic
system.

The Indian problem remains complex, but, like most

problems, it is more likely to be solved if its origins and
complications are understood.

3 °SI, 1961, 286ff.
3^\Even in inflated times, the 1961 appropriation of nearly
one hundred and twenty-seven million dollars for the Indian
service represents a marked Increase over the four to six
million provided in the l8 7 0 's.
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appendix

Key to Abbreviations

in Footnotes

In addition to standard footnote abbreviations,
the following have been used:
AGO L.R.

Letters Received,
Office.

Adjutant G e n e r a l ’s

A&N Jnl

Army and Navy J o u r n a l .

B.C.

Correspondence, Board of Indian
Commissioners.

B.C.M.

Miscellaneous Correspondence,
of Indian Commissioners.

3IC

port of
oi the Board of Indian
Annual Report
Commiss i o n e r s .

P..L.3.

Letters, Sent,

C.GoL.S.

Letters Sent, Commanding General of the

CIA

Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs.

Board

Board of Indian Commissioners.

D i e t . Am. B i o g .

Dictionary of American 3 1 o g r a p h y .

xJ.I.A.F.

Appointment File, Department of the
Interior.

Army.

D.I.L.R.

Letters Received, Department of the
Interior.

D.I. Register

Department of the Interior R e g i s t e r .

D.I.L.S.

Letters Sent, Department of the Interior.

Div. Miss.' L.S.

Letters Sent,

Div. Mo.

L.R.

Letters Received, Division of

the Missouri,

Div. Mo.

L.S.

Letters Sent,

Missouri.

E&M.

Division of the

Division of the

Mississippi.

Endorsements and Memoranda (Philip H.
Sheridan and VJilliam T. S herman Papers).
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H •A •L •S •

Letters Sent, Headquarters

IIP. E x . Doc.

House of Representat Ives Executive
Document.

HR M s c .

House of RepresentatIves Miscellaneous
Document'.

Doc.

of the Army.

HR R p t .

House of Representatives R e p o r t .

1.0.L.R.

Letters Received,
Affairs.

1.0.L.o.

Record of Letters Sent,
Indian Affairs.

1.0.R.B.

Report Book, Office of Indian Affairs.

J •C •C •

Journals of the Continental C o n g r e s s .

NA, RC-

National Archives,

SI

Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Inte r i o r .

sw

Annual Report of the Secretary of War.

3.W.L.R.

Letters Received,
of War.

S .W .L .S .

Letters Sent,
War.

S e n > Ex. D o c .

Senate E x e cutive D o c u m e n t .

Office of Indian

Office of

Record Group.

Office of the Secretary

Office of the Secretary of

S e n . M i s c . D o c . Senate Miscellaneous D o c u m e n t .
Sen. Rpt.

Senate R e p o r t .

Stat. L.

United States Statutes at L a r g e .
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